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ABSTRACT 
 
PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING INCULTURATED THEOLOGY IN THE 
DIVERSE AFRICAN CONTEXT: STEPS BEYOND TRADITIONAL HERITAGES 
 
 
 
By 
Sr. Jane Catherine Hagaba 
December 2009 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Marie Baird: 
This dissertation critically examines the foundational significance of Christ for 
contextual theologies in the African Catholic Church. It begins with a presentation of 
Benezet Bujo’s approach and contextual methodology. As a critical study, this 
dissertation is premised on the principle that the object of Christianity is the 
transformation of peoples and their societies. Therefore, the study examines the ways in 
which African societies founded on an immutable principle of blood kinship can open to 
the Christian faith and to the globalizing world today. The dissertation grapples with this 
issue to unravel the weaknesses and limitations of African theologies of inculturation. 
The paper argues on the basis of empirical evidence and Vatican Council II teaching, and 
in view of a sound inculturation, that the primary root of the present cultural and human 
crisis on the African Continent is rooted in the diverse anthropologies and ontologies.  
 v
The paper, in turn, appeals to theological anthropology in contemporary Catholic 
theological thought to discern the essential working principles and practical guidelines 
for contextual theological methodology. A major principle in this quest for a sound 
methodology is the meaning of Jesus of Nazareth for humanity in diversely constituted 
cultural settings. Having recognized Christology as a theological and anthropological 
principle, the dissertation brings out the Christian significance of the (traditional) 
Western social system for diverse cultures in Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Second Vatican Council and post-conciliar teaching affirms the “‘validity’ of 
global and diverse cultural experiences.”1  This outlook has presently produced the 
positive effect of using African cultures as necessary immediate contexts in which to 
reflect on the meaning of Christ for Africa.  An inappropriate trend, however, continues 
to mark developments in theological thought under the umbrella of African theology. The 
primary agenda of the majority of African theologians is to provide a positive 
interpretation of African cultures while challenging the negative colonial as well as the 
missionaries’ attitudes toward African cultures. That said, the legitimate intent to provide 
valid interpretation of African cultures consists mainly in idealizing the traditional 
African cultures. There are three end results of this theological scenario.  First, African 
theologians tend to lose sight of the bigger question concerning the “meaning of Christ” 
for Africa in the many matrixes of cultural idealization.  Second, there is a prevalent lack 
of critical contextual theologies to facilitate genuine understanding of the traditional 
cultures vis-à-vis the contemporary African reality. Finally, contextual theologians have, 
to date, not been able to put forward a theological method that is at once conducive to the 
diverse African cultural context, and one that is consistent with the Vatican Council II 
theology of the church and its mission.  Given these general but important factors, this 
study has the task, as one of its working objectives, to locate its starting point for 
theological reflection on the African reality. Representative voices within Africa, such as 
Benezet Bujo, John Pobee and others offer this study a relevant starting point.   
John Pobee’s theological assumptions get to the heart of what is fundamentally 
wrong with contextual theologies and inculturation in the African ecclesial milieus.   He, 
 2
for instance, argues that “in the biblical faith, Christology was expressed in very 
functional terms…in terms of his activity.”  He goes on to add that the “tendency to 
discuss Christology in terms of…metaphysical speculation” is a Western tendency, a 
theological posture that is “terribly [ineffective] in Africa.”  Whether Pobee realizes it or 
not; he is indicating, and rightly so, that the element of “faith seeking (further) 
understanding,” i.e., by means of reason, does not lie within the ambit of the traditional 
African cultural and religious experiences.  And in complete contrast with Post-Conciliar 
theology such as that found in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, Pobee is also clearly 
indicating that the fundamental question of “being” vis-à-vis the “being of beings” does 
not constitute the subject matter for contextual theologies and inculturation. Thus far 
Pobee is consistent with the general failure in African theology to recognize ontology as a 
necessary subject matter for contextualization and inculturation.  Hence, as contribution 
to, and in utter contrast with existing theologies in Africa, this study strives to show that 
Africa advances multiple anthropologies and ontologies that give rise to a variety of 
human natures.  This is the basic cause of all sorts of conflicts on the African Continent.  
So, the current task for this study is to show that Christ is the only meaningful and lasting 
solution to the African human and cultural dilemma, because he offers a unified concept 
of a human being and of human nature, to say nothing of a universal structure of 
redemption.  In sum, these statements comprise the central subject matter of this 
dissertation. 
The present topic of study, Principles for Developing Inculturated Theology in the 
Diverse African Context: Steps beyond Traditional Heritages sums up the end goal of this 
study. In its basic substance, the topic speaks to the rationale of grounding contextual 
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theologies in Christology proper as opposed to ancestral Christology or world views. 
Given the basic character of Christology, the fundamental opposition this study perceives 
between Christology and ancestrology presupposes a thesis that recognizes the basic and 
anthropological ontological assumptions underlying the traditional and diverse African 
religions. Such a thesis in turn requires a clear grasp of the African cultural reality today.  
Hence, the thesis of this dissertation developed out of the realization that African cultures 
are in a period of critical transition from a traditional way of life to a somewhat 
indeterminable cultural reality and as such, present a very complex challenge to the 
church’s evangelizing mission.  The colonial impact signaled a cultural transition from 
exclusively traditional cultures that revolved around tribal self-determination to national 
cultures encompassing different ethnic groups.  This colonial political venture left a 
lasting mark on African cultures without transforming the diverse African traditional 
consciousness.  Though relevant to the economic and political dynamics of the present 
world, a national culture was introduced in Africa arbitrarily to the extent that African 
traditional mindsets have never truly adapted well to the Western social system.  As a 
result, there are two socio-political trajectories in the African continental cultures.  There 
are Western-based national socio-economic and political dynamics, and the traditional 
cultural dynamics, all affected by a larger globalization. These competing dynamics have 
never been synchronized, and there is no indication that they are in the process of being 
harmonized.     
Furthermore, the political enthusiasm and euphoria that marked Africa’s post 
colonial road to independence seem to be relegated to the remote past.  Though happy to 
be rid of the colonial presence, few today could relate to the optimism of post colonial 
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Africa.  Most Africans have only witnessed political and economic strategies emerge and 
disappear without a single trace, and foreign assistance obtained without long range 
results.  Consequently, contemporary Africa reels with endemic economic 
underdevelopment and poverty, hunger and disease, rampant political unrest, population 
explosions partly fanned by a refugee problem, rapid environmental degradation, swift 
cultural changes, and the breakdown of the traditional cultural moral fiber.  Diverse 
cultural expressions further complicate the matter, because variations in culture allow for 
varied experiences and often conflicting cultural responses to common national issues.   
In the light of this background, this dissertation maintains that  
• Africa is in a human and cultural crisis that is rooted in the enduring complex 
experience of cultural diversity that is at once tribal and national.  
• A genuine and lasting response to the current human crisis and the 
rejuvenation of cultural life that is truly African and truly responsive to 
existing global dynamics that affect Africa in myriad ways depends on how 
the Catholic Church of Africa and African governments deal with the issue of 
manifold diversity. 
• With the onslaught of the hegemony of the European colonizers, traditional 
cultural diversity was expressed in the artificially created national cultures.  
The result has become the norm in Africa today with its myriad problems.  
Therefore, the thesis of this study is: The current cultural African context (with the local 
and global realities intertwined) and its many forms of conflict must be addressed in any 
African theology of inculturation today.  This is essential if local African theologies are 
to be developed in ways that extend beyond the romantic fixation on ancestral experience 
at the expense of addressing the complexities of contemporary Africa.  An inculturated 
African theology must address the signs of the time as they exist and bring the Gospel to 
bear on them (cf. GS, no. 4).  This thesis does not advocate the complete abandonment of 
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the African ancestors and their religiosity and values, but rather proposes that their true 
substance be understood before African cultures can truly become valid sources for 
mission theologies.  
 It is, therefore, the primary objective of this study as a whole to re-affirm that 
Jesus Christ, the Word incarnate, as the foundation of theology constitutes a basic 
principle for a contextual theology that is at once Christian and Catholic.  The nature of 
the incarnation implies that inculturation cannot take place without regard for cultural 
anthropologies. In light of anthropological considerations, therefore, the study concerns 
itself with matters of basic principle.  These dictate a “structural analysis” as the main 
method of study.  Following the same method, the five chapters generally strive to show 
that ancestor-based Christological propositions are not grounded in the sound 
understanding of the basic philosophical and theological principles called forth by 
inculturation. Hence and essential to the primary objective is the recognition that diverse 
traditional cultural experiences in Africa impact the perception and interpretation of the 
existential reality.  The result is the existing diverse cultural philosophies of a person, of 
human nature and of existence.  In such a diversely constituted ontological context, it 
becomes imperative to understand the primary principle and the philosophies that hold 
everything together-both generally and specifically.  For only then can a contextual 
theology proceed with a clear understanding of the primacy of Jesus Christ in Catholic 
theology as a whole. The above central subject and subject matter are broken down into 
specific working objectives comprising five chapters. 
 The specific and working objective of Chapter 1 is to portray the “basic direction 
and internal consistency” of what is commonly known as African theology (in the 
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singular).  The chapter raises many questions relevant to the thesis, the central being 
whether a theology that is founded on the ancestors would lead the church’s mission to 
the same end as one that is grounded in Jesus Christ.  The above objective is 
accomplished by means of critical analysis of a representative contextual theological 
proposal by Benezet Bujo.2  He offers a relevant context for comprehending the “majority 
voice” in African theology.  All theological works cited in this chapter are in turn 
evaluated against the Africa Synod (1994), relative to John Paul II’s encyclical known as 
Ecclesia in Africa and Its Evangelizing Mission Towards the Year 2000. 
 Situated in the context of the current globalizing scene and in response to Chapter 
I, the aim of Chapter II is to bring out the “formative principles” of the traditional but 
diverse African world views.  This is essential to a sound understanding of African 
anthropologies and ontologies.  A detailed analysis of the “general and the particular” 
African ontologies serve the purpose of opening sound avenues for contextual theologies 
to consider how “faith and reason” are structured in the African world views.  It is on the 
account of the aforementioned structure that this study maintains that, founding a 
contextual theology on ancestral Christology would not yield the result intended by 
Catholic mission theology.  Chapter II employs the concept of culture as a tool of social 
analysis to realize its specific and general objectives. Of significance to both objectives is 
the African theological view of culture vis-à-vis the one put forward by the Second 
Vatican Council. The substance of Chapters I and II is essential for a good grasp of the 
Christological and anthropological concerns in Chapter III. 
 In response to central concerns in Chapters I and II, Chapter III strives to show 
that Christology is at once a theological and anthropological principle, and on the basis 
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of which the study brings out the essential relationship between African traditional 
cultures and Western culture per se.  This chapter is the heart of the entire dissertation, 
because the formulation of working principles for an inculturated theology in Africa, 
presented in Chapter IV & V, are grounded in the understanding that the Christ event 
speaks in philosophical (or anthropological) and theological terms.  On the basis of the 
same terms, Chapter V proposes the theological concept of “gathering” as a fitting image 
of the self-understanding of African Catholic Church. It is important that all the elements 
presented in this study (and many more to be discerned else where) are in place before 
contextualization can begin, but precede inculturation. 
In conclusion, Chapter V and as a continuation of Chapter IV maintains that the 
Catholic Church can only “gather” the peoples of Africa in their historical diversity if 
contextual theologies are grounded in Christology as the foundation of Christian theology 
and mission.  The principle for gathering all that is good in human experience is 
articulated in Chapter III, and on account of its substantive content, the study as a whole 
arrives at the following conclusion. Ancestors offer a starting point for theological 
reflection insofar as they indicate the basic structure on which cultures and diverse 
philosophies are crafted. Beyond that, ancestors or the values they propagate, however 
valid their cause, do not redeem us by themselves.  
 
CHAPTER I: THE CONCEPT OF AFRICAN THEOLOGY 
 Introduction: A Critical Analysis of Ancestral Theological Perspective  
Incarnating Christianity is important in every culture, but all the more so in a 
continent such as Africa in which Christianity was implanted by European missionaries, 
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who had no prior or immediate knowledge of African cultures.  That subsequent 
evangelization was generally patterned on the previous experience of the missionaries 
was not exceptional to the rule. The missionary activities in Africa were thus subject to 
the cultural consciousness of the Europeans’ world view.  Heightened awareness during 
the Second Vatican Council that the Roman Catholic Church was a global church, 
prompted attention to the closely related questions of contextualization and inculturation.  
At the same time, the official Catholic teaching in missiology simply spells out the basic 
doctrine, upon which inculturation and contextualization draw rather than the manner in 
which contextualization and inculturation are to proceed. Such practical matters have to 
be left to the respective discernment processes in specific regions of the world.  Even 
then, these require nuanced interpretations to ensure general clarity and harmonious 
interpretation.  In the estimation of this author, interpretation in this area has not achieved 
desirable general clarity to guide the implementation of particular contextual theologies.  
This point will be clarified in the course of this study.  Nonetheless, this introduction 
attempts to highlight the major points that ought to concern contextual theologies in 
general and Africa in particular.   
Concerns with contextual theology in Africa arise through necessity.  
Contextualization generally seeks to answer the basic questions of who is Christ per se in 
conjunction with the attendant question of who Christ is for the particular African 
cultural and ecclesial milieus.  This task must be accomplished in the wider context of 
evangelization.  That is to say, the task of evangelization in contemporary Catholic 
theology is a tandem process involving mutual interplay between contextualization and 
inculturation processes.  The success of incarnating a Christian world view among world 
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cultures is contingent on appropriate contextualization in much the same way that the 
latter is dependent on effective inculturation.  While it is impossible to treat one without 
implying the other, Chapter I focuses on the theological technicalities of 
contextualization with respect to Africa vis-à-vis the wider church.  Hence, the ensuing 
analysis gives special attention to the theological underpinnings apparently called into 
question by the various perspectives in African theology.  This chapter, as a result, must 
examine the African theological vision for “situating” the Gospel so that Christian faith 
can take deep root and thrive in Africa.  In setting this goal, there are a number of factors.  
This study, first and foremost, perceives three general but major principles that 
any contextual theology must attend to. A brief outline of these will also provide a 
compass to the technical concerns in this chapter and study as a whole.  First, in 
contextualization, the need to articulate the cultural reality of the respective local 
culture(s) precedes everything else.  Central to this is an understanding of local cultures.  
These not only include the beliefs and practices of the people, but also whether the local 
culture is homogeneous or diversely constituted.  The elements of “culture” and 
“diversity” shape the second principle, which consists in the determination and the 
functionality of an appropriate method of contextualization.  Contemporary Catholic 
missiology has designated what is now known as inculturation as the method for 
evangelizing cultures.  As the fundamental principle in contextualization, inculturation is 
dependent on the appropriate understanding of the local needs of the church, the 
situation, and actual needs of the people.  Hence, incarnating Christian faith in a culture 
through evangelization are the primary goals of contextualization.   
 10
 The third principle involves the selection of the theological foundations suited to 
the situation and the perceived goal.  One ought to keep in mind that there are variations 
in this formulation determined by the specific end in view.  Nonetheless, the key question 
concerns the constitutive principal foundation for a Christian theology.  The central 
argument of this chapter, which is also an advancement of the contemporary Catholic 
missionary vision, is the fact that, theological foundations are determinative of whether or 
not a local theology will promote dialogue between Christianity and the local cultures.  
This is critical for an enlightened understanding of what contextualization is about.  It 
means that contextualization is a process of ongoing discernment in view of opening 
minds and hearts to the Gospel so that a life-long journey of dialoguing with the eternal 
truth of God’s self-communication, through the Second Person of the Trinity can take 
place.  When contemporary African theology is examined in light of these three general 
principles, it is found lacking in these same aspects.  
 Since its inception, African theologians have been focused on articulating the 
African reality as a precondition for inculturation.  But in doing so, these efforts 
consistently exhibit the following questionable trends.  Despite the obvious evidence of 
cultural diversity in Africa, theological reflections insist on speaking about Africa as 
though it were a homogeneous cultural entity.   This has had the effect of confounding 
the possibility of a viable unified approach that could speak to commonality and diversity 
in the African local Catholic Church.  Favoring a universalistic and dogmatic approach in 
view of upholding a monolithic local theology, African theology thrives on exploiting the 
problem of Western European cultural domination as the most critical problem facing 
Africa.  Little efforts, if any, have been devoted to the task of exploring limitations within 
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the African cultural heritages that might be providing a fertile ground for ongoing 
negative external influences.  A glossy view of African cultures also leads to flirting with 
the prospect of shifting theological foundations from Christ and the Gospel to African 
grandparents (ancestors) and their religious legacies.  This persistent tendency raises 
serious questions regarding the ability of a contemporary African theological perspective 
to affect the demands called for by inculturation.   
 To bring these questionable issues in African theology to the forefront, this 
chapter, therefore, focuses on the selected work by Benezet Bujo: African Theology in its 
Social Context.  As a point of contrast, this work illustrates what this study deems as the 
fundamental flaws in African theology.  And in argument for African theological reform 
chapter I attempts to situate this critique in the African Synodal teaching (1994), and in 
John Paul II’s Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation: Ecclesia in Africa. 3  In their doctrinal 
and missionary foundations, these documents provide the theological point of departure 
for theological reflection in Africa today.  Without this important turn, inculturation in 
Africa will remain a mere academic venture, fragmented, if not stuck in the mud of non-
productivity and evangelical ineffectiveness. 
  Schematically, section I, part A, presents an overview of the main features of 
African theology and its general orientation.  The immediate and narrow aim of Section I 
is to provide a general understanding of African theology, and the theological-historical 
background that has shaped its general intellectual outlook.  The subsequent critical 
appraisals of the ancestral approach, exemplified in the writing of Bujo, provided in 
section I, part B, may well be grasped against this general background.  Chapter I as a 
whole draws upon some authors who have treated pertinent issues in some detail.4  An 
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African theologian, M.L. Daneel, deserve special mention. Daneel’s work is particularly 
pivotal, because it offers a comprehensive and critical study of African theology in its 
multifarious perspectives prior to the Synod with the commitment to be unbiased.  On the 
whole, the research found in Daneel’s work is extensive and his evaluations are 
convincing.     
 
SECTION I 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN THEOLOGY 
 Understanding the historical premises of African theology is an important step to 
gaining insight into its driving force and its perceived goal: liberation from Western 
cultural domination.  Therefore, the purpose of the following account is to demonstrate 
the close link between Bujo’s proposal and African theology as a whole.  This step in 
turn provides the needed theological context for critiquing African theology. 
The Concept of Africa in Relation to African Theology  
Ngindu Mushete identifies three major theological currents in the quest for 
evangelizing Africa; namely, mission theology, Black theology and African theology.  
His work clarifies the African theological concept of “Africa” and how it applies to 
African theology.  Mushete’s analysis is simply outlined in paraphrased form as follows.5  
The “theology of mission” basically refers to a dominant approach favored by 
missionaries prior to the Second Vatican Council, and is still being used to a certain 
extent.  Its primary focus is to save the souls of those generally regarded as pagans.  In 
the present, as in the past, its agents tend toward a total disregard for the issues of culture 
and as such, they favor a universalistic approach to evangelization. 6   
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Black theology, on the other hand, delineates the Black South African context 
with its own specific interest, goals and methodology, and grows out of the experience of 
apartheid.  This is essentially a liberation theology, inspired more by the experiences of 
the African-Americans than the teaching by the Second Vatican Council.  The central 
motif of Black theology is political and economic liberation without a perceived need to 
incorporate the notion of culture.7  Third, but not least, African theology, represents a 
specific outlook stemming from a pre-independence revolutionary milieu and the recent 
teaching of the Second Vatican Council.  Technically, African theology is the domain of 
Sub-Saharan Christianity, and focuses on inculturation as its mode of operation.  
Although Sub-Saharan Christianity specifically embraces “African theology,” the term 
generally designates theologies that have Africa as their context and object.  African 
theology, therefore, consists of varieties of perspectives and methods that converge and 
intertwine forming a convoluted network of meaning known as African theology.8  With 
its major goal of making Christianity relevant to Black Africa, African theology is 
complex due to the vastness of its field of interests, the variety of its concerns and 
approaches.   
Though focused on the Black cultures, this study in the end embraces Africa as a 
whole.  This in no way implies the intent to exhaust issues affecting Africa.  This 
particular focus is more technical and develops from the following rationale.  African 
Catholicism understands itself as one local Church.  While conscious of underlying 
pastoral differences in the local churches, for instance, the African Synod spoke as one 
voice thus underscoring the ‘oneness’ in the self-understanding of the Catholic Church in 
Africa (cf. EA, no. 17).9  The question remains, however, as to whether this self-
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understanding warrants an all-embracing contextual theology at this point in time.  Also 
when viewed from an evangelical standpoint, Catholic teaching on inculturation draws 
attention to culture as a theological constant in contemporary mission theology.  Yet, 
culture does not hold the same meaning and significance in different parts of Africa.  This 
presents enormous challenges for contextualization processes as a necessary step in 
inculturation.  All these are issues of global magnitude, which do not come as a given.  
Hence, it is precisely due to challenges such as these that this study must speak in terms 
of Africa as a whole in order to raise issues concerning the methodological and 
theological effectiveness of an all-embracing notion of African theology.  But because 
the majority of African theologians are convinced of the suitability of an all-
encompassing approach, we must now look at how the idea of a contextual theology is 
envisioned.  The background that has shaped the notion of African theology is the best 
point to begin at. 
A Historical-Theological Locale of African Theology 
 Contemporary Catholic missiology is encountering challenges posed by past 
human histories and traditions in different local situations of the universal church.  In the 
case of Africa, the teaching on the relationship between faith and culture initially 
coincided with the period when the continent was struggling to free itself from the 
shackles of colonial rule.  The late 1950s and early 1960s fomented political movements 
whose immediate goal was to rid the continent of all forms of oppression.  Prominent and 
influential among these is Pan-Africanism, with the “ultimate objective of bringing total 
liberation to the African” and “to give all people of African descent a sense of identity, 
self-determination and emancipation.” 10  Pan-Africanism and other movements that 
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developed in this period aroused deep aspirations, and most especially the optimism to 
restore a genuine African identity. The Pan-African rationales were the colonizers, who 
did not merely assault the political integrity of African societies. Their racially charged 
imperialism left no doubt in the minds of Africans that they had become less of a people 
through colonizing activities. Consequently, theologians and agents of political 
independence have, since the late 1950s, associated the restoration and the normalization 
of traditional consciousness with the removal of oppressive forces.  This also partly 
explains why African theology tends to conceive and to express the notion of restoration 
in very idealistic and simplistic political terms.  Nonetheless, it is in these yearnings for 
freedom and identity where we can locate the fledgling of a panoramic and an all-
inclusive theological notion of “African” theology.  That is, due to widespread 
colonialism on the continent, the term “African” took on a theological and functional 
significance.  To grasp further the political implications of the Pan-African ideas, we 
must provide an historical overview of the missionary and colonial past.  This can help to 
situate the sentiments and idealism that permeated revolutionary ideologies from the 
beginning, as well as show how this later inspired an “all-encompassing” African 
theology.  
Emmanuel Martey observes correctly that “African Christians…learned how 
[European] colonialism drained African societies of their essence, trampled African 
culture11 underfoot, undermined African institutions, confiscated its land, smashed its 
religions, destroyed its magnificent artistic creation and wiped out extraordinary 
possibilities.”12 Cecil Rhodes and David Livingstone, whose colonizing activities 
impacted South and East Africa, lend insight into the colonial attitudes that energized 
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unlimited plundering of Africa.  Rhodes declared that “Only one race [the White race] 
was destined to help in God’s work of justice, liberty, and peace.”13  David Livingstone 
expressed the same view more intensely:  
We come among them as members of a superior race and servants of a 
government that desires to elevate more degraded portions of the human 
family.  We are the adherents of the benign, holy religion and by mere 
consistent conduct and wise patient efforts become the enjoinders of peace 
to a hitherto destructed and downtrodden race.14   
  
 Significantly, these attitudes are essentially cultural and verbalize the meaning and 
concept of a human being to which the African colonizers subscribed.  One does not need 
great imagination to realize what persons can do to one another when distorted visions of 
what is good come wrapped in the attire of religious beliefs or an idealized view of 
culture.  In these unholy utterances one finds the unfortunate link between the spread of 
Christianity and colonialism, and the roots of ongoing Black consciousness, missionary 
vision, and the probable character of African theology.  For with time, the Christian 
Church under the auspices of western European missionaries came to be seen as “an 
instrument of imperialist oppression.”15   
In his extensive treatise on African theology, M. L Daneel reflects this outcome 
by admitting that “When black African theologians define and delineate the task of a 
relevant theologia Africana, they invariably do so in terms of a reaction against imported 
theology” [his emphases]. 16   Generally accepted, therefore, is the distrust of theologies 
developed from a non-African context, now deemed incapable of offering a solution to 
Africa’s problems.  The need “to do it [ourselves],”17 fired up an indiscriminate 
hermeneutic of suspicion, directed at “Western-oriented theologians who profess, to 
theologise…on behalf of the Church in Africa.”18  This intellectual stance is also a means 
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of undercutting what native theologians view as a “subtle paternalism which, despite 
excellent intentions, emerges in the work of Western missiologists.”19  There is, however, 
no unanimity in this outlook, because some African writers do not exhibit such 
exclusivist tendencies.20 
On the whole, articulating a contextual problem for the African local Church is 
one of the characteristic marks of African theology.  The historical premises, as outlined, 
are determinative in this particular regard.  The African human reality is often perceived 
through reactionary lenses that mainly focus on the past experiences of traditional life 
and colonial or missionary activities.  This inclination is also indicative of the preferred 
theological premises and dominant methods.  For example, a common factor among the 
various strands in African theology is the need to account for the African past and 
incorporate it into theological thought aimed at inculturation.  The result is a reactionary 
stance, which coupled with a predominantly historical approach, presumes to endow 
African theology with the necessary philosophical resources to stave off “the directive 
pressure, norms and aims of Western theology.”21  But these historical premises are not 
without methodological implications for African theology and its end in view.  Martey 
believes, and accurately so, that the colonial historical background “has provided a 
relevant context for African theologians ‘to formulate theological constructs on 
Africanization’ and liberation.”22  This propensity becomes more evident when we 
correlate “the programmatic” [motifs] of Pan-African organizations”23 with the general 
orientation of African theology.   
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Points of Correlation: Pan-Africanism and the Historical-Theological Premises of 
African Theology 
 
The historical-philosophical background outlined here has also shaped common 
operative principles and objectives that cut across the various theological strands in 
African theology.  The historical-theological premises of African theology derive their 
significance from missionary and colonial activities.  A common experience of 
oppression that gave political activists a sense of collective consciousness also inspired 
their sense of a common identity and the need for collective action.24  Martey’s account 
of the chief concerns of Pan-Africanism sheds light on the association pointed out here.  
The “unification of all black people, commitment to the empowerment of black people 
and the liberation of all black people”25 comprise the historical-philosophical structural 
basis of action toward political and cultural emancipation prior to African independence.  
Martey’s observation generally reveals a close relationship between colonial tendencies 
and the reactionary stance in African theology.  Like political activists, native theologians 
have since viewed themselves as (Black) Africans originating from a common culture 
that is subjected to long and a widespread suffering stemming from colonial oppression 
and misguided evangelization.  Hence, to summon the vital human and moral resources 
for liberating Africa from religio-cultural domination, the empowerment of Black 
Africans is a priority in the African theological vision.  One of the earliest champions of 
cultural emancipation of Africa illustrates Martey’s arguments well.  Amilcar Cabral 
maintained that:  
the domination of a people can be maintained only by the permanent and 
organized repression of the cultural life of the people concerned…to take 
arms to dominate a people is, above all, to take up arms to destroy…their 
cultural life.  For as long as part of that people can have a cultural life, 
foreign domination cannot be sure of its perpetuation.26  
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As a result, Amilcar Cabral “stressed liberation as an act of culture”27 thus testifying to 
the historical conceptual pillars by means of which the agents of Pan-Africanism sought 
to restore African identity and cultures.   
Significantly, the same political elements of liberation, unification, and 
empowerment also correspond to three main historical premises of African theology.  To 
a greater extent, these have impacted the concept of the African context and the 
theological expression of its cultural realities.  Concerns for “identity” and “culture” 
continue to occupy centre stage in the theological and the pastoral concerns of the local 
African Church.  The “goal of African theology [is to communicate] the Christian 
message in a way that liberates Africa from religious and cultural domination.”28  As M. 
L. Daneel also points out, African theology aims at “liberating the Gospel from the 
Western wrappings…[so that] the truth which Jesus of Nazareth reveals about God may 
encounter the spiritual, cultural and intellectual worlds of the African personality.”29  In 
retrospect, the sacred personal space formerly occupied by missionaries and colonizers, 
in the style of Cecil Rhodes and David Livingstone, is by correspondence, to be 
reclaimed through religious and cultural liberation. 
 The theological premises of African theology are not without practical 
implications for inculturation, granted the basic assumptions behind African theology.  
African theologians operating under “African theological umbrella” envision liberation, 
empowerment and unification of Black Africa.  In their view, theological unity has, 
supposedly, been attained through the choice and use of a global category known as 
“African theology” and the focus on Western domination as the primary problem.  
However, the basic presumptions behind this global category are replete with theological 
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and methodological problems. To mention but one basic problem, the universalistic 
character of African theology presupposes Africa as a homogeneous cultural context, 
rooted in a common experience of oppression, always originating from outside.  These 
intellectual and methodological horizons ignore the significance of cultural diversity for 
contextualization.  While there is some evidence of recognition of the need to relate the 
present cultural evolution in Africa to traditional cultures,30 these efforts are still at the 
level of conceptualization.  An unanswered and persistent question is whether Africa’s 
“problems” and their “solutions” conceived consistently and primarily along the terms 
envisioned by African theology are relevant to inculturation.  Can an all-embracing 
African theology claim genuine contextual relevance in step with cultural diversity?  As a 
step toward getting to the very root of the problem that cultural diversity poses for 
contextualization, this reflection must now turn to the representative and ardent 
proponent of African theology in an ancestral theological mode: Benezet Bujo.  The 
primary focus is on one of his writings entitled:  “African Theology in Its Social 
Context.”31    
B. “AFRICAN THEOLOGY IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT” 
Preliminary Questions  
In the previous analysis, reference was made to varieties of perspectives and 
methods in the configuration of African theology.  A depth analysis of each one is not 
within the scope of this project.  Yet, this fact raises legitimate questions regarding the 
practical effectiveness of this study.  What benefit can this study accrue by focusing on 
one approach among so many varied voices?  What are the practical implications of 
making generalized assertions based on one approach?   
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We have seen that African theology regards Western cultural dominion as the 
most serious problems threatening Africa’s cultural destiny.  The possibility of traditional 
African cultures equally posing sinister problems is not at the forefront of most 
reflections.  This lacuna is also one of the most striking features in the entire African 
theological edifice as represented in Bujo’s theological synthesis.  A total disregard for 
limitations in African cultures is discernible in his whole-sale use of ancestry as an 
organizing principle for a contextual theology.  From the standpoint of this study, 
ancestry is at once a value and a problem in contemporary Africa.  These and other 
factors make Bujo’s proposal the most appropriate perspective from which to explore the 
ancestral traditions and their functional potential.  This task can be well grasped against a 
background understanding of ancestry. 
 The concept of ancestry as it applies to Africa generally refers to the common yet 
varied experiences of tracing the life of individuals and tribal communities to particular 
persons in the past known as “biological ancestors.”  The ancestors are designated so, 
because they are, supposedly, the originating family unity to which communities trace 
their biological roots.  In this sense the ancestors are the primordial human beings to 
whom tribal community can trace the gift of life.  Also from a religious standpoint, 
ancestors derive their title and authority from having played a prominent role worthy of 
ongoing emulation by their progenies.  Because of its symbolic religious significance, 
rooted in the traditional understanding of God-human relationships, ancestry is not 
simply “one” of the common denominators in the traditional cultural heritages.  It is a 
decisive principle underlying the totality of any African world view and the communal 
lives that it engenders.  Ancestry is the traditional moral principle which establishes a 
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sense of, and the right to belong to a traditional community called a tribe.  Consequently, 
ancestry is the defining factor of what it means to be both a human being and an African.  
As one would expect, therefore, ancestry is highly “recognized” and “valued”, because 
all Black Africans imbibe ancestral consciousness in varying degrees of scope and 
intensity.   
For very technical purposes, it suffices to point out in passing that, because of its 
affinity with the African religious experiences and cultural consciousness, the ancestral 
approach to inculturation carries the “possibility” for greater reception by African 
Christians than most approaches.  After all, Africans know and value ancestry, and they 
exist by perpetuating values rooted in the ancestral heritages.  In the religio-cultural-
ancestry framework, for instance, one encounters enduring values of “family,” 
“brotherhood and sisterhood,” “respect for life,” “communal solidarity” and many others.  
The reality of these universal values in African societies is the basis for Bujo’s arguments 
for an ancestor-based approach to contextual theology and inculturation. 
Seen from a critical standpoint, however, the ancestral approach carries the risk of 
uncritical assimilation of ideas and values rooted in this common experience.  In stating 
this one must observe that the “value” of ancestry per se is not what is in question here.  
The stated risk refers to the consequence of a cultural value, such as ancestry, becoming 
so emphasized that it acquires an unchallengeable or normative status.  A possibility of 
uncritical assimilation of ideas often comes with an “embrace” reinforced by close 
familiarity with cultural values.  To this extent, cultural subjects imbibe and promote 
such values, at the same time conforming to their interpretative and socializing power.  
When values acquire this status, they reinforce the “standardizing” or regularizing 
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function of culture as a whole.  In this case, familiarity can also be understood with 
reference to the idea of “a cultural blind spot.”  This is a basic intellectual and moral 
stance made possible by collective experiences that impel societies and individuals to 
interpret reality in a particular way.  As a result, a particular cultural leaning does, to a 
greater extent, shield a society from perceiving and understanding reality in terms of a 
larger and complex whole.  In the case of Africa where traditional mindsets are still at 
large, ancestry is socially legitimized to the extent that ancestral consciousness is like the 
air an African breathes in and out!  This brings us back to the importance of Benezet 
Bujo’s proposal as a point of contrast for an alternative approach to contextual theologies 
in Africa.   
Most theological writings have not explored the importance of ancestry in 
contemporary Africa’s existence.  Hence, by virtue of recognizing the concept of 
ancestry, Bujo demonstrates a good measure of awareness of its importance in the Black 
African experiences.  Ancestry is the one most important premise in his discernment for 
the best means of incarnating Christianity in Africa.  His efforts exceed others, who have 
delved into this central feature of Africa’s communal life.  But for the particular purposes 
of this study, the why and how of his discernment is what a critical reading of his 
proposal is primarily concerned with below.  This focus will be limited to his perceived 
contextual problem, objectives, principles, and methodology.  All these will be examined 
on his own terms.  His own words are directly and extensively cited to allow his own 
meaning to speak for itself.  We begin by examining his perceived agenda.    
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Bujo’s Programmatic Statements   
African Theology in its Social Context conveys Bujo’s attempt to construct a 
relevant local theology for Africa.  His own particular agenda should be understood from 
this vantage point.  Bujo was impelled to write by what he perceived in African theology 
as a failure to  
[move] beyond the negritude movement.”32 As a dominant trend, 
negritude gives the “impression that [the] real aim [of African theologians] 
is to show the world how religious Africans are, and how the basic 
elements of their traditional religion can be used as the ‘raw material’ for 
the construction of an African theology.  But no effort is made to work up 
this ‘raw material’ into a genuine, even if tentative, theological 
synthesis.”33  
  
Consequently, he launched his project in response to a rising “[demand to rethink] this 
conventional approach to African theology.”34  Rethinking African theology consists not 
only in the need for “a theology that can really lead to an incarnated Christianity in 
Africa, [but also one that is in accordance with] the wishes of the Bishops of Africa and 
Madagascar.”35  He further argues significantly that the existing approaches manifest a 
“lack of any theological synthesis…many if not most, African theologians do not proceed 
contextually.  They ignore the actual, post colonial situation, [and fail as a result to 
construct a new liberation theology for Africa today].”36  But granted his particular 
stance, these programmatic statements are ironical as we shall see shortly.  Nonetheless, 
these assertions earned him laudatory appraisal from a well reputed Catholic theologian, 
Robert J. Schreiter, C.P.P.S. In the foreword to the discourse in question, Schreiter said:  
Blending together concerns for traditional African values within the 
horizon of contemporary social issues in Africa, this book represents the 
synthetic quality of his theological project.  Neither a traditionalist trying 
to preserve African rural culture in the mindless fashion nor a reformist 
calling for a move away from African roots, he holds in balance the past 
and the present, the cultural and the social, and the urban and the rural, in 
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order to develop a theology that speaks to Africans and explains Africa to 
those outside.37   
 
The theological and methodological validity of these claims remain to be seen in the 
course of this study.  Of immediate relevance is the configuration made by central 
elements in the programmatic statements.   
Bujo specifies that African Theology in Its Social Context is more “an initiation to 
African theology in order to suggest a few basic ideas that might later provide matter for 
deeper reflection.”38  By this he indicates the nature and content of his agenda, and the 
function it serves in the wider scheme of African theology.  We have seen his point that 
theology must be contextual so that it can be attuned to the demands of incarnating 
Christianity in Africa.  He, in addition, affirms “reaction” as an essential feature of 
contextual African theology.  Attentiveness to this last point is a necessary condition for 
coming to a better appreciation of the substance of his proposal. The four elements of 
reaction, content, method and objectives, and their interrelationships not only form the 
basic structure of his agenda, they are also vital to comprehending his synthesis.  In the 
same way, though the programmatic statements have the ‘negritude movement as their 
origin,’ the real function of negritude, on close examination, is to furnish a context for 
addressing a much greater problem of Western cultural domination.  Thus, the 
weaknesses he points out in contemporary African theology are important concerns, 
insofar as they offer him a starting point to focus on one major concern: the integrity of 
Black Africa and its cultures.   
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The Contextual Problem: Western Domination in Africa 
According to Bujo, incarnating Christianity in Africa must be achieved by means 
of contextualization, and rightly so.  He also maintains that this ought to come about by 
means of a theological synthesis.  He gives expression to this vision by focusing on the 
recurring problem of Western domination.  This problem enables the organization of 
subject matter and the sequence of his arguments around a common agenda in African 
theology.  In this entire scheme, one should also keep in mind the role of the dynamic of 
reaction in shaping his theories and methods.  Most native African theologians reflect a 
varied measure of concern for the on-going conflict between Western and African 
cultures.  This concern is frequently accompanied by sentiments of sadness or anger that 
run deep within the different ranks of Black African theologies.  An example is captured 
graphically by a contemporary African priest, whose sentiments Bujo cites.   
 [In 1885 at Berlin our Continent was partitioned.  Without consulting 
anyone they had pity on our misery….Every time I come across this date, 
I feel the same contempt still. That man despises you so be it.  The worst it 
is that they taught me this date. They made us memorize it…Before our 
passive faces they displayed the results obtained: The pacification of 
Africa; the benefits of civilization in Africa; the courage of explorers; 
disinterested philanthropy.  And no one, [a]bsolutely no one pointed out 
this injury, this shame which followed us everywhere, [t]hat a man, your 
equal, should meddle in your affairs without consulting you at all. It is a 
flagrant lack which any well-bred ear resents].39  
 
Historical events such as these constitute the basic problem that inspires Bujo’s 
interpretation and the eventual synthesis of the ancestral traditions with Christology.  
Referring to the conflict in view, Bujo states that “the problem of culture cannot be 
ignored.  The Black African must rediscover his roots so that the ancestral tradition may 
enrich post-colonial people and make them adopt a critical attitude toward modern 
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society.”40 These historical events also form a thread of continuity with contemporary 
African theological concerns, and situate his particular agenda in the latter’s overall 
framework: to liberate Africa from religious and cultural domination.   
Accordingly, Bujo begins by admitting that “[w]hen we consider current debates 
on the subject, we cannot go wrong if we reconstruct the preparatory stages which shaped 
the actual theology of Africa.”41  This sensitivity to the African-Western cultural conflict 
shapes his theological schema and the sequence of his argument.  His reflection begins 
with the ATRs’42 views, followed by accounts of the colonial and missionary activities, a 
review of the African theological response to those activities, and concludes with his own 
synthesis.  This schema is not simply a matter of literary convenience; the arrangement 
reinforces the significance of the stated conflict, and justifies his proposal.  Also the 
impetus for the reactionary twist in his work derives from this background.  He states: “In 
the first place, we must discuss how African religion is the very heart of the traditional 
society and how colonization and missionary activity together often upset the delicate 
balance between the basic elements of the old clans and tribes. Only then can we 
understand the reaction of African theologians and authors.”43  Ultimately, this 
reactionary twist is decisive for his choice of context.  For while his expressed concern is 
the contemporary African cultural situation, his vision of what is “African” and “cultural” 
draws upon Africa’s pre-colonial culture.  It is thus important to establish, why the 
ancestors and the life meaning they advocate are essential to his synthesis by examining 
the nature and terms of the ancestral method.  However, because of the basic nature and 
the complex network of meanings associated with theological methodology in general, 
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and his synthesis in particular, the task of critiquing Bujo is situated in the fundamental 
and wider theme of theological foundations. 
SECTION II 
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS  
The Second Vatican Council laid the ground for recognizing culture as one of the 
major sources for contextual theology.  At the same time the Council maintained that 
Christ is the foundation of Christian theology (GS, no. 58. cf. nos. 22 & 45).  In view of 
contextual methodologies, the link between Christology and culture remains a difficult 
and elusive task.  Yet this difficulty makes it imperative that we understand the 
theological foundations for the Proto-Ancestor Christology as a condition for coming to a 
better grasp of Bujo’s synthesis and the content that explains it.  The first step in this 
somewhat long process is to outline Bujo’s ancestral theological schema.   
A Theological Schema  
Since the ancestor-based approach seeks to point out a path toward a relevant and 
viable contextual theology, Bujo must reckon with a basic challenge in contemporary 
theology of mission.  How does contextualization make Scripture, tradition and the 
culture of the local Church sources for a local theology?  In response, Bujo states his 
thesis unequivocally that “[the theology of ancestors [is] the starting point for a new 
Christology].”44  This basic statement unfolds along two essential elements: the method 
and its theological foundations.  First, Bujo asserts that “The person of Jesus Christ and 
the community of the Church are the two fundamentals of the Christians faith.”45  
Second, he specifies that these are to be “[examined] in light of Africa’s ancestor-
tradition.”46  These two interrelated ideas are decisive in Bujo’s conception of a 
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contextual methodology. That is, if the first statement specifies selected theological 
foundations, the second spells out the method in view.  But first, what does Bujo intend 
by these assertions?  
The Rationale for the Proto-Ancestor Christological Foundations 
  
First of all, whereas the general approach is ancestor-based, Bujo develops this by 
use of various systems of thought and modes of theologizing.  Though he does not refer 
explicitly to praeparatio evangelico47 analogy and correlation, these methodological 
perspectives are discernible in his entire discourse.  These converge and diverge in the 
many ways as he attempts to relate cultural religious experience to Christ’s experience.  
Noticeable in his argument is a very thin line between correlation and analogy.  At the 
same time, correlation and praeparatio evangelico function in tandem to consolidate the 
relationship he establishes between Africa’s religious traditions and Christianity.     
Bujo begins his reflections with a general theological account of ATRs’ 
experiences and their views of God.48  His immediate goal is to bring out the universal 
significance of Africa’s belief in the oneness of God.  He moves logically from this 
foundational point to show how traditional faith could illumine the understanding of the 
African view of God-human relationship.  He then goes on to conclude and accurately so, 
that “[t]he novelty of Christianity for Africans did not consist in its proclamation of one 
God, but rather in the more complete and definitive proclamation of that one God, whom 
Africa already knew, and who also is the God of Jesus Christ.  It showed more clearly 
than the African tradition was able to, and how this God wishes to be and can be, in fact, 
better known.”49  By this statement Bujo does not only affirm the universality of grace 
that always accompanies created reality, he also seeks to demonstrate its implications for 
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a local theology.  In his own words, “To establish the reign of God in Africa means to 
start from the most basic elements of black culture in order to revitalize modern life.”50  
Thus far, his position does not sound immediately contradictory.  After all, the church’s 
teaching since the Second Vatican Council has reclaimed and made this process 
normative for contemporary missiology.51  Be that as it may, his argument, in principle, 
consistently signals a departure from the basic orientation of contemporary Catholic 
missiology, in which there is a dialectical tension between the universal and the particular 
dimensions of what it means to be a church.  Nor does his basic position lead to an 
evangelical process similar to the one proposed by Justin S. Ukpong, for instance.  
Following in the spirit of Ad gentes Divinitus, n. 22), Ukpong explains how Jesus 
employed the Jewish language, symbols, and world view in his proclamation of the Good 
News.  Jesus was thus able to transform his contemporary society from within.  Ukpong 
wants to construct a Biblical model and then relate it to the African situation.  He 
consequently suggests that inculturation should begin with basic elements in the African 
traditional culture and move progressively to the essence of Christian faith.  In essence, 
Ukpong’s treatise applies basic principles of Vatican Council II, which appear in 
numerous forms. 52  Conversely, many of Bujo’s claims seem to echo a similar position.  
Even though Bujo does not cite Nostra Aetate, nos.1-4, his arguments, up to this point, 
resonate with that teaching.53  This is why his approach could, on the surface, be easily 
construed to be in the same vein with Ukpong’s position, and so on.  Contrary to the fact, 
the differences lie in the proposition that the theology of ancestors become the starting 
point for a new Christology. 54  This position is very critical and as such, one must 
understand what Bujo is saying and how he is saying it.   
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Bujo is proposing that ancestry becomes the framework for understanding who 
Christ is per se, and who Christ is for Africa.  In other words, while the Judaic tradition is 
the relevant background for the New Testament Christology and what Christ stands for, 
the ancestor tradition becomes the new foundation and the frame of reference for 
understanding the totality of Christ for the diverse African context.  Because of the 
importance of the Proto-Ancestor Christology for Bujo’s theological schema we must 
dwell, for a moment, on the hermeneutics stemming from this new Christology.  The 
purpose is to get to the theological mechanics that lead to the Proto-Ancestor Christology.   
Ancestral Hermeneutics for Translating the Gospel into Cultural Categories 
  
The preceding highlights express convictions in accordance with Bujo’s overall 
view and agenda.  The immediate purpose of this section is to indicate a major shift from 
the hermeneutic principles that are grounded in New Testament Christology to the ones 
framed by the ancestor tradition.  This shift, on the part of Bujo, is not necessarily 
arbitrary.  Incarnation as the principle for inculturation55 also gives expression to the 
traditions of the ancestors.  Therefore, it is at this level of meaning that one can grasp 
what Bujo means above by “[interpreting] the person of Jesus Christ and community of 
the church in light of Africa’s ancestor-tradition.” 
In the context of incarnation Christology, the interplay between “correlation” and 
praeparatio evangelico establishes a direct link between the Christ and African ancestors.  
The highest point in the many correlations he draws between the Christ and ancestors is 
marked by the conviction that “In his earthly life, Jesus manifested precisely all those 
qualities and virtues which Africans like to attribute to their ancestors in daily life.  We 
can, therefore, understand the importance of a Christology ‘from below’ for the African 
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context.  Theology can only speak of God in human terms drawn from human 
experience.”56  This argument points clearly to his theory and method.57   
Reference to the root meaning of the term “Prot(o)” and its usage by Bujo is a 
necessary step in understanding the Proto-Ancestor Christology.  The meaning of prot(o) 
should not be understood in isolation, but in relation to praeparatio evangelico as its 
proper philosophical-theological frame of reference in Bujo’s schema.  In one of his 
many references to the incarnation he states that “[J]esus, present Word made flesh, is the 
privileged and unique place of the total revelation of human kind.”58  Since the 
incarnation of the Word is the theological backdrop for his synthesis, the root idea of 
Prot(o) aptly alludes to the John’s transcendent Christology of  the incarnation.  “In the 
beginning was the Word and the Word was with God” (Jn. 1:4c).59  This prime aspect of 
John’s Christology strives to underscore the preexistence of Christ in relation to the 
incarnation.  Even if the Johannine exposition may have been called for by a polemical 
situation, the Christological insights surfaced, nevertheless. A word of clarification is in 
order here.  
The Oxford dictionary defines prot(o) as something “original;” one from which 
“others develop” or [follow from it].60  It also cites the “protozoa” (meaning animal-like 
forerunners of true animals) as a typical example.  Following these illustrations, “proto” 
denotes a primary principle that regulates the essential character of all nascent-principles, 
as in the case of protozoa.  Prot(o) then basically means whatever emerges from the 
primary principle does not change its essential or core substance.  The “secondary 
principles” function in much the same way as the “primary one.”  The same internal logic 
is perceptible in the correlation set between the person of Jesus Christ and the ancestor-
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personalities.  In order for the ancestors to assume a theological foundational status, Bujo 
equates Christ’s qualities with those of the ancestors.  Christ’s qualities must be seen as 
properly belonging to the preexistent Word, first and foremost, before the Word became 
incarnate.  This way, Christ’s humanity and divinity validate the African ancestral 
humanity and everything they stood for.  The conclusion must be, therefore, as follows: 
the Word that took flesh in the womb of the collective experience of Israel is the same 
Word that prompted and inspired the ancestors’ search for God in the African cultures.  
Seen this way, the incarnation ceases to be a concrete experience that took place at a 
particular time in a particular context and becomes a universal experience.  From the 
perspective of the [coming to life of Revelation in Christ], Jesus is Proto-
Ancestor for the Africans.  Jesus, the Christ, identified himself with 
humankind, so that he constitutes their explanation.  From now on Jesus 
makes his own all the striving of the ancestors after righteousness and all 
their history in such a way that these have now become a meeting place 
with the God of salvation.61   
 
This is one of the highest points in the Proto-Ancestor-Christological schema, and the end 
to which his entire project tends.  It summarizes his total vision for a contextual theology.  
That is, from the mutual relationship between the formal beliefs in God and the accrued 
meanings of life present in the African traditions, one can now understand why the 
ancestral method consists in the synthesis between the “ancestors” and the Jesus Christ.      
Because Bujo’s thought patterns, with regard to incarnation, are consistent with 
the praeparatio evangelico mode of thought, this trend properly places him in accord 
with theologians who find in praeparatio evangelico the most important frame of 
reference for contextual theology.  M. L Daneel’s testimony is convincing: 
This view [praeparatio evangelico] represents a liberation from Western 
missionary theological over-accentuation of the ‘pagan’ nature of the 
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traditional religion. After all, from the praeparatio evangelico perspective, 
the Christian message is the fulfillment rather than a rejection of the pre-
Christian African religious experience.62   
 
This too is the theological historical backdrop for Bujo’s synthesis, in view of which he 
maintains that, “It is still pertinent today to ask ourselves who Jesus is and what impact 
he has on the African who does not need to change culture to be called a child of God.”63  
Hence, having established the rationale for the Proto-Ancestor Christology, he must now 
bring this anthropocentric vision to its logical end  
The next step for Bujo is to demonstrate the concrete meaning of Proto-Ancestor.  
This step requires that one understands basic “technical ideas” involved as Bujo’s 
transitions from the “concept” (Proto-ancestor) to the “concrete” realities; i.e., the 
African existence and life of the Church.  Then as now, correlation functions to establish 
the bond between the ancestral legacies with the Judeo-Christian tradition.  Very 
significantly, the task of correlating the ancestral and the Jesus experiences begins at the 
same point where the Judeo-Christians traditions locate the decisive and originating 
specific events in God’s self-revelation in Israel; i.e., in the final and mutually 
interdependent events of the Passover traditions. He says:   
The particular words, actions and rituals associated with the ancestors, and 
with the elders in general, have deep meaning in the life of African people. 
They constitute a rule of conduct for the living, and they must be 
continually repeated.  The present and future depend on this repetition and 
representation of that speech, actions and rituals; it is in truth a matter of 
life and death.  The past is enshrined in the tradition of the Fathers, but is a 
past which still lives on and is the guarantee of the present salvation.  The 
repetition of the past in a kind of memorial calendar is no mere pious, 
ineffectual remembrance but a necessary return to the source of life which 
is essential if men and women are to be able to take a decisive step 
forward.64  
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That the ancestral experiences are portrayed as a parallel to the Judeo-Christian Passover 
events is unmistakable.  The Passover traditions, among other things, commemorate a 
decisive moment when Israel of old crossed the threshold of death, when the community 
consciously chose to depart from Egypt and become a people of God.  Although Israel 
did not die in the literal sense, the community died spiritually to the “soothing” and 
“deceptive effects” of a dehumanizing life in Egypt, and to a life vision that country 
offered the Israelites.  Israel had a lot of meat and vegetables to eat in Egypt but they 
lacked fundamental dignity as a people.  Hence, without foreknowledge of the future, 
Israel chose to trust God on account of Moses’ word.  The Exodus proved a long and 
arduous but fruitful spiritual journey.  And with that decisive passage, a new history of 
world order began.  Similarly, the events surrounding Jesus’ last moment have parallel 
significance to the Exodus.  Jesus held on to his confidence in the Father’s love and will 
to save humanity.  With this faith-filled vision, Jesus decided, like Israel of old, to 
embrace the will of God and cross the threshold of death.  Since then, these Passovers 
have become the historical and religious points of reference for Judaism and Christianity.  
They constitute Final Testaments to which future generations of Jews and Christians look 
back to understand, where they came from, where they are, and where they are going.  As 
we have seen, these dialectics in the Judeo-Christian traditions have their substantive and 
soteriological “equivalent” in the ancestral traditions, according to Bujo.  
When we say that we want to use the concept of ancestor as the basis of 
Christology, we are referring to God fearing ancestors…Only in the case 
of such ancestors can we speak of experiences and examples as truly a 
‘last will and testament’ left behind for the benefit of their descendants.  In 
this context, it is to be noted that the last words of a dying person…are of 
particular significance.  These words are words of life, setting a seal on the 
experiences and example of one…The final event in the life of a dying 
person is normative for those he or she is leaving behind.65  
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There is no doubt, therefore, that the “choice of terms” is deliberately intended to set a 
bond between the African and the Judeo-Christians tradition, specifically the Passover 
events. The Deuteronomic tradition records moments when Israel posed to consider: 
“These are the commandments, the statutes and decrees, which the Lord, your God, has 
ordered that you be taught to observe….Hear then O Israel, and be careful to observe 
them, that you may grow and prosper.”  St. Mark later reports that “While they were 
eating, [Jesus] took bread…and said, ‘Take it; this is my body’…Then he took a 
cup…‘This is my blood of the covenant, which will be shed for many’ (Mk. 14: 22-25. 
cf. Deut 6: 1ff.).  In summary, these parallels illustrate how Bujo establishes the rationale 
for the ancestral Christology.  Striking as these similarities between the two traditions 
might be, a basic question is deserving of mention.  Granted that a Christian theology has 
implications for the life of the church and the world around it, what is the terrestrial goal 
of ancestral theology?   To answer this question and to understand the purpose of Bujo’s 
vision, we must also strive to understand what ancestral Christology intends to achieve.  
To this the analysis now turns.  
The Terrestrial Goal of the Proto-Ancestor Christology  
It ought to be clear by now that a ‘synthesis’ is the means of achieving a relevant 
theology for Africa.  In the Ancestral Christological schema, a synthesis is synonymous 
with the concept of “ Catholic methodology.”  As a theological tool, it is “the means by 
which uneasy co-existence between the two faiths, Christianity and African religions 
could be overcome.”66  As one would expect, the ancestral theology does not only “offer 
Africans a Christianity which they understand,”67 it will also invigorate Africa to deal 
effectively with its most fundamental problems, especially “neo-colonialism.”68  Bujo 
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framed his synthesis with insights drawn from an earlier African writer, Joseph Ki-Zerbo 
whose work he cites.   
Writing under the influence of Pan-Africanism (1962), Ki-Zerbo had attempted to 
do what all native theologians have been and are still trying to achieve in various ways: 
“to rehabilitate the values of African culture.”69  Now as then, rehabilitation is frequently 
conceived along two dialectical factors of cultural identity and natural dynamism.  Native 
theologians believe that the restoration of Africa’s “natural dynamism…and identity [is] 
a condition for opening up Africa to the ‘universal’ dialogue with men and women from 
all corners of the human family.”70  This aspiration summarizes the theological agenda of 
African theologians presented in this chapter.  Bujo’s conception of the ‘real’ problem of 
Africa is clearly informed, to a greater extent, by this ideal.  In essence, his project aims 
at defending African humanity in all its past and contemporariness.  
Ki-Zerbo, according to Bujo, patterned his visions on similar aspirations and later 
suggested “three basic guidelines”71 for managing Africa’s problems and needs.  His first 
guideline consists in identifying “the main features of the social organization and 
conception of the traditional African society.”72  “[T]the traditional African concept of 
authority, in which ancestors are included” is the key underlying principle.  
Consequently, Ki-Zerbo proposed that the ancestral tradition enshrined in the traditional 
structure of authority be the “[starting point] in the discernment for a ‘new African 
society which would combine African tradition with elements from modern Western 
society.”73  The second guideline also consists in identifying “the principal elements of 
the present crisis”74 in Africa.  The third sought to determine “what prospects and what 
transcendent structure will emerge to create the new African society for her to obtain a 
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higher sociological level?”75  Ki-Zerbo found the lead in the first guideline: “the 
traditional African concept of authority”76 which as “an African basis” must provide the 
dynamism for needed “transformation.”77  
However, Ki-Zerbo’s approach to Africa’s transformation has theological and 
methodological implications, according to this study.  His conception of the solution to 
Africa’s problems consists in the process of discernment that begins with the established 
structures in the pre-colonial traditional society before considering the actual situation in 
contemporary Africa.  This is precisely determinism.  Rather than derive a method for 
social transformation from the concrete experiences of contemporary Africa, Ki-Zerbo 
preferred a discernment process based on traditional norms.  It is a process that resonates 
with the Black Africa’s cultural psyche, because traditionally Africa solves problems by 
looking backward in time not forward toward the unknown future.  Our ancestors did it, 
so must we do.  This is the law of the land!  This way Ki-Zerbo subjects an intrinsic 
transformative dynamism in contemporary situation to the dynamics of established 
traditional structures.  Moreover, the functional significance of these structures has been 
appropriated not only by Western cultural imperialism and its positive influences, but 
also by the changed human and social conditions in Africa, and the world in general.  
These realities cannot be reversed by simply re-instating basic elements in Africa’s past; 
it demands much more complex effort beyond Ki-Zerbo’s vision.  Furthermore, Ki-
Zerbo’s basic logic has negative implications for a contextual theology.  The purpose of 
this last point is not to question the legitimacy of drawing upon positive traditional 
African experiences.  The primary concern here is a technical one: how can contextual 
theology relate the past, present and future so that Christianity could say something 
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meaningful for Africa today?  When this question is examined against the background of 
“theological foundations,” Ki-Zerbo’s vision has affinity with Bujo’s own, which brings 
us to the purpose of this section.   
The philosophical background furnished by Ki-Zerbo’s guidelines offers a 
relevant transition to Bujo’s Proto-Ancestor Christology.  Bujo embraces Ki-Zerbo’s 
insights whole heartedly and in turn declares that “There is then no dream of recreating a 
Paradise Lost in modern Africa.  Africans want to bring the world of their ancestors to 
new life in their world, for only thus can they find true life for themselves and for their 
children.”78  This is the key to understanding the true purpose of the Proto-Ancestor 
Christology.  Bujo further gives Ki-Zerbo‘s guidelines a nuanced affirmation.  Referring 
to the social dynamics in pre-colonial traditional society, he says, “Their tolerant and 
virtually classless society should help modern Africans to avoid the class struggle which 
has been characteristic of Western society: equality and fraternity should come naturally 
to Africans.”79  The presumption here is that the Western socio-economic and its political 
systems are responsible for the despotic tendencies and moral poverty in African political 
leaders and the masses, and the current mystifying cultural impasse in Africa.  
 In summary, the fullness of Bujo’s basic assumptions comes to the fore through 
the idea of Proto-ancestor and the theology it proposes.  This section has endeavored, 
above all, to show that the transformative dynamism necessary for Africa’s religious 
development and maturation does not immediately lie with the Gospel or Christ for that 
matter, as Bujo’s Proto-Ancestor Christology is often construed.  The transformative 
dynamism resides with the tradition of ancestors.  This line of approach inevitably begs 
many questions on the centrality of Christ for Catholic theology and its mission.  It 
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because of who Christ is for the Church, mission and the world that the following critique 
is designed.   
 
SECTION III 
A CRITICAL RESPONSE 
It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that the evangelical dynamic, 
meaning and content of a contextual theology that is genuinely Christian is contingent on 
what is set as the theological foundations.  The following critical analysis proceeds from 
some basic concerns about the assertions made by Bujo regarding the Christological and, 
henceforth, the ultimate value of the traditional African religious heritage in general, and 
ancestry in particular.  In the final analysis, the above presentation of Bujo’s proposal 
was an attempt to highlight the constitutive principles in Christology to which Proto-
Ancestor Christology occupies a center stage.  Basic to the present critique is the 
essential principle and belief that Christian faith exists in dialogue with human traditions.  
Likewise, dialogue has so far been discussed, not in terms of working definitions but in 
terms of a primary principle (who is Christ) to show that the former is intrinsic to the 
theological foundations.  Precisely, in view of the need to develop human capacities as a 
necessary step in the ultimate salvation, the emphasis here is on dialogue as a central 
principle in the church’s mission to the world.   
   Bujo’s basic assumption so far is that once correlations are drawn between the 
essential function of an ancestor and that of Christ, then, Black Africa is able to 
understand the latter’s importance for their lives.  On the surface, the Proto-Ancestor 
Christology presumes to provide the soteriological and needed basis for Christ to claim 
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the seminal functions of ancestry in the African religio-cultural experiences.  This is also 
how some readers perceive the proposal in question.  For instance, when Alfred T. 
Hennelly, S.J, proposes Bujo’s synthesis as “the major resource for African Theology” to 
illustrate the trend of liberation theology in Africa, he is convinced that “Bujo is one of 
the pioneers in the search for a truly African theology.” 80 Contrary to the fact, there are 
defective Christological and methodological subtleties that are basic in nature and obtain 
from the correlations drawn between the ancestral and the Judeo-Christian tradition.  As a 
result, and granted the fundamental function of Christology81 for Christian theology, the 
Proto-ancestor Christology and the theology it advances must be understood against the 
complex matrix of Bujo’s ancillary themes, ideas and arguments, and the various means 
he employs to achieve a synthesis between all these elements.  This task, then, demands 
getting beyond his high sounding statements about the primacy and universality of Christ 
to see ancestry as the interpretative framework he is proposing for understanding who 
Christ is per se, and who Christ is for Africa.  This important step can be achieved by 
situating this critical analysis in the context of three basic problems associated with the 
proposal as a whole.   
There are issues in Bujo’s proposal related to: 
a) An absence of a clear cognition and a compelling articulation of the actual 
problem(s) of contemporary Africa; 
 
b) Problems rooted in the lack of “inner theological consistency”;82  
c) A lack of a meaningful anthropology and Christology that could bear effectively 
upon (a) above, and consequently inform the development of viable methods of 
inculturation and pastoral strategies that Africa is so much in need of today. 
 
 At the same time, because these issues constitute the subject matter for the subsequent 
chapters, this critical analysis basically points out the major flaws in Bujo’s basic 
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arguments.  We shall begin with the issue of ‘inner theological consistency’ and tie in key 
points from (a) and (c), above. 
Inner Theological Consistency 
Stephen B. Bevans has used the concept of the “inner theological consistency” to 
indicate one of the key issues in contemporary concerns for the “[criteria for Christian 
orthodoxy]”83 in the field of contextual theologies.  In summary, this concept speaks to 
the “basic movement of Christianity”84 that contextual theology ought to embody and 
reflect.  But since Bevans outlines this concept as a matter of fact, this section develops it 
further to show why and how the question of inner theological consistency bears directly 
on the central question of the “theological foundations,” especially in relation to Bujo’s 
proposal.   
We begin by taking a line from Pope Paul VI. “The Gospel and, therefore, 
evangelization cannot be put in the same category with culture.  They are above culture” 
(EN, no. 20).  This statement presupposes an understanding of the basic principles 
governing the mission of salvation entrusted to the Church.  Paul VI is not saying that 
culture is not an important theological reference point, but that relating the two must be 
done in such a way as not to merge the contingency of the human on the divine, also 
represented in the “faith” and “culture” relationships.  Paul VI’s position can also be 
explained in the following way.  Culture as a reference for theology introduces an 
attendant question: who is Christ for a particular culture, to the basic question of who is 
Christ per se.  These, are in fact, the two major interrelated themes in Christology that 
ground the idea of theological foundations.  For purposes of convenience in this study, 
we shall term these questions as “the Christ-questions.”  These are equal dimensions of 
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the same reality called “Christology” and as such, constitute the “defining structure of 
meaning” called the “Christian theological foundations.”  While the basic question entails 
scripture and tradition, the second “applies” the salvific dynamism (in Scripture and 
tradition) in relation to culture.  The inner theological consistency that Bevans and others 
write about derives, therefore, from the interplay between these two central themes in 
Christology.  The delineation we have just made is imperative in order to reflect on the 
condition in the Catholic tradition that scripture, tradition and culture are three major 
sources for contemporary theology.  We seek to understand Bujo’s application of this 
provision in the Proto-Ancestor schema.  In the ancestral model for a contextual theology 
that we are currently investigating, for instance, these elements tend to merge to the point 
where a distinction cannot be made between explicit and implicit revelations.  Bringing 
into perspective these two dimensions can help to clarify the Christological ramifications 
of Proto-Ancestor Christology as the foundation of African theology. 
 We have seen that in view of the theological foundations, Bujo makes the 
community of the church and the person of Christ the scriptural frame of references for 
the Proto-ancestor Christology.  In connecting Christ and “the community of the Church” 
he seeks to evoke the experience of the early Church that led to the formulation of the 
Gospels.  This is not a new strategy or proposal since our knowledge of Christ cannot be 
separated from the community of the early Church.  But Bujo is doing something quite 
novel.  The “community of the early Church”85 (Scripture) and the transcendent “person 
of Christ” are his points of reference only insofar as they establish the paradigm for his 
synthesis.  He states, “The person of Jesus Christ” and “community of the Church” are to 
be “[examined] in light of Africa’s ancestor-tradition.”86  A closer examination of the 
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grammatical expression in this last statement can offer insight into the meaning of 
“theological foundations,” especially as it applies to his “synthesis” or method.   
There is a fundamental difference in meaning and method between the foregoing 
statement and its reversal; i.e., Africa’s ancestor-tradition is to be examined in light of the 
person of Christ and the community of the church.  According to Bujo’s paradigm, the 
ancestor tradition is the ultimate frame of reference.  In the second statement Christ and 
the Christian tradition are the ultimate frames of reference.  In other words, Bujo is not 
simply using words to convey neutral meaning.  The grammatical structure of the 
particular postulation contains Christological and methodological significances; i.e., the 
meaning and terms of his method are hereby structured by language itself.  The African 
ancestor-tradition is Bujo’s primary source and ultimate point of reference, while his 
projected synthesis is worked out by drawing upon the mutual interchange between the 
person of Christ and the ancestor personalities, situated in the context of the local Church 
in Africa.  But, if by this Bujo’s intent is to evoke the experience of the early Church that 
led to the four Evangelical traditions, his strategy contains a basic shift from the early 
Church model.  Whereas the scriptural traditions are a result of the early communities’ 
experiences of Christ, incarnate and Risen, Bujo’s synthesis is premised on the conviction 
that the essence of the Christ event is already present in the African traditions. We saw 
that his incarnation Christology evokes praeparatio evangelico in direct relation to the 
idea of prot(o).  In the final analysis, therefore, Bujo has made Christ not the foundation 
per se but his point of validation.  How does he do this? 
Attributing all Jesus’ “virtues and qualities” to the ancestors is Bujo’s way of 
stating that the essence of Christ and what he represents is already present in the ancestor 
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personalities and traditions.  As a result, this gesture also imparts Christological 
significance to the ancestors and what they stand for.  Ancestry becomes, not simply the 
mode of communicating eternal truth, but also the basis of what Africans can say about 
God and about their existence.  Whether or not Bujo was aware of the inherent anomaly, 
this is a point at which “ancestry” displaces the would-be proper function of Christology 
in his synthesis.  The ascription of Christ’s personal qualities to the ancestors overlooks 
that these flow from the unity between Christ’s human and divine natures. Moreover, the 
unit of two natures introduces ontology as the axis of theological foundations.  The 
foregoing explanation can be expressed differently by appealing to specific technicalities 
in a theological method. That is to say, the basic question of who is Christ seeks to 
address all reality at the level of primary principles.  It speaks of the meaning and 
purpose of existence in ultimate or decisive terms.  The question of who is Christ for a 
particular context such as Africa seeks basically to render the first question meaningful 
for the cultural contexts concerned.  The second question, however, must be answered by 
bringing the “first question” and “cultural realities” into play.  In other words, the second 
question is the domain of contextualization, but which must make the person and 
meaning of Christ its backdrop.  Because these two questions are critical to 
contextualization, understanding how Bujo has handled them can clarify where the 
problem with his synthesis lies.   
Bujo answered the basic question of who is Christ in two ways.  On the one hand, 
he makes an exclusive reference to the Johannine transcendent Christology to illustrate 
who Christ is as indicated in the preceding discussions.  His references to the Passion, 
death, and the resurrection are transient in nature and have no soteriological bearing on 
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his overall synthesis.  On the other hand, and very significant, he also explains the Christ 
factor by appealing, not to the scriptural tradition but to the ancestral experiences.  We 
saw this with reference to the juxtapositions he sets between the African and the Judeo-
Christian traditions.  He does this, because he seeks to justify and illustrate his conviction 
that the ATRs contain elements that are in harmony with the Judeo-Christian vision.  His 
approach lends itself well to the views of one of the most eminent forerunners in 
contemporary African theology.  John S. Pobee’s also believed that “[t]heological 
formulations spring out of people’s experiences and culture.”87  The issue, however, is 
that the specific end product of contextualization is a “Christian theology” but not just 
any theology for that matter.  And this is the problem with Bujo’s synthesis.  By 
appealing to the ancestors rather than the Christ event in its complexity, Bujo merges the 
Christ-questions to the point where the conceptual peculiarities and significances between 
them disappear.  The basic question of who is Christ is overtaken by the attendant 
question, and in Christ’s place we have the ancestors as the explanation of the African 
existence and the would-be Christian experience.  Christ becomes the ineffectual ideal 
toward which the African heritages aim.  At this point, it must be underscored that the 
Proto-Ancestor scheme can be appealing when one forgets that the question of who is 
Christ comprises an ontological question.  And that humanity, according to Christian 
faith, cannot find ultimate meaning by appealing to human experience while 
simultaneously making very basic presumptions about the Redemptive plan of God 
realized in Christ.  In summary, the Proto-Ancestor Christology shifts theological 
foundations from its Christian ontological status to the cultural-historical level: the 
ancestral experiences.88   This for Bujo is not without purpose.  
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Convinced that “African traditional religions promised salvation, and freed people 
here and hereafter,”89 the most logical suppositions run as follows.  Since ATRs are 
rooted in the ancestral traditions that embody a salvific dynamism, then, the best that 
theology can do is to find a point of connection that enables ATRs to resume their 
original religious vitality.  As for the Christian-based acknowledgement that 
“Jesus…transcended [the ancestral ideal] and brought it to new completion….Christ is 
the ultimate embodiment of the virtues of the African ancestors, the realization of 
salvation for which they yearned” have a single purpose.  They ought to be understood in 
terms of the basic direction of ATRs presumed here.90  By affirming Christianity, Bujo 
treats or presents Christ simply as the ideal beyond to which the African traditional 
religious propensity is geared.  This is the only logical means by which the “Africans 
[can] bring the world of their ancestors in modern life” without being adulterated by 
Western Christianity.   
It is not far-fetched, then, to identify the following as the purpose for the Proto-
Ancestor Christology.  By correlating the person of Christ, and the early Church’s 
experience with African religious heritage, Bujo seeks to assert a direct continuity 
between the two religious traditions in a very forceful manner.  Perhaps more revealing is 
his belief that, “the conclusion must be that Africa has a vision of the future that is not 
radically different from that of the Judeo-Christian tradition.”91   As a result, “[w]hat is 
needed is a new synthesis.  It is not the question of replacing the God of the Africans, but 
rather enthroning the God of Jesus, but not as a rival God of the ancestors, but as 
identical with God.”92  True enough, Christology seeks to affirm and clarify the 
“oneness” of God experienced in other religious traditions, but there is more to this 
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central task.  Christology, first and foremost, seeks to verify and clarify simultaneously 
the claims by religious traditions to the spiritual and moral integrity, and their orientation 
to the fullness of truth regarding human life that Christ expresses through his incarnation.  
Seen this way, “Christianity does not replace the God whom traditional Africa sought.”  
But Christianity, through Gospel Mission, goes a step further and puts cultural religions 
to the task of refining and advancing their initial religious impulses.  This process 
happens neither automatically nor in haphazard manner.  Christianity presents the Jesus 
event along with Revelation in Israel as the points of reference among non-Christian 
believing cultures.  When the Second Vatican Council reaffirmed incarnation as the 
normative principle for evangelization, for instance, the Council Fathers were convinced 
of the universality of grace antedating the event of the incarnation.  But they stated this 
cautiously without merging the fine lines between implicit and explicit revelations (GS, 
no. 58).93  For purposes of this investigation, a holistic response to the basic question of 
who is Christ should not be limited to correlating deistic concepts, meaning and values in 
the Judeo-Christian with the African traditions.  A satisfactory response should make the 
Redemptive plan of God in its total complexity and in its transcendence and concreteness 
the framework of such a discussion.  “Formal or structural resemblance” between the two 
traditions is not the essential substance by which the two traditions can be linked.  Hence, 
because of the importance of the relationship between faith and culture94 for 
contextualization, we must examine how an indispensable principle in Catholic 
missiology features in Bujo’s Christological schema: Christian-cultural dialogue. 
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The Implications of the Proto-Ancestor Christology for Christian-Cultural Dialogue  
The attempt so far has been to point out that the problem of the lack of “inner 
theological consistency” stems from the larger and basic question of the “theological 
foundations.”  This section takes a step further to point out the implications of ancestral 
Christology for Christian-cultural dialogue.  The discussion will be limited to the 
implication of Proto-Ancestor Christology for dialogue. Theological foundations are 
determinative as to whether a contextual theology will allow for or stave off effective 
dialogue between Christianity and cultural traditions.  It was indicated that the question 
of who Christ is for Africa cannot be answered unidimensionally; i.e. without putting into 
proper perspective the basic question of, who is Christ per se?  We have also seen that 
Proto-Ancestor Christology is a result of patterning New Testament Christology on the 
ancestral dynamics.  Moreover, this process is carried out without due consideration for 
the serious negative values inherent in the ancestral traditions.  As we shall see in Chapter 
II, some of the most revered ancestral values are contrary to the Christian faith and 
practice.  Also, since the negative aspects of ancestry exacerbate the existing crisis in 
Africa, if Christianity is to have any impact on the collective African psyche formed by 
the ancestral moral tradition, contextual methodology must accommodate a dialogical 
dynamic.  This point makes it imperative to show the reason why the synthesis in 
question curtails rather than promotes a dialogical approach as a condition for the 
development of cultural religious traditions. 
Like all other elements of Christian faith and practice, dialogue depends on the 
structure of Christology as the foundation of a Christian theology, but not after the fact.  
The salvific substance (deposit of faith) must be present in whatever one decides to make 
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the foundation of theology.  That is, Christ, the Second Person of the Trinity, who by 
virtue of his life, death and resurrection, is the model for humankind as well as their 
ultimate savior.  Here we can appeal to Robert Kaggwa‘s conclusion regarding Bujo’s 
synthesis.  After relating the concept of “church” to the various levels of meaning in the 
Christian faith (trinity, Christology, pneumatology), Kaggwa had this to say about Bujo’s 
synthesis, especially as it relates to his ecclesiological position.  “A new understanding of 
the Church as koinonia is not foreign to Bujo…but the problem is that ‘[he reads] it back’ 
into the clan system and the world of ancestors.  In the final analysis, it is the African 
clan and the ancestors that become the solution to all problems.”95  Kaggwa could not 
have been any more accurate.  Yet we must still inquire whether the tendency which 
Kaggwa describes is limited to Benezet Bujo.  For the specific concern of this study, the 
basic nature of Bujo’s problem amounts to the juxtaposition between unequal subjects of 
existence:96 the human beings called the ancestors and the Christ, who is also God 
incarnate.  Even more so, the ancestors eventually displace Christ and become the 
explanation of what Africans can think and say about God and existence.  This is 
basically why the mechanics of the Proto-Ancestor Christology oppose dialogue as a 
central dynamic in evangelization and in human existence.   
What all these lead to is that dialogue cannot proceed fruitfully when it takes off 
at the level of basic doctrine or formal confessional statements.  For example, Bujo states 
accurately that, the ancestor constitutes the unity of the community and represents the 
pivotal point from which all actions of the members of the clan can take their dynamism.  
This function of the ancestors thus understood, in a very formal sense of religion as an 
institution, is a doctrinal statement at the level of basic meaning.  It describes the 
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determining function of ancestry in African societies.  When the same faith statement is 
translated into practice, moral actions would ensue, as Bujo expresses accurately: 
“Anyone who does not remain in this vital union with the tribal father… and with the 
members of the clan community condemns himself or herself to death, because outside 
the community in its visible and invisible dimension no one can survive.”97  Ironically, in 
the same way that this central belief fans intense tribalism and exclusivity in Africa, it 
would have provided a fitting basis for Africa’s understanding of the pre-Vatican II 
ecclesiology that there is no salvation outside the Church!   
Nevertheless, ancestry thus understood is the ultimate frame of reference in the 
ATRs in the same ways that Christ is for the Christian tradition.  Hence, when dialogue 
begins, by setting Christ and ancestors on the same plane, the dialogical process becomes 
deadlocked; in principle and in practice.  On the part of the religious adherent, dialogue 
evokes a “defensive response” not merely as a reaction but as a human necessity.  Why is 
this so? Ancestry is the concrete point at which moral precepts (doctrine) and self-
explanations are defined, in much the same way that Christ is for the Christian faith. In 
other words, dialogue becomes deadlocked when it is conceived and carried out at the 
level of confessional statements.  This is more often than not, because doctrine does, to a 
great extent, hold a symbolic significance in the similar mode of rituals.  Certain 
doctrines are very compact representations of the “rational limit” of what the believer 
understands fluidly through faith.  A Christian belief that God is a Trinity is a compact 
statement that also represents the backdrop of Christian faith.  The human mind alone 
cannot get beyond the concept of the Trinity, especially when what the mind seeks to 
understand is not related to God’s self-communication in the world.  Faith can get beyond 
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compact statements but only, because faith understands reality through love and hope.  
Where one does not “yet” possess faith in something, one approaches it rationally and as 
such, cannot get to the religious meanings that may be involved. 
Reflections on dialogue in contemporary Catholicism tend to overlook that 
religious faith touches the believer at all levels of being.  To such an extent, the believer 
responds to challenges to his or her faith by summoning resources from various levels of 
his or her being: mental, physical, psychological, spiritual, etc.  Whether a believer will 
respond or simply react in the dialogical setting depends on the interplay between these 
various levels of personal being.  In a situation where dialogue is between convinced and 
faithful adherents to different religious traditions, reaction, however subdued, underlies 
much of the exchange.  The intensity of reaction also depends on the level or substance of 
confessional statements that are being challenged.98  And from the rational and 
psychological points of view, the believer tends to react defensively in dialogue because 
the concrete basis of his or her faith and experiences are being shaken.  In the final 
analysis, this is what Bujo’s Proto-Ancestor Christology leads to with respect to 
Christian-cultural dialogue.   
The matter of dialogue in Africa is more complex than Bujo or the local church 
seems to have yet grasped.  Ancestry has no borders, because African Christians are 
informed by ancestral values in the same way that non-Christian Africans are.  When the 
Christian message encounters the traditionalists, who are as convinced as Bujo about the 
salvific integrity of the ancestral traditions; the evangelical summons often fall on deaf 
ears.  This reality happens to plague the African Christian faith and practice.  So, if the 
African Christians, together with the adherents of ATRs, are to aspire to the fullness of 
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truths and experiences that the Christ event represents, it is of paramount importance that 
contextual theologies accommodate a dialogical evangelical dynamism.  Inculturation 
cannot afford to proceed from what appears like a naïve understanding of ancestry in 
relation to Christology proper.   
One of the most subtle problems with Bujo’s proposal is his avoidance to state 
explicitly where he stands with regard to Revelation in Israel.  However, this can be 
inferred from what he says, and how he says it.  For instance, the claim to [fullness of 
salvation] such as the one he makes on behalf of the ATRs is arbitrary and tends to mar 
the experiential and conceptual peculiarities with respect to the idea of salvation in Israel.  
The claim reflects no effort to see a distinction between “formal basic religious 
inclinations” in ATRs and the “content or substance” of that inclination.  Since this 
matter is treated in Chapter III, it suffices to state the following. That traditional Africa 
did aspire to the realization of a life lived in the presence of the divine is a formal basic 
religious inclination.  But to proceed from this general religious posture and ignore the 
particular “substance” of that inclination; i.e., meaning, ideas and moral values that 
would help to clarify ATR’s aspirations, their basic assumptions and ethical norms, is 
inappropriate.  Of course, most of Bujo’s elucidations of the African religious views are 
accurate.  The problem is that those ideas and values are flawed by virtue of moral 
limitations or sin that marks all cultural realities.     
In contrast to this, what stands out in Bujo’s argument is tantamount to a précis 
that the ancestral traditions attained a normative theological (and moral status).  They can 
thus provide an autonomous source and frame of reference for understanding and living 
the New Testament event.  These glaring overtones are partly the reasons why this study 
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stands in disagreement with Bujo’s proposal.  The entire ancestral schema renders 
irrelevant the question of normative history as originating with Revelation in Israel.  For 
history would be one religious history as Karl Rahner’s theology of the anonymous 
Christian has been rightly interpreted.99  The functionality attached to terminologies of 
profane and sacred history, grace, human freedom, and sin is rendered superfluous in the 
theology of the anonymous Christian.  This is precisely the same direction to which the 
Proto-Ancestor Christology points.  So, if Bujo’s line of argument is taken seriously, it 
would mean that the ancestral religious propensity simply converges into the normative 
history that Revelation in Israel represents without any basic contradictions.  Thus far, 
this background furnishes the context for pursuing further a corollary theme to that of 
dialogue: the function of Christology in fostering the development of cultural traditions. 
Christian Faith and the Development of the African Cultural Traditions    
 We now seek to pursue further the function of dialogue in the Christological 
schema, especially in facilitating the development and growth of cultural traditions.  In 
view of this, the major problem with Bujo’s use of incarnation Christology has to do with 
what appears like an exclusive use of praeparatio evangelica as the proper context for 
understanding the incarnation.  There is no attempt to use concrete Scriptural traditions.  
All we get is an abstract Christology of incarnation that replaces the actual mission of 
Christ: Gospel mission. 
The idea of praeparatio evangelico derives its meaning from John’s transcendent 
Christology as already described (Jn. 1:4c).  This understanding is also implied in the 
teaching of Dei Verbum, where it expresses the Church’s missionary stance to the world, 
particularly in relation to existing religious traditions.  And in contrast to Bujo’s stance, 
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Revelation in Israel is the proper context for praeparatio evangelico primarily, because 
the former provides the rationale (ultimate salvation) and its potency (Christ) for the 
mission (DV, nos. 7-10. cf. EN, no. 9). 100  It follows that Christian Revelation as the sum 
total of God’s self-communication through the Christ event, comprise the events of the 
incarnation, the Passion and Death, the Resurrection and the sending of the Spirit.  These 
as equally important dimensions of Christology modify the notion of praeparatio 
evangelico, thus giving the “incarnation” a particular leaning and propensity.  In sum, the 
incarnation has the Judaic culture as its proper context, but not as an event that took place 
simultaneously in all cultures.  There is an erroneous perspective that colors some 
application of the idea of praeparatio evangelico, such as one championed by Iniobong 
S. Udioidem.101  There is a tendency to confuse the “affirmation” of the cultural realities 
made possible by event of the incarnation with incarnation of the “Christ event in world 
cultures.”  Incarnating Christianity in cultures is a process that is forever contingent on 
the “free will” of cultural subjects, and for that matter, happens gradually.  If this were 
not so the church would not be theologizing about the dialectical relationship between 
faith and culture or Christian-cultural dialogue.  In terms of contextual methodologies, 
incarnation of the Christ event in cultures is a complex matter requiring the balancing of 
Scripture, tradition (doctrine), and culture.  An illustration can show why an absence of 
similar perception in Bujo’s schema hinders dialogue as a condition for the development 
of the African cultural traditions.   
The task of incarnating Christianity entails bringing Scripture, doctrine, and 
culture to bear on the development of a cultural tradition.  In light of the current 
considerations, Bujo’s argument that “Christ constitutes the explanation of human kind” 
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reflects a measure of understanding the church’s teaching on the universal significance of 
the incarnation.  But because Bujo takes the church’s recognition of implicit revelation as 
an indiscriminate validation of cultural values, there is need to illustrate the difference 
between a “formal doctrinal statement” and its “application” to shed more light on what 
is the issue here.   
The Council Fathers stated that for the church’s evangelizing mission to become 
effective,  
…it is necessary that in each of the great socio-cultural regions, 
theological investigation be encouraged and the facts and words revealed 
by God, contained in the sacred scriptures, and explained by the Fathers 
and Magisterium of the Church, submitted to new examination in light of 
the tradition of the universal church.  In this way it will be more clearly 
understood by what means the faith can be explained in terms of the 
philosophy and wisdom of the people, and how their customs, concepts of 
life and social structures can be reconciled by divine revelation, (Ad 
Gentes Divinitus, no. 22).   
 
Church doctrine such as this is not an end but points beyond itself to a particular spiritual 
and moral path that the Catholic faith represents in its entirety.  By implication, doctrine 
always requires interpretation before it is applied.  At this level of the church’s teaching, 
this declaration is a doctrinal statement in the form of authoritative guidance.  It provides 
the basis for understanding the Catholic faith in the incarnation and the practice of that 
faith through missionary activities. As it stands, the statement naturally follows the 
dynamics of the “proclamatory nature” of the spoken Word of Scripture.  That is, 
although its intent is to protect the deposit of faith, doctrinal formulations do not spell out 
how local theologies should be developed, but leaves to the proclamatory principle in the 
scriptures to manifest itself through dialogue with cultures. “Proclamation” as the 
character of official teaching derives from the intrinsic quality of Jesus’ style of teaching.   
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That is, there are two moral trajectories in Jesus’ proclamation of the Kingdom of 
God that culminate in the church’s teaching on the “defense” and the “purification” of 
cultures.  At the first level, Jesus’ preaching was always an invitation to Israel to identify 
and recognize her own religious experience in the proclaimed Word.  This is what the 
doctrinal statement is inviting the local churches to do.  The affirmation of what has 
always been good in Israel since creation is always implied.  In view of inculturation, the 
idea of “defense of culture” so prominent in Vatican II missiology can be located at this 
level of proclamation.102  The church defends culture when evangelization seeks to 
recognize and make use of the valid truth in the culture as a “starting point” for encounter 
with the Risen Christ.  Yet, defense is not the same as validation, for the mission of the 
church is to defend in order to invite a culture to embrace further growth.  Why?  God’s 
“invitation or call” is dynamic, because it seeks to bring human beings beyond their 
cultural ideals and meanings to new horizons of meaning and experiences.  Thus in view 
of the greater scheme of things, it is at the level of “interpretation”103 that our individual 
and communal faith and spirituality do find and give fuller meaning and expression to the 
reality of salvation to which any authentic doctrine points.  To this end the second level 
of proclamation is directed. 
  Proclamation at the second level consists in the “challenges” such as those 
contained in Jesus’ call to Israel to outgrow its “weak” points: to the benefit of later 
generations of non-Jewish cultures.  Because of the fierce resistance to his message, 
much of Jesus’ teaching is conveyed along the path of “challenge or confrontation.”  This 
line of proclamation underscores the necessity of taking a critical view of culture at the 
point of social contemporaneity.  Similarly, it is at this second level that we can locate the 
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purification of cultures which contextual theology must express through a critical 
approach to culture (GS, no. 58).  Weighed against these two moral imperatives, 
therefore, Bujo’s synthesis is devoid of the proclamatory dynamic; i.e., the power of the 
Word to affirm and to challenge simultaneously in order to promote further growth.  The 
ancestral synthesis enforces religious and cultural status quo.  What is remarkable thus far 
is his failure to distinguish between formal doctrinal statements, such as the one 
mandating the local Churches to carry out appropriate research into their heritages.  Seen 
this way, this teaching cannot be used simply to affirm indiscriminately what is already in 
the cultural religious heritages of people.  Moreover, interpretation and application of 
doctrine must always preserve the essential meaning and character of the core message of 
the Gospel.  Where these important points are violated or not well synchronized, the 
defense of culture would stand in opposition to the dynamic of purification.  As result, 
the Gospel cannot act as a “leaven” of society in cultural domains.  What this study is 
saying repeatedly is that dialogue is an intrinsic function of Christology, because it 
enables and facilitates the development of cultural traditions.  For that matter, dialogue 
has direct implications for contextualization.  Its reality attunes local theology to be 
attentive not only to culture but also to the existing conditions of the human being 
involved.  That Proto-Ancestor Christology is very deficient in this important and initial 
stage in inculturation is illustrated by the following paragraph.  
    Bujo acknowledges the question of contextualization as an important 
dimension of inculturation.  However, contextualization, as far as Africa is concerned, 
demands attentiveness to a number of factors: a) the concept of a human being; b) the 
meaning and basis of culture; c) the reality of social change; d) cultural domination, and 
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e) cultural dialogue.  His handling of these issues, if any, leaves a lot to be desired.  
Although his main concern is contemporary Africa, the context that supplies the subject 
matter for his synthesis is decisively pre-colonial Africa.  Many questions remain 
unanswered in this regard among which is whether self-determination could be achieved 
by focusing solely on ATRs in their institutional past.  Thus Bujo fails to treat adequately 
issues of social change in their concreteness and consequently betrays contemporary 
African humanity.  The most outstanding issue in this particular instance is a general 
perception of culture as an entity separate from its authors.  His view generally suggests 
that the African people may be impelled to change by present world conditions, but their 
cultures have unfaltering tenacity and dynamism.  The mistaken belief seems to be that 
all social values constructed in the remote past can be inserted in the present history 
uninterrupted and still function viably.  
Despite his inventive uses of African ancestry, Bujo shares a common impulse 
with most writers in African Theology, as explained at the beginning.  More than most 
who have delved into the aspect of ancestry, he is outstanding in his foresight on the 
function of ancestry in the totality of the African world view.  Be that as it may, the 
resultant theology does not speak to the basic direction of Christianity for reasons already 
outlined, and those yet to be discussed.  In view of the basic issues of theological 
foundations discussed so far, let it be clear that Bujo’s proposal is one of the most radical 
challenges to the claims of Christianity regarding the meaning and the primary function 
of Christ in the greater scheme of ultimate salvation for all humanity.  Whether or not he 
was cognizant of the full implications of the Proto-Ancestor schema, the following is the 
outcome.  Because the ancestors are raised from their social function to the level of the 
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basic104 theological foundations, a Proto-Ancestor Christology challenges rather than 
enhances the basic function of Christ for a Christian theology.  It is, therefore, the basic 
nature of this problem which necessitates that this rebuttal takes the reflections on Bujo’s 
proposal to the level of theological foundations.  This task is extended to Chapter III, 
where it will be possible to treat ontological issues beyond the terms of the present 
working objective.  All in all, Bujo’s proposal aptly represents the prevalent trend of 
theological thought prior to the African Synod.  The next step is a reflection on the 
contributions to the African Synod event, 1994, to the basic question on the person of 
Christ and his meaning for the Church’s mission in Africa.  The end result of this 
particular task is a necessary step toward an understanding of the importance of the vision 
proposed by this study. 
 
   SECTION IV 
A.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AFRICAN SYNOD (1994) FOR 
CONTEXTUAL THEOLOGIES 
 
For centuries the Catholic Church has convened extended meetings of the 
hierarchy to discuss and deliberate about matters relating to faith, morals, or 
theological discipline. Pope John Paul II convened regional and national ecclesial 
Synods to take stock and consider where the church’s mission in a particular region 
or nation is proceeding. Synods, therefore, meet to address existential needs and to 
speak authoritatively in response to them as magistra vitae.  The African Synod was 
called by the Pope John Paul II in 1989 in order to respond to major pastoral and 
theological concerns, in this case the evangelization of Africa.  This entire process 
was termed by John Paul II as the building up of the “family of God on earth” in 
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ways suited to the African context.  This chapter thus attempts to situate this study in 
the pastoral-theological context of the African Synod.  However, given the broad 
range of the Synod’s concern, this chapter is limited to the significance of the 
Synodal teaching for contextual theologies and for inculturation. While this chapter 
situates the critique of African theology in the context of the general theological-
historical background of the African synod, this exercise is not meant to be 
comprehensive 
 On the surface appearance, the African Synod did not have an explicit agenda for 
critiquing African theological efforts.  But the deliberations by the Synod Fathers, in 
conjunction with John Paul’s Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation: Ecclesia in Africa,  
have direct bearing on the nature and orientation of Africa theology as from 1994 
onward.  Related to the issues raised in the preceding critique is an important question 
also addressed by the Synod Fathers and John Paul II. What is the fundamental basis 
(principle) for missionary work and contextual theology in Africa?  Their response to this 
critical matter is indicative of the appropriate direction for the African theological efforts.  
The specific concern by this study, with regard to this matter, is the extent to which 
contemporary African theology is in accord with the decisive points in the Synodal 
teaching.  For while the Synod event bears directly on the issue of the authenticity and 
the commitment of the local African Church to the mission of the universal church, the 
event and especially the theological emphases therein do not seem to have caught the 
attention it deserves in the post-Synodal theological writings.  The current treatment of 
some important aspects of the Synod is based on the available evidence and on the 
conviction that the search for contextual theology must be firmly rooted in the major 
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points of departure taken by the African Synod and John Paul II’s Apostolic Exhortation.  
The Pope’s particular nuanced teachings on these matters have methodological 
implications for local theologies in Africa.  Published two years prior to the Synod, 
Bujo’s theological horizon, before and after the Synod, was an appropriate point of 
reference.  We shall begin with the general prevalent attitude prior to the African Synod, 
because it reflects the standing attitudes of most African theologians 
A cloud of indifference in Catholic African Christianity still hangs steadily over 
the African Synod since its conclusion.  While many are convinced the Synod achieved 
nothing, theological reflections also continue with little, if any, reference to the core 
substance of its teaching.  But if a synod is in actuality what Engelbert Mveng proclaims 
it to be, then, it must be an important milestone in the development of the Catholic 
African Christian tradition so much yearned for.   
[T]he synod, both a divine invitation and a call to conversion, was viewed 
[by some] as a decisive step to allow the Church in Africa to discover 
itself and to become aware of the many challenges that the future poses.  
By the grace of God this synod could be an opportunity for the Church in 
Africa to discover its conciliar dimension and to lay the foundation of a 
true communion of the churches of Africa to build the kingdom of God on 
our continent in solidarity and charity.105  
 
Before presenting major highlights related to this event, we will begin with an illustration 
of particular expectations on the part of the African Catholics that might have led to a 
general misunderstanding that continues to hinder viable reflections on what the Synod 
(1994) was all about, and what it stands for in terms of the Catholic African tradition.   
In the final moments toward the actual Synod event, “The New People Editorial 
Staff” based in Nairobi, Kenya, sent an emotionally charged “Open Letter to the Holy 
Father” alleging that  
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Due to the African tradition of respect for the elders and superiors 
combined with the authoritarian attitude of the Roman Curia a good 
number of African bishops have developed an attitude of passive 
obedience. Holy Father, do not allow your collaborators to misinform you.  
The members of the local church in Africa are not happy with the decision 
to hold the Synod in Rome.  To speak of what happened as a ‘genuine 
African event’ adds insult to injury.106   
 
Even though the expressed disappointment and the consequent despondency revolve 
around John Paul’s decision to hold the Synod in Rome, the real cause is the 
misunderstanding fomented by a general unwillingness to examine events in their total 
complexity and totality.  The Editorial staff’s take on John Paul’s involvement in the 
events of the African Synod also illustrates this point with telling effects.  They further 
questioned the Pope whether “there [is still] any room left for experimentation, for a 
reflection that is not a mere repetition of what is stated in the official documents?”  They 
went on to point out very poignantly that:  
Inculturation without profound reflection is impossible.  Why then is there 
so much fear of African theologians?  Why do new rules make them only 
responsible to the secretary of the Synod rather than to the synod Fathers?  
Will their voices be heard at all in Rome during the Synod?  At Vatican II, 
Bishops were entitled to have a personal theologian.  Was that experience 
so harmful as not to be repeated at the level of a Synod in Africa?...The 
‘Higher Theological Institutes’ were mentioned a couple of times… and it 
is said that they ‘should be further developed’ and ‘should continue to do 
research in this area (the African Traditional Religion) and make proposals 
to bishops.’  What about the proposal they have already made?  How long 
are they supposed to make proposals which are systematically ignored?107   
 
We shall observe in passing that Bujo’s proposal is one such example, written in anticipation 
of the Synod event.  On the whole, this letter aptly illustrates the current argument that the 
most basic concerns underlying the African Synod may not have been immediately clear to 
many.  Or some simply refused to acknowledge the challenges in view.  The aim here is not to 
question whether or not the letter should have been written, and much less whether or not the 
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local African Church was unhappy.  The important question is whether the expressed 
discontent, in view of the greater scheme of things, communicates a real understanding of the 
events.  Even the Pope’s personal concern for Africa was telescoped through the Synod related 
disappointments, thus illustrating the tension many African Christians put between the Pope’s 
compassion and his responsible intervention. “We find in your attitudes and speeches you give 
when you visit African countries a deep and compassionate knowledge of our life and 
problems.  [But] we do not find this knowledge in the text of Instrumentum Laboris.”108  
Despite the expressed discontent, John Paul’s deep concern for Africa comes in a complex 
matrix of personal compassion and pontifical responsibilities.  For this and other reasons, the 
fullness of the Pope’s vision still remains a future possibility for the entire Catholic Church of 
Africa as indicated in his Apostolic Exhortation: Ecclesia in Africa.  For immediate purposes, 
this letter represents, to a great extent, the prevailing emotional and intellectual climate that 
continues to hinder the African Catholic elite to reflect deeply on the Synod event.  To get 
beyond the cloud of misunderstanding and indifference, we must conjure up some soul 
searching reflections with respect to John Paul’s take on African Catholicism prior to and after 
the Synod.   
An Overview of the Theological-Historical Context of the Synod 
The concept of “African unity” discussed earlier on gradually impacted the self-
understanding of the African local Church.  From the initial collaborations, among 
African Bishops, in expressing pastoral concerns on the continent during Vatican II 
Council (EA, nos. 3, 5); a sense of unity among different Episcopal Conferences 
gradually emerged over the decades.  Coupled with the commitment of African 
theologians and others, this drive apparently blossomed into the desire for an African 
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Council long before the African Synod, 1994. According to Engelbert Mveng, the 
pastoral vision for an African Council consisted in “[exploring and examining] future 
directions for Christianity” in order to “create conditions for the development of the 
Christian religion so that it could establish deep roots.”109  Thus in view of the issues at 
hand, a concept of an African Council is a very important stage for understanding the 
circumstances that led to a Synod as the appropriate province for collegial functions in 
the African Church (EA, no. 7). In other words, John Paul changed from the council to 
the synod as the appropriate venue for reflecting on the African reality vis-à-vis the 
church’s mission. It suffices to mention here the significance that the aforementioned 
transition holds for understanding the African Synod’s specific focus and John Paul’s 
post Synodal Exhortation.  Engelbert Mveng‘s succinct and honest historical account 
sheds needed light on the pros and cons that accompanied the process of formulating the 
structural and operational philosophy for an African Council.110  The concept of 
“particular churches” will be the main focus in this particular regard. 
 According to Mveng’s account, the concept of particular churches had to do with 
the theological-structural and operational framework which theologians, in liaison with 
SECAM, proposed for an African Council.  He points out two pivotal issues regarding 
the transformation of an African Council into an African Synod.  First, Mveng observes 
that the “task force” for an African Council decided to use Canon (439.1) as their frame 
of reference in applying to an African Council the “doctrine and practice of the particular 
churches.”111  And that the imprecision in the Canon and the African interpretation of 
it112 resulted in a disjunction between the theological and philosophical underpinnings 
laid for an African Council and the Vatican II Council doctrine on the particular churches 
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(OE, no. 2. cf. AG, no. 19-22).113  He states significantly that “The statutes for an 
[African Council or SECAM] did not correspond to any of the ecclesial structures 
envisaged in the Code of Canon Law.  [T]he [nature of conciliar gathering stipulated by 
the Code] has neither statutes nor jurisdiction nor power.”114  Despite this, the task force 
found in the New Code of Canon Law cited above (1983) the basis for stipulating how an 
African Council would relate to the Holy See and other ecclesial communions.  “SECAM 
could invite a delegation or representative from the Holy See, but this delegation would 
have no voting rights” in much the same way as “ecumenical representatives from Africa 
or delegates from Catholic ecclesial communions outside the continent”115 would not.  In 
addition to these two major factors, Mveng observes that the process of creating an 
African Council was daunted by a [general lack of consensus in Africa] on the number of 
major issues.116  It is, therefore, no small matter that some people “saw the calling of an 
African Synod as the quite logical gesture of a pope, tired of waiting for an African 
episcopate to take responsibility, took it upon himself to do what the law allowed him to 
do-convene a Synod of Bishops and designate the evangelization of Africa as its central 
theme.”117  True as that may have been, it would be an overstatement to attribute the 
basic causes for transforming the proposal for an African Council into an African Synod 
to the immediate circumstances surrounding the process of setting up a council structure. 
This study also observes that the fundamental weakness in the theological underpinnings 
for an African Council, and other related matters, were indicative of a much greater 
problem that loomed before John Paul II.  His decisive concerns in the post Synodal 
reflections center clearly on the Catholic African expressions of theology, precisely 
Christology and ecclesiology.  The weaknesses in the formulations for an African 
 67
Council stem from this greater reality.  In other words, the meaning of Christ and its 
implication for evangelizing Africa is the one major factor that impelled his decision on 
the Synod, and the one thread that binds the Apostolic Exhortation: Ecclesia in Africa.  
The goal and theme of evangelization assigned to the Synod only makes sense against the 
Christological background treated by the Pope. The Catholic Church is founded on 
Christ, but it is equally grounded by the various levels and dimensions of theologies and 
pastoral practices that articulate Christ’s foundational character in the totality of the 
Church’s mission.  If a theology is flawed at a very fundamental level, it follows that the 
Christian practices and spirituality it engenders will be equally skewed.   
The desire for a greater measure of self-determination as an African local Church, 
though a good aspiration in itself, was frequently expressed in theologies that were not 
genuinely grounded in Christ and what he stands for.  An immediate example is the 
current proposal under investigation in which Bujo had designated ancestry as the basis 
of new Christology and ecclesiology for Africa.  The tensions cited in his proposal in 
particular are representative of the general trend of the African theological enterprises 
prior to the Synod.  M. L. Daneel reports similar extreme positions in African theology 
that sought to assert the “superiority of traditional African religions,”118 for instance.  
Proponents of this view “advocate an unconditional return to the indigenous religions of 
Africa.  Others ‘assigned’ more or less equal value to Christianity, so that the former is 
not seen as introducing a special, new dimension to Africa.”119  Given this propensity that 
dominated the theological scene, we can safely assert that the provision in the Canon that 
Mveng comments about resonated well with dominant impulses in African theologies of 
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inculturation than with Vatican II theology of ecclesial communion would have.  John 
Paul II did not miss this.  He begins by reminiscing that  
Right from the beginning of the preparations for the Special Assembly, it 
was my heartfelt desire, fully shared by the Council of the General 
Secretariat, to ensure that this synod would be authentically and 
unequivocally African.  At the same time, it was of fundamental 
importance that the Special Assembly should be celebrated in full 
communion with the universal Church (EA, 19). 
 
  
This statement is critical to the understanding of the different themes and the emphases 
that the Pope makes in his Post-Synodal Exhortation.  To verify these claims we must 
turn to the John Paul’s teaching in view of the African Synod. 
B.  JOHN PAUL II ON GOSPEL MISSION IN AFRICA  
Ecclesia in Africa is a Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation.  This document 
consists of a synthesis of John Paul’s teaching with that of the African Synod (EA, nos. 
1-2).  While the Synodal teaching and the Apostolic Exhortation encompass all areas 
related to ecclesial life, the present analysis is limited to matters relating to the concept of 
Catholic faith and theology as articulated by John Paul II and the African Synod Fathers.  
This task necessitates picking up and weaving some important threads pertaining to 
Bujo’s proposal with major points in the two documents.  Ecclesia in Africa not only 
reveals the importance of the church’s universal mission to John Paul’s thoughts, but also 
that this dimension of Christian faith and life presented itself as a problem with respect to 
inculturation in Africa.  In the exhortation the Pope maintains a gentle but firm attitude 
toward African Christianity; on one hand affirming the positive and viable propositions 
from the Synod, on the other hand, inserting explanations and challenges where the 
Synod apparently did not give sufficient attention to certain basic matters (EA, nos. 60-
61).  This mood that pervades the entire document is also indicative of what was of 
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primary concern to the Pope with regard to African Catholicism.  For purposes of this 
study, therefore, understanding the meaning and purpose of John Paul’s teaching in 
Ecclesia in Africa is necessary in order to better grasp the issues raised in this study 
against African theology in general, and Bujo’s proposal in particular.   
To enable the church in Africa to assume full responsibility by which it would 
take a lead in ensuring that Christianity plays a role in setting the Continent in a new 
direction, the Pope took a number of important steps.  In a statement that is clearly a 
criticism of the operational philosophy of the African proposal for Episcopal gathering, 
he said: “Synodal Assembly cannot be reduced to a consultation on practical matters.  Its 
true raison d’etre is the fact that the Church can move forward only by strengthening 
communion among her members, beginning with pastors” (EA, no. 17).  He clarified that 
the African Synod would “promote an organic pastoral solidarity within the entire 
territory and nearby Islands” (Pope’s emphasis) (EA, no. 5).  He, however, maintained 
this without losing sight of the longstanding quest by the African Catholicism for some 
measure of ecclesial autonomy.  In a reminiscence that indicates this awareness the Pope 
said; “The celebration of the Special Assembly showed to the whole world that the local 
Churches of Africa hold a rightful place in the communion of the Church, that they are 
entitled to preserve and to develop their own tradition” (EA, no. 11).  But to ensure that 
in doing so the Church remains, ‘one, holy, and apostolic’ (EA, 11. cf. OE, no. 2), the 
Pope adds that this must be done “without lessening the primacy of Peter.  This chair 
presides over the assembly of charity and protects legitimate differences, while at the 
same time it sees that such differences do not hinder unity but rather contribute towards 
it” (EA, 11. cf. Lumen Gentium, 13).  These two complementary statements are typical 
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examples of the many pointed emphases the Pope made regarding the mission of the 
church in Africa.  The statements point specifically to the creative tension John Paul II 
put between the pastoral needs of the local African Church and the universal mission of 
the church (EA, no. 2, 16).  By inference, the development of a “Catholic” African 
tradition ought to emerge in communion with the universal church’s faith and line of 
thought.  And the African church, represented in its hierarchy, could not afford to focus 
on issues that would cripple rather than facilitate the proper function of the Gospel 
Mission in Africa (EA, no. 13).  In the introduction alone, John Paul II mentions over 25 
times the theme of “ecclesial communion” in relation to the “universality of the Church 
and its missionary role.”  These two themes flow in tandem in the introduction, which 
also happens to be the space where the Pope makes the effort to cast off a shadow of any 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of his role in the Synod (EA, nos. 1-6).  
The second step that John Paul II took was to identify the theological frame of 
reference that would ground the Synod event.  He put this into perspective by basing 
himself on the three important events.  First and foremost, the Pope understood his role in 
the Synod event in light of his pontificate and personal calling.  Two major important 
highlights of these were the realities of his pontificate that occurred between the event of 
the Second Ecumenical Council, and the movements of the church and of human history 
toward the end of the Second Millennium.  Thus he points out that the Synod was “an 
event of such decisive importance for the church in Africa” (EA, no. 1): a decision that 
led to the selection of a theme that would effectively cover all the issues at hand.    
The theme assigned to the Special Assembly-The Church in Africa and 
her evangelizing mission towards the Year 2000.  ‘You shall be my 
witnesses’ (Acts 1:8) expresses my desire that this Church should live the 
time leading up to the Great Jubilee as ‘a new Advent,’ a time of 
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expectation and preparation.  In fact, I consider preparation for the Year 
2000 as one of the keys for interpreting my pontificate (EA, no. 18. cf. 
EA. no. 16).  
 
Remarkably, this theme echoes a major theme of Vatican II missiology (Ad gentes, nos. 10-
18).  Given the Pope’s reasoning, his choice of this theme had the purpose of making the 
teaching of the Second Vatican Council the authoritative basis for understanding how the Spirit 
was moving the church’s mission in Africa.  He states in retrospect: “The Second Vatican 
Council can certainly be considered, from the point of view of salvation history, as the 
cornerstone of the present century which is now rapidly approaching the Third Millennium.  In 
the context of that great event, the church of God in Africa experienced true moments of 
grace,” (EA, no. 2).  Hence, Vatican II ecclesiology provides an evangelical framework in 
which to deal adequately with Africa’s ecclesial and pastoral concerns as well as the Pope’s 
own.  He later evaluates the teaching of the Synod along the same themes and objectives he 
had established before (EA, no. 8).  If different Episcopal Conferences in Africa were seeking 
for some kind of meaningful inter-collaboration, the Pope managed to unite them around the 
concept of a Synodal Assembly (EA, 15-16).  Clearly, then, the Pope sought to challenge 
African Catholicism from focusing only on the immediate pastoral concerns, but to reflect on 
them in light of ‘salvation history’ as it was being defined by momentous events, local and 
global.  Significant too, he sought to put collegial activities in their proper perspective beyond 
the juridical function of Canon Law as we saw in matters relating to an African Council.  
Referring to the Second Vatican council event he said, “That historic event was truly the 
crucible of the affective and effective communion of worldwide bishops” (EA, 2, cf. 2 Cor. 11: 
28).  
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Keeping the African cultural and ecclesial realities in view, John Paul II enunciated 
central aspects that must accompany the African Christian search for the truths regarding 
Africa’s total destiny and the church’s mission.  One aspect that is evidently John Paul’s 
initiative appears in segment (60-61) of the Apostolic Exhortation: a segment that deals with 
theological foundation.  The Synod Fathers had treated the meaning of Christ for Africa, and 
expressed their firm faith in the function of theology in the evangelizing process, but had not 
focused explicitly on the question of theological foundations for theology and mission.  They 
had instead treated this topic indirectly by pointing out the “Theological basis of inculturation” 
(Prop, 28).  The Pope’s position on this theme is critical, because it is closely tied with Peter’s 
primacy, collegiality, and ecclesial communion as essential themes in the overall church’s 
universal mission.  That is, it is theological foundations that ground these themes giving them a 
viable and dynamic unity deserving the title of a Catholic theology and mission.   
Referring to the ‘Theological Basis of Inculturation’ the Synod had declared that 
‘Every culture needs to be transformed by the Gospel values in the light of the Paschal 
Mystery’ (EA, 61. cf. Prop. 28).120  John Paul went beyond to situate this affirmation in the 
framework of theological foundations to indicate where the central dynamic for cultural 
transformation lay.  He observed that “Given the close and organic relationship that exists 
between Jesus Christ and the Word that the Church proclaims, the inculturation of the revealed 
message cannot but follow the ‘logic’ proper to the mystery of redemption” (EA, 61ff).  In 
other words, it is not enough to base inculturation on the Paschal Mystery.  Christ by his very 
person and eternal mission situated in the Jewish religious is the foundation and consequently 
the organizing principle: “the logic proper to the mystery of redemption.”   
This sublime mystery of the Incarnation of the Word, a mystery which 
took place in history: in clearly defined circumstances of time and space, 
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amidst a people with its own culture, a people that God had chosen and 
accompanied throughout the entire history of salvation, in order to show 
through what he did for them or what he intended to do for the human race 
(EA, no. 60).  
  
By this emphasis the Pope points out the unique role played by Revelation in Israel in the 
missionary function of the Christian Church.  Accordingly, this role cannot be appropriated by 
any cultural religious tradition.  By implication, the development and growth of the Catholic 
African tradition can take place only when theology in Africa is rooted in authentic 
Christology.   
John Paul II was not alone in seeking to attune the African theological enterprises to the 
Christological horizon.  S. O. Abogurin, a West African theologian, had earlier on argued 
forcefully and accurately that “The Church in Africa today is concerned about indigenization 
and contextualization.  It needs to be equally concerned about the dangerous heresies of 
syncretism, of direct and indirect denial of the uniqueness of the power and adequacy of Christ, 
and of the denial of the completeness of our salvation in him and through him.”121  With the 
same conviction, the Pope exhorted African Christianity not to withhold preaching the Gospel 
of Christ from the followers of ATRs.  He reminiscences that “All those privileged to be at the 
celebration of the Special Assembly for Africa rejoiced to see how African Catholics are 
assuming ever greater responsibility in their local Churches and are seeking a deeper 
understanding of what it means to be both Catholics and Africans” (EA, 11).  In a nutshell, the 
chief problem which John Paul II perceived in the African Church was how to be both Catholic 
and African.  He also understood that this would not happen unless Catholics assume due 
responsibility through their church leadership.  The Synod was the first step in the long process 
of seeking how to be at once Catholic and African.  These were calls that the Synod Fathers 
had to confront afresh with binding force.   
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With a touch of humor, the Pope gathered the Synod Fathers around “the Tomb of Peter 
for the opening of the Special Assembly” and had them profess their faith in the “unique 
Church of Christ,” following the famous exchange between Jesus and Peter, “Do you also wish 
to go away?...Lord to whom shall we go?  You have the words of eternal life and have believed 
and know that you are the Holy One of God” (Jn. 6: 67-69) (EA. no. 10).122  With that 
confession, the Pope solemnly and ritually led the hierarchy to recommit themselves to its 
primary obligation, and through them, the entire church in Africa thereafter.  In his own words: 
“The fact that evangelization is the theme of all these Synodal Assemblies is meant to indicate 
how alive today is the Church’s awareness of the salvific mission which she has received from 
Christ” (EA, no. 18).  Referring to the expressed commitment to Christ’s Lordship, the Pope 
reminded and emphasized that the: “the Bishops of Africa entrusted their Continent to Christ 
the Lord, convinced that he alone [not their ancestors] through his Gospel and his Church, can 
save Africa from its present difficulties and heal its many ills” (EA. no. 10 cf. 40).  All these in 
practical terms imply that while the Chair of Peter retains the duties stated in Lumen Gentium, 
no.13, the path of inculturation and its success in Africa is, henceforth, incumbent upon the 
authoritative guidance of the African ecclesial hierarchy in communion with the universal 
Church.  Evidently, it was clear to the African Bishops that as the local church in Africa 
continues to seek ways of articulating its concerns and teaching in light of its mission, its 
ultimate frame of reference had to get beyond the immediate confines of the African cultural 
experiences to the very foundation of the church’s mission.   
The Synod as a Major Point Departure for Contextual Theologies   
The present purpose is to bring out the points of departure, which the Synod took in 
view of inculturation and contextual theology in Africa.  Hence, with reference to theologians 
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the Synod states unequivocally, “Your mission is a great and noble one in the service of 
inculturation which is the important worksite for the development of African theology….The 
Synod knows that without the conscientious and devoted exercise of your function something 
essential would be lacking” (MS. no. 56).  The Synod Fathers also acknowledge that “You 
have already proposed the African reading of the mystery of Christ” (MS. no. 56).  The Synod 
then affirmed that “Jesus Christ the Son of man…is the center and model of every aspect of 
Christian life (i.e., Church-as-Family, and Church-as-Brotherhood).  The Incarnation of the 
Son of God is the principle and model of inculturation” (Prop. no. 28. cf. EA, nos. 60-62).  
Having rooted inculturation in incarnation Christology, the Synod declared that “the Gospel 
itself becomes the principle that purifies, guides, animates and elevates the culture, 
transforming it in such a way that there is a new creation.  There is need for every culture to be 
transformed by Gospel values in the light of the paschal mystery” (Prop. 28).  Thus the Synod 
Fathers concurred with John Paul II in recognizing that the salvific power of God lies with the 
Gospel, not with culture.  
Against this background, the Synod went further to lay down “a criteria of inculturation 
[emphasizing that] the project of inculturation will respect the two following criteria: a) 
compatibility with Christian message, and b) the communion with the universal Church” (Prop. 
31).  This emphasis was nailed in by a statement that “In all cases, care should be taken to 
avoid syncretism” (prop. 31).  Taken as a unity, these major positions bring out three important 
elements in the contextualization process.  First, incarnation is the theological-evangelical 
framework for contextual theologies and Christ is the overall foundation as well as the 
organizing principle.  The mutual interplay between African theology and inculturation is made 
possible by the New Testament Christology as their primary basis and condition.  It also 
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follows that, if “inculturation…is the important worksite for the development of African 
theology,” the Synod situated contextual theologies in the framework of the church’s mission.  
That is, pastoral commitment in contemporary Catholicism does not take its dynamism from 
somewhere else, not the least from ancestral heritages; it must be informed by Vatican II 
missiology.  Therefore, the challenge for contextual theologies in Africa is how to draw upon 
positive elements in the ATRs at the same time upholding Christ as the foundation of a 
Christian theology.  In practical terms this means that certain pastoral concerns for the local 
church in Africa may be valid, but the entire process toward the perceived goal must preserve 
and reflect the evangelical dynamism at the heart of the Christian tradition: i.e., salvation is in 
Christ. This in turn implies the need to shift the interpretative framework for contextual 
theology from the predominantly cultural-historical premises defined, by a pre-and-post-
independence reactionary philosophy, to the Gospel, the contemporary human and cultural 
realities.  In reference to this reality the Synod Fathers said:  
….we also share a deep concern and call for a new and urgent thrust in the 
evangelization of African men and women, wounded in their dignity by 
the scourges of the colonial past, oppressed by wars, disturbed by so many 
sects, manipulated by local and foreign means…The Synod wishes 
therefore that the post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation refer to the actual 
situation of Africa so as to help determine pastoral and missionary 
priorities and address the message of salvation to men and women of the 
Continent (Prop. no. 2).   
 
The key word here is ‘the actual situation of Africa,’ although there is no mention of African 
cultures being possible causes of the present situation. Nevertheless, the Fathers favored “an 
onward-looking vision” while mentioning past events in light of the present.  But for some this 
gesture is tantamount to an abandonment of the historical approach favored by African 
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theology.  Basing his reflection on the Lineamenta,123 Justin S. Ukpong, for instance, maintains 
that “history repeats itself” when past realities are not brought to bear on the present.124  
Given the fact that the Synod’s theme is the future evangelization mission 
of the African church, this approach does not seem very helpful.  The 
history of evangelization ought to have been presented in such a way as to 
provide the proper vision, inspiration and commitment needed for the 
church to create a new history in the third millennium.  For history is not 
necessarily a presentation of dead facts but rather a matter of interpretation 
of facts; the purpose of interpretation determines the selection and 
organization of facts…Thus history repeats itself when knowledge of the 
past has not been utilized to create a new situation (his emphasis).125  
 
The problem with Ukpong’s perspective does not consist in the relevancy of the historical 
events for current discernment.  The main issue is the preeminence he accords to the past.  
Precisely, inculturation as a working principle of evangelization requires that 
evangelization makes the present rather than the past the starting point for reflection. The 
General Directory for Catechesis refers to this approach as “the pedagogue of God, 
source and model of the pedagogue of the faith.”126  By necessity, the past experiences 
find many relevant and apt entry points in the present.  We see a similar trend in Christ’s 
entire missionary activity.  He approached people where they were.  The traditional 
issues such as “respecting rules of the elders,” (Mt. 12: 1-8) are historical realities that 
came into play only after that fact.  He did not require that his contemporaries first 
recount and commit to memory the historical abuses stemming from the imperial powers 
of the time before they could understand the contemporary and future significance of his 
message.  Once his message would be understood in relation to their current situation, the 
past experiences would not elude the dynamic character of Israel’s religious memory.  
Israel’s spiritual genius lay in making the past meaningful in every generation.  
Moreover, the nature of Jesus’ mission could not accommodate prioritizing an historical 
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approach to people’s needs and problems.  Animosity as a natural consequence of 
dwelling on the past hurts militates against the “love of neighbor” as the axis of the 
kingdom of God Jesus came to establish.  In similar fashion and in contrast to the line of 
approach sought by Ukpong, the Synod Fathers avoided turning the Synod into a “war 
zone” by dwelling on the past missionary blunders and omissions, and only mentioning 
them where it was necessary (MS, no. 10).     
In brief, Ukpong’s position represents a general inclination in African theology to 
overlook the vitality of the present moment.  Accurate reading of the past consists in 
making the present moment a vantage point for reflection.  A present moment contains 
experiences that can help to better re-cast the past.  Jose Comblin’s view point speaks to 
the relevance of any contemporary human situation for contextual methodology.  “The 
real signs are human beings, human responses to the challenges posed by objective 
events.  Only human beings, through their gestures and actions, can create realities that 
point out a roadway and a course to be taken.”127  The basic problem with the insistence 
on the historical approach consists in the failure to perceive that the signs of the time 
should be discerned from current human actions that signal a transition to an 
objectionable way of life in Africa.  Harvey J. Sindima observes accurately that “The 
African condition is very complex; the problems are many and seem to feed into each 
other in an endless and vicious circle: political problems produce economic crisis which 
cause civil unrest, ethnic prejudice, linguistic tensions as people scramble for what seems 
to be an ever diminishing national economic pie.”128  Yet in utter contrast to the Synod’s 
basic position and other issues raised here, Bujo maintains the most contradictory and 
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self-defeating argument.  Convinced of the viability of the ancestral vision in the post-
Synodal era, he recurs that:  
The ancestor is the main pillar on which a community or clan rests.  The 
ancestor constitutes the unity of the community and represents the pivotal 
point from which all actions of the members of the clan can take their 
dynamism.  This observation is extremely important for an ecclesiological 
blueprint that strives to be at home in the Black African cultural 
heritage…the primordial ancestor, to whom the founding of the clan may 
be attributed, plays an indispensable role.  It is the primordial ancestor 
who is the sustaining force for later ancestors, who form a chain of unity 
and through whom the contemporary generation is able to trace its origin 
back to the first ancestor.129 
 
This post-Synodal reflection is remarkable in terms of issues raised in this paper. The real 
problem does not consist in the essential truth regarding the function of the ancestor; it 
lies in the enduring potency Bujo attaches to ancestry in a totally changed world.  The 
very fact that Bujo maintains the same theological stance after the Synod suggests two 
things from his point of view.  Either the Synod did not provide any valid and 
authoritative teaching on contextual theology, or Bujo was not convinced of its 
Christological focus.  At any rate, this determination imparts to his proposal a 
contemporary significance.  For, if he had to make a proposal in the post-Synodal era, he 
would construct the same reflections that appear in ‘African theology in its Social 
Context.’  Yet, from what we have seen, the teachings of the Synod in conjunction with 
John Paul’s Apostolic Exhortation constitute major points of departure for theological 
thought in Africa.  Without this authoritative teaching making some head-way into the 
area of theology, the Synod event will, like many historical decisions in Africa’s recent 
history become a relic of the past.  
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 For the main purpose of this study, the Christological affirmations made by the 
Synod provide the rationale for situating post-Synodal theological reflections in the 
context of universal theological dialogue.  That is, to acknowledge Christ(ology) as the 
foundation of inculturation and eventual theologies is to open these efforts to the 
legitimate interest, dialogue, and the scrutiny of the universal church.  By implication, 
when the Synod Fathers call for the need for the “local churches [to be given] trust and 
freedom to accomplish [their] task” (Prop. 28), this freedom must be understood as 
effective freedom. Otherwise, theological fruits must be open to universal dialogue.  A 
theology that is overly defensive or inward-looking cannot claim a “Christian” let alone a 
“Catholic” status.    This brings us to an important point on the “reactionary approach to 
theology” and how it plays into the issues discussed so far.   
A Legend of the Reactionary Approach to Contextual Theology 
 Bujo advances his synthesis like his predecessors believing that African theology 
is a legitimate ‘reaction’ against the West in its Christian and cultural orientations toward 
Africa.130  An outstanding evidence of this is the outright avoidance of non-African 
sources and church tradition in general.  It is as though the church, of which African 
Christianity forms a part, just sprang up yesterday and, as such, it has no history, no 
tradition and consequently no religious memory.  Bujo follows in the footstep of writers 
like G.M. Setiloane and Buthelezi, who specified that, “There is also a distinct reaction 
[in African theology] against Black theologians who display a lack of originality by 
constantly falling back on the views of Western theologians which they imbibed during 
their training in Western Universities: Barth says, Tillich thinks, Eliade suggests, 
Bultmann argues…”131  One should observe that this attitude is not directed simply at a 
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“a lack of originality” that involves unreflective use of sources by simply paraphrasing 
original authors.  A reaction against such tendencies does not necessarily have 
theological content.  But when “reaction” is made the principal basis of action for an 
enterprise as deep and as complex as a Christian theology, it is not just inappropriate; it is 
regrettable.   
The reactionary inclination represented by Bujo, Setiloane, and Buthelezi’s views 
is indicative of a theological direction that strives to exclude “Christian imagination” 
from theological enterprises, in addition to failing to recognize the “end” sought by a 
contextual theology.  A reactionary mentality is generally indicative of a “cloud” that 
hangs over some contemporary Catholic writers with regard to the subject of the ultimate 
function and goal of Christology vis-à-vis the plurality of religious traditions.  Is the end 
of inculturation “an African theology” or the identity of a local church, even as these may 
be essential to the process?  How does the end sought by inculturation in Africa relate to 
the end sought by the church’s universal mission or Christology for that matter?  In other 
words, a reactionary approach is not without decisive Christological content.  A practical 
issue is fitting here.   
By not being able to participate effectively in the historical events that continue to 
shape and propel the contemporary world, Africa is already “standing still” as the world 
passes by.  Theology in Africa cannot afford, therefore, to abstain from making 
intelligent use of non-African and Catholic Church traditions as valid resources under the 
cover of “originality” and “identity.”  If African theology is to serve any relevant 
function in the life of the local church and in the lives of the peoples of Africa, it should 
not be closed-up. To do so is to cease to be Christian, for like Christianity, human beings 
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exist and mature through dialogue.  There is no human hurt, betrayal, or contentment that 
can justify a theological abandonment of this moral propensity at the heart of the 
Christian faith.   
Moreover, the continuing problem of obstructive activities in Africa by the West 
requires a “creative response” not a Christianized reaction.  A reactionary philosophy or 
approach to this important issue compounds the complex human or cultural issues that 
confront Africa now.  A reactionary approach accommodates an intrinsic methodological 
dynamic that negates the function of Christology in facilitating Africa’s search for fresh 
solutions as pointed out above.   In brief, only those theological visions bolstered by valid 
approaches to inculturation will defend and validate the integrity of contextual theology 
and ecclesial identity in African Catholicism.  Otherwise, a reactionary or defensive 
approach undermines inculturation efforts at a very fundamental level.  In contrast to this 
mentality, the Synod event contributed decisively to the development of contextual 
theologies in Africa.  The success or failure of this teaching hinges on how theologians 
utilize the Synod’s strengths and weaknesses in conjunction with the teaching of the 
universal church, and available theological resources.  And not the least, future success 
also hinges on the preparedness of the African hierarchy to put into effect the Synodal 
deliberations. 
CONCLUSION   
The critique of African theology through the theological lenses of Benezet Bujo, 
and others, bring this discussion to some important and transitional conclusions.  The 
factor of Ancestry is the one basic element in the African world view.  Ancestry 
continues to dictate African morality in many ways.  Bujo’s merit lies in having 
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recognized its importance for inculturation.  For the most part, his interpretation of 
ancestry is, no doubt, an accurate representation of the moral and spiritual ideals Africa 
attaches to cultural ancestors.  His rationale for romanticizing the “past” has to do with 
the enduring significance of the cultural religious function of ancestry in the African 
societies.  These facts notwithstanding, the moral and spiritual realities he asserts evoke 
divergent moral pre-dispositions and experiences in the contemporary nations of Africa.  
To take the reality of ancestry literally is tantamount to overlooking an ever-deepening 
human alienation in Black Africa rooted in the ancestral tradition.  African cultures are 
rooted in the long experiences of ancestry without a recognized common center or origin.  
Consequently, Africa is now afflicted with experiences of social malfunctions stemming 
from human alienation, fomented by diverse experiences of ancestry.  These experiences 
are much deeper, complex and elusive than the problem of Western cultural domination.  
Ironically, effective rectification of obtrusive activities in Africa by the West is 
contingent upon Africa’s honest unwillingness to confront the reality of ancestry.  
Otherwise, an idealization of ancestry or using it in its “pure religious confessional 
status” shows how much Africa stands in need of understanding its own “past decisions” 
and coming to terms with it. 
To conclude, a genuine concept of African ancestry is, therefore, one that must be 
understood in terms of cultural diversity without a common unifying center.  This cultural 
reality is one of the “greatest challenges” facing, not only the contemporary mission of 
the church in Africa, but also national governments in Black Africa.  Cultural diversity 
calls for a “wholly new approach” to inculturation beyond current proposals in African 
theology, also epitomized in ancestral theology.  Contextual theology need to move 
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beyond the presumption that because ancestral experience is pervasive, it can provide a 
fundamental basis for effecting positive development on the African continent.  Idealized 
claims based on common heritages do not immediately come across as contradictory until 
one realizes that “similarity” is not “identicalness.”  This distinction ought to draw 
attention to the confounding cultural diversity made possible by universal yet diverse 
experiences of ancestry.  These are not theoretical speculations without a practical basis.  
For from the political and economic life of present day African nations, the universal 
experiences of ancestry hold the prospect for meaningful survival as well as the risk for 
the total demise of African cultures in a world that is constantly changing.  If ancestry is 
to play any effective role at any level of Africa’s existence, it must be interpreted as well 
as reinterpreted.  To arrive at this, African theologians will need more than intellectual 
acuity; they will need honesty, courage and openness to articulate the most basic 
problems in contemporary Africa as a condition to the discernment of the best means of 
incarnating Christianity and formulating a contextual methodology suited to a diverse 
cultural context.  Chapter II attempts a systematic interpretation of the reality of African 
ancestry in its past and contemporary significance 
 
CHAPTER II: THE AFRICAN CULTURAL CRISIS 
 
INTRODUCTION: The Challenge of Articulating the African Reality 
 
This chapter presents an alternative to the dominant emphasis on pre-Christian 
traditional beliefs as a source for a Catholic theology in Africa. This is a necessary step 
for effective incarnation of Christianity in Africa.  The present chapter derive the 
indicators for African transformation from the ancestral past and the present African 
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situation. To this end, the African cultural crisis is a working theme employed to express 
realities in contemporary Africa. The theme, nonetheless, introduces concepts and topics 
that are very broad in meaning and scope.  The term African raises questions about the 
soundness of speaking in general terms about a continent as expansive as Africa, with 
varied demographic, geographical and cultural alignments.  These factors make it 
seemingly difficult to speak about Africa in terms of its entirety.  The political-historical 
factors created certain demographic alignments corresponding to three broad cultural 
regions, for instance.  The system of apartheid in the South, and the infiltration of Arabic 
cultures in the North define two different cultural regions.  North Africa is oriented to 
Arabic culture and also maintains vestiges of European colonial cultures. South African 
society is economically and politically aligned to Western civilization with many pockets 
of Black African cultures.  This leaves Sub-Saharan Africa; a region predominantly 
composed of traditional African cultures existing side by side with Western based social 
systems.  Given these diverse histories and cultural expressions, Sub-Saharan Africa 
comprises the most complex segment of the Continent.  Yet complexity does not 
necessarily imply impossibility.  These are challenges signaling the need for better and 
effective ways of articulating the African reality. The following sections outline technical 
considerations that inform the basis of the subsequent argument   
TECHNICAL CONCERNS  
 
The Main Argument  
A meaningful understanding of the African reality in its complexity must examine 
ancestral traditions in light of the present situation. The African biological ancestors hold 
the key to understanding the cultural similarities and differences on the African 
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Continent. This is what this chapter is about. At the same time the chapter proposes an 
urgent need to recast the meaning and value of the ancestors and their respective legacies. 
Theological reflection should not place so much emphasis on the traditional philosophies 
and yet fail to recognize their inherent limitations.  The positive and the limitations of 
African cultures are recognizable when the varied traditional philosophies are interpreted 
in light of an accurate understanding of the human being, situated in the context of 
contemporary Africa and the world in general.  It is the view of this author that once 
knotty issues in the ancestral philosophies are understood, then, it becomes possible to 
evaluate the true character of Western cultural hegemony in Africa.  
Having said that, it is also important to note that the present argument is not about 
whether or not ancestral philosophies can provide the conceptual and the working 
framework for understanding the African reality.  Rather, it inquires in what manner and 
to what extent can ancestral world views be at the service of contextual theology and 
inculturation.  While Benezet Bujo and those in his camp are accurate in maintaining that 
the ancestor is the basis of religious and social unity, they fail to recognize an extremely 
important point.  The “unifying function” of an ancestor is exclusive to tribal cultures.  
For these very reasons, the function of an ancestor is not a transcultural experience such 
that it can be equated to Christology.  There are profound cultural and ethical differences 
in the collective traditional perceptions and usages of the value of ancestry. Those 
differences are not relics of the past; they are ongoing and are manifest in the lives of 
contemporary African societies-tribal and national.  Therefore, in the same way that 
ancestry has varied interpretations, so are the mindsets, perceptions and ethical 
commitments among the numerous Black African tribes.  One is therefore bound to find 
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different beliefs and practices that define distinctive cultural entities.  This being the case, 
where does this leave the persistent belief in cultural homogeneity ardently espoused by 
African theology?  There are various ways which this study seeks to account for this 
dominant assumption.  The best way to do this is to examine the deeper question of the 
place of God in the historical experience of African ancestors. 
  For a long time the search for a contextual theology has consisted in associating 
the ancestrology with a more theocentric tradition reminiscent in the beliefs, ideas, and 
names of God.  This way of proceeding obscures the existing avenues for discovering the 
distinctive strata that make up the various phases in the evolution and development of 
Black cultures.  Otherwise, direct association of ancestrology with a more theocentric 
tradition has the effect of canonizing the meaning and the role of ancestors.  The 
philosophical-theological distance that would enable us to comprehend the true historical 
and religious worth of ancestry is consequently obscured, and in its place we have their 
hallowed roles.  Little wonder that Black Africa has ceased to view its ancestors as 
typical human beings who were only attempting to make sense of the world in which they 
lived.  These religious and philosophical dispositions notwithstanding, there is need to 
presuppose the existence of two main streams of religious traditions among the common 
heritages: ancestrology and theocentrism.  We cannot simply presume that the general 
tradition of belief in the Supreme Being developed in the context of the ancestral social 
structural set up still evident in the present day African tribes.  To do so is to merge 
ancestrology and theocentrism in a manner that obscures the urgent need to come to 
terms with the glaring limitations rooted in the ancestral heritages. To facilitate clarity on 
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this important subject, this chapter seeks to proceed on the presupposition of two 
distinctive cultural religious heritages.   
There is evidence of an ancient religious (theocentric) tradition with a general 
tendency toward a universalistic world view.  There is also another tradition with a 
general propensity toward religious and cultural fragmentation. The second tradition is 
characteristic of the present day ancestral religious beliefs and social practices still in 
currency.  When the two traditions are examined carefully, there are irreconcilable 
tensions between them.  It is on these accounts that this chapter maintains that the 
transcultural similarities do not necessarily imply the existence of a single African 
culture.  The tendency to posit a single culture is a way of simplifying the African reality 
and the problems therein.  As for this study, the presence of two religious traditions 
constitutes a fundamental problem to which this chapter seeks to give a realistic 
portrayal. Before that, the following sections outline the way in which this chapter seeks 
to articulate the reality.   
The Method of Social Analysis 
The method of analysis points to the general direction of this chapter. Social 
analysis of the African reality often focuses on the economic and political 
underdevelopment. In all aspects there is a general tendency to exclude any valid 
question about the meaning of culture.  Yet this is a key to a deeper understanding of 
African anthropologies, which are extremely important factors in any attempt to 
evangelize the continent.  The failure to proceed by a clear concept of culture has meant 
that the structure of contemporary social analysis diminishes rather than enhances the 
possibilities of understanding persons vis-à-vis their social environments.  The end result 
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is that economic and political policies rarely correspond to real issues of people and their 
societies.  It is for this reason that this chapter lays stress on the need for a comprehensive 
understanding of the term “culture” in relation to the native anthropologies.  The purpose 
is to facilitate the coming to grips with what is not readily available through modern 
empirical methods. A few statements can clarify the value of culture in the social analysis 
of the African ecclesial situation. 
A genuine Christian theology cannot simply bypass the substantive value of 
African cultures in a hurry to construct a universal contextual theology for Africa.  
Theological methods that simply romanticize traditional cultures only embolden the 
unfolding cultural crisis in Africa. Hence, to bring some fresh insights into the existing 
efforts, the following few paragraphs introduce foundational themes for the current and 
later chapters.  That is, the “condition” for the success of the Christian mission in Africa 
depends, among other factors, on the accurate understanding of culture based on the 
universal meaning of a human being. This is the inroad into African cultures and the key 
to unlocking the hidden realities therein.  Accurate understanding of culture is also basic 
to discovering the meaning of cultural diversity, especially as it relates to the African 
situation. On the whole, the concepts of culture and cultural diversity are basic to 
understanding the depth and scope of the emerging cultural crisis.  Hence, the main 
argument calls for a systematic analysis of the traditional African heritages with the 
purpose of bringing out the reality of cultural diversity in Africa. Cultural diversity is also 
key to grasping of the diverse concepts of a human being in Africa.  Concepts of culture 
and of a human being therefore constitute a fundamental problem in Africa.  Anything 
else said about Africa is better grasped against these two factors. The first part of this 
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chapter, therefore, focuses on the meaning of culture, while the remaining part examines 
the meaning of cultural diversity in light of the existing cultural crisis.   
Because a coherent view of culture can function as a tool of social analysis, it is 
perceived by this study as one of the most effective means for explaining the traditional, 
and the contemporary African cultural realities in relation to external influences.  The 
concept of culture, therefore, affords to this study the terms and conditions for speaking 
about contemporary realities in Africa. The factor of “contemporariness,” among others, 
introduces into perspective the appropriateness of “social analysis” being conducted in 
Africa today.  That is, in attempting to articulate the African reality, cognizance has to be 
made of the constant intersecting of the historical and contemporary factors and 
circumstances that make those obstacles elusive.  That is to say, there are specific social 
changes initiated in Africa by colonialism and evolving conditions in the world that make 
it extremely difficult for people to recognize the meaning and value of “culture.”  Yet, 
this is essential to a genuine grasp of the African cultures.  Hence, the theme of “social 
analysis” is directly related to that of culture, and serves two purposes.  First, it provides 
an intellectual and social framework for understanding the crisis brought about by the 
encounter between Africa and the West.  Second, social analysis also facilitates the 
identification of obstacles against a better understanding of culture in relation to African 
heritages.  The theme of contemporary social analysis is, therefore, a very crucial area of 
concern if the church in Africa is to grasp the significance of major social changes as 
emphasized by the Second Vatican Council.132  Contemporary social analysis operating at 
many levels poses a serious obstacle to development efforts in developing countries.  
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SECTION I 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFRICAN SOCIAL ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE 
 
 The reality of economic underdevelopment in Africa is common knowledge, and 
a copious literature on the subject exists.  This overview seeks only to put a face on this 
reality by providing terse examples of reviews and opinions on the existing economic 
situation.  The purpose is to match the total African reality with the dominant 
interpretations of it.  The end goal is to critically evaluate the appropriateness and 
viability of the existing perspectives in the social analysis of the African economic 
reality.  
 Giovanni Arrighi has conducted studies on African underdevelopment over 
several decades.  In one of his recent studies he examines the World Systemic Context of 
African Crisis.133  This analysis opens with the following general remark: “Over the last 
half century, the African crisis of the late 1970s has been transformed into what has aptly 
been called the African tragedy.”134  His judgment resonates with Paul Gifford’s work.  
After a painstaking research on the public role of African Christianity in development, 
Gifford makes the following conclusion. “The [African] continent is slipping out of the 
Third World into its own bleak category of the nth world.”135  Dismal as this may sound, 
Gifford based his judgment on the number of case studies on selected African countries, 
regions and, many official reports.  The most outstanding report is issued by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa136 which he paraphrases in this way:   
[Africa’s share of the world trade has all but disappeared….In 1950 it 
was 5.2%, in 1980 it was 4.7%, in 1990 it was only 1.9%....Between 
1961 and 1995 Africa’s food production per person decreased by 
11.6% (by comparison Latin America’s increased by 31.4% and Asia 
by 70.6%)….Returns on investment in Africa dropped from 30.7% in 
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1960 to 2.5% in the 1980s…There has been a general collapse in 
infrastructure….Africa has fallen well behind other developing areas of 
the world…]137 
 
The suffering caused by the ever-deteriorating economic situation is becoming a way of 
life for the African majority.  Most disturbing is the deteriorating sense of confidence and 
hope in the ability of the contemporary African nations to steer the respective collective 
destinies.  The prevalence of a steady decline and uncertainty also led Adrian Hastings to 
conclude that, “if the 1980s were the ‘lost decades’ for Africa, then the 1990s may well 
become the decade when “Africa [is] rendered irrelevant to global development….”138  
This particular evaluation by Hastings is coming to pass to a greater extent.   
The marginalization of Africa is perhaps materializing more rapidly than would 
have been imagined a few decades ago.  While economic and political patterns in Africa 
remain divisive and alienated, the so-called first worlds, like Europe and developing 
countries in Asia and South America, are building economic blocs or alliances to 
facilitate better working relationships.  Perhaps, none has explicitly voiced the economic 
and the political alignments of the emerging global structures better than Chirac, the 
former president of France.  Prior to his visit to Britain to “celebrate the 100th anniversary 
of the Entente Cordiale, a pact that ended centuries of intermittent warfare between the 
two countries,” Chirac expressed his “vision of a ‘multipolar’ world in which ‘there will 
be a great American pole, a great European pole, a Chinese one, eventually a South 
American pole,’ with the United Nations mediating among them.”139  Any serious 
thinking person ought to be concerned about the plight and role of the African Continent 
in this “multipolar” world projected by Chirac and similar propagators of globalization.   
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Whatever the case may be, Chirac represents a growing attitude in the economically and 
politically developed countries.  Countries which do not catch up with the changing 
patterns of life in today’s world, or show sign of doing so, cannot become viable partners 
in the new global drama of human interdependence operating in the context of economic 
and political solidarity.  Granted that the majority African nations are continually losing 
their moral credibility, a crucial factor for the operation of statehood, their marginal 
status should not surprise as much as it should worry us.  But there is more to this 
multifaceted global phenomenon.  The less Africa participates in the affairs that 
determine and shape the course of a world culture and history, the more the most 
powerful players in the global culture will continue, with more tenacity, to define who 
Africans are as a people.  Put simply and tentatively, Africa is entering a phase when the 
most powerful portion of the human community will ultimately shape its core identity. 
Therefore, weighed against this emerging social landscape, Gifford’s phraseology 
of the continent “slipping into its own bleak category of the nth world” is accurate.  The 
idea of “slipping” rightly denotes a steady decline of cultural life, and the Continent’s 
standing in the world community.  This is the reason the current study attempts to 
articulate the African reality in terms of a crisis as a step toward recognizing a serious 
problem in Africa. However, because the human suffering in Africa is explicitly felt at 
the political and the economic levels, the essence of the crisis is, more often than not, 
explained solely in socio-economic and political terms.  For example, explicating the 
present African economic reality in terms of a “crisis” is neither exceptional to this study 
nor to the three European analysts cited.  African Crisis Areas and U.S.  Foreign Policy is 
a diversely co-authored work covering nine selected African countries.  These authors 
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from different continents “focus attention on the conflict in the political and military 
arena….”140  Their aim is to point out where U.S. foreign policy is at odds with self-
determination in Africa.  This work reveals an important fact; foreign aid to Africa comes 
with strings attached.  As a result, it does not meet the real needs of the Continent. 
Foreign aid ends up as a tool used by donor countries to control, manipulate, and 
destabilize African nations.  Tunde Obadina, a native of Africa, is eloquent in regard to 
the economic implications of slave trade.  He is not, however, equally convincing when 
he traces as well as attributes the “contemporary African crisis to slave trade.”141  For 
example, he concludes that because of the slave trade evils, “African underdevelopment 
is [thus] inevitable.”142  There is indeed a sense in which the slave trade deprived Africa 
of human resources, both in reality and in potentiality.  Among other negative outcomes, 
the slave trade reinforced negative attitudes toward the Black peoples in countries where 
slaves were exported.  These facts notwithstanding, it would be too simplistic and naive 
to attribute the current crisis to slavery alone!   
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies comments on Carlos Lopes’ work 
in these words. “The African crisis is a recurrent theme in all discourses on Africa in the 
1990s, in stark contrast with the optimism of the first decades of independence.”143  
Based on his personal experience of the workings of United Nations Development 
Program, Lopes weighs the interplay between the external and the internal factors in the 
overall economic underdevelopment at different phases of post-independence African 
history. Although Lopes’ primary intent is to draw attention to the importance of the 
cultural factor in development, he generally dwells on the economic and political 
realities, attributing the crisis to poor economic policies, local and international. On the 
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whole, he manifests no cognizance of the possibility of the traditional cultures being part 
of the problem rather than the solution.  His concern for the cultural factor is handled in 
the same style of uncritical assertion of the viability of traditional African social 
structures.  In the end, Lopes concurs with most analysts who associated the crisis with 
poor local governance, public corruption, non-productive but self-centered African elites, 
natural disasters and many other afflictions, such as HIV-AIDS, as part of this long list.  
But important as these factors may be, the African crisis, according to this study, is more 
than the lack of material progress and external interference.   
The economic and political anomalies signal the existence of a much deeper 
problem than has been explained.  Many of the causes usually cited like “poor local 
governance, public corruption, and non-productive and self-centered African elites” are 
symptomatic of a deeper cultural problem.  It is with this conviction that the remaining 
sections develop this argument in detail. Before that, it is necessary to indicate points of 
dispute between the existing perspectives and this study.  The basis of disagreement with 
the existing forms of social analysis consists in a narrow understanding of the meaning of 
“crisis” with respect to the total African reality.   
General Perceptions and Explication of Contemporary African Reality  
The analysts cited share common denominators relevant to the present pursuit.  
Each employs a working theme of “African crisis.”  On the whole, their particular 
perspectives represent two types of social analysis often conducted in Africa.  As a 
native, Otunde Obadina represents the dominant perspective that frequently determines 
causality by focusing on external causes “alone.”  There is hardly an explicit intent to 
examine the possibility of Africa’s own contribution to the crisis.  Arrighi and Lopes 
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represent analysts who seek to achieve some balance by making sense of causal factors 
underlying rampant African economic and political underdevelopment.  Carlos Lopes’ 
work deserves a special mention.  His perspective stems from having recognized the 
ongoing Western stance to Africa. He argues that 
Democracy cannot be sustained in the context of economic 
crisis with countries under pressure that will not enable them to 
make any changes of their own, but rather apply standardized 
economic reform packages, that entail political compromises, 
political bases and specific objectives and targets which are 
imposed from top, and may be from outside.144 
 
 
To transform the political and economic landscapes in Africa, Carlos strongly emphasizes 
the need to consider native African “culture” as a necessary and possible model for 
economic development.  The problem, however, is that Lopes entertains these 
convictions without due consideration for possible flaws in the traditional cultures.  He 
assumes there is a native model that can be well matched to diverse cultural and social 
experiences without triggering philosophical and ethical conflicts in contemporary 
African nation-states.  There is no doubt each one of the analysts cited casts significant 
light on one or more factors underlying the African crisis.  Their individual merit 
withstanding, the general perceptions and modes of analyses are limited to economic and 
political dimensions of modern African social life.  Lost to this general picture is the 
meaning of the ordinary Black African person and his or her role in the crisis.  Instead, 
the politicians and structures of social evil associated with modern economic and political 
life are made to bear the entire burden of responsibility for the existing crisis.  Jean Marc 
Ela makes a similar point, to a greater extent. 
Our people’s situation cannot be attributed solely to the 
penetration of our continent by multinationals, which regard 
 97
Africa simply as a playground for the superpowers.  We must 
look for internal factors in the dispossession of the African 
masses.  This process continues despite modernization 
programs and growth efforts, since their benefits are 
monopolized by an elite in Africa of ever worsening 
economic and social disparities.145     
 
These are certainly serious issues, but do not constitute the fundamental cause of what 
this paper considers “internal factors.” The depth of Ela’s insight is undercut by ascribing 
the perceived problems to “the monopolization of benefits by African elite and the ever 
worsening economic and social disparities.146  All these are symptoms and, therefore, 
understatements of the African reality.  We must discern that which enables multinational 
companies and the many evils that impoverish all Black African nations.  Should we not 
be looking into our native traditions to discern that which predisposes Black African 
elites and politicians to behave in more or less the same way when they assume positions 
of responsibility and privilege? Can their behavior be traced back to their respective 
native cultural predispositions?  In sum, an effective study of the African reality ought to 
place the Black African person and his or her native anthropology at the centre of 
analysis.  For, even though the economic and the political aspects play an important role 
in development, these aspects of culture alone do not comprise the primary causes of 
African underdevelopment.   
In his second expanded edition on African Religions and Philosophy, John Mbiti 
is gradually sobering up to a very critical realization.  He recognizes that without 
appropriate understanding of “traditional beliefs, attitudes and practices can only lead to a 
lack of understanding of African behaviour and problem.”  These are realities “to be 
reckoned with in modern fields of economic, political, educational and religious life.” 147  
Mbiti rightly sees that the development of a culture suited to modern African society 
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requires putting native anthropologies into proper perspective.  Mbiti is not simply 
calling for more of the same.  He recognizes in the traditional anthropologies obstacles to 
socio-economic and political development.  Before delving into this important subject, 
the following paragraphs attempt to present the historical roots of the lopsided social 
analysis of the African situation, an essential factor in comprehending the depth of the 
African crisis insofar as it relates to traditional cultures. Special attention is given to the 
actual dynamic of excluding native cultures from development strategies.   
Intellectual and Philosophical Footprints from the African-Western Cultural 
Encounter 
 
A lopsided approach to African development began with the onslaught of 
colonization.  The general trend of social analysis in Africa is a result of the intellectual 
and philosophical footprints from that historical event.  What began as a misguided and 
biased approach to socio-economic and political development has become normative in a 
world that is becoming increasingly complex with the passage of time.  The colonial 
intellectual stance has not vanished.  There exist conditions today that perpetuate the 
colonial error of contemplating cultural development solely in economic and political 
terms.  But if development efforts are to bear lasting fruit in Africa, traditional cultures 
have to be put into proper perspective. Placide Tempels’ account of the colonial stance in 
Africa provides a general but important window into the historical problem of excluding 
the meaning of culture from development strategies and policies.   
 Placide Tempels, a French missionary priest working in Africa during the colonial 
days, somewhat148 broke with the prevalent intellectual perception of African cultures.  
The conclusions and portrayals of Africa then were based on the surface interpretation of 
customary behaviors.  According to Tempels, for example, R. Allier, a contemporary 
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psychologist had observed that “If you ask the Bantu, for instance, the reasons for 
performing their customs, they cannot tell you.”149 Allier meant to say that the Bantu 
have the inability to offer a rational explanation behind their many practices and ritual 
experiences.  He went on to conclude, the Bantu “do not indulge in reflective thought.  
They have no theories or doctrines.  The only thing that matters is the carrying out of 
certain traditional acts, preserving contact with the past and with the dead.”150  In the 
mind of colonizers, represented by Allier, the Bantu are typical Africans. Tempels stood 
up against this tide of thought arguing that “Anyone who claims that primitive people 
possess no system of thought excludes them from the category of men.  Those who do so, 
contradict themselves fatally elsewhere.”151  Apparently, Tempels recognized this 
philosophical outlook as the general drive behind the colonial tendency toward haphazard 
erection of the Western social system in Africa.  Thus Tempels voiced his convictions to 
those he regarded as “colonizers and missionaries of good will,” urging them to take 
African anthropologies seriously.  The central portion of his argument says it all. 
The persistence of these attitudes through the centuries of simultaneous 
evolution can only be satisfactorily explained by the presence of a corpus 
of logically co-ordinated intellectual concepts, a lore.’  Behaviour can be 
neither universal nor permanent unless it is based upon a concatenation of 
ideas, a logical system of thought, a complete positive philosophy of the 
universe, of man and of the things that surround him, of existence, life, 
death and of the life beyond.  Without excluding other factors (divine and 
human) we must postulate, seek and discover a logical system of human 
thought as the ultimate foundation of any logical and universal systems of 
human behaviour.152 
   
Tempels sought to lend insight into the missionary endeavors and the colonizers’ intent to 
erect in Africa the Western social institutions of economics, politics, education and 
jurisprudence.153  But, the colonizers’ primary interest was more in transforming Africa 
into the Western likeness than in the cultural situation and mindsets of the African 
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beneficiaries.  Tempels’ profound insights thus had little impact, if any, on those to 
whom they were directed.  The Western social system was implanted in Africa in total 
disregard of the African ontologies. It would be a misperception, however, to conclude 
that these intellectual and philosophical dynamics have abated, or that if they do exist 
they are explicitly carried out by foreign and public policy makers.  The reluctance to 
take a comprehensive view of culture is a globally complex problem that manifests itself 
differently today.  There is a tendency, either deliberate or born out of ignorance, to 
ignore the significance of traditional cultures in the understanding of the contemporary 
underdevelopment issues.   
The disregard for native anthropologies in development was a transformative 
action.  In this action is embedded a negative principle of ongoing disorientation as far as 
the African existence and self-determination are concerned.  Of urgency, therefore, is the 
need to reverse cultural disorientation: an issue African theology has not tired to give 
voice to. Yet contrary to the majority theological position, there is urgent need to 
critically examine traditional anthropologies in conjunction with the mechanics of 
“cultural exclusion” in its historical and contemporary significances in the world today.  
To that end, the following subsections highlight an important aspect in the overall 
dynamic of cultural exclusion.  
The Crisis in Contemporary Social Analysis  
The formal structure of on-going social analysis is determinative of whether or not 
Africa will overcome the cultural crisis in which it is currently immersed.  The crisis in 
social analysis today can be recognized in the chasm between present historical social 
realities and the analysts’ modes of operation.  Taking Africa as an example, the functional 
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significance of traditional African social philosophies and the attendant cultural structures 
were supplanted by Western social philosophy since the colonial period.  Thus, a functional 
disharmony characterizes traditional African nations.  Creating functional harmony does 
not consist in reinventing the ancestral modes of operation. Rather, it requires the 
reformulation of traditional African philosophies in ways suited to the ever-changing social 
conditions in the world in general and in Africa in particular.  This goal can be achieved by 
means of diverse and comprehensive methods of social analysis that take into consideration 
the possible role of traditional anthropologies in the ongoing economic and political crises.  
The religious, socio-economic, and political viability of traditional anthropologies ought to 
be ascertained through the same process. This condition applies equally to the church’s 
missionary strategy in Africa.  These are not options but urgent demands for contemporary 
Africa.  The perspectives in social analysis are not only too fragmented, there is the lack of 
a coherent notion of culture as an encompassing paradigm for relating, explaining, and 
reconciling points of conflict between African and the Western social system .  Father 
Placide Tempels hinted at the primary cause behind the stated “lack.”  There are historical 
roots behind the on-going reality of including native cultures from political an economic 
policies. .The next few paragraphs expand on this issue by outlining the historical factors 
that continue to shape the mentalities decried by Placide Tempels.  
The overall colonial stance to the colonized peoples was not accidental but a 
consequence of the mindset formed by complex events in the Christian Europe of the 
time.  There are two types of interrelated events: the religious events treated in Chapter 
III, and the socio-economic and political events of modernity.  The latter events comprise 
the focus of the current section, without necessarily rehearsing what actually happened.  
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The main objective is to discern in the formal structure of modern social analysis the 
historical dynamic of excluding “culture” from development considerations.  Particular 
attention is given to the basic assumptions underlying contemporary social analysis.  This 
aspect, according to this paper, comprises a fertile arena where a pattern of “cultural 
exclusion” continues to unfold with new vitality.  The following highlights draw mainly 
upon the contributions by Herb Thompson and Bruce Kapferer on the current crisis in 
social analysis. 
A familiar phenomenon today in the majority of schools and universities world-
wide is the paucity of academic programs in cultural anthropology as an important 
academic discipline suited to the needs of the globalizing world.  Two contemporary 
European professors have treated the epistemological implications of this phenomenon and 
its impact on contemporary methods in social analysis.  Herb Thompson was a professor of 
economics at Murdoch University, (located in Perth, Western Australia).  Bruce Kapferer is 
a professor of anthropology at the University of Bergen (located in Norway).  Though 
anchored in different disciplines, the general thrusts of their arguments lend themselves to 
the stated objectives and issues discussed so far in this chapter.  Their discourses focus on 
the uncertainty and inability of cultural anthropologists in academia to contribute 
effectively to modern day social theories.  They emphatically attribute this state of affairs 
to the recurring impotence of anthropology, and the contemporary social theorists’ 
irrational refusal to acknowledge its epistemological significance for integral development.  
The work of these two professors facilitates an understanding of the root of the ongoing 
anthropological impotence, as well as its repudiation by contemporary social theorists. 
Therefore, through historical analysis, Thompson and Kapferer demonstrate that 
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epistemological and methodological controversies concerning the value of native cultures 
in development have been around for a while.  Significant to their pursuit are the major 
historical factors responsible for the diminished understanding of culture, and the functions 
and value of cultural anthropology in the field of knowledge and contemporary social 
discourse.  They trace existing controversies to specific historical events: the drive to 
modernity, colonization, and postmodernism.  These, according to the two authors, are not 
isolated occurrences.  The moral and philosophical assumptions since the early modern 
time (16th & 17th centuries) are the connecting and the ever regenerative link to the current 
crisis in social analysis.   
Precisely, the intellectual and philosophical impulses that gave birth to 
“modernity” drew moral imperatives from an abstract or elitist view of culture.  
“Modernity,” Thompson observes, “was a project of global conquest originating from 
Europe” and has always been part of North American political consciousness and cultural 
stance to the world.154   Its “obvious Eurocentric position holds that because of the 
exceptional characteristics of European culture and rationality, the people were able to 
transcend their cultural limitations and extend their influence across the world.”155  That 
this basic assumption translated into a programmatic-ideological course of action that 
fanned colonization into flame is history. “Europe, while not the normative centre of 
modernity, [has] priority as the historical point of reference in any processes of change 
from the 15th century onwards.”156  And it came to pass; colonization became the main 
vehicle by which Old Europe transmitted its civilization beyond its own territories.   
As a result, it was not so much the humanity and the well being of conquered 
people that motivated the colonial decisions to alter their traditional ways of life, but the 
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promise of political advantage that would come from spreading the fruits of modernity.  
Henceforth, colonization operated and thrived on the basic assumption that development 
strategies and policies can be imported into and thrive in any given social milieu 
independent of indigenous cultural mindsets, religious consciousness, and moral 
dispositions.  From the epistemological and historical standpoints, however, modernity 
fashioned and encouraged a certain way of viewing the world as much as it attenuated 
intellectual motivation to delve into the meaning of culture and of the native cultures of 
colonized peoples.  It was the same stance that prompted Placide Tempels to call for 
conscientious insertion of Western social philosophy into traditional African societies.157  
His was a call impelled by Christian reason, which is shared by Herb Thompson and 
Bruce Kapferer in non-religious terms.  The perspectives of the two professors are 
generally presented here in three interrelated sections.  The first section explains, among 
other factors, why the colonial mentality puts into question the freedom to create culture. 
The Human Freedom to Mould One’s Own Culture    
The Christian vision of humanity fosters free participation in molding one’s 
culture.  Freedom of participation allows for the emergence of diverse cultures.  At the 
same time, the Christian religious dynamism fosters a creative tension between the 
notions of unity and diversity as an ontological necessity. But modernity was a major 
point of departure from this Christian vision as the moral horizon of Western culture as a 
whole.  The departure occasioned transformation in Western intellectual consciousness; a 
phenomenon that continues to unfold into the larger world through Western influence.  
Culture has increasingly ceased to be a moral imperative for human existence and has 
become an ideological construct, transposable from the West into all cultural milieus by 
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any “possible” means.158  Practical and moral considerations for human development 
consequently shifted from the concrete reflection on the actual situations of real people, 
to the abstract structural frames of reference.159  Empirical method is now entrenched as 
the norm of social analysis. Call this moral and intellectual aberration, but ideological 
protagonists, now as then, uphold “political and economic propositions…that [equate] the 
intellectual, cultural and technological advance of victorious nations as something that 
needs to be emulated by the ‘poorer,’ less ‘civilized’ peoples of the world.”160 
Henceforth, the meaning of culture as an intrinsic human reality has been transformed 
into a “specific category” of “civilization:” modern Western civilization.161  But for 
thinkers, who share Thompson’s and Kapferer’s vision, a purely empirical approach to 
the human condition disregards the meaning of culture in development and spells doom 
for the entire world. It is impossible to muster adequate understanding of peoples’ 
conditions and needs without real knowledge of their cultures.  The fundamental 
problems of contemporary social analysis can be better grasped from this global 
standpoint.  
All things considered, there is need for regenerative efforts to precede 
development efforts.  According to the two professors, regenerative efforts in cultural 
anthropology consist in identifying two major and interrelated factors that currently foster 
the entrenchment of an ongoing aversion to the significance of culture in development.  
First, there is need to comprehend the rationale and basic direction of modernity to 
determine the seminal “content and mode” of contemporary social analysis. Second, a 
course of action which befits the present times ought to be determined.  Because 
modernity made lasting imprints on the global intellectual consciousness regarding the 
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nature and process of development, the primary aim of Thompson and Kapferer is to 
challenge this dominant intellectual stance.  They see the need to step back into history 
and locate the sources of the philosophical and the moral assumption that underpin 
contemporary social analysis.  It is possible then to identify the many points of moral 
conflict and departures that increasingly lead to the trivialization of cultural 
anthropology, be it in academia, or among policy makers.  The following summary of 
Kapferer’s response to the issues in question can illustrate the common stand with 
Thompson. 
An Anthropological response to the Lopsidedness of Social Analysis 
 
Having assumed a single world (European) view, colonizers were able to 
unilaterally impose massive changes on native cultures.  Kapferer calls attention to this 
problem as the original raison d'être for the emergence of anthropological studies in 
European universities.  In academia, he points out; anthropology arose, first and 
foremost, to challenge cultural homogeneity as the philosophical horizon for 
colonization.162  With the intent to reverse this anomalous trend, originating 
anthropologists placed emphasis on “vital methodological and ethical concerns.”163  
Essential to this goal, “culture and field work [were established as] the twin pillars in 
anthropology.”164  Kapferer points out that within the original structure of theory and 
method, anthropology “was not merely adding to the knowledge of human being but as 
opening up new possibilities for thought and theory concerning the human conditions that 
were closed to other disciplines.  Anthropology was the new way to explore the human 
condition.”165   That these academic efforts in the remote past continue to persist, even if 
dimly, can be observed in the writings of contemporary American anthropologists, 
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George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fischer.166  They give forceful and comprehensive 
testimony to the validity of Kapferer’s argument.167  Although the convictions which 
Marcus and his colleagues express have not yet made observable impact, their basic 
direction reaffirms the nature of anthropology and its future prospects.  This consists in: 
exploring new ways to fulfill the promises on which modern 
anthropology was founded: to offer worthwhile and interesting 
critiques of our own society; to enlighten us about other human 
possibilities, engendering an awareness that we are merely one 
pattern among many; to make accessible the normally unexplained 
assumptions by which we operate and through which we encounter 
members of other cultures.  Anthropology is not the mindless 
collection of the exotic but the use of the cultural richness for self-
reflection and growth.168 
 
The objectives Marcus and Fischer lay out are at the center of the ongoing controversies 
between anthropologists and social theorists.  Contemporary social theorists adamantly 
rebuff the view that knowledge about a particular culture brings valuable insights toward 
a holistic development.  The social theorists’ stance is conceivably borne out of the 
influence from modern and postmodern thought.  According to Thompson, the dividing 
line between epistemological and philosophical positions of the modern and postmodern 
eras appears to be very slim-the next subsection illustrates this.  
A Socio-Economic Response: Recognizing the Postmodern Twist 
 
Although postmodernism initially sought to challenge the basic assumptions of 
modernity, it is as ideologically oriented as modernity, according to Thompson.  Given 
the internal logic and theories propagated by postmodernism, Thompson rightly points 
out that postmodernism elevated the epistemological and methodological value of social 
sciences while alienating cultural anthropology as a valid source of knowledge for human 
development.169 The consequences in its wake are the “[dominance] of structuralism, 
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institutionalism, Marxism and Dependency theory.”170  In all these, it is the pre-
conceived abstract ideas on development that ultimately matter most as opposed to real 
persons and circumstances in which they live.  The postmodern era can thus be seen to 
complicate rather than unravel historical issues from the past, a point Kapferer also 
emphasizes.   
Thus in the context of a postmodern epistemological stance, anthropology 
according to Kapferer is unable to impact the intellectual, philosophical, moral, and 
methodological quagmire ushered in by modernity.  Not only do contemporary 
anthropologists suffer from “intellectual timidity,” there is neither clearer perception nor 
deeper interest in native cultures by the host of academic disciplines in the colleges and 
universities.171  Anthropology thus remains a superfluous discipline, incapable of 
touching real life situations.172 Meanwhile, “culture” has been replaced with the 
specificity of class, race, and gender in the development process.” 173  This emphasis is 
based on a postmodernism’s flawed presumption that such analytical constructs can elicit 
a meaningful understanding of diverse situations, peoples and societies.  In reality, 
postmodernism disregards the fact that the categories of class, race, and gender, like 
many others, have arisen out of a particular social context in response to specific 
concerns in development.  For this reason, the same analytical constructs do not 
necessarily speak to all dimensions of meaning embodied in the concept of 
“development” as a human category.  Hence, their shortcoming notwithstanding, the 
growing popularity of postmodern analytical constructs cannot be ignored.  Their overall 
effect can be seen in the current aversion to the significance of culture in planning and in 
the enacting of development policies.  The outcome of this intellectual scenario is the 
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ever weakening concept of culture, and the consequent fragmentation of various levels of 
existence.  The following is a synthesis of the summative viewpoints by Thompson and 
Kapferer. 
The Meaning of Culture Remains Shrouded in Mystery 
The central motifs in Thompson’s argument, presented in the form of an inquiry 
are a thematic articulation of major philosophical perspectives by means of which the 
crisis in social analysis can be better understood. The issues he raises therein aptly bring 
the present objective of pinpointing the shortcomings in contemporary social analysis to a 
constructive conclusion. Thompson inquires whether: “…certain cultural traits promote 
economic development…, or does economic development adapt to immutable cultural 
traits? Does economic development instill certain cultural traits…or do cultural processes 
internalize and appropriate developmental processes? Are culture and economic 
development relatively autonomous?”174  The point is well made: not all traits in native 
cultures are conducive to economic development presupposed by Western social 
philosophy. The presumption that economic and political processes can bypass individual 
and collective psyches formed by definite cultural beliefs and practices is a complete 
distortion of what social analysis ought to be about.  Contemporary social sciences hardly 
prepare modern persons to relate empirical methods and the perceived needs of society to 
the meaning of “a person” in relation to that of culture.175  Methodological configurations 
in social sciences, for instance, are more and more defined by social predictability in 
view of profit making than the need to serve real persons living in the real world.  Yet, 
human needs consist of more than the aspirations for material well being.  It is against 
this extremely narrow understanding that Thompson raises his five questions cited above. 
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These, he believes, constitute an “extremely fertile and intellectually searching debate 
and dialogue, as the institutional and cultural perquisites and foundations for economic 
development has been simply ignored by most of those in the economic profession.”176  
In summary, the particular merit of Thompson and Kapferer lies in their ability to 
perceive the crisis in social analysis as a dynamic rooted in the past, and presently linked 
with the internal mechanisms of the present historical processes. Modern analytical 
constructs have a role to play in the overall scheme of social analysis, but it is a limited 
role.  The lack of an encompassing theory of culture renders perspectives in 
contemporary social analysis ineffective and impracticable.  The dominant tendency to 
proceed from a priori principles crafted from a particular social context or time in 
history177 reinforces pathetic ignorance about the meaning of culture, in addition to 
engendering a constraining belief that “culture is a diversion from the alleged real 
processes in the contemporary world (or worse, is a purposeful cover for capitalist, racist 
and sexist oppressors).”178  These typically postmodern viewpoints can be sweepingly 
narrow and uncompromising. Devoid of appropriate structures179 of meaning for 
achieving comprehensive social analysis, postmodern epistemology in this regard 
complicates rather than enlightens what is holistic and genuinely important for human 
development. It does not provide answers to deeper questions regarding the meaning of a 
person in relation to culture.  Today’s social conditions need an encompassing structure 
of social analysis that can effectively speak to universality without eliminating legitimate 
diversities.  The enforcement of modern and postmodern analytical constructs has a lot to 
do with the present preoccupation with the material aspects of development as opposed to 
the development of the whole persons and their cultures.  Interestingly, culture is also 
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made of non-material dimensions that are not unconditionally attainable by empirical 
means.   
Convinced, therefore, that the true meaning and value of social analysis should 
not be equated with the basic method in social sciences, the current author aligns the 
objectives of this study with the growing discontent with the paradigmatic approach to 
reality established by empirical methods.  George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fischer’s 
position explains this point:  
The present is a time of reassessment of dominant ideas across the human 
sciences (a designation broader than and inclusive of the conventional 
social sciences).  This reassessment is more salient in more disciplines 
than others, but its presence is pervasive.  It is not just the ideas 
themselves that are coming under attack but the paradigmatic style in 
which they have been presented.  Particularly in social sciences, the goal 
of organizing principles by abstract, generalizing frameworks that 
encompass and guide all efforts at empirical research is being 
fundamentally challenged.180    
 
 Marcus and Fischer recognize “the problem of loss of encompassing theories” that 
would render meaningful the “considerations of such issues as contextuality, the meaning 
of social life to those who enact it, and the explanation of exceptions and indeterminants 
rather than regularities in phenomena observed…”181  In light of the current study-
objectives, an encompassing theory of culture is both a necessity and a means of 
addressing conceptual fragmentation brought about by modern and postmodern 
relativism. Hence, an attempt is made to define culture since effective analysis of the 
traditional African cultural heritages depends on this important step.  
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SECTION III 
A. WHAT IS CULTURE?  
 There are many authors, representing different fields of study who offer 
conflicting and less-than-whole definitions of culture.  Thierry Verhelst makes a 
compelling argument in this regard.  “Conferences about culture often suffer from a lack 
of precision when it comes to the terminology used.” 182  The definitions tend to be 
limited to “values and customs, others think essentially of art, yet others think of 
education.” 183  His perceptive appraisal withstanding, Verhelst’s own definition is not 
different from those he criticizes.  He defines “culture” as “a complex whole of solutions 
that a given community inherits, adopts or invents to face the challenges of its natural and 
social environment.”184  Verhelst merit consists in having recognized the functional 
limitation of existing concepts of culture.  But be as that may, his definition is as vague as 
a general view that culture is a way of life.185  In addition to not providing diagnostic 
concepts for social analysis, it is difficult to decipher from as pithy a definition as that the 
essential relationships between culture, person, and development.   
The issues raised in the previous section are local, but they are also global in 
scope and character.  They precisely revolve around the larger question of human 
wellbeing, and a partial conception of culture is inappropriate to the present task.  
Conceptual clarity is thus required in the face of conceptual and methodological 
complexities involved in the African encounter with Christianity and Western culture. 
Present concerns about contemporary social analysis reveal that the changing concept and 
experience of culture world-wide renders the aforementioned encounter more complex 
and elusive.  It is, therefore, in view of working toward conceptual and methodological 
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clarity, that this study turns to the Second Vatican Council teaching on the meaning of 
culture. The intention, however, is not to present an exhaustive analysis of Vatican II 
teaching on the subject. Rather, the purpose is to heighten the exceptional clarity with 
which the bishops at Vatican Council II defined culture. This the Council accomplished 
by delineating dimensions that make up the reality we call culture.  But first, reference to 
Vatican II teaching is preceded by a comparative summary of two other views on culture: 
the physical anthropological view and the African theological view. This will heighten 
the importance of Vatican II teaching on culture beyond the present study.  
Physical Anthropological Approach to Culture 
There are many perspectives in the physical anthropological view of culture. The 
perspective taken by Leslie A. White and Beth Dillingham presented here represents just 
one of the kinds.186 Their intention was to provide a conceptual framework in which the 
meaning of culture can be explained. Their propositions generally reflect common 
conclusions based on empirical assumptions that make the theory of evolution the 
primary point of reference.  Accordingly, they situated their research in the framework of 
an evolutionary view of human life convinced that generic biological functions in the 
human species developed gradually over time.  They then concluded that humanity’s self-
consciousness evolved along a similar process.  Against this philosophical background 
the researchers established the origin of human cultures. Linking it to habitual behavior, 
White and Dillingham maintained that every human being, unlike non-beings, has the 
ability to symbol.187  This is the “ability freely and arbitrarily to originate, determine, and 
bestow meaning upon things and the events in the external world, and the ability to 
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comprehend such meanings.”188  The next step was to determine the origin of these 
natural mechanics.  
 In accordance with scientific research methods, the researchers located the origin 
of producing symbols in the “neurological evolution of the nervous system” of the human 
primates.189  Basing on this as their physical evidence, White and Dillingham then 
reached a conclusion: the universality of this biological function gave humanity the 
capacity to “originate” and “impose” meaning on reality.  The choices of “verbs” they 
use to describe the foundation of culture are as important as the total meaning of culture 
conveyed. Culture is brought about through a process of symbolizing; i.e., by humans 
attaching new meaning to an independent reality.  For example, the meaning attached to a 
national flag is neither inherent in the material that makes the cloth nor in the cloth.  It is 
imposed on it by persons who want to convey a specific meaning related to social life.190 
So based on the idea of symbolizing, they concluded that “[a]ll definitions of culture are 
arbitrary,” even if they are [valid, justified and useful].191  They further deduced that 
“Man and culture constitute an inseparable couplet.  By definition there is no culture 
without man and there is no man without culture.”192  By implication, there can be no 
definition of culture unrelated to specific and concrete experiences of culture.  
Interjecting the primary motivating factor for White and Dillingham’s research project 
can clarify the thrust of their conclusions.   
The above assertions are made in the noble effort to dispute the “biological 
inferences [often] drawn from cultural data, and used in the assignment of “superior 
brains, nerves, glands” to some cultures rather than others.  Because such a perspective 
tends to associate the essence of culture with only certain cultures, White and Dillingham 
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point back to the evolution of the neurological system as the cause and basis of culture.  
They found no scientific evidence behind the genetically based intent to define culture in 
terms of superior brains, and the like.  So on the whole, Leslie A. White and Beth 
Dillingham undoubtedly introduce important elements into the multifaceted and ongoing 
debate on the meaning of culture.  The attempt to identify the origin and foundation of 
culture is an important and needed step.  It reflects the need for a common universal basis 
for understanding culture.  This need is well expressed in their analysis of the arbitrary 
quality that marks every culture.  Many elements of traditional cultures world-wide are 
based on whims rather than on objective facts, reasons or principles. Such arbitrariness 
equips cultures with a greater measure of subjectivity.  This, more often than not, attunes 
cultures toward exclusivity.  On this particular account, White and Dillingham’s research 
provides a measure of clarity to the present quest for an encompassing theory of culture. 
Questions remain, however, as to whether White and Dillingham’s research satisfy the 
quest for a coherent concept of culture that is also universally applicable? Does the effort 
to locate the origin of culture in neurological evolution effectively express the 
relationship between culture and a person as a whole? 
White and Dillingham leave many questions unanswered.  For instance, the need 
for an encompassing theory of culture implies that culture is definable outside the 
specific or concrete social experiences or milieus.  Every definition of culture need not be 
descriptive and based on concrete forms of culture.  After all, the possibility of locating 
in any one culture the concepts that speak to the commonalities and legitimate diversity 
in the universal experience of culture is negated by the very nature of cultural 
arbitrariness.   Further more, the emphasis on the neurological evolution as the 
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foundation of culture is greatly laden with exploitable loopholes. It bypasses the meaning 
of a human being as an embodied spirit, with the natural capacity for rational reflection. 
These dimensions of human nature always carry the possibility for revision and further 
development.  Our researchers’ focus concerns itself with bodily functions and mental 
task foremost – ignoring the fact that humans can originate meaning in more than one 
way.  For example, while it is accurate to posit the human intellect as the center of the 
ability to create culture, it is equally important to take into account the significance of 
“bodiliness.”193  For example, White and Dillingham maintain that to be human is to be 
cultural, which must be realized through exerting a conscious habit upon existence.  
Critically understood, the mentally retarded persons, whose minds we cannot know but 
whose bodily structure and needs are nonetheless human would not be deemed human 
beings.  Yet we know that by their very needs as human beings, they impose a culture of 
care and concern on the surroundings.  It is thus valid to maintain that a human being can 
create culture in more than one way.  So, what is the basis of culture: the mind, the body, 
or both?  There has to be a coherent concept of culture capable of speaking 
comprehensively about the totality of a human person as the “subject” of culture.  The 
merits of physical anthropology withstanding, we now present important highlights in the 
African theological conception of culture before treating Conciliar teaching. 
A Summary of the African Theological Views on Culture 
Instrumentum Laboris of the African Synod (1994) states unequivocally that: 
“Culture is not to be confused with the actual practices of a culture.  The practices may 
differ from place to place and in the same place from one epoch to another, without 
essential change in the culture.”194  The document goes on to add: 
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The trained or experienced person can discover similarities of culture 
(depth level) where others see only diversity… Some people with diverse 
practices and languages can share an overall culture; such seems to be the 
case of Africa, south of the Sahara; there one tends to speak of African 
traditional Religion in singular, this without prejudice to the existence of 
sub-cultures195 (my emphases).   
 
This statement more or less captures the basic assumption of the African theological view 
of culture.  Those assumptions are significant, because they point to the basic differences 
between the African theological thought and the Vatican II theology of culture.  The 
statements thus provide this study the reasons to critique the African theological concept 
of culture.   
 First, the view that “culture should not be confused with individual practices” is 
very misleading.  It is premised on an erroneous perception of African culture(s) as a self-
defining entity that transcends space and time, and consequently overrides diverse tribal 
expressions.  For instance, after Instrumentum Laboris points out the cultural evolution 
“brought about” by major intrusions in Africa, the document goes on to celebrate that  
“[w]hen it comes to values and basic assumptions of the people, the resistance is still 
strong and the underlying African identity is still intact.”196  The problem is: “resistance 
and intactness” do not necessarily imply cultural strength and viability.  Nonetheless, 
without necessarily overcoming a homogeneous view of culture, the African Synod 
contradicted this rather sanguine outlook by stating that “the culture (in the singular) that 
gave our people identity is in a crisis.”  This is not to suggest the Synod made things any 
clearer.  For how can a culture be “intact” and in a “crisis” at one and the same time?  So, 
absent a clear concept of culture in the African Synod documents, it is difficult to tell 
precisely what the Synod meant by “a culture in a crisis.” Second, the expressed views 
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represent a general African understanding of cultures which comprises the horizon from 
which Instrumentum Laboris and African Synod explain the meaning of culture.  
Notably, this predominant perspective does not distinguish between “shared cultural 
foundations” and “genuine cultural diversity” in Africa.  Nor does Instrumentum Laboris 
perceive that varied developments of the common heritages might have emerged over the 
passage of many centuries of reformulations and additions.  There is, therefore, a general 
failure to recognize that while African “cultural foundations,” symbols, customs and 
practices generally cut across tribal borders, the experiences and meanings attached to 
them differ profoundly from one tribe to another.   
Third, there is an easy transition from “culture” to “religion” and vice versa, thus 
giving the impression of religion and culture being synonymous.  The reason for this 
theological anomaly can be traced to the African cosmological perspective, which 
resonates with the thinking behind Instrumentum Laboris, for instance.  African 
traditional consciousness does not distinguish the secular sphere from the religious one.  
While this has the merit of conveying a sense of cosmic unity, it can be a hindrance to the 
attainment of conceptual clarity about the essential differences between Christianity and 
culture. Persons may be less prepared to readily understand the possibilities that lie 
within the range of each or the impact of religion in general on the development of 
peoples and cultures. This might as well be one of the greatest problems facing Africa–a 
theme addressed in the later section of this dissertation. Finally, can any culture, in the 
true sense of the word, endure meaningfully without appropriate cultural practices?197  
The idea of “not confusing culture with cultural practices” introduces a passive 
relationship between “a particular culture” and “its people or subjects.”  It denotes 
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African cultures as self-perpetuating entities, capable of surviving the changes in the 
human psyche and in society apart from what people do and value.  The meaning of 
existence is also reversed.  For, instead of culture being a reality as possessed by the 
subject; it becomes the “subject as possessed by the culture.”  Fr. Nwachukwuike Iwe of 
Nigeria illustrates this state of affairs in unambiguous terms: 
Culture is marked by continuity in time and comprehensiveness in the 
scope of its sway over its members, its members may die and perish but it 
continues its mark in time from generation to generation: its impact on its 
members is comprehensive or without exception, and inescapable as 
death.198   
 
Nwachukwuike rightly emphasizes the all-inclusive impact of culture on the entire 
society. But we must still inquire into the origin of culture.  Thus this study takes issue 
with the relationship the author sets between culture and its subjects. The unmistakable 
meaning he conveys is that culture apparently has an autonomous existence apart from 
the cultural subjects.  He is right with respect to the traditional African heritages, because 
individuals are born into their respective cultures and die never having changed an iota of 
it.  But, does Nwachukwuike’s conceptual horizon not raise the fundamental question as 
to whether contemporary Africans possess the “will” and, therefore, the “capacity” to 
advance the meanings they attach to reality in their environments, save that passed from 
the ancient ancestors’ times?  What reasons would really dictate cultural transformations?  
Yes, Black African psyche signals a people under the sway of the ancestral world views.  
Their only and best choice in the face of the unfolding historical but providential events 
is to “repeat” the traditional beliefs and practices.  It is not surprising then that the 
expressed views do not entertain consideration for the origin and foundation of culture.   
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In summary, the African Synod documents accurately bring out the general African view 
of culture.  The Synod provides the background for understanding Africa’s resistance to a 
“conscious” choice toward radical cultural transformation where it is needed.  The 
expressed views of culture combined with cultural resistance underlie the existing 
African theological arguments for uninterrupted continuity of the traditional religious 
heritages.  But for the purpose of this study, there is no doubt that the African theological 
view of culture is flawed and is, as such, an impediment in the path of theological 
reflection and inculturation.  In the context of growing global repudiation of culture, 
incarnating Christianity requires conceptual clarity with respect to the meaning of culture 
and to the character of social analysis.  It is also vital in the discernment for an effective 
response to the socioeconomic and political development in specific social milieus.  It is 
only by striving to understand the meaning of culture that anyone can truly understand 
Africa and it essential needs.  To this end the reflection turns to the teaching by the 
Second Vatican Council.  The Council Fathers made great achievements in assembling 
together key concepts that are basic in the comprehensive understanding of culture.  All 
the loopholes identified in the preceding perspectives are adequately attended to. The 
teaching is referenced here for the immediate goal of identifying appropriate conceptual 
tools for social analysis. This allows us to put into perspective the historical and the 
ongoing conflicting encounter between African world views and the traditional Western 
social philosophy.   
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B. THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL ON THE MEANING OF CULTURE 
The Human Person is the Ground of Culture  
  Lacking in the above views are the elements crucial to an in depth understanding 
of culture.  These include the relationship between “person” and “culture.”  Second and 
derived from the first are the “foundation” and “purpose” of culture.  The third and 
equally important is the element of “cultural diversity.”  Whether or not diversity is seen 
as a “necessary good” or “quality,” depends upon the relationship that is set between the 
first and the second group of elements.  The supreme value of Vatican II teaching on 
culture consists in the Council having incorporated all these elements without arousing 
conflicting views.  The following paragraphs attempt to highlight important dimensions 
of that teaching.  The presentation of these elements follows no particular order here.  
Details on the same topic can be obtained easily from Vatican II Council documents, 
especially Gaudium et Spes. 
Human life from a theological standpoint is more than a series of events which 
empirical facts can reveal or explain.  The Conciliar anthropological thought emerged 
from the church’s recognition of the ever-deepening dichotomy between the spiritual and 
material aspects of human life.  This theological trend is also indicative of the rift 
between faith and reason-a subject treated in Chapter III of this study.  Gaudium et Spes 
no. 4 expresses the aforementioned rift in these words: “There is…a painstaking search 
for a better material world, without parallel spiritual advancement.”  Paragraph 25 of the 
same document endeavors to reflect on human existence in light of what it means to be a 
person in the world.  Discernible, therefore, in the Conciliar schema is a dynamic 
relationship the Council Fathers set between person and culture.  The primary aim is to 
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bring out the interdependence between the two and the determination of the transcendent 
and contingent principles.  Notably, though there is interdependence between various 
elements, the Council in no way places equal value on person and culture.  For instance, 
Gaudium et Spes no. 12 indicates clearly that the meaning of a person always transcends 
particular self-understanding.  Clearly then, the meaning of a human being (human 
ontology) is the philosophical-theological framework for a wholistic understanding of 
culture in relation to a human being.  T.M. McFadden offers a fitting explanation of 
Gaudium et Spes no. 25.  A human being is composed of spiritual and corporeal 
orientations by means of which one is enabled to live in the world.  The simultaneous 
orientations to concrete existence and to the transcendent ground of being have direct 
bearing on the understanding of culture.  “If man precisely in and through his finitude is 
ordered to the Absolute as the culmination of all human dynamism, says McFadden, 
“then this Absolute will be manifest within the social historical process and not centrally 
in some individualistic religious experience.”199  According to McFadden, this is a 
corrective to any scheme of thought that seeks to create “any dichotomy between soul 
and body or the material and spiritual realms”200 of a society.  His position is explicitly in 
disagreement with the social science perspectives that trivialize culture and physical 
anthropology that renders a concept of culture solely as a product of arbitrary forces.  In 
this way McFadden’s views comprise a good transition to Vatican II teaching.  For the 
Second Vatican Council closely linked human existence and destiny in such a way that 
the concrete and the transcendent dimensions of human being could also be discernible in 
the overall concept of culture.  Human ontology becomes the appropriate philosophical 
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framework for understanding and explaining anthropological questions arising from 
contemporary social change.   
A Theological-Anthropological View of Culture 
The Vatican II definition of culture is premised on paragraph no 12 of Gaudium et 
Spes..  “According to the almost unanimous opinion of believers and unbelievers alike, 
all things on earth should be related to man as their center and crown.” This statement 
purposely grounds the meaning of culture in the universal humanity,201 and reiterates the 
Christian vision of a common origin and destiny.  Embodied in this vision are the beliefs 
about a common humanity, i.e., possessing the same basic orientations and inclinations.  
This teaching fits into the methodological category as explained by McFadden. “Rather 
than propose an abstract concept of [human nature, contemporary Catholic theology] 
begins with the concrete unity of persons as they appear in history, situated within the 
one actual, and supernatural existential order.”202  This is indeed the theological-
philosophical horizon to which Gaudium et Spes attunes the concept of culture insofar as 
it relates to a person or the human way of being.  After identifying a person as the starting 
point for understanding his or her social environment, the document then goes on to aptly 
specify the different dimensions that make up the totality we call culture.  After a 
statement is made regarding the purpose of human life from a historical standpoint, the 
Council then explains the functions of culture in view of the ultimate goal of human 
existence.   
Gaudium et Spes no. 53 thus states: “It is one of the properties of the human 
person that he can achieve true and full humanity only by means of culture, that is, 
through the cultivation of the goods and values of nature.  Whenever, therefore, there is a 
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question of human life, nature and cultures are intimately linked together.”  Notice that 
the document does not speak about some abstract nature but about the fundamental 
inclinations observable in all humankind and always manifest in all cultures.  Gaudium et 
Spes does not mention that the same inclinations can be disposed differently or diversely 
when acted upon by different factors.  The reason for this omission is clear.  Once the 
basic principles are understood, the practical questions can be derived accordingly.  
Hence, with basic presumptions in place, the Gaudium et Spes no. 53 begins by defining 
culture in these compact terms.  “The word ‘culture’ in the general sense refers to all 
those things which go to the refining and developing of man’s diverse mental and 
physical endowments.”  The basic human inclinations are condensed into what is meant 
by “all those things” and are specified as follows: 
• [The human being] tries to subdue the earth by his knowledge and his labor 
(human intellect).   
 
• [The human being] humanizes social life both in the family and in the whole civic 
community through the improvement of customs and institutions (the basic 
inclination social development beyond the nuclei family). 
 
• [The human being] communicates and preserves customs and institutions to be an 
inspiration for the progress of many, even all humankind (inclination to 
education).   
 
• [The human being] expresses through his/her works the great spiritual experiences 
and aspirations of men/women throughout the ages (religious inclinations)  
 
 
This section of Conciliar teaching continues to be the focus of many theological 
studies.203  The intention here is not to give a detailed treatise on each aspect outlined 
here but to indicate in general terms the constitutive dimensions of the total reality known 
as culture.  Accordingly, culture is composed of a series of specific interconnected 
dimensions or moral principles corresponding to basic human needs and aspirations.  The 
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first point combines the basic inclination “to know” with the reality of “human labor.”  
Persons are endowed with free thought and reflection, all of which ensue into concrete 
forms of livelihoods and all kinds of social facilities.  In other words, all the 
distinctiveness associated with each culture has its origin in free human thought and 
reflection.  The nature of the human intellect (in the classical sense) implies that the 
general human orientation toward a cultural life does not happen once.  It continues as 
long as the functions of intellect remain integrally operable.   
The second point speaks to the organizational aspect as a basic human inclination 
ordered to harmonious existence.  The third aspect underscores the value and function of 
education in the advancement and sustenance of all cultural values and goods.  The fourth 
dimension points out the reality of religion as the transcendent and organizing principles 
for all cultural good and the springboard of ethical principles and social morality.204  That 
is, religion offers the underlying moral values on which all dimensions of culture are 
based.  All these elements that comprise the meaning of culture also constitute the 
“common good” of a cultural entity.  In a nutshell, the Vatican II cultural ontological 
schema admits no room for arguments regarding religion as something existing outside 
culture. Nor do political and economic life realities simply co-existence “with” culture.  
Common phraseologies such as economics, politics and culture are consequently very 
misleading.  Politics, economics, education, social institutions, the practice of religion, art 
and many others comprise the reality known as culture. On the Christian historical note, 
while this teaching validates the social experiences of all human groupings as essentially 
cultural, it does not justify or validate every element within any specific cultural 
experience. The next few paragraphs and the remaining chapter clarify will this last point.  
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Seen as a whole, the Conciliar anthropological schematic representation admits a 
number of empirically determinable facts.  What is basically human is also what is 
constitutively cultural.  A human being is neither a one dimensional species concerned 
only about material existence, nor an amorphous species without any basic direction.  A 
person is an embodied spirit with an evident basic orientation toward integral human 
wellbeing.   It is with this similar attentiveness to the unity of the material and spiritual 
dimensions of a person that led the American pollster, George H. Gallup (1901-1984), to 
assert that “I could prove God statistically. Take the human body alone – the chances that 
all the functions of an individual would just happen by chance is statistically 
monstrous.”205  The specified human tendencies are not decoration. They are 
foreordained and are geared toward the development of “true and full humanity” that 
includes corporeal and spiritual realities.  Thus far we have reached an important point in 
this chapter.  Vatican II theological-anthropological view of culture has hermeneutical 
significance for this study. According to this study, Vatican II cultural ontology presents 
basic elements common to all cultures, namely; the relationship between person and 
culture, its foundations, the basis of diversity and the purpose206 of culture.  The study 
now turns to apply those elements to the traditional African cultures in the effort to 
explain their internal constitution.  This particular focus meets the objectives stated at the 
beginning of this chapter, namely, the cause of the cultural crisis, and of the conflict 
between African Nations today and the Western social system.  Other essential cultural 
elements will emerge within this wider interpretative framework.   
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SECTION IV 
 
Recognizing Cultural Diversity in Africa  
 
This study cannot emphasize enough that recognizing cultural diversity is a 
crucial factor in the church’s mission and in the development of modern nations in 
Africa. In this factor lies a host of possibilities as well as very serious obstacles. So to 
assert that in the pre-colonial period the present day tribal collectivities in Africa were 
nations may sound too simplistic to the modern person so accustomed to using the 
notions of “state” and “nation” interchangeably; i.e., without due regard for their 
etymological meaning.  The term “state” is a more modern political arrangement 
originating in the West and for that same reason is suffused with Christian ideals.  
“Nation,” on the other hand, is a general way of speaking about human communities and 
lends itself to global traditional forms of communities before modern civilization.  The 
Oxford Dictionary definition of “nation” lends itself well to its etymological meaning.  A 
“nation” is “a large community of people, usually sharing a common history, culture and 
language, and living in a particular territory under one government.207  Each of the 
aforementioned aspects of a “nation” was an essential feature of the African cultural 
collectivities known as “tribes.”  In the pre-colonial times, each tribe had its own sources 
of income “[or means of livelihood, a distinct social and political organization].”208  
David Barret, a European theologian, carried out an extensive research on African tribal 
cultures.209  Following a set of criteria that speak to commonalities and differences 
among tribal cultures, Barret identified 100, 000 tribes.210  Barret observed significantly 
that in “much of Africa, the tribe has been for centuries past and to a large degree still 
today the main social, psychological, economic and even governmental reality.”211  That 
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said some clarification is necessary.  The “governmental reality” strictly applies to the 
pre-colonial period. What endures in this last regard is the strong tribal resistance to state 
governance. This is manifest in the human and ethical postures of tribes as we shall see. 
John Mbiti has for a long time served as a principal source on African Traditional 
Religion. To explain the collective African experience and view of communality he opts 
for the term “people” as the synonym for explaining the collective experience of African 
tribes in general.  The purpose for his choice is to heighten the distinction between the 
African and the European usages of “tribe.”212  Mbiti’s selection and usage of the term 
“people” resonates with his aim to present a universal African religious philosophy.  The 
question this study puts before this kind of approach is whether the generic term “people” 
squares properly with African anthropologies and sense of “being.”  Tribal cultures in 
Africa have variant concepts of a person, which is why the use of people as a synonym 
for African tribal communities in general is as misleading as Mbiti’s idea of African 
religious philosophy (in the singular).  This study prefers the term tribe, because of its 
capacity to elicit deeper underlying meanings that are neither obvious nor are so easily 
conveyed by the term “people.”213  Moreover, the tribal social framework is the 
culmination of “culture” in the formal and real sense.  It is from this view point that this 
study presents the tribe as the normative social structure, and the legitimate expression of 
the African view of a person, culture, and diversity.214  Thus properly understood, a tribe 
is the embodiment of an African experience of self as a human being. There are 
ontological and experiential characteristics that set one tribe from another. 
Mbiti rightly points out that an African tribe is composed of members, who “share 
a common kinship and history, which is often traced mythologically to either the first 
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[ancestral] man created by God or to national leaders responsible for establishing 
structures of the society concerned.”215  He also spells out the essential features of the 
tribal cultures in these words: “a tribe shares a common language, customs, morals, 
ethics, social behaviour, and material objects.”216  He accurately points out that these 
elements are still at large in Africa today.  Notice that the elements cited as typical of an 
African tribe are universally shared by all human cultures.  But when the same elements 
are interpreted in light of an African tribal culture one will discover not only cultural 
distinctiveness among the tribes, but also a basic orientation toward inward-centeredness 
in the expression of the same elements.  Michael Paul Gallagher’s observations about 
tribal cultures in general lend themselves well to the factor of cultural distinctiveness and 
an ethnocentric propensity among African tribal cultures.  “Differences between 
cultures,” he says, “are rooted in how people learn to perceive their social relations with 
one another.”217  He points out four factors that “mutually [reinforce]” the emergence of 
social relationships or identities: “the acquired way of perceiving one’s place in society, 
the social context and its dominant patterns of interaction, individual behaviour, choices, 
and the form of religious vision typical of different cultures.”218  He maintains rightly that 
because “one grows up assimilating basic assumptions of the tribe; such a one comes to 
view the surrounding world with a certain slant.”219 Based on Gallagher’s explanation, a 
slanted view of the world is typical of human cultures.  As a matter of fact, this is the 
manner in which tribal cultures in Africa also evolved.  But Gallagher also offers an 
important and useful point for bringing out some differences with respect to the evolution 
African tribal cultures.  A technical explanation is required to show the functional 
relationships among the tribal structural frames of reference. That is, it is very important 
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to understand how each element functions to heighten cultural distinctiveness in the 
entire tribal structure.  For then it becomes possible to comprehend the diametrical 
opposition among tribal cultures and the claim by this study that the diverse ancestral 
visions and practices are the hinge of the existing human and cultural crisis in Africa. 
When explaining cultural diversity as an ingrained element in the making of 
culture, Gallagher lays emphasis on “mutually reinforcing factors” in the emergence of 
cultural diversity.  By presenting these factors as a matter of principle, this allows for a 
more specific explanation of each factor in light of concrete cultural experience. When 
applied to Africa, therefore, the mutually reinforcing factors[s] correspond to formative 
principles or moral values in an individual tribal culture. Tribal moral values refer to all 
structures of meaning and practices that convey the total world view embodied in a tribal 
culture. In other words, what gives an “African tribal” culture a “particular slant,” is the 
total (religious) world view, traceable to a tribal ancestor.  Formative principles refer to 
the ancestors and their moral legacies which are the foundations of tribal cultures.  These 
are also the interpretative moral frames of reference for individuals and tribal societies as 
a whole.  At the same time, we can recognize a difference between a specific cultural 
“slant” and the overall orientation of cultural diversity among African tribes. The role of 
ancestral religions played a central role in fashioning the character of cultural diversity in 
Africa. John Mbiti exemplifies this dynamic in his effort to relate tribal religious 
heritages to the social dynamics of a group. He states unequivocally that “One must be 
born [into a tribal community] to participate in the religious system of a tribe other than 
your own.”220  He elaborates on the formal practical implications of this basic cultural–
religious orientation:  
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To be human is to belong to the whole community and to do so 
involves participating in the beliefs, ceremonies, rituals and festivals 
of that community.  A person cannot detach himself from the religion 
of his group, for to do so is to be severed from his roots, his 
foundation, his context of security, his kinships and the entire group 
of those who make him aware of his own existence.  To be without 
one of these corporate elements is to be out of the whole picture.  
Therefore, to be without religion amounts to a self-excommunication 
from the entire life of society, and Africans do not know how to exist 
without religion.221 
 
 
What this indicates, in essence, is that African tribal cultures are fundamentally closed 
social systems.222  This is not difficult to comprehend given the basic functions of 
religion within the entire structure of any culture.  Leonardo Boff forcefully brings the 
function of religion in the societal orientation of basic values and priorities.  He states: 
Through religion, societies define for themselves the most 
transcendent meaning of their practices, and the destiny of persons 
and history.  The vehicles of religion are powerful symbols, 
archetypes of great depth as well as of historical permanence.  It is 
by way of religion that separations are repaired and points of 
convergence discovered between times and eras.223  
 
If the basic function of religion is to organize disparate elements in culture, giving them 
coherence, then it is basic in the formation of moral and ethical consciousness of the 
cultural subjects.  Similarly, the socio-religious scenario described by Mbiti is indicative 
of the fundamental alignment of personal self-consciousness within the tribe as the source 
of ultimate identity.   
In sum, the previous observations are important for a genuine understanding of 
the difficulties that continue to dog development efforts in Africa.  Like wise, a vision of 
inculturation that ignores basic elements in African cultural systems is bound to achieve 
no lasting fruits.  But the reductionist tendencies in African contextual theologies ignore 
the reality of cultural diversity and its moral implications.  For example, despite Mbiti’s 
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recognition of the role of religion in giving form and substantive content to tribal 
identities, he opts for a homogeneous interpretation of tribal world views.  To explain the 
African philosophy of life, he says “there are no parallel systems which can be observed 
in similarly concrete terms.”224  Although Mbiti’s anthropological views generated 
enormous interest in African religions and cultures, and have contributed greatly to the 
development of African theological thought, this study takes issue with the stated 
assumption.  How can different tribal communities rooted in non-accommodating 
religions, propounding diverse moral visions and ethical horizons, embodied in dissimilar 
languages share one religious philosophy?  The answer lies in the general and 
longstanding need in African theology to present a coherent explanation of Black religio-
cultural experience.  But it is a need that prefers reductionism to a critical presentation of 
traditional heritages.  The nature of cultural diversity in Africa defies such reductionist 
approach.  Thus far the present major section focuses on the technical relationship of the 
ancestors to their respective religious heritages.  Since the manner of proceeding is 
basically structural, the current objective does not necessarily admit a specialized analysis 
of individual tribal cultures.  Also because moral values can be too numerous for an 
analysis of this kind, the following reflection is limited to the tribal view of a person, the 
basis of culture, the concept of a common good, and of a community.  In conjunction with 
the current objective, there is an effort to indicate the points of conflict in tribal cultures 
and how they feature in the development of African nation-states.  This objective requires 
that we step back into traditional history to provide a window into the major footprints of 
the African collective psyche: Organic unity characteristic of traditional cultures was 
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dismantled by colonialism without necessarily eliminating the formative significance of 
traditional world views.   
Toward Understanding African Anthropologies and Ontologies 
 
In order to live a truly Christian life, one needs to have a right comprehension of 
the basic relationship between Christian faith and human culture. For the anthropological 
horizon from which a Christian derives his or her ultimate identity and moral frame of 
reference is determinative of whether or not that Christian will live a truly Christian 
spiritual life marked by the redemptive grace made possible through Jesus Christ.  The 
present section is a very important one in this regard.  It seeks to cast important light on 
the aspects of Black cultures that presently cloud as well endangers its positive values 
and future prospects. The present objective therefore focuses on the African human being 
in relation to culture. While a human being is the rightful foundation of cultures, 
according to the Second Vatican Council,225 African tribal cultures are constituted 
differently.226  The interplay between ancestry and tribal religions in the collective Black 
African history played a central role in the emergence of diverse traditional 
anthropologies and concepts of “being.” It is true that traditional African world views do 
accommodate recognizable awareness of the transcendent reality of the human being.  
However, the concepts of a person are deeply colored by individual tribal anthropologies 
and ontologies as we shall see in these final analyses.  There is a level at which the 
transcendent realities of the human being fade away in the many matrixes of 
ancestrology.227  What matters ultimately is ancestral descent and legacies.228 It is 
therefore important to bring out this anthropological anomaly. Of great significance is the 
reality of African religions having essentialized ancestry to such a degree that the 
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consideration for contemplating God’s active presence became obsolete. It is due to this 
critical fact that the subsequent analyses lay stress on bringing out unwholesome 
dimensions of ancestrology in the effort to counter balance the exaggerated appraisals of 
ancestry in the Black African cultural experiences. We shall therefore account for the 
recognizable absence of God in the traditional religious experiences in order to provide 
the background for understanding the character of cultural diversity in Africa. However, 
given the fact that non-Christian Africans acknowledge the existence of God, it may 
sound contradictory to say that God is absent in the religious experiences of African 
religions. But is it not true that intellectual knowledge of God is not necessarily 
synonymous with personal encounter with God?  Having said so, the present focus is 
only technical, because the study only seeks to account for a formal absence of God in 
the ‘faith structure’ of the traditional religions. Knowledge of this reality heightens our 
understanding of the origin of numerous tribal cultures, human alienation among Black 
African tribes and the moral behavior the latter engenders. 
The Existence of Two Religious Traditions in African Traditional Religions 
The following reconstructions are premised on the thesis that there exist two 
religious traditions: the more ancient tradition and the one initiated by the tribal ancestors 
much later in the history of African cultures. Many, if not most, of African religions are 
replete with valid concepts about the mystery of God in relation to the world. 
Interestingly, and in a very formal sense, some of these concepts correspond with the 
Judeo-Christian religious beliefs.  The present reflection does not dwell on the detailed 
discussion of these concepts. The immediate purpose is to demonstrate that the most 
ancient religious tradition exist side-by-side with the ancestral religious tradition. For 
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instance, the traditional concepts of the mystery of God are not handed down in some 
elaborate and systematized conceptualization such as those one encounters in African 
theological writings.  Traditional concepts of God come in many but succinct forms and 
often cut across tribal religions. These include but are not limited to phrases indicating 
God as the “creator” of humankind, and tribal names bearing some essential attributes of 
God.  There is a fitting example from the Bantu of Uganda.   
The sense of God as an inexplicable generous giver, the ultimate decision maker, 
finds particular expression in Bantu names for the divine being.  Among others the 
following names selected from five different tribes: Kyagaba, Byarugaba, Niwagaba, 
Agaba, Hagaba. These names convey the sense of God’s inexplicable and indeterminable 
generosity.  While in some cases these names represent the point of surrender to the 
divine will in case of the unexpected, they may also indicate the mood of celebration at 
the moment of birth. In other words, God gives freely according to God’s own plans. 
While the nuances in the actual usage of these names are not discussed here, we shall 
note an important point.  Although these names originate from different Bantu tribes, the 
root stem “gaba” “to give” is common to all and is indicative of a widespread belief 
among the Bantu in God as the one “ who gives” life in various forms.  But given the fact 
that each African traditional religion is exclusive to individual tribes, the religious sense 
conveyed by such names can be traced only to the distant common past before the 
emergence of the tribes. There are serious reasons behind this claim.   
When one relates the Bantu sense of God’s boundless act of giving to that of God 
as the sole Creator of “all human kind,” one gets a sense of a common (universal) human 
nature as a significant element in the African religious heritages.  Yet when we critically 
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examine the basic structure tribal anthropologies and anthropologies we find that each 
tribe views itself as a different humanity from the others. This then prompts one to 
inquire as to why Black Africa have such a strong sense of God as the universal Creator 
and value God’s boundless generosity, and yet we all fail to see this abundance in terms 
of the “whole?”  Why, for instance, do we believe in God as the universal creator yet 
cling tenaciously to an ethnocentric vision that extols individual tribal humanity over and 
above the others?  The answer lies in the historical shift from an ancient religious 
paradigm that focused on the mystery of God to an immutable and, as such, a limited 
value of ancestry. This shift suggests that later socio-religious traditions emerged in 
opposition to each another. These later traditions are characterized by divisive world 
views and the need for each tribe to outdo the other.  Interestingly, while African 
theology has long celebrated Black African belief in God as a creator, the mentalities and 
relationships among different tribes do not demonstrate this reality. The primacy of 
ancestry and the attendant value of blood kinship hold sway over the ancient religious 
inclination toward the recognition of the common human nature.  In brief, the previous 
correlation between the universality of God’s act of creating and giving, with the 
widespread expression of this reality, is just one example that justifies the existence of 
two religious traditions in African Religions.  Brief and limited as these illustrations may 
be, they provide the rationale for examining the events that may have led to the 
truncation of the primordial religious dynamism toward the universal, and the consequent 
socio-religious momentum toward anthropological and ontological fragmentation in 
Black cultures.  Carrying some moderate historical excursions into African history with 
the purpose of identifying significant points of departure remain the best option here. 
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The ancient tradition indicates that Black Africa in general had embarked on 
contemplating the mystery of God.  Historical events must have led to the break up and 
evolution of numerous cultural units, which later became the foundation for present day 
tribes.  The break may not have eliminated the significant values of the primordial 
religious meanings.  But the experience may as well have established a common 
paradigm for tribal ancestral religious structures to emerge as important symbols of 
tradition thus ensuring continuity with the past.  That is to say, the need to channel 
individual and collective religious experiences through an ancestor marks an important 
point in the development of the African religious tradition.  The need to validate the 
cultural experience of separated groupings provided the occasion for centering every 
aspect of communal life on the ancestor. Although the need for unity, mediation, and 
continuity are important aspects of many religious traditions, the role assumed by later 
ancestors brought about adverse consequences.  As group consciousness became more 
prominent and the good to be safeguarded, the mystery of God as the ultimate point of 
reference grew more and more distant as the ancestor came to occupy the normative point 
of reference or the transcendent ground.  And we begin to see why an African is likely to 
be preoccupied with ancestors or materiality rather the mystery of God.  From a practical 
standpoint, these considerations enable us to make sense as to why the biological factor 
of kinship easily overrides ethical commitment to the universal common good.  The 
supplanting of the transcendent ground by later ancestors also meant the gradual decline 
of the need to explore new possibilities by rational reflection so as to continually 
transform the traditions in light of emerging circumstances. Passing on inherited values 
became normative for the material survival of a tribe.  But in the minds of traditionalists, 
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there remains a conviction that persons are experientially connected to God through the 
ancestor as the mediator.  There is a lot of evidence to corroborate the position taken by 
this study.  
Migrations of African Tribes within Africa 
 Examining the factor of demographic change and the conflict it inspires can be an 
effective means for identifying the points in time and events such as those that led to the 
shift in the primordial religious paradigm.  Although there is a lot retained in folklore and 
conveyed by oral history, the absence of literary history in African traditions renders the 
current project very elusive.  But we must keep in mind that difficult does not always 
mean impossibility.  What is provided is an estimation of social life in pre-historic Africa 
based on the available sources-written, oral, and concrete social structures remnant of 
traditional tribal nations.229   
Certain basic religious beliefs, customs and practices plus oral histories on Africa 
often converge on one fact: life in distant Africa was once a shared experience.  The 
recent histories of major migrations in Africa indicate that the Bantu peoples originated 
from what is now mostly known as North Africa and moved southwards to the parts 
occupied by neighboring countries south and north of the Zambezi River.  This is also the 
region that has been of great interest for archeologists. The remains of the oldest human 
species are reported to have been discovered in the same region.  It is amazing, indeed, to 
recognize the similarities in social perspective between the Bantu people of South Africa, 
and the Bantu of East and North East Africa.  Nonetheless, even if there may have been 
large social groupings spread over the Continent in primordial Africa, there appears to 
have been a general close proximity of one family unit to another.  As one would expect, 
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sharing a common world view and societal arrangements would have been the order of 
the day.  The multiplicity of cultural diversity characteristic of pre-colonial and present 
African societies is more likely than not to have begun with demographic changes.  
Population increase and the many social conflicts the former triggered are usually cited 
by historians as one of the primary causes for major migrations. The Luo migrations in 
East Africa testify to this reality. Those who settled in present day Uganda continue to 
regard themselves as Luo but with different ethnic identities which distinguishes them to 
the Luo of Kenya.  These include Alur, Acholi and Jopadhola. The search for new 
habitats for people and domestic animals was an important venture, and an occasion for 
new social structural setups. 230  Bartheolomew Abanuka draws upon Igbo (Nigeria) oral 
history where it is believed the latter settled in the present location around 2555 B.C. It is 
not clear how Abanuka arrives at that date, given the fact that African traditional cultures 
are not literary cultures.  He nonetheless adds an interesting point that the Igbo idea of 
“chi” and belief in ancestry “would have developed around this time.”231  The question is; 
where did the Igbo come from to settle in their present location?    
 The phenomenon of social change was not unique to Black Africa.  Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, in his work entitled, The Future of Man, gives a compelling 
explanation of the divergent evolution of human societies over the globe.   
Prehistory teaches us that in the beginning Man must have lived in small, 
autonomous groups; after which links were established, first between 
families, and then between tribes.  These associations became more 
elaborate as time went on.  In the phase of the ‘neolithic evolution’ they 
hardened and became fixed on a territorial basis.  For thousands of years, 
this principle remained essentially unchanged; it was the land, despite 
social readjustments, which remained the symbol and safeguard of 
individual liberty in its earlier form.232  
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Though the nuances in Teilhard’s explanation might have been based on the evolution of 
Western societies, the general principle he cites reflects the social historical dynamics in 
the universal evolution of diverse human societies.  The difference between this general 
picture and the African cultural histories revolves around two factors: the “hardening” of 
the tribal social structures and the importance of land in the overall need for collective 
identity.  While, for instance, Christianity played a central role in breaking up “hardened” 
tribal borders and ethnic philosophies in the West, it has not managed to break 
consanguinity as the primary value and the organizing principle of social philosophy in 
Africa.  This implies that one must first understand what may have happened historically 
before elaborating on the supreme importance of blood kinship in the hardening of tribal 
“boundaries” in the theoretical and in the practical sense.     
It is credible to argue that in all primitive cultures world-wide, biological family 
units were the original foundations of social groupings.  But in Africa, the need for 
identity and security seem to have accompanied the general search for peace and 
habitable environments.  These family units were consolidated around the figure of a 
founding ancestor or family leader.  From a realistic and psychological point of view, the 
precariousness of human life in the primitive eras may well be the reason primitive 
cultures evolved around individual family units.  It was supposedly easier to solicit 
cooperation and harmony by appealing to blood kinship than any other factor.  In Africa, 
however, the need to preserve and perpetuate family lineage and religious heritages 
emerged as a big motivating factor.  Hence, something distinctive evolved in Black 
African cultures.  
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Because of the exclusive emphasis on the family ties, blood kinship persisted and 
became the universal organizing principles in tribal cultures over the ages.  Whether 
initiated by migrations or conflicts, the break away groups retained the primordial world 
view, the value of consanguinity and pertinent major structures, customs and practices.  
New experiences, tribal visions, and perceived “needs” also called for further additions 
without necessarily eliminating primordial religious belief in God.  This is the same 
reason this study maintains that there exist two strains of tradition and religious 
inclinations in the diverse cultural religious heritages in Africa.  The ancient religious 
tradition embodies the religious dynamism toward a universal world view, while the 
more ancestor-based tradition tends toward cultural and religious fragmentation. That 
these two traditions exist in opposition to one another is a point that ought to be explored 
more deeply.  John Mbiti has made significant advancements in his study on this subject 
since the first publication of his major work cited in this study.  In the introduction to the 
second expanded edition, Mbiti has broken good ground which he presents in the form of 
a new quest to understand specific dimensions of the African religious beliefs and 
practices.  His recent views indicate a major shift from an apologetic perspective to a 
critical view of African Traditional Religions.  However, his acknowledgement of the 
shortcomings of African Religions challenges his previous philosophical assumptions, as 
well as indicates that he is at the initial point of searching for appropriate answers to his 
new insights.   
John Mbiti has recently come to recognize in African religions an absence of a 
dynamic religious movement toward the universal as the general orientation of major 
religious traditions.  Mbiti’s account for the inherent limitations in African religious 
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heritages is still far from satisfactory, because he presents African religions as a unified 
tradition that has developed uninterruptedly over the centuries.  It is little wonder 
therefore that his analysis of African anthropologies vis-à-vis tribal religion is still 
idealistic. For example, Mbiti attributes the lack of the universal dynamism to the 
absence of missionaries for propagating tribal beliefs.  This is how Mbiti explains the 
reason for traditional religions being limited to the respective tribes.  It is rather 
surprising that he does not yet see the technical and religious significance of his own 
insight that “being born into a tribe is a condition for legitimate participation in the 
community of that tribe.” Nonetheless, the issues he points out are legitimate and raise 
further questions against the claims made by Benezet Bujo in Chapter I regarding the 
soteriological integrity of African religious traditions.233  Mbiti makes more important 
observations that redeem certain limitations in his initial assessment of African religions.  
In his second edition, he draws a distinction between the formal African religious belief 
in the after life, and the manner in which the same belief is constituted and practiced.  It 
is here that he makes extremely important summations of his recent reflections.  Because 
of the forceful and prolific nature of this particular insight, it is quoted here in its entirety.  
Mbiti admits that African belief in the after life 
…does not constitute a hope for a future and better life.  To live here 
and now is the most important concern of African religious activities 
and beliefs.  There is little, if any, concern with the distinctly spiritual 
welfare of man apart from his physical life.  No line is drawn between 
the spiritual and the physical.  Even life in the hereafter is conceived 
in the materialistic and physical terms.  There is neither paradise to be 
hoped for nor hell to be feared in the hereafter.  The soul of man does 
not long for spiritual redemption or for closer contact with God in the 
next world.234  
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  In a fitting conclusion to his new position, Mbiti further says, ‘[t]his is an important 
element in traditional religions, and one which can help us to understand the 
concentration of African religiosity in earthly matters with man at the centre of this 
religiosity.”235  Thus far Mbiti provides us with basic insights into the limitations of tribal 
religions.  All these need further analysis to unveil dimensions that remain hidden from 
sight. This analysis draws upon two important points from Mbiti, because they are related 
to the current objective. These are “the concentration of African religiosity in earthly 
matters,” and “the preoccupation with man at the centre of this religiosity.”236  Although 
Mbiti divides his study quest into these two areas, they are interrelated.  The 
preoccupation with man (the ancestor) almost at the exclusion of transcendent questions 
is the fundamental cause of African preoccupation with earthly matters. When human 
beings obscure the basic inclination to the transcendent reality, they seek ultimate in 
earthly matters.237  The absence of hope for paradise and a longing for spiritual 
redemption, according to this study, results from the interplay between two problems.  
Having centered religious experience around the ancestors, the very avenue for further 
reflection and spiritual exploration was systematically “attenuated.”  But since only the 
transcendent ground can offer infinite possibilities for breaking through the material 
sphere, the preoccupation with ancestry also means that the religious paradigm has to be 
drawn from the physical aspects of life. Mbiti does not delve deeper into the issues he 
raises.  So the following analyses strive to bring out how the ancestral religious 
mechanism operates to bring about temporal and human fulfillment with a tribe.  This is 
extremely important for one to understand the nature of the human and cultural crisis 
unfolding in Africa.  
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THE FOOTPRINTS OF AFRICA’S COLLECTIVE CULTURAL PSYCHE 
Essentializing of Ancestry and Its Implication for Self-understanding and Existence  
The nuclei and extended families are essential to human existence.  A natural 
family circle is where a person learns to relate to self, others and also develops a sense of 
the higher being.  The different hierarchies of authority inherent in the natural family help 
different members to learn interdependence, as well as how to place oneself in a wider 
society. At the same time and in the Christian world view, the moral value of 
consanguineous social structures has to be regulated by other hierarchies of meaning.  
Most important is the value of a common human nature which steers persons toward 
unbiased openness to people outside one’s family.  A basic common nature is the moral 
foundation for the universal common good. This has further implications in the Christian 
view of human existence. That is, a natural family has the moral obligation to widen the 
circle of relationship and to freely cooperate in building inclusive structures of existence.  
So while Christianity affirms that transcendent values are inherent in the basic 
constitution of all humanity, Christian life also demonstrates that a family which closes in 
upon itself can become impoverished at the many levels of existence.  It is with this 
understanding that the following analyses explore the African problem of making 
ancestry and biological descent the ontological basis of personal and communal 
identity.238 That this ontological posture espouses multiple philosophies of human nature 
in Africa is still far from understood. This is the reason this study stresses the need to 
comprehend the reality of the basic structure239 of African philosophies of a person and 
of being. 
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 The idea of a “world view” is an encompassing category because it expresses the 
reality of culture in its totality.  To speak, therefore, of a traditional world view in Africa 
is to allude to a host of elements found in all tribes that cannot be analyzed in the scope 
of this study.  Subsequent sections are, therefore, limited to elements of cultures that can 
bring out an inward-looking dynamic in traditional heritages. These include specific 
moral perceptions, shared values, the character of ethical commitments and attitudes.  All 
these elements give expression to the total world view and to the general philosophical 
and moral disposition of tribal cultures.  They help us to see how the tribal cultures 
prepare members to “focus” on the corporate values and goods of their tibes at the 
exclusion of those outside the group.  The role played by cultural factors in “centering” 
the life of society is well illustrated by Dismas Bonner, O.F.M.  He has used the concept 
of “a ‘focal thing and practice’”240 to illustrate the function of cultural elements in 
orienting persons in society.  The examples he provides are means toward a deeper 
understanding of the mechanics of collective consciousness and ethnocentric orientation 
in an African tribe.   
According to Bonner, social environments embody factors that often have power 
to center individual or collectivities around specific objects of value.  He observes that 
“focal things are as diverse as the preoccupation of humanity.”241  He cites TVs, DVDs, 
computers, etc, as typical examples of things that “coalesce into culture” characteristic of 
the present times.  With the intent to underscore the formative impact of modern 
technology, Bonner points out a familiar occurrence. “Once several hours on the internet 
or watching TV become a regular part of life, something else is going to disappear, such 
as reading, prayer, sharing meals…or the cultivation of personal relationships.”242    
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[a] ‘focal thing or practice’ has a commanding presence.  It engages one’s 
body and mind, puts us in relationship to others.  Focal things and the 
engagement they foster have power to center our lives, to arrange other 
things around this center in an orderly way, because they help us to 
recognize what is important and what is not.243   
 
Following Bonner’s principle of “centering society,” the “focal things and practice” 
correspond to what this study regards as the “formative mechanics” in African tribal 
cultures.  The ancestor has the purpose of centering a tribal community on the perceived 
common good, compactly known as a tribal heritage. The dynamics of centering is made 
possible by the general tribal perceptions, moral values, ethical commitments, social 
structure and attitudes that a tribe espouses.  The centering roles of ancestry intersect at 
many points thus making it possible to see the interrelationships and functional 
differences between the tribal world views. At the background of all these lurks the most 
important question of all: the place of God in relation to the centering role of the 
ancestors. An enlightened understanding of the cultural crisis therefore consists in 
recognizing the role played by ancestrology in continually eliciting specific cultural 
responses or behaviors.  In fact, the tenacity of African cultures does not so much consist 
in the in-built mechanisms which enable traditional heritages to hold out against social 
change, but in the power of ancestry to center every one on the respective tribal ethos and 
interests.  For instance, in spite of the enormous social changes that have taken place, 
Black Africa is still more attuned to the tribal moral ideals than the Western social ideals 
which form the basis of socio-economic, political and educational aspirations. 
There are notable observations in African theological thought regarding the 
preoccupation with ancestors more than with God.  Africans recognize the existence of 
God but also see the need for mediatorial role of the ancestors, so the explanation usually 
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goes. Rather than get to the crux of this extremely important issue and explore its 
theological and moral import, the general tendency is to validate the ancestral religious 
paradigm unexamined.  This predominant theological trend ignores a crucial issue that 
could lead contextual theologies and inculturation toward a fruitful path.  In other words, 
without knowledge of the centering role played by ancestry, it is not possible to 
understand that an ethnocentric social orientation is not simply an option but a part and 
parcel of African culture-past and present.  Nor can one appreciate the delusional 
character of development strategies that seek to realize decisive corporate actions in 
African nation-states by simply appealing to political or economic policies.  We need to 
make recourse to Mbiti’s ideas cited before.  That is, “One must be born [into a tribal 
community] to participate in the religious system of a tribe other than your own.”  Being 
born is therefore, a condition for participating in the life of a tribe.  One must be deemed 
a descendant of a tribal ancestor to become eligible for full (authentic) participation in the 
respective community. Some reconstruction is worthwhile because of the elusive nature 
of the ideas involved.   
The emphasis on natural descent as a condition for legitimate participation in the 
life of a tribe is a clear indication of where traditional cultures place the ultimate point of 
moral and ethical references.  Being born in the line of a tribal ancestor takes primacy 
over the transcendent frame of reference that the Christian religion presents, for instance.  
We once again see the point at which an ancestor assume normatives status and 
ontological functions the Second Vatican Council associated with the meaning of a 
person per se and in relation to culture.  This trend, according to this study, is indicative 
of a definite and constant shifting away from the transcendent horizon as the ultimate and 
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point of reference to the tribal ethos. We shall now provide some examples of ancestral 
values common to all tribes to illustrate the previous 
Blood Kinship as a Supreme Moral Value 
 All religious traditions have founders and prophets.  Their words and actions were 
often the basis for religious development and ethical practice.  This is true for the Judeo-
Christian tradition as it is for major religions in the world.  However, it is one thing to 
make prophetic words and actions the basis of future faith and actions.  But is also 
another thing to take the finite and immutable principle such as “blood kinship” and make 
it a permanent and ultimate point of human existence.  The last point constitutes a 
formidable problem in missionary work and social development in Africa.  To grasp this 
is to have understood the underlying mechanics of cultural resistance, alienations among 
the same Black race, and the multitude of problems they all trigger. An immediate 
example here is the experience and concept of “being in community.” 
 In the Vatican II theology the idea of “being in community,” i.e., culture, is 
derived from an understanding of the person as a whole in relation to God.  In African 
religious traditions “being in community” is an outcome of blood relationships within a 
tribe which shares a common ancestry.  The meaning of a person is filtered through the 
experiences of blood kinship.  The sense of belonging to one’s own is experienced with a 
certain immediacy compared to the Christian religious moral precepts. Here too Mbiti has 
made an important observation.  Having recognized that African beliefs and practices are 
not formulated into a systematic set of dogmas which a person is expected to accept, he 
goes to add a point which can help us to appreciate the current argument. “People simply 
assimilate whatever religious ideas are held or observed by their families and 
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communities…the creeds are written in the hearts of the individual, and each one is 
himself a living creed of his own religion.” 244 Despite, however, the implications this has 
for ethical morality-given the spiritual and theological substance of African religions 
pointed out above-Mbiti adds an interesting conclusion. He says, “it is this which makes 
Africans so religious: religion is their whole system of being.”245  According to this 
author, one can be religious without being spiritual; one can be spiritual without being 
virtuous and one can also be virtuous without being holy.  In other words, religiosity by 
itself does not tell us much about the quality of moral life and spirituality as lived by any 
person: action and attitudes do.  Therefore, religiosity, spirituality and morality have to be 
weighed against the transcendent truths about the human being and the nature of human 
existence.  The following behaviors and attitudes tell a lot about tribal anthropologies and 
ontologies. 
Blood kinship and the sense of loyalty it elicits are the defining factors in the 
daily social encounters, either within or outside one’s tribe.  Also because every aspect of 
social and religious life is filtered through the same finite value, “blood kinship” is also 
the fundamental cause for a deep-seated alienation and conflicts among the various ethnic 
groups that make up the present day African nations. Blood sets the tone for the Black 
African concept of a person, social relationships, the community, and so forth.  It is in 
recognizing blood kinship as the organizing moral principle of social life that Chapter I 
steered against a unilateral adoption of ancestry as the universal foundation for contextual 
theologies and inculturation and inculturation.  Citing another related argument made by 
Benezet Bujo’s can add new dimensions on the current issue.   
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In his work entitled The Ethical Dimensions of Community, for example, Bujo 
follows his usual assumption that there is a uniform moral principle which can be the 
foundation of “African morality.”  Consistent with his typical line of argument, Bujo 
commends the traditional stance of unquestionable obedience to the ancestral legacy in 
his work cited here.  He finds in this stance the rationale to argue for the continuation of 
the ancestral legacies, in principle and in practice.  He draws the current line of argument 
along the African communitarian understanding of a person. This, according to Bujo, is a 
predominantly African view of a person as opposed to “the concept of the inviolability of 
the single person”246 as a Western cultural trait.  Bujo’s aim is to show the different 
concepts and usage of freedom between Africa and the West.  He reasons that 
“[d]ecisions must not be made individually, since the entire family and clan community 
have their say. This discussion may go to the extent that the single person has ultimately 
to obey, even if not yet convinced by the argument of the community.”247  There is some 
validity in this statement. The nature of obedience does not require that one completely 
understands a particular decision before such a one can comply. However, insistence on 
uncompromising obedience such as the one Bujo cites is rooted in the fact of “structured 
freedom”: a moral stance treated in Chapter IV. We shall allude to the communitarian 
view of a person with respect to African anthropologies. 
  Notice that in the African communitarian schema, the theological basis for 
absolute obedience to the community derives from the importance of a spoken “word.”   
And Bujo is right in recognizing that because “the Word is so important in the African 
context,” then it is even more important “for the formation of consciousness.”248  Let it be 
clear, however, that the “Word” refers to a specific ancestral legacy.  What is right or 
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wrong about this picture?  One ought to draw a line between the actual interpretations of 
the formative aspects of the cultural heritages in general, and about which Bujo is 
accurate, and the theological and moral implications of specific beliefs and practices in 
the daily living of life in modern Africa.  First and foremost, if the argument for cultural 
diversity as presented in this study is understood, the claims to a uniform concept of 
African ethical morality as a model for dialogue become superfluous.  Claims of this kind 
are based on a flawed concept of a person, community, and culture in African cultural 
experiences.  The claims neither appeal to cultural diversity, nor doe they foster 
recognition of blood kinship as the defining factor for social relationships, within and 
outside individual cultures.  In fact, all claims about African communalism ought to 
desist from getting lost in abstract theological technicalities such as the “spoken word.”  
But even then, one must go a step further and inquire: what is the nature of the word on 
which the African tribal communitarianism is founded?  This question is being answered 
here by getting down to the internal mechanisms represented by the concrete thought 
patterns in the daily execution of moral judgment among African tribes.   
Emphatically, the entire African cultural anthropological and ontological outlook 
is precisely ethnocentric.  It is in this context that one can truly understand what Bujo 
means by “The Word establishes the foundations of the community and causes it to grow, 
because it means life.”249  Social relations in a tribe are essentially consanguineous!  
Since one has to be born into a tribe to become a legitimate participant, blood kinship is 
the most fundamental connecting link in the various clan-communities comprising the 
tribe.  The “natural” principle of blood kinship has the “religious” function of connecting 
the new generations to their ancestors, and by the same virtue establishes legitimate 
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membership and participation in the tribal community.  In the past, as in the present, the 
principle of blood kinship plays major administration functions.  In this particular case, it 
is in the clan where the religious and the administrative functions of blood kinship are 
epitomized.  The positive values usually associated with Black Africa as a whole are 
experiences within the tribe in general, and the clan in particular.  These include but are 
not limited to; a deep sense of community, sisterhood and brotherhood, a strong sense of 
connectedness and responsibility to the extended family, the sanctity of life and of 
marriage, the love of children and the cherishing of elders, and so forth.  The clan system 
organizes and administers these relationships around the natural principle of blood 
kinship. Because physical existence and family life are very central in consanguineous 
social systems, the clan system demarcates the boundaries of sexual morality, and 
particularly fends off incest and all kinds of immoralities.  One cannot marry within one’s 
clan, because in the clan people are more closely related by ties of blood compared to the 
tribe as a whole.  It is in the clan where social relationships and traditional religious 
experiences are intensified. There is also an important aspect to this arrangement: the 
experience and concept of personal and collective identity are further deepened in the 
clan context. In the past as well as in the present, the need for identity and ethnic purity 
fosters in-breeding.  This practice is responsible for the evolution of distinctive physical 
features (genetic pool) that Africans often associate with the “gift of God” from the 
moment that “God created the tribes”! Each tribe therefore holds a belief in the separate 
origin from others.250    
Further more, clans have a great flexibility in interpreting and using the common 
tribal religious heritages.251 The irony in this consanguineous social philosophical 
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structure is the deeper it gets, the tighter relationships become and the more alienated one 
community is from another.  For instance, being a legitimate member of a tribe is not a 
warrant for participating in the religious life of any clan besides one’s own.  One has to 
be born or marry into a clan to become a legitimate participant.  Marriage is the means by 
which relationships are extended to all other clans in the tribe.  It is, therefore, in the total 
context of a clan that African communalism can be properly explained.  Similarly, the 
meaning of a person and ethical commitments the former evokes are all inconceivable 
outside the clan.  Having linked intimately the meaning of “society” with the natural 
origin of the group, the meaning of a person took on the “natural” overtones in the tribal 
social network of meanings.  That is to say, the meaning of a person is a by-product of a 
tribe’s experience of its biological humanity. Hence, to speak of human nature is to speak 
in terms of genetic heritage or biological qualities manifested in the tribal community.   
 In spite of all these obvious realities on the African cultural landscapes, African theology 
generally presumes that every African tribal world view proceeds from a univocal 
concept of “personhood” and “community.  Such a position reflects an error in judgment.  
This study is in complete agreement with Marcus and colleagues, who admit to multiple 
views about personhood conditioned by specific cultural experiences.  These authors 
propose that:  
Perhaps the most effective focus for the descriptions that would deal with 
ways in which cultures most radically differ from one another is the 
consideration of conceptions of personhood—the ground of human 
capabilities and actions, ideas about self, and the expression of 
emotions.252   
 
This phenomenon is conceivably demonstrable in the African social contexts.  Although 
all cultures are generally concerned about the human being, and seek to highlight his or 
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her importance and place in the world, African cultures are not founded on clearly 
differentiated concepts of a human person and human nature such as that we encounter in 
Christian anthropology (or Second Vatican II ).  Since a biological ancestor is the 
founder of a tribe, the meaning of a person is arrived at indirectly, i.e., via the experience 
of a tribe or consanguineous community utmost.  This is another way of saying that 
responses to ethical demands do not necessarily ensue from the questions regarding right 
and wrong. That which is right consists in what my tribe and clan deems it to be. Since 
the meaning of a person and identity are fundamentally tied to a tribe’s self-
understanding, actions tend to be spontaneous in the sense of doing what is expected of 
one. This brief explanation opens a window into the previous arguments regarding the 
major shift from the dynamic religious movement to the universal to preoccupation with 
finite realities: ancestry and blood kinship. 
In conclusion, African traditional anthropologies manifest little evidence of ever 
having sought to explain the human person in terms of innate capacities.  This possibility 
was curtailed at a point when the religious frame of reference shifted from the Absolute to 
the human ancestor.  This basic stance has not changed.  Nonetheless, since virtue was 
encouraged and vice condemned, people of traditional African religions are still able to 
live “virtuous lives” within the limits of the ancestral traditions.253   And the great virtues 
associated with Black Africa are a result of that virtuous commitment.  But on the whole 
“to be” or “Being,” in the “African” traditional sense, consists in remaining in unending 
relationship with those to whom one is bonded by natural ties of blood.254  These include 
the living and the “living dead.”  Against this cultural background, it is not surprising that 
persons harbor animosity toward members of other tribes. This is an outward expression 
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of dehumanized need for self-preservation.  Due to the many forms of conflict that 
preservation engenders in Africa, it is important to treat one of its many tools 
A Stranger: Concept and Function  
One of the enduring characteristics in Black African cultures is the deep 
psychological need to remain loyal to one’s own tribe.  And since relationships are 
basically consanguineous, loyalty is considered a great virtue and a sign indicating that 
one is “true” to his or her humanity epitomized in the tribal humanity.  Hence, to the 
extent that each person embodies and reflects the moral and ethical ideals of one’s tribe, 
such a one is “a person.”  Thus far it is clear that personal identity is intimately 
intertwined with collective identity.  And very importantly, because members of other 
tribes are not eligible participants in the inner life of another tribe, they are ipso facto 
known as “strangers.”  Although the latter concept has many nuances and usages among 
African tribes, it is generally used to demarcate between those who belong with a tribe 
and those who do not.255  In other words, the perceptions of persons are filtered through 
the notions of us and them.  Everyone else is a stranger and an intruder.   Swailem 
Sidhom favors this stance while pointing out that “All that goes into making of a man is 
incorporated in the complex unity of a tribe, outside of which, all others are strangers and 
inferior if not enemies.”256  A few living examples can illustrate the previous point, as 
well as add another dimension to the meaning of stranger. 
The concept of a “stranger” has different connotations in the African usage 
compared to that which one encounters in the West.  In the West a stranger generally 
denotes an unfamiliar person, one who is not known in the neighborhood, or even a 
suspicious looking individual.  A stranger in Africa is generally close to the English idea 
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of a foreigner in the sense of having no valid legal status in society.  While all the 
connotations of a foreigner find expression in the African usage of stranger, the ethical 
dimension is what makes all the difference.  The idea of a “stranger” is one of the most 
obvious means of determining a particular tribe’s attitude to members of other tribes.  
Indicating that one is a stranger is another way of saying such a one is not entitled to 
ethical commitment from another tribe other than one’s own.  By implication, an African 
is always a stranger as long as one moves outside one’s own tribal territories.  The irony 
is that a Black African is one who is always a stranger in his or her own country, given 
the present national arrangements!  The following concrete examples are not exceptions 
but simply illustrations of the continued usage of stranger.  
 In Uganda one finds a common usage of Munamawanga among the Baganda, 
who use the term more covertly.  The Buganda being one of the largest and dominant 
monarchical societies, we can presume the development and use of stranger was a 
necessary point of political emphasis.  The term stranger would have been a political 
statement in the face of competing monarchical societies in the geographical area now 
known as Uganda, or the great lakes, and in the East-central region as a whole.  The 
moral and ethical assumptions underlying Buganda’s use of stranger are more or less 
similar to those found in other parts of Uganda, and Africa in general.  The Teso people 
are more direct in the usage of stranger than the Baganda.  Seeped in the general trend of 
alienation, members of other tribes are directly addressed in terms of emoit or amoit, 
depending on whether one is a male or a female stranger.  But it is the Tutsi people who 
express the deeper anthropological connotations underlying the traditional use of stranger 
in Africa.  While Umunyamuhanga is the equivalent of munamawanga and emoit or 
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amoit, the Tutsi takes the meaning to its deepest level.  In contrast to the rest of Black 
Africans who are foreigners, the Tutsi describe themselves as U’mwana wu’muntu, which 
literally means, the son or daughter of “a human being.”  By implication others are not 
equal in comparison; the non-Tutsi is less human, and consequently irrational.  On the 
whole, it is not the ontological basis, “Being,” that precedes and informs the concept of a 
society as in the case of Catholic social doctrine.  The reverse is true for the traditional 
African experience.  For when you put into perspective the basic metaphysical 
assumption of “Being,” the conclusion must be that the tribal cultural systems are not 
open social realities basically inclusive.  In fact, there is correspondence between 
“racism” in the West and “tribalism” in Africa.  Both cultural stances capitalize on the 
finite aspects of common origin, skin and blood, as the basis for understanding the 
meaning of a person as a totality.  But while racism is no longer an official organizing 
principle for social life, and is officially acknowledged as a serious problem in the West, 
Black Africa deals with the reality of tribalism by “denying” its existence.  As it happens, 
whatever is denied, not dealt with, takes deeper roots and becomes more difficult to 
uproot.  One of the most explicit ways in which denial is carried out is the invocation of 
the belief; blood is heavier than water.  Robert Kaggwa cites his fellow missionary of 
Africa who rendered this maxim appropriately: [in Africa, blood is heavier than the 
waters of baptism].257  Not even Christianity can make fundamental claims where 
interests of blood ties are at stake.  This self-destructive sense of loyalty surfaces today 
during the many economic and political crises that plague Africa.  In the face of moral 
conflicts, for instance, the commitment to the common good collapses at the speed of 
lightening.  It is so easy to switch loyalties in favor of promoting tribal interests; after all 
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what threatens the tribes also threatens one’s identity.  The ethical implications and 
consequences of a consanguineous social philosophy are simply too many and far 
reaching.  A few conclusive statements are made in this regard. 
Rather than be concerned about ways of enhancing mutual regard, intellectual and 
psychological indifference comprise the over all moral disposition in Black African 
culture.  Nicholas Kristof, an American syndicated columnist for the New York Times 
asks a telling question in his article on the current genocidal activities conducted against 
the neighboring African peoples by the Sudanese Arabs. “The Arabs want to get rid of 
anyone with a black skin…We could raise the issue before the United Nations: It is 
shameful that Africans and Moslem countries don’t offer at least a whisper of protest at 
the slaughter of fellow Africans and Muslims.”258  Kristof implicitly points out the Black 
African indifference toward his or her suffering brothers and sisters in the Sudan. High-
level concerns and activities such as those conducted by the African Union ought not to 
replace explicit moral support for the Black people of Southern Sudan.  In today’s world, 
public protest has become an effective tool against injustice.  One does not need money 
to put up a protest; one needs a coordination of heart and mind.  How about the 
insensitivity of African political leaders?  Is it, for instance, accurate to attribute all 
political and economic problems in Africa to political leaders?   
It is true that African politicians ruined the chances for positive change that 
marked the transition period from colonialism to independence.  But, if one also takes an 
honest journey into the general African cultural psyches, one will not fail to discover that 
the actions of African political leaders are in conformity with their cultural upbringing.  
Unschooled in genuine concern about the universal common good beyond the tribe, the 
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strongest primary sense of political obligation is to the immediate family, and then the 
tribe becomes second.  As for the African masses, governance becomes a political play of 
deception and military maneuvers.  Therefore, based on what has been presented above, 
there is an intimate connection between tribalism and indifference to one another’s plight, 
between adherence to the natural principle of blood kinship and endemic corruption in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  It is not an exaggeration to conclude that one of the outstanding 
traits of traditional African cultures is the ability to orient entire persons to be concerned 
with one’s own family and those with whom one is closely linked.  As for the rest of 
humankind little or nothing else matters.  Because the tribal mentalities so described have 
been sustained over a long time, they have formed habits and practices that are almost 
second nature.  It is not surprising to find that practicing Christians also espouse some of 
the most dehumanizing values from African traditional heritages.  It is thus impossible to 
understand the primary cause and the sheer extent of the contemporary crisis in Africa 
without getting down to the underlying structures of meaning in the African cultural 
systems.  Emily Grosso recently put forward a forceful argument this author deems a 
fitting summation of the goal of this chapter.  She contends, and rightly so, that the real 
problem in Africa has less to do with poverty and more with a lack of “priority given to 
strengthening human relationships, which would be another way of considering wealth 
and the ‘market’ exchange.”259  This general phenomenon, in essence, amounts to 
a certain cultural resistance [and] a fundamental contradiction difficult to resolve-
in the encounter between Africa and the West in Evangelization…Africa would 
like to have access to the fruits of technology without the scientific principles that 
create it, or the philosophy of nature, the human person and his or her activity 
which are implied in it. ‘Give us your airplanes and keep your gods….260   
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These are strong assertions whose import may not be immediately obvious unless one is 
prepared to take a critical view of the structures of meaning that feed the basic 
philosophical assumptions underlying tribal cultures.  Most importantly, Grosso’s 
indictment supports the call by this study to examine the appropriateness of the ancestral 
foundations for a local theology and inculturation.  One way in which the current chapter 
seeks to challenge the ancestral theological perspective is to insist on the reality of 
cultural diversity, which in itself undercuts a uniform interpretation of ancestrology.  
Also basing ourselves on the preceding analyses, it is accurate to conclude that a flawed 
concept of culture hinders the possibility of recognizing the ways in which cultural 
diversity bears on contextual theology and inculturation. Arguments for cultural 
uniformity in Africa only compound the possibility of arriving at a more effective unified 
approach to the African reality.  Beyond Africa, the factor of cultural diversity is essential 
to the realization of contemporary Catholic theological and missionary objectives. The 
persistent failure to account for cultural diversity within emboldens the present difficulty 
of understanding the essential link between the various local theologies within Catholic 
theological thought.  With this primary in view, the following conclusion fleshes out the 
character of the human and cultural crisis in Africa. 
 
SECTION V 
CONCLUSION: THE ESSENCE OF THE AFRICAN CRISIS   
A Closed Cultural Tradition can be Suggestive of a Closed Mind 
The idea of a crisis effectively portrays the human and social conditions in 
present day Africa.  In its ordinary dictionary usage, a “crisis” simply means a moment of 
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“great difficulty or danger when an important decision must be made.”  The situation in 
Africa in general and particular terms indeed suggests a moment of great difficulty 
calling on the African continent to take a decisive course of action to avert the possibility 
of greater tragedies.  The best of the resources for accomplishing this task lies within the 
reach of Africa itself.  The most basic and urgent is the willingness to examine the 
traditional heritages in light of the changed human and social circumstances in the 
present day African nation states.  This study is not the first to put forward a suggestion 
regarding Africa’s need to change unviable traditional mindsets. 
 In 1990, Aylward Shorter, a missionary who has lived and worked in Africa for a 
long time, wrote an article entitled: “Obstacles to Liberation in African Religious 
Traditions.”261  The observations he makes more or less encapsulate the main arguments 
presented in this chapter on the role of traditional structures of meaning in shaping 
collective mindsets.  Shorter’s theme was motivated by his view that because African 
cultural systems are “tradition-directed,”262 they are “closed …closed to the possibility of 
innovation, change, and development….]”263  To substantiate his view, Shorter points out 
evident characteristics of a closed society.  
By definition, a closed society is unselfconscious and stranger to 
rational planning.  Of itself, it is incapable of experiencing a change 
in organization or structure. Criticism is not tolerated and no 
alternative courses of action can be contemplated.  Such a society is 
ignorant of everything save its own socio-cultural inheritance.264 
 
  Shorter also explains accurately that, “The identity of each ethnic group is bound up 
with a local tradition that brings together a land and a people.”265  He goes on to indicate 
its implication for social structure and life.  “These cultural traditions afford a sense of 
continuity and impart a well defined social identity, but they also impede socio-cultural 
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integration on a larger scale.  Ethnic rivalry can be inefficient, unproductive, and 
corrupt.”266  In reality these characteristics are more or less typical of African nation-state 
cultures today. Thus seen against this traditional cultural landscape, one is bound to 
appreciate Shorter’s deduction that “[Unwillingness to change yields irrationality and 
more].”267  In sum, Shorter offers important insights into the traditional African 
philosophical strata.  A key idea that best sums up all his points is the subject of 
rationality-a concept that ranks high in this study as a whole.  It is almost impossible to 
truly appreciate the depth and scope of the contemporary African crisis unless one is 
prepared to recognize a great measure of irrationality in the traditional African social 
philosophies.  According to this author, the crisis in contemporary Africa is in essence, 
the crisis of reason.  Because Chapter III treats the latter theme in detail, the following 
outlines simply encapsulates evidence of irrationality on the basis of the discussions in 
this chapter.   
The Absurdity of Blood Kinship as the Organizing Principle of Social Life 
The entire human race, according to Genesis, originates from one divine cause.  
For this same reason all persons are embodied spirits.  Unable to completely understand 
one’s self at any one time, individual persons gradually comes to self-awareness and full 
realization by interacting well within the world in which one lives.  Gaudium et Spes 
affirms that “believers, no matter what their religion, have always recognized the voice 
and the revelation of God in the language of creatures.”268  The human being thus comes 
to integral maturity by coordinating the innate powers of the body and the spirit.  Yet, 
even though the material and the spiritual dimensions are interdependent, it is the human 
spirit, as the transcendent ground of human existence which constantly draws persons 
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toward the infinite measure of fulfillment.  Implied in Gaudium et Spes is an 
acknowledgement of the developmental character of self-realization and ultimate 
fulfillment.  As the Second Vatican Council points out, human finitude impacts the 
coming to full self-realization by sole reliance on innate powers alone. 269  Genuine 
spiritual and material development requires the recognition of the “transcendent ground” 
of human being and existence.  This means that the flourishing of reason is contingent on 
the proper functioning of the spiritual dimension.  This is necessary because reason is 
important in facilitating the hierarchical ordering of values in the scheme of existence.  
The most basic is a person’s relationship to God and to others in society.  In most, if not 
all, African religious traditions recognize the existence of God as indicated before.  The 
problem, however, is the disjunction between this formal recognition and where African 
Traditional Religions locate the moral frame of reference with respect to questions about 
existence.  A few authors in Africa have acknowledged that, although Africans possess 
knowledge about God, the latter seems far removed from the real lives of people.270  In 
light of the position taken by this study, the aforementioned religious stance abides due to 
the scrupulous preservation of the ancestral legacies.  The following subsections illustrate 
the moral and ethical implications resulting from the traditional position.   
The Dampening of Spiritual Capacities Generates Intellectual Crisis 
The determination to preserve the ancestral tradition intact also means that an 
African is one who sees no need to advance the traditional heritages by means of on-
going reflections, re-interpretation of the traditional heritages, and so forth.  Instead, an 
ideal African sees in that heritage the absolute normative path for personal and collective 
fulfillment through the changes of history.  However, there can be no doubt that the 
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traditional stance undercuts the proper development of the spiritual dimension persons. 
This is an indispensable dimension in the proper development of the human intellect.  
The practical consequences of this are the personal and collective intellectual disposition 
of seeking only to copy or imitate the material life designed by developed countries while 
holding tenaciously to the paths marked out by the biological ancestors.  The worst 
expression of a dysfunctional intellection is in the resurgence of superstition-a topic 
deferred to Chapter IV.  It suffices to mention that God continually works in human 
history and is known intimately when persons encounter others meaningfully.  These 
experiences are generally limited, if not obstructed, by filtering reality primarily via the 
ancestral mode of existence.  For example, the reason tribalism and public corruption 
pervade African society is because of the persistent reluctance to recognize and honor the 
humanity of the “other.”  The maxim of “blood is heavier than water” is a very 
dehumanizing moral stance.  Families, blood kinship, and so on certainly have their 
indisputable role in the wider scheme of human existence.  Without family ties the human 
society becomes disoriented.  But regardless of this, blood relationship cannot be the 
foundation of culture, because of the moral limitations inherent in the biological factor. 
Consanguinity is immutable and, as such, cannot be the moral principle for socialization 
beyond legitimate differences. For example, a family is a sacred space where one belongs 
only by virtue of natural descent.  One cannot make rightful claims on another family 
without violating certain sacred rights.  However, because the human species is 
communitarian by nature, persons have a moral obligation to form and widen relational 
boundaries.  This obligation also means that belonging to a “wider family community,” is 
a natural and moral right of all persons.  In other words, families exist by natural descent 
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while a society or community comes into existence by means of deliberate socialization.  
In the natural family biological nature is at work; in the second reason must hold sway 
over the instinctive inclination.  Since socialization carries an element of freedom, it 
presupposes the openness of one person to another.  Hence, while “community” is an 
expandable dimension of human existence, genetic heritage is not.  But to us Africans, a 
“family community” and “community per se” are one and the same realities.  Therefore, 
lasting relationships can only be expanded through marriage and reproduction.  The 
impossibility of one ever getting married to everyone else is part of the reason the tribal 
community in Africa remains essentially closed to outsiders.    
The Common Good and the Crisis of Ethical Life 
Given the basic structures of meaning governing the consanguineous social 
philosophies, the common good is the good of those with whom one belongs.  This is the 
reason it is extremely difficult for a Black African person to truly appreciate the concept 
of the “universal common good” of a nation-state.  The great irony is that life in modern 
African nations is based on the Western social system.  The meaning of a person and the 
concept of a universal common good are the two pillars that govern ethical commitment 
in the Western social philosophical framework.  Obviously, the encounter between the 
African and Western conception of a person and the common good is one that abounds 
with many conflicts.  The conflicts of that encounter feed into African underdevelopment 
and the ongoing cultural crisis increasingly fanned by the desire by each tribe to gain as 
much as possible from the central governments.  The problem of conflicts based on the 
tribal interests leads to a brief considerations on the subject of justice.  Perhaps nowhere 
are the contradictions of blood kinship most visible as in the exercise of justice.   
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The Crisis of Reason in the Exercise of Justice 
 Different societies have varied experiences and sense of justice.  Yet the manner 
in which a society conceives and administers justice is a necessary condition for social 
development and for the attainment of political peace.  When it comes to Black Africa, 
policy makers, politicians, educators take the cultural factor for granted.  All that is 
needed is a good education or professional training and a rule of law, so the thinking 
goes.271  But considerations as to whether a collective cultural psyche impacts the 
administration of justice do not immediately arise.  As a result, unhealthy competitions 
stemming from conflicting cultural world views, indifference to those outside of one’s 
own clan or tribe, and the squandering of public resources rank among the greatest evils 
in African societies today. It is on account of these primary obstacles that a new course of 
cultural action ought to be charted and without which African politics and economies will 
forever remain divisive and fragmented as they are today. 
 What ought to be taken seriously is the formation of individual and collective 
human psyches formed by diverse social philosophies as much as it is by personal 
choices.  In the case of Africa where “tradition-directed mindsets” remain at large, 
individual and collective psyches manifest the following peculiarities in the exercise of 
justice.   Since filial (love) relationship is the driving force of social life, we Black 
Africans have tended to have overdeveloped affectivity as well as moral insensitivity.  
That is, we tend to be moved by strong emotions rather than rational judgment even when 
we encounter persons outside family circles.  In other words, in the exercise of justice 
(moral judgment) we, more often than not, tend to be moved by instincts nurtured by a 
life of curving in toward one’s own rather than from reason.  It is little wonder that we 
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are very prejudiced toward each other. This is a deep seated problem indicative of serious 
spiritual malaise.  Precisely, the affective domain as developed by African traditions is 
blind on rational issues, because it relies on instinctive drives.  In the face of practical 
justice, priority is experienced along the natural duty to love and serve one’s own.  In the 
same vein, it is no exaggeration to say overdevelopment of emotions steers toward 
instinctive responses to reality formed by a long habit of “curving in.” This dominance of 
the instinctive drive over rationality is not difficult to understand given the instinctive 
nature of filial love.  
 Filial love derives from a natural duty to love self and all those connected to one 
by ties of blood.  The natural love for family tends toward emotions or natural instincts 
more than reason.  This is not to say reason or rational judgment is absent in the actual 
living of family life.  Rather, affectivity as the primary impulse in filial love gives the 
latter a distinctive orientation to justice.  For instance, a normal parent does not need to 
ponder on whether or not his or her child ought to be rescued from a burning house.  
Justice on the other hand is a moral duty which thrives on the free response from the 
depth of one’s being.  It derives from a sense of the ultimate causes tied in with the 
natural duty to “love” in the general and universal sense.  It is the kind of love that 
prompts a parent to forget his or her own family, plunge into a burning house to rescue a 
child of a stranger.  True justice instills persons with a sense of sacrifice.  Comparatively, 
because filial love is mostly driven by the natural instincts ordered to natural survival, 
persons can be paralyzed by the fear of the unknown, while daring only to function 
within the sphere of what is known-the familiar.  This fear extends to all areas of life, 
never daring to initiate something new unless one is certain about the outcome.  In brief, 
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the key issue here is the existence of a fundamental conflict in Africa between the natural 
duty to love one’s own, and the higher calling to justice as a moral duty.  The conflict 
presents logistical problems in the execution of social justice. An illustration from Bujo’s 
Benezet’s views is helpful. 
 Contrary to Bujo’s fallacious claim that “equality and fraternity should come 
naturally to Africans,”272 our traditional African societies do not create conditions for 
persons to interact justly outside the tribal milieus.  Fraternity and equality come 
naturally within the clans, and less effectively within the tribe entire; but little or nothing 
outside that familial domain.  With blood kinship (blood is heavier than water) as the 
center of gravity for social life, rationality as the axis of justice is easily sacrificed to the 
instinctive drive toward the tribe and family members.  Since the material world is 
essential for the development of a whole person, there can be no doubt that being 
enveloped by such habits affects the orientation and the functions of the intellect.  Under 
these circumstances, the rational intellect can still function by mastering well “that which 
is placed before a person.”  But left to oneself, the same person can be incapable of 
generating the knowledge one needs to cope with emerging needs.  This author is in 
agreement with Emily Grosso on the fact that it is not poverty that is a problem in Africa 
such that all African states and peoples can do is to imitate developed countries with the 
precision of a photo-copier.  In addition to the general unwillingness to makes conscious 
and responsible changes in the traditional social structures, it is high time to realize that 
rational abilities can be weighed down by instinctive responses to moral questions.  
Authentic rationality is, more likely than not, to evolve when a person has an opportunity 
to be constantly drawn to the higher callings of justice.  The instinctively driven person 
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is, on the other hand, at best in a status quo environment.  Such a one has to be moved by 
emotions of affection before one can commit oneself to another in truth and in justice.  
But since it is not natural to have spontaneous affection for total strangers, those outside 
the tribe or family may not be entitled to justice on the immediate or long term basis.  
Social justice presupposes commitment to “right relationship” with others, which 
relationship must be rooted in respect for the transcendent dignity of each person.   
But given the existing cultural scenario, the bottom line has to be that Africa is in a crisis 
of reason, which manifests itself in the exercise of justice.  The attempts to attribute 
corruption to public leaders only are farfetched and wrong headed.  Corruption is 
ingrained in our tribal world views.  By the same virtue, every Black African person can 
be presumed to be potentially corrupt in matters of social justice until proven other wise.  
With this summary of the character of the African crisis gives leverage to discussions in 
Chapter III on the issue of whether or not Africa needs the Judeo-Christian religious 
dynamism and Western social system. 
Which Way Africa: Cultural Development or Self-Preservation? 
 
Thierry Verhelst is preeminently eloquent on the general principles presupposed 
in the relationship between a human being, culture and social development.  His 
argument resonates well with many voices concerning the importance of culture in 
development.  Verhelst states that:  
Culture is the springboard to the blossoming development of any 
community or region.  If a group is culturally impoverished, it follows 
into under-development for want of knowing how to find its bearing, 
how to select, how to resist and how to draw its indispensable self-
esteem from its own identity.  If this stage is reached, fatalism and 
submission, even inertia and anomie lie in wait for it.273 
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According to this study, African traditional cultures and the modern nation-state cultures 
are becoming more and more impoverished along the terms described by Verhelst.  
Without a coherent and viable culture, it is impossible to realize and sustain any kind of 
development, now or in the future.  While this seems to be the lot for contemporary 
Africa; both African and Western social analysts focus on the economic and political 
realities.  There is a general reluctant to incorporate an adequate concept of culture, to say 
nothing about the general reluctance to critique traditional African cultures.  These go on 
yet the social realities in present day Africa reveal that contemporary Africans are not 
insulated against the cultural trappings of their immediate environment.  Therefore, to get 
beyond a rather superficial analysis of the African situation, we must work toward the 
discernment of a fruitful cultural path for Africa.  This requires being critical of the 
ancestor-directed visions of reality, which obviously ignores two important factors that 
have greatly impacted modern day Africa, namely, Christianity and the Western social 
heritage.  Closely associated with the issue of whether or not Christianity has anything 
new to offer Africa, African theological thought is prompted by the issue of hegemonic 
forces to denounce the viability of the “traditional” Western social system in Africa. 
Along with this is a more theological issue: the place of biblical theology in the 
fashioning of an African local theology at the service of inculturation.   In the estimation 
of this author, the questions regarding the Western social system and biblical faith in 
Africa are interrelated.  For this same reason they must be treated in unison. This is an 
extremely important point in the study, because the latter sets a new theological 
framework in which to address all issues raised from Chapter I up to this point.  Chapter 
III is designed to point to a theological framework in Catholic theological and missionary 
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thought so that the same issues such as those addressed in this study can be examined 
from a legitimate theological horizon. 
CHAPTER III: CHRISTOLOGICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
SECTION I 
 
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF CHRISTOLOGICAL REFLECTION  
 
The present section introduces themes and topics relevant to the central theme of 
this chapter and study as a whole. Having examined the real problem(s) of Africa in the 
previous Chapter, this chapter reflects on the fundamental principles essential to 
contextual theological methodology and inculturation. The meaning of Jesus Christ for 
the church’s mission and theology in Africa is the theological context of the present 
reflection.  So in its substance and main objective, this chapter mainly extends the scope 
of Christological and anthropological considerations introduced in Chapters I and II, 
respectively. Reiteratively, the significance of Christology for a contextual Christian 
theology can neither be established in abstract, nor can inculturation take place without 
meaningful contextualization.  Contextual theological reflection must, first and foremost, 
be clear with regard to the meaning of Jesus, his person, and mission. Furthermore and 
indispensable to the stated tasks, theological reflection must present adequate 
understanding of the traditional African anthropologies. In other words, bringing the 
meaning of Jesus Christ to bear on the diverse self-understandings in Africa is the key to 
resolving rampant misunderstandings of the central significance of Christology for 
contextualization and inculturation.  Also closely intertwined with the present 
Christological and anthropological considerations is the significance of the Western 
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social system for Africa today.  This factor has to be included because the success of a 
social development that is truly rooted in the Western social tradition also depends on an 
inclusive concept of a human being beyond the ancestral anthropological horizons. To 
this general end, this chapter highlights the basic structures by which Catholic theology 
presents the meaning of a human being without which it would be impossible to 
appreciate Africa’s urgent need to advance the traditional concepts of what it means to be 
a person with obligations to build a culture.  
The above central objective and themes evolve in this chapter by means of a 
teleological argument whose purpose is to justify the ultimate significance of Jesus Christ 
for the church’s mission in Africa. This schematic set up derives from having recognized 
the two-pronged character of the Christian mission per se.  The Christian message of 
salvation requires dialogue with native cultures. Christian faith also offers conceptual 
hermeneutic tools by which a native culture can enter into dialogue with other cultures.274  
The Jesus event comprises the primary principle and hermeneutic tool for Christian 
dialogue with native cultures.  With reference to the diverse self-understandings treated 
in Chapter II, Christology unlike ancestry impels Africa toward a holistic dialogue and 
philosophical development among its many traditional cultures.  Each tribal tradition is 
enabled enter into dialogue with biblical theology, the Western Christian religious and 
cultural heritages. This chapter then responds to the above expressed concerns and 
objectives by drawing upon the Second Vatican Council Christological perspective, 
especially its specific anthropological perspectives and writings. This Conciliar 
perspective is concerned with the meaning of Christology and the meaning of a human 
being in relation to his or her native self-understanding.  In brief, Christological and 
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anthropological considerations emerge as a necessary response to the fundamental 
concerns in this study, namely, the constitutive theological foundations for contextual 
theology and inculturation in Africa, and as the means for the effective assimilation of the 
essential substance of the Western social philosophy.275  Thus this chapter purposely 
reaffirms the traditional position in Catholic theological methodology: Christ is the 
foundation of Christian theology and mission. The intention, however, is not to explore 
topics and themes that naturally fall under theological foundations.  Rather, the primary 
aim is to allow the meaning of Jesus Christ to emerge and speak to basic needs and 
concerns in African contextual theology and inculturation.  To that end, Christological 
considerations are discussed in the context of contemporary Catholic theology of mission. 
Of particular significance is the Second Vatican Council document known as Gaudium et 
Spes.  This document spells out the path by which Christian faith encounters diverse 
cultural self-understandings. The following subtopics specify matters of principle 
relevant to current pursuit. Special attention is given to the essential link which the 
Second Vatican Council puts between Jesus Christ and the church’s mission in the world.  
Christology in the Context of Contemporary Catholic Theology of Mission 
 Gaudium et Spes particularly focuses on the mission of the Church in the world 
today.  At the center of this mission is Jesus Christ whom the Council delineated as 
“alpha and Omega” for specific reasons given in paragraph no. 45. “The Word of God, 
through whom all things were made, was made flesh, so that as a perfect man he could 
save all men and sum up all things in himself. The Lord is the goal of human history and 
civilization, the center of mankind, the joy of all hearts, and the fulfillment of all 
aspirations.” Against these basic Christological affirmations, the Council spelled out the 
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purpose of the church’s mission. “[T]he Church has one sole purpose-that the kingdom of 
God may come and salvation of the human race may be accomplished.” It follows that 
the church’s self-understanding as “the universal sacrament of salvation” derives from 
Jesus’ person, the universality of his saving character and mission. Hence, internally 
linked to Jesus Christ, the church’s mission consists in “manifesting and actualizing the 
mystery of God’s love for men” revealed through Jesus of Nazareth. 
 The internal structural link as outlined above is but a primary step that must 
precede and inform the church’s mission in the world.  So the Council was also very 
realistic in taking into account the complex matrices obtaining from cultural diversity, the 
actual locus of the church’s universal mission.  A Post Conciliar document, Evangelii 
Nuntiandi, elaborates on this particular reality in the following hermeneutical terms: 
[T]his universal church is closely involved in the particular churches which 
comprise this or that part of the human race, speaking this or that language.  Each 
will have its own cultural heritage, its own outlook to the world, its own historical 
memories, its own human foundations, and these features will give a certain unity 
to each.276 
 
That said; a critical question arises concerning the ways in which diverse cultures are to 
recognize Jesus Christ as the foundation, center, and fulfillment of human aspirations in 
their cultural diversity. Gaudium et Spes treats this central concern under various topics 
and themes.  First and foremost, the document acknowledges the essential relationship 
between a human being and culture. Be it to affirm the necessity of culture for integral 
human development, this should not obscure the teleological view of the human being as 
the main theme that ties together the various topics and themes in the aforementioned 
document.  The affirmation of culture also ought to be seen against a critical analysis of 
modern (Western) culture and an explicit concern for the meaning of a human being in 
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general. Thus, Gaudium et Spes treats the meaning of a human being from two related 
horizons: the cultural (philosophical anthropological) and the Christian (theological 
anthropological) view of a person.  This is evident in the emphasis that the growing 
awareness of the importance of culture is not necessarily helping the human race to 
recognize and claim the corporeal and spiritual dimensions as its true composite identity. 
Rather, the meaning of a person is more and more defined within the horizon of cultural 
experience: a human being as a “cultural being.”277  The unwelcome result of this 
prevalent view is an ever deepening sense of “cultural autonomy” which hinders “the 
unification of the world and the duty imposed on humankind to build a better world in 
truth and justice” (GS, no. 55).  An instance of a philosophical-theological anomaly is 
well illustrated in the African encounter with Western culture, a concern expressed in 
Chapter II.  
 The view of a human being as a “cultural being” existing within an autonomous 
self-defining social sphere is the primary hindrance in the African-Western encounter.  
Both cultures presently project anthropological postures which foster alienation, hostility, 
and the will to dominate rather than engage in mutual dialogue. For instance, the West 
has generally maintained a dictatorial posture in its attempt to share its cultural wealth 
with Africa. The latter on its part responds with an unwavering posture of resistance to 
meaningful transformation that would allow for valid acculturation to take place.  It is 
due to obstacles such as this that the current chapter explicates the meaning of a human 
being as a basic hermeneutic principle by which mutual dialogue can emerge between 
African cultures and Christianity and the West.  This chapter draws this basic insight 
from the Second Vatican Council teaching on what is at the center of the Christian 
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mission (GS, 45). This concern for Christian-cultural dialogue is framed by the theme of 
faith and culture, which translates into faith and reason. The following subsection 
outlines the main substance of faith and culture, and the theological ideas that inform this 
particular trajectory.  
Faith and Culture: Christian Faith Encountering Cultural Reason  
The theme of faith and culture in Gaudium et Spes is tailored to the subject of the 
theological content from which the contemporary Catholic Church draws its working 
principles for mission theology (GS, no. 57).  In other words, Faith and culture comprise 
a central working and hermeneutic principle in mission theology. This principle can, 
therefore, be recognized as a philosophical-theological framework by which the Second 
Vatican Council sought to establish an ontological link between the Christian faith and 
the diverse cultures.  Paragraph no. 58 of the same document describes the stated link in 
general terms by referring to the “self-revelation of God” to all “peoples” which took 
place “according to the culture proper to each age.”  This mode of self-revelation is 
denoted by a generic term: philosophical anthropology or human self-explanation.  It is in 
view of the philosophical anthropological significance that the Second Vatican Council 
acknowledges cultural values, not only as a “heritage of each human culture, but of the 
human race” as a whole.  At the same time, the same paragraph underscores that the 
general self-revelation of God “[culminated] in the fullness of manifestation (explicit 
revelation) in his incarnate Son...”   This particular mode of God’s self-revelation 
comprises a body of knowledge known as Christology. And because Jesus Christ reveals 
the being of the human person, Christology is by the same token theological 
anthropology.  Therefore, discernible in paragraph no. 58 is the intent to draw attention to 
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the object of God’s self-revelation. Be it the human race in its cultural diversity or Jesus 
the Word Incarnate, a human being, including Jesus, is the common denominator and the 
primary recipient of God’s self-revelation.  Basing ourselves on this particular 
anthropological-Christological juxtaposition, we can say that the human being thus 
emerges as the basic organizing principle in the Christian faith’s encounter with world 
cultures.  This is vitally necessary granted the divergent nature of the cultural self-
understandings and the obstacles they pose in the path of intercultural dialogue, a 
necessary condition for universal integral human development.  Therefore, centering the 
Christian mission on the human being offers an appropriate terminology common to both 
human cultures and Christian Revelation.  This terminology is philosophical 
anthropology in the case of cultural self-understanding, and theological anthropology in 
the case of the revealed truths about the nature of a human person.  Thus very essential to 
the revealed truths, the commonality which the Second Vatican Council identifies 
between Christianity and culture should not be construed as an equation of faith and 
culture. There is a fundamental relation as well as a difference between Christian faith 
and culture. In a seeming paradox, anthropology is the meeting point as well as the point 
of departure between the Christian view of a person and cultural anthropologies. The next 
subsection illustrates this extremely important point in the Conciliar theological schema 
for the church’s mission. 
Self-understanding in the Framework of Theological Anthropology 
 While the Second Vatican Council acknowledges that cultural self-explanation is 
a valid human experience obtaining from basic human nature, the same Council also 
underscores the partial character of culture-based self-understanding. “For man will ever 
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be anxious to know, if only in a vague way, what is the meaning of life, his activity, and 
his death” (GS, no. 41). It is, therefore, due to this reality of being basically inclined to 
know the self and at the same time being unable to attain complete self-knowledge by 
one’s own effort that this chapter is designed to bring out the significance of the basic 
human inclination for inculturation or mission theology. However, at this initial point in 
the chapter, the aforementioned objective is limited to outlining the relationship the 
Council Fathers set between Christology and anthropology. Precisely, the Conciliar 
statement that: “believers and unbelievers agree almost unanimously that all things on 
earth should be ordained to man as their center and summit” (GS, no. 12) requires some 
clarification (my emphasis).  The Council’s emphasis on the centrality of a human being 
for theology and mission presupposes an ontological view of a human being. This 
perception is very different from the prevailing view of a person as a “basically cultural 
being.”  The last view implies that human beings are products of cultural creations-in the 
theological sense of creation.  Note that the Council uses the “same” term center in the 
same paragraph to describe the universality of Jesus’ saving mission and to delineate the 
importance of a human being in cultural anthropologies. The theological rationale for 
placing equal accent on the centrality of Jesus Christ, and on a human being in general, 
can be established from the present and the following sub theme.  That is, Christology or 
theological anthropology is the proper philosophical framework for understanding what 
Gaudium et Spes means by a person as the “center and summit” and Christ the fullness of 
what it means to be human being.  
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A Human Being as Imago Dei  
 The central significance of a human being as far as culture and Christian faith are 
concerned is presented in this chapter under the theological theme of a “human being as 
made in the image of God.” This structural set up has a number of functions.  First, it 
heightens the significance of Jesus Christ for the church’s mission and for the human 
race.  Second, the image of God delineates the teleological character of a human being 
and by so doing draws attention to what is common between all cultural subjects and 
Jesus Christ. Jesus as man and humankind as impacted by culture both have their origin 
and end in God.  However, because Jesus Christ as God is also the foundation, center, 
and the fulfillment of human aspirations, the “image of God” comprises the appropriate 
anthropological context for expressing the centrality of a “human being” and Jesus Christ 
as the definitive expression of a human being. Therefore, the present structural set up has 
a basic purpose of drawing attention to the teleological difference between Jesus Christ 
and the human race. The difference can be determined from the paragraph in Gaudium et 
Spes framed by the theme: “Christ the new man,” whose main idea is captured by the 
following statement. “It is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh [incarnation] that 
the mystery of man truly becomes clear” (GS, no. 22).  Hence, against the background of 
imago Dei, the incarnation emerges as an event that expresses the ultimate meaning of 
humanity’s self-understanding. On this account, the Second Vatican Council declared, 
“the church is entrusted with the task of opening up to man the mystery of God, who is 
the last end of man; in doing so it opens up to him the meaning of his own existence, the 
inner most truth about himself” (GS, no. 41).  In sum, this is a programmatic missionary 
statement, which this chapter explores to better bring out the unique character of the 
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Jesus event for humanity. Seen as a whole, imago Dei offers the theological rationale for 
framing Christological consideration in theological anthropological language.   
Christology as the Essence of Theological Anthropology 
 The present sub-theme calls for the understanding of the “link” which the Second 
Vatican Council presupposes between God’s general self-revelation among cultures and 
the Jesus event which took place in the Jewish religious setting. That link consists in 
understanding the essential relationship between philosophy and theology, or 
anthropology and Christology. That is to say, when the Council speaks about the church’s 
task being that of “opening up man to the mystery of God,” it means opening cultural 
anthropology into Christology as indicated in the following citation from Karl Rahner.   
 As a Catholic Christian and theologian, Rahner formulated theological 
anthropological statements within the theological tradition behind him. That tradition can 
be recognized as mostly Thomistic. The Thomistic perspective in Rahner’s thought 
obtains from a basic concern such as that expressed by the Second Vatican Council: there 
is a relation between Christian faith and culture.  Rahner’s argument counters the 
traditional and the contemporary theological tendency to confine the meaning of a 
“person” within the domain of philosophy alone.  In this, he follows the Thomistic 
metaphysical principle known as the “the path of return” whereby “knowing” and 
“being”278 are closely related. Ary Roest Crollius, S.J., explains that for Aquinas, 
“knowing is always a return: …human knowledge means a complete return but 
essentially in such a way that this coming-to-oneself…is coming from another…, to 
which mode of being-present-to-oneself the image of return (reditio) is most 
suitable….”279  Viewed against the background of the Judeo-Christian world view, 
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Rahner’s argument, cited below is more or less a thesis of his theological anthropology. It 
is a thesis which allows for the distinctive philosophical and theological patterns of 
thought to emerge between him and Thomas Aquinas.   
A genuine anthropology…must open into Christology….Christology is the 
end and beginning of anthropology.  And this anthropology, when most 
thoroughly realized in Christology, is eternally theology.  It is the theology 
which God himself has taught, by speaking out his word, as our flesh, into 
the void of the non-divine and sinful.  It is also the theology which we 
pursue in faith, unless we think we could find God without the man Christ, 
and so without man at all.280   
 
The above statement emerges as a result of Rahner wrestling with a basic question which 
the Judaic faith confronted with incomparable success: what is the fundamental 
relationship among human beings in their historical diversity? The Biblical story of 
creation emerges as the explicit revelation of a general anthropology, culminating in 
Christology as the “center and summit” of theological anthropology. 
In other words, there is more to a human being than the historically conditioned 
self-definitions, which are always limited by the very fact of human finitude and sin. 
Hence, when the Judaic faith proclaims a human being as made in the image of God, it is 
putting forward a general human ontology by which diverse cultural groupings can 
recognize their common ontological identity, an identity which surpasses historical self-
explanation. Consequently, it follows that an authentic human being is one who defines 
the self in relation to God, the origin and end of human life. In brief, Judaism transcended 
biological ancestry as the definitive point of what it means to be a person, and by so 
doing subordinated the former to the transcendental view of human nature.  All people 
are made in the image of God without exception.  Thus the conclusion must be: imago 
Dei constitutes a general human ontology. It also signifies the structure of existence by 
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which a human being is ordered to realize his or her transcendent nature. This particular 
form of self realization is in itself a “return” to God as Aquinas rightly understood. 
Therefore, since imago Dei applies to all human beings without exception, the human 
being is the foundation of theology and of culture.  This is a self-evident argument in the 
Second Vatican Council theology of mission.  
However, simply asserting the centrality of a human being does not necessarily 
resolve current confusions that have emerged in Catholicism as theologians attempt to 
contextualize Christian faith. The tendency is to focus on the available “elements of 
revelation in culture” without an equal attempt to consider that native anthropologies are 
not identical with theological anthropology, and for the same reason, cannot constitute 
the foundation of theology. Contextual theologians, nonetheless, put cultural 
anthropologies in opposition with Christology.  When this happens, conflict rather than 
dialogue emerges as the normative characteristic of the Christian mission. The same 
conflict is “willingly” extended to the efforts aimed at intercultural dialogue.  This factor 
is reflected in the African theological assessment of Western culture and of its Catholic 
Christian heritage.  It is because of the urgent need to resolve this impasse in the African 
theological reflection that this chapter appeals to the theological anthropology of John 
Duns Scotus and Karl Rahner.  The Selection of the aforementioned Catholic theologians 
is deliberate.  Although Rahner works within the framework of dogmatic theology 
propounded by Thomas Aquinas, he critiques the latter for failing to achieve a systematic 
anthropology of “return” consistent with biblical anthropology. Succinctly, Aquinas 
emphasized, to a greater extent, the innate human capacity to know the “truths” to the 
point of undermining the basic human need “to listen to God’s revelation.”  In other 
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words, Aquinas puts a stronger accent on reason than on faith. But for Rahner, faith or 
listening to God’s revelation is a condition for authentic ultimate human fulfillment.  
 In an attempt to point out the continuity of Rahners’ theological anthropology 
with pre-Vatican II anthropological tradition, John Duns Scotus emerges as an important 
source for grasping Rahner’s argument that historical self-understandings 
(anthropologies) ought to open to Christology.  Both Catholic thinkers provide an 
extremely important background for a better grasp of the Second Vatican Council 
anthropological thought in relation to Christology. In sum, this is the background against 
which this study also re-affirms Christology as the valid foundation for African theology.  
The Christological-anthropological framework is also the basis for discerning the value 
of the Western Christian religious and cultural heritages for Africa.  
 
SECTION II  
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WESTERN CULTURE FOR CONTEXTUAL 
THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION 
 
 The Second Vatican Council acknowledged cultural diversity in the world (GS, 
no. 2).  Yet the Council also deliberately situated the Pastoral Constitution of the Church 
in the Modern world in a specific cultural setting: Western culture.  This manner of 
proceeding raises a valid question regarding the “intent and effectiveness” of the 
Church’s approach to the world in which culture is not uniform.  For instance, does the 
cultural setting of Gaudium et Spes not contradict the expressed Council teaching on the 
importance of cultural diversity in the same document?  This is an important question 
which the non-Western contextual theologies of inculturation cannot overlook without 
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eliminating important contemporary realities that bear directly on the Church’s mission.  
Ignoring such a question can consequently undermine the pastoral effectiveness of the 
local churches within Catholicism that is greatly impacted by the Western tradition.  
In order to underscore the significance of the Western culture for contextual 
theologies, a passing reference to the idea of the “signs of the time” in Gaudium et Spes 
ought to be made here. Gaudium et Spes states, “At all times the Church carries the 
responsibility of reading the signs of the time and interpreting them in the light of the 
Gospel” (GS, no. 4).281  It is important that we comprehend what constitutes the “signs of 
the time” in the Conciliar theological thought.  Note that the document dwells at length 
on the epochal changes in the world, most of which are rooted in the technological 
advancement originating from the West (no. 3 cf. 5-10). The council enumerates different 
types of technological advancements. But as important as the material advancements may 
be for theological reflections, such changes do not constitute the sign the Council has in 
mind.  Technological changes in the world are signs of the time insofar as they point to 
another sign, the human being, who is at once the primary cause and the victim of social 
changes.  Hence, the document presents a human being in light of changes that are of a 
basic nature. “Swift upheavals…are products of man’s intelligence and creative activity, 
but they recoil upon him, upon his judgment and desires, both individual and collective, 
upon his way of thinking and acting in regard to people and things”(GS, no. 4). And also 
conscious that change does not necessarily imply uniformity in mindsets or moral 
objectivity, it is clear that the Second Vatican Council is particularly concerned about a 
certain philosophical stance underlying the many changes.  
There are…[other people] whose hopes are set on a genuine and total 
emancipation of mankind through human effort alone and look forward to some 
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future earthly paradise where all the desires of their heart will be fulfilled. Nor is 
it unusual to find people who have lost faith in life and extol the kind of 
foolhardiness which would empty life of all significance in itself and invest it 
with a meaning of their own devising (GS, no. 10). 
 
The aforementioned stance, as the next section elaborates, has roots in the Enlightenment 
movement which took place in the West. This philosophical phenomenon greatly 
impacted the once Christian-based Western anthropological mindset. In addition to 
affecting the direction of contemporary Western social philosophy in general, the 
influence of the Enlightenment had a direct impact on the general attitudes toward the 
meaning of a person in the Western cultural experience.  Hence, it is by focusing on the 
Western cultural heritage and its modern version of self-understanding that the church 
strived to salvage its own traditional theological heritage, as well as develop new insights 
by which the existing errors can be corrected.  
There is, therefore, a direct link between the Western philosophical tradition and 
the Second Vatican Council teaching on the meaning of a human being.  The Council 
Fathers understood that today’s world has been greatly and irreversibly impacted by 
Western cultural development. This impact not only carries the overtones of the Christian 
world view; through it the West is also steadily shaping the social and the religious 
dynamics of an emerging global world. This ongoing and yet indiscriminate transmission 
of social values has the power of molding the personal and the collective self-
understanding of the non-Western cultures, for better or for worse.  In sum, this particular 
focus, on the part of the Council, was in no way a neglect of other cultures. Rather, by 
proceeding as it did, the Second Vatican Council paradoxically showed deep concern for 
the world cultures (GS, no. 9). The setting of Gaudium et Spes, therefore, ought to be 
seen as an invitation to the world to understand the enormous influence the West has on 
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the entire world. In the same vein, the Catholic Church invites the world cultures to enter 
into positive dialogue with the Western culture and its Christian heritage.   
That said, in order to facilitate the aforementioned dialogue, the following  
historical overview highlights the positive developments in the West as a result of the 
Greek philosophical culture having opened to the Christian vision of humanity. 
Contextual theologies have a lot to learn from these experiences and developments. 
Needless to say, a statement of clarification is necessary at this point. This study as a 
whole and particularly the following analyses speak in the general terms of the West: a 
usage that can be illuminating and confusing at the same time. It suffices to mention, in 
passing, that Greek philosophy is, to a great extent, a cornerstone of Western thinking. 
This is because the same philosophical influence, like the Christian influence, 
encompasses Europe, North America, Australia and Canada. It is, therefore, in light of 
this common experiential background that this paper also speaks in the general terms of 
“the West”: without excluding legitimate diversities.  
The Christian Influence on the Greek Philosophical Anthropology: An Overview   
Important philosophical anthropological themes relevant to the task of 
contextualization emerge under the present topic. These include, but not limited to, a 
concept of human nature and how it affects the concept of a person, social order and 
relationships, and individual participation in society. These factors are particularly 
significant in understanding the pre-Christian Greek traditional social strata, in the period 
of 800-400 B.C. The concept of human nature and of a person, and how these translate 
into social-political order, is what immediately concerns us.  The other factors mentioned 
only illustrate the main theme of “person and human nature.” David Walsh, a professor of 
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political science at the Catholic University of America, has written an extremely 
profound and a multifaceted reflection on the current theme.  His work is, in many ways, 
a valuable source for coming to grips with the significance of Christianity on the 
development of the essential and enduring elements of the Western cultural 
anthropological outlook.282  There are other important sources in existence, some of 
which are mentioned in this dissertation. These sources however contain specific details 
on the present subject in a way that exceeds the present objective and scope.  
When Christianity encountered the Greek intellectual culture, the latter had 
achieved notable developments in philosophical anthropology. Greek culture had attained 
significant philosophical differentiations regarding the concept of human nature and of a 
person.  Put succinctly; following the Aristotelian philosophy of human nature, Greek 
philosophical anthropology closely associated the soul with reason. That association 
played a central role in the pre-Christian Greek understanding of a person and of human 
nature.  Aristotle posited the soul as the ground of reason, thus pointing to the spiritual 
domain as the ground of human nature.   At this level of comprehension, reason was 
specifically known as nous, or the capacity for rational reflection and the means by which 
persons come to authentic self-understanding and ultimate self realization.283 Reason was, 
on the same account, a transcendent reality. Aristotle also understood that genuine self-
discovery consisted in the discovery of reason; and self-understanding involved the 
participation of reason in “Being” as the point of “self disclosure.”284  Therefore, 
anchored in the spiritual realm, reason was the light that guided the soul toward its ascent 
to perfection.285  This philosophical anthropological structure meant that it was reason or 
nous that defined human nature.  In sum, these are very important philosophical 
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developments which measure up well with the Christian view of human nature and its 
teleological end. But as the saying also goes, the devil is always in the details. For despite 
the fact that Aristotle “identified the possession of the nous as the defining characteristic 
of human nature,”286  “Greek philosophy did not acknowledge the unity of the human 
being…The end of Greek philosophy was to deliver the intellect from the fetters of the 
flesh.”287 It is, therefore, no surprise that “what bestowed worth and value on human 
beings was the intellect.”288 At this point, it is essential to the present pursuit to take the 
following considerations into account.  
A citizen of the contemporary world societies, which are attuned to the practical 
concerns for social participation, is bound to inquire about the ways in which individual 
contribution featured in the ancient Greek polis. Such an inquiry stands to reason, 
because every anthropological conception has immediate, concrete, and ethical 
implications. It is, therefore, very important that we understand the ways in which the 
Greek philosophical anthropology translated into a social-political philosophy. Jose 
Comblin makes pertinent summary observations on this crucial point. 
There was no room in the Greek world for the development of a concept of 
the human person. Vis-à-vis the family and state, the individual had no 
rights. It was unthinkable that the individual could have more value than 
the “people,” the laos, the city state. Not even philosophy offered a route 
access to the inalienable value of the individual.  The universal and the 
universal alone was the object of philosophy, not the individual. [And so] 
Greek philosophy understood itself as a movement of a universal 
intelligence that was the same in all individuals, a movement acting 
through ideas that were independent of individual particularities….289 
 
Given the great Aristotelian philosophical anthropological achievements indicated in the 
previous paragraphs, it is not immediately clear as to why the state of social-political 
affairs would emerge as Jose Comblin succinctly describes it. David Walsh points out 
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some basic social problems resulting from Aristotelian philosophical anthropology. The 
key issue is the relation between reason, human nature, person, body and their 
implication for social order.   
What Aristotle apprehended as the defining characteristic of human nature-
the possession of-nous remains confined to a small segment of the race. 
Those who possessed the full actuality of reason were a handful within the 
population of the polis, and one of the abiding problems of Aristotelian 
political thought centered on just this contradiction.  If the polis existed by 
nature, why was it in principle incapable of affecting the fulfillment of 
most of the human beings who composed it?...The universality of the life of 
reason seemed particularly attenuated.290 
  
Further clarification is in order: 
…having compressed the transcendent finality of the person into the self-realizing 
citizens within time…Aristotle’s human nature is perpetually on the verge of 
disintegrating into a variety of human natures...Despite his formidable 
intelligence, he cannot break through the transcendent human nature and, as a 
consequence, struggles to fit such a conception into boundaries of an 
intramundane order. 291 
  
In brief, Walsh is saying that there was an unwholesome mixture of valid philosophical 
truths and flawed conceptions of human nature in the Greek philosophical ideals. It is 
also in the flawed conception of human nature and how this translates into social order 
that the impact of Christian faith on Greek philosophy is significantly revealed. Thus, a 
Christian critique of Greek anthropology reveals the following: despite the philosophical 
discovery of reason and its transcendent quality, the philosophers failed to recognize the 
authentic universality of reason.  The philosopher was the embodiment of the authentic 
human nature; the rest of the Greek masses were, by implication, a sub-human species. 
As a result, the common man’s existence and self- realization was dependent on the 
participation in the rational ideals generated by the philosophers.  Put differently, it was 
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the philosopher who had succeeded in freeing rationality from matter (flesh) where it was 
imprisoned. 292  In brief, Walsh and Comblin are intent on spelling out the absence of a 
universal philosophy of human nature in the Greek philosophical anthropology.  Walsh 
rightly points out that the “plurality of human types empirically present”293 reigned 
supreme. Because the non-philosophers were inferior to the philosophers in terms of their 
‘being,” there was more than one human nature.  In short, it is when the basic 
metaphysical inclination in the Greek philosophical anthropology is truly understood that 
the fact of the Christian influence on the Greek philosophy and culture can also be 
appreciated. So given the intrinsic Greek philosophical inclination toward a variety of 
human natures, only a transcendental view of human nature could render ontological 
equality expressible and human nature cease to be a possession of a few persons. This is 
the constitutive fundamental role which Christianity played when it encountered the 
Greek philosophical culture.  It is, therefore, against the Christian view of human nature 
that David Walsh also presents a compelling account of the emergence of political and 
social liberty in the West.  
Accordingly, the absence of a universal philosophy of human nature in the Greek 
philosophical anthropology made it impossible to attain liberty characteristic of the 
established Western social ideals. 
[I]t would be impossible to sustain the commitment to liberty as an 
indispensable principle, nor to acknowledge partnership in the open horizon 
of history with all human beings, living and dead. In the absence of the 
transcendent, we would forever seek a finite realization within time.294  
 
Walsh goes on to elaborate that: 
 
The moment of breakthrough came with the recognition of the full universality of 
human nature, the removal of the burden of the intramundane fulfillment, the 
equal distance of all humanity from divine perfection, and the intractable presence 
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of evil in life derive from the Christian differentiation…The full emergence of 
reason in this comprehensive sense -the one we recognize as our own- is 
peculiarly dependent on the epiphany of Christ.295  
 
These and other facts that Walsh point out bolster the basic thrust of his argument that 
Christianity enlarged Greek rationality by acting as its catalyst. Thus far, David Walsh 
and Jose Comblin bring us to a high point in the present effort to point out the 
development of a universal philosophy of human nature in the Western cultural tradition.  
Christianity is the constitutive moral horizon for the emergence of the transcendent view 
of human nature and of a human being as the moral basis of liberty and equality in the 
Western social philosophy.  We shall return to the theological view of human nature in 
the later sections of this chapter.   
The present aim of bringing out the limited scope of the Greek philosophical 
influence on the emergence of Western social philosophy is a needed step in this study.  
First and foremost, it serves to illustrate, though in a limited way, Karl Rahner’s view that 
a genuine anthropology must open into Christology.  Toward the same end, David Walsh 
and Jose Comblin demonstrate that the rationale for such a step is at once ontological and 
experiential.  Once Greek Christians recognized the limitations of their own philosophical 
achievements, they found in Christianity the point for self-transcendence: imago Dei.  
With the acknowledgment of each person as made in the image of God, the transcendent 
value of a person and of human nature emerged.  In the same vein, the Greek 
understanding of “being” as a participation in the fullness of “Being” was elevated, thus 
contributing to the development of the Christian Catholic philosophical tradition.  
Ultimately, personal fulfillment would no longer consist in the participation of the ideas 
of a few philosophers.  Each person is, henceforth, rightly endowed with the innate 
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capacity for the ultimate fulfillment.  As a result, collective participation in social-
political life, without discrimination, became a moral obligation for all.  And this is 
ultimately an obligation presupposing individual responsibility for moral development as 
a condition for sustaining socio-political virtues.   
In conclusion, the true significance of the Greek influence on the West in 
general296 stems from Greek philosophical anthropology having “opened” up to the 
Christian vision of humanity.  In the same vein, a genuine appreciation of the Western 
social philosophy and cultural achievements is, therefore, not possible without equally 
grasping the pre-Christian limitations in the Greek philosophical culture.  Basic to the 
stated limitations is the meaning and value of a human being in the Western social 
system. According to the authors cited in this paper, the present Western social ideals are 
unexplainable without reference to the imago Dei anthropology.  This Judeo-Christian 
ideal is basic to an understanding of the Western culture as a common heritage.297  All in 
all, it is from understanding the Christian influence on the Western cultural ideals and 
self-understanding that we can also grasp the full implication of situating Gaudium et 
Spes in the Western cultural context. Without the latter cultural setting, the Catholic 
Christian heritage would miss something very important. Greek philosophical 
anthropological heritage also boosted the understanding of the various aspects of the 
Judeo-Christian revelation.  And it is precisely for reasons such as these that the next 
section presents an overview of the impact of the Enlightenment on the originating 
Western philosophical anthropology. Because of the enlightenment having reversed the 
originating anthropological foundations of the Western social ideals and having borrowed 
and assimilated the cultural values of the West, dialogue with Western culture becomes a 
 193
very complex matter. This is an important consideration which contextual theologies 
cannot ignore without defeating the very purpose of inculturation. 
The Impact of the Enlightenment on the Western Christian Anthropological 
Outlook  
  
After Christianity provided a solid foundation to Western culture, there also 
emerged a philosophical anthropology which could only thrive on the sound 
intertwining of faith and reason, faith and culture. The meaning of a human being was 
no longer explainable from a purely rational standpoint as was the case of Greek 
philosophical anthropology.  Moreover, because Christian faith had become an 
essential feature of the collective and individual self-understanding, there had also 
emerged a bond between philosophy and Christian theology which gave the West a 
common world view.  This religious-cultural landscape would change with the onset of 
the Enlightenment, a movement which charted a new course of philosophical 
anthropology.  If Greek Christian philosophers had succeeded in reconciling theology 
and philosophy, the Enlightenment put them asunder.  Recognizing this chasm is 
essential to the success of contextual theologies, especially with respect to the need to 
integrate the Western Christian heritages.  To better distinguish the true value of the 
Western social tradition from deviant historical developments requires understanding 
the impact of the Enlightenment on the Western cultural-religious experience. That 
said, the historical factors involved in such comprehension are diverse and complex, 
and therefore exceed the present scope. The following observations simply chart a 
matter-of-fact course through key events and factors in the effort to bring out the 
Enlightenment problematic for the Christian mission in general.    
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Though known as a movement, the Enlightenment generated diverse 
philosophies with different aims. Regardless of their different agendas and positive 
contributions to philosophical thought in general, all the Enlightenment-based 
philosophies have one primary goal: to create a new vision for the world.  This goal 
consists in recognizing the Enlightenment as the ultimate point of reference for social 
order. Obviously such a basic oriented strategy would naturally require a 
comprehensive methodology and procedure as the following paragraphs point out. It 
ought to be remembered that the Enlightenment occurred during the modern era, a 
period when Christian faith was also being implanted in non-Western cultures.  Hence, 
the drive to create a new vision for the world also meant that the Enlightenment poised 
itself to supplant Christianity as the emergent moral vision for world order.  Because 
this line of thought is very central to this study’s objective, it is important that one 
grasps the ways in which the Enlightenment conceived the means for realizing its 
primary global agenda.   
Thomas E. Woods provides a detailed historical analysis of the primary 
objective and the many factors that shaped the Enlightenment philosophical movement. 
According to him and evident in modern Western social philosophy, the purpose of the 
Enlightenment was to wean society from the direct influence of religion.  
Beyond [the] Secularization of [Christian] charity and good works, enlightenment 
opinion sought more generally to evacuate religion of the external ritual and 
superstition that…not only served no positive good but also created dissention 
among men and nations…the philosopher alone, setting forth universal principles, 
could mend what theology and superstition had torn asunder.298   
 
In brief, the movement consisted of philosophies, which purported to be enlightened 
and free. These people identified Christian practices and beliefs with superstition. 
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Convinced religion robs people of the very foundations for human existence, freedom, 
and rationality, the Enlightenment protagonists sought to regain what was “lost.” The 
philosophers took two steps toward this goal.  First, they substituted religion with 
philosophy as the ultimate epistemological and moral horizon.  Second, the 
philosophers posited the absolute value of a human being.  The following statement by 
Immanuel Kant represents this new-fangled anthropological outlook. “Everything over 
and above a good life which a man thinks he can do, in order to please God, is mere 
superstition and idolatry.”299 Implicit in this statement is the loss of faith in the validity 
of Christian religious knowledge.  Only reason, and reason alone, would provide the 
moral compass for society.  Thomas Woods offers further insight into an important 
event leading to the ongoing hegemony of philosophy. “Bolstered by Isaac Newton’s 
discovery of the essential order of the universe and the predictability of its operations, 
the philosophers exalted the role of man in the universe.”300  The human capacity for 
rational understanding of the laws of nature meant that human beings could now attain 
mastery over nature, and by so doing, steer world history in accordance with empirical 
truths. Woods’ analysis makes it possible to understand the intellectual mechanics 
leading to the current preference for empirical truths over and above religious truths. 
Whatever is unverifiable is henceforth considered irrational. It does not need too much 
analysis to see that this kind of epistemological outlook disqualifies faith as a 
legitimate path to certain truths not immediately accessible to instrumental reason. 301  
The overall impact, also well noted by Thomas Woods, is the “[putting] to an end once 
for all any search for the essence of things and for an ultimate truth that explained and 
undergirded the phenomena of the physical world.”302  Put differently, the 
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Enlightenment created a vacuum of the essential meaning. This vacuum became the 
actual context in which the Enlightenment philosophers propounded the new meaning 
of a human being. Not only was the concept of a “person” removed from the sacred 
sphere in which Christendom had previously explained it, it was situated in a purely 
secular philosophical horizon foreign even to Greek philosophical anthropology.  
Stripped of the transcendent horizon, a person became a self-realizing entity.  
Everything else is but a means for immediate personal goal and satisfaction.  Although 
the Enlightenment philosophers accentuated the values of liberty and rationality, they 
evidently propounded an opposing philosophy of human nature irreconcilable with 
authentic liberty and rationality.  Although the accent was put on a “person” as a 
rational and free being, by unequivocally assigning a central place to instrumental 
reason, the Enlightenment blurred an important point for self-transcendence.  For 
present purposes, we shall simply take note of the theological implications of this basic 
idea for contextual theologies. 
Either by coincidence or keen insight, the philosophical revolution is built on 
the same principle as Christianity.  Precisely, the philosophers did not simply place the 
human being at the center of their moral vision; they turned that human being into the 
absolute point of moral reference thus reinterpreting what it means to be a person.303  
No longer is a human being to be viewed as imago Dei.  He or she exists as a self-
created and therefore a self-defining being.  For this fundamental reason, a secular 
philosophy per se would not be such a formidable force for the Christian mission, were 
it comprised of mere ideas.  The abiding strength of the Enlightenment consists in 
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having furnished society with a new philosophical anthropology as the foundation of a 
new cultural world view.   
The Second Vatican Council evidently understood the depth of this impact on 
Western culture and its multifaceted implication for the rest of the world.  In terms of 
the church’s mission, the stated impact is enormous.  It is not, therefore, surprising that 
the same Council proceeded by an anthropological approach to theology and mission. 
By asserting the meaning and value of the human being, the church rightly sought to 
reverse the multifaceted spirals of alienation generated by the Enlightenment (GS, 
nos.12, 20-22).  The Council went further to show that the impact of the Enlightenment 
is not confined to the West.  Chapter II made reference to the effects of the 
Enlightenment on contemporary views of culture vis-à-vis social development in 
general.  All this is unfolding because the West still maintains a strong influence on the 
rest of the world. That influence acts as a conduit through which the pro-Enlightenment 
philosophical culture continues to spread, for better or for worse.  It is also against this 
general background that contextual theologies ought not to overlook the importance of 
the West for theological reflection and social development.  Africa cannot, for 
instance, make the most of the Western social tradition unless it knows how to sort out 
the good from the bad: to distinguish the authentic Western social philosophy from the 
erroneous ones. Thus, it is no small argument that African contextual theologies need 
to take Western influence on the world very seriously, both in its positive and negative 
influences.  But in doing so that theology ought to make an accurate reading of the 
Vatican Council II theology of the church’s mission and discern in it the organizing 
principles involved.  We have already indicated the human being as the foundation of 
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Christian theology and mission.  Essential to this foundational principle is the 
anthropological and theological value of faith and reason. Faith and reason, from the 
theological anthropological standpoint are necessary for exploring cultural 
anthropologies.  To that end, the following sections spell out major anthropological 
assumptions rooted in the Enlightenment and significant contemporary responses to the 
same.  The expressed concern is not only very important in illustrating the need for 
critical thought in reading contemporary Western anthropological assumptions, it also 
sheds light on the lot of issues often taken for granted in theological methodology, 
especially the relationship between Christology and cultural anthropologies.  
Key Christian Concerns about Contemporary Western Philosophical Anthropology 
 
A remarkable element in Second Vatican Council thought is the central 
significance of a human being for philosophy, theology, and for the church’s mission. 
Even though the same focus reflects advancement in Catholic theology, there are clear 
indications that the Council has in mind the pro-Enlightenment view of a person and its 
implications for theology, global societies and the church’s mission.  According to the 
Council, an increased awareness of the value of a human being today is not necessarily 
matched with appropriate self-understanding. And so, the Council calls for a deeper 
reflection on this subject.  “But what is man?  He has put forward, and continues to put 
forward, many views about himself, views that are divergent and even contradictory.  
Often he sets himself as the absolute measure of all things, or debases himself to the point 
of despair” (GS, no. 12).  David Walsh sheds great light on the current subject.  He 
grounds his critique of contemporary anthropological assumptions in Western philosophy 
in the basic understanding of a human being vis-à-vis God.  For Walsh, there are basic 
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structures of meaning that come into conflict when empirical methods gain an upper hand 
in the epistemological sphere.  For David there is a “contrast between Medieval and 
Renaissance science.”304  Walsh points out that distinctive quality.  
Nature was a discrete realm, open to empirical investigation, but in 
no sense an avenue into the inner working of the divine.  God ruled 
the universe through his will, which remained inaccessible to 
rational speculation.  Only through his self-revelation in scripture 
was access provided into the divinely willed order of things.  
Nature by itself could not disclose its ultimate structure.  
Ultimately, whatever rational order is to be discovered empirically 
falls under the shadow of the impenetrable divine will.305  
 
The Post Enlightenment thinkers may not necessarily agree.  For instance, Richard 
Dawkins, “an Oxford University Zoologist and best selling author on evolution and its 
social implication had this to say in his work entitled, The Selfish Gen.”306  Convinced 
that religion is a “virus of the mind,” Dawkins, according to Pamela R. Winnick, “argues 
that human beings and animals are mere ‘machines,’ repositories for selfish genes whose 
sole goal is self-replication.  It may sometimes appear that we are acting charitably when 
all we’re doing is protecting our genes.”307  But it is Francis Crick, “the great scientist 
who discovered the Double helix nature of DNA”, who epitomizes the temptation by 
instrumental reason to exceed its epistemological boundaries and define reality in 
ultimate terms.  In his work entitled, The Scientific Search for the Soul, Crick advances 
even a more debased view of a human being and personality. “Your joys, your memories 
and ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the 
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells.”308  Clearly, all there is about a person 
correlates with his or her body mass.  It is precisely due to this kind of anthropological 
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outlook that Pope Paul VI directs his critique of contemporary philosophy, informed and 
directed by a scientific reason. 
This scientific reduction betrays a dangerous presumption.  To give a 
privileged position in this way to such an aspect of analysis is to mutilate 
man and, under the pretext of scientific procedure, to make it impossible 
to understand man in his totality.  One must be no less attentive to the 
action which human science can instigate; giving rise to the elaboration of 
models in society to be subsequently imposed on men as scientifically 
tested types of behavior.  Man can then become the object of manipulation 
directing his desires and needs and modifying his behavior and even his 
systems of values.  There is no doubt that there exists here a grave danger 
for the societies of tomorrow and for man himself.  For even if all agree to 
build a new society at the service of man, it is still essential to know what 
sort of man is in question.309 
 
Dawkins and Crick represent a tip of an iceberg in the growing anthropological 
assumptions that mar the essential relation of faith to reason.  Against this tide, Vatican 
Council II placed emphasis on faith and reason as ontological realities that must precede 
and inform the human search for self-understanding.  For, if the biological constitution is 
all there is about a person, then human beings are amoral animals genetically 
programmed to promote the survival of their own genes and, therefore, they assist others 
only insofar as this is likely to serve the genetic objective of survival. With no higher end 
beyond bodily experiences, persons can only exist by complying with the dictates of 
instinctive drives.  In sum, Dawkins and Crick exemplify an epistemology that sets a 
dichotomy between the spiritual and the concrete dimensions of a person. It subsumes the 
notion of ‘truth” under empirical truths, a critique well made by Pope Paul VI. 
Methodological necessity and ideological presuppositions too often 
lead the human sciences to isolate, in various situations, certain aspects 
of man, and yet to give these an explanation which claims to be 
complete or at least an interpretation which seems to be all embracing 
from a purely quantitative or phenomenological point of view.310  
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In the same line of thought, the Council Fathers made it clear that the legitimate 
autonomy of science does not mean absolute separation from theology. Instrumental 
reason is not the whole of human reason.  The task for the Council Fathers, then, was to 
conceive a method that can speak comprehensively and concretely about a human being.  
By dismissing the value of religious truths, the pro-Enlightenment movement did away 
with the transcendent as a major pole in philosophy. The subsequent analyses illustrate 
the ways in which the Second Vatican Council and Catholic theologians continue to 
strive to resolve the anthropological and the missionary impasses generated by the pro-
Enlightenment philosophers. 
Bridging the Historical and the Transcendent Poles in the Order of Human 
Existence 
The Enlightenment propounded a fragmenting and self-alienating anthropology. 
By positing a human being as the beginning and end, and by relegating the sources of 
knowledge to reason alone, faith becomes irrelevant in the broader scheme of attaining 
comprehensive knowledge.  It is for this basic reason that David Walsh argues rightly 
that the Enlightenment philosophy was, in essence, the instrumentalization of reason.   In 
the place of a person as “a being” who can commune with a higher being, there emerged 
a self-contained, self-seeking, and self-realizing person.  Walsh goes further to posit that 
instrumentalized reason is essentially a “truncated rationality.”311  This is a reason that is 
basically cut from (God) the transcendent as its true source and end.312  And it is for this 
same fundamental reason that the Second Vatican Council realized that the 
Enlightenment impact on the Western philosophical tradition calls for a major shift in the 
theological and missionary methodology to facilitate fidelity to the Gospel in the ever-
changing cultural situations.  After all, much of the Christian traditional heritage is 
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embodied and transmitted through the medium of Western Christian tradition. The 
contemporary Catholic theologians cited in these pages think along Conciliar lines and, 
as they do so, lend great insights to the general objectives of this study as a whole.  
In the pre-Enlightenment West, faith and reason were well aligned.  The stated 
alignment corresponds to the bond between theology and philosophy.  Hence, as long as 
an ontological link between faith and reason remained intact in Christendom, theology 
and philosophy spoke effectively to the concrete and the transcendent dimensions of the 
human reality.  But once the intellectual turn began to advance an epistemology that 
could no longer provide the medium for the church’s mission, a basic revision in the 
missionary method became imperative (GS, no. 4-7 & 15).313  A shift in theological 
methodology during the Second Vatican Council was also, in essence, an affirmation of 
the normative value of faith and reason for philosophy, theology, and mission.  The 
above shift is characterized by a specific focus on the ontological relation of Christian 
faith to culture.  Once the link was established, the importance of faith and reason in 
theological methodology was no longer treated in the purely abstract Thomistic 
methodology. Since our immediate concern is mission theology, an explanation of how 
faith and reason feature in the making of specific mission theologies is important at this 
stage. To that end, the Second Vatican Council specifically linked “faith and culture” as 
the normative principle in the church’s missionary approach to diverse cultures (GS, nos. 
57-59).314  There are two sides to this basic shift in missiology.  First, the Council 
affirmed the traditional method in theology in these terms: 
This sacred Synod, therefore, recalling the teaching of the First Vatican 
Council, declares that there are ‘two orders of knowledge’ which are 
distinct, namely faith and reason.  It declared that the Church does not 
indeed forbid that when the human arts and sciences are practiced they use 
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their own principles and their proper method, each in its own domain.  
Hence, ‘acknowledging this just liberty,’ this sacred Synod affirms the 
legitimate autonomy of human culture and especially the sciences (GS, no. 
59).  
 
It ought to be noted carefully that “legitimate autonomy” mentioned by the Second 
Council is not the same as absolute autonomy advanced by the Enlightenment 
philosophers. We have already seen that a human being constitutes the primary principle 
for theology and mission. But since human beings also define themselves historically, the 
church has to approach culture by paying attention to the existing self-understandings, 
and how indigenous philosophies structure rationality. Specific to this task is, therefore, 
the ways in which cultures structure rationality.  As indicated in Chapter IV, structured or 
indigenous rationality has a great potential to reinforce or impair the transcendent 
dimension of reason per se.  One basic way in which such a transformation occurs is by 
persons making their respective cultures the ultimate point of self-understanding or 
identity. Thus, it is not surprising for the Council Fathers to have understood that the 
prevailing tendency to view a person as “cultural being” applies to all societies without 
exception.  The following critique by Walsh facilitates an understanding of the 
problematic of a culture-based self-understanding.  The substance of his critique in reality 
is not exceptional to pro-Enlightenment Western self-understanding; it applies to all 
cultural situations world-wide. 
The inability to articulate the sources of the modern self leads to a deeper 
confusion.  Absent a transcendent frame of reference, we are not simply without a 
‘sacred canopy’; we become incapable of distinguishing between the immanent 
and transcendent dimensions of what we do.  The differentiation collapses, and 
mundane reality is made to bear the mystery of all.315 
 
In terms of the traditional Catholic methodology, Walsh’s observations reinforce the 
Second Vatican Council’s intent to reconcile faith and reason. And also because faith and 
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reason are definable within the wider framework of theological anthropology, their 
essential bond demands a clear grasp of the ontological structure of human being and 
existence. This is an extremely important step which draws attention to the essential 
meaning of reason beyond the limits of diverse cultural or philosophical experiences. 
This particular concern is treated in the major section which treats Karl Rahner and John 
Duns Scotus’ anthropology. In the mean time, David Hollenbach expresses the Second 
Vatican Council teaching in this particular regard. He says: “Historical existence 
demands the presence of two poles…: the pole of involvement in the limited conditions 
on the one hand, and the pole of transcendence into the new and unlimited absolute 
other.”316  Gaudium et Spes no. 59 provides a clue to the relation of the historical and the 
transcendent poles and its importance for the mergence of self-understanding. “There are 
many links between the message of salvation and culture,” the document states.  The 
entire paragraph goes on to illustrate the fact that the Jesus event and the church’s 
mission, like philosophical anthropologies, unfold in the context of culture. Seen against 
the entire schema in the same document, the previous statement simply means that human 
salvation unfolds by means of Jesus encountering culturally defined (i.e., self-defined) 
persons. 317  There is, therefore, no way contextual theologies could realize the primary 
objective of (inculturation) mission without paying attention to native philosophical 
anthropologies. This is, in sum, the rationale for positing faith and reason as two major 
poles in theological and missionary methodology.  
There is at once an historical and an evangelical rationale to this major shift in 
mission methodology. Situating the traditional methodological principle of faith and 
reason in the context of culture meant that Western culture also became the object of 
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Christian evangelization. In this way the above shift enables theologians to be sensitized 
to the ways in which diverse cultures exercise rationality and how this corresponds to the 
Christian reason.  On the evangelical level, the church is enabled to challenge humanity 
and all its cultural projects and in the process discover the deeper dimensions of 
particular cultural experiences.  This also means that the primacy once given to the 
Western Christian experience and cultures vis-à-vis the young churches and their 
indigenous cultural philosophies are relativized without dismissing valid elements in the 
Western heritages, religious and cultural.318 In the light of this important point, it ought to 
be clear that even though the problem of “faith and reason” in Conciliar thought is 
discussed with reference to Western culture, it applies equally to all cultures.319  To think 
otherwise is tantamount to a belief that evangelization can truly take place independently 
of adequate knowledge about native systems of thought and how these directly impact the 
salvation of the persons involved.  Is this not the very reason that pre-Vatican II 
methodological assumptions are presently failing to touch the cultural consciousness of 
Western and non-Western cultures alike? The next major section strives to bring out the 
relation between philosophy and theology or anthropology and Christology. A deeper 
meaning of the bond between faith and reason (culture) also emerges in the wider context 
of philosophy and theology. A key topic features prominently in the aforementioned 
theme; i.e., the nature and function of philosophical knowledge in the wider scheme of 
attaining ultimate self-realization.  A number of theological ideas emerge under the 
following schema and help to cast more light on the topics covered from Chapter I.  Most 
importantly and essential to this study’s objective is the fundamental limitation of the 
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ancestor-based philosophical anthropologies.  In the place of ancestors and particular 
cultures, there emerges a human being who is capable of self-transcendence. 
 
SECTION III  
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AS A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
PRIMORDIAL SELF-UNDERSTANDING 
  
This is a major section exploring anthropology in relation to Christology as 
developed by Karl Rahner, John Duns Scotus and others. These sources help us to get to 
the depth and scope of contemporary Catholic theology of mission. Theological 
anthropology elaborates on the relationship that contemporary Catholic missiology puts 
between Christian faith and culture.  This relationship translates into the broader theme of 
the relationship of the human race to Jesus of Nazareth. This last statement comprises the 
main objective of the present major section. The present objective also embodies two 
trajectories. The first and basic idea is that theological anthropology (i.e., Christology) is 
the full expression of cultural anthropological strivings. The first trajectory leads to the 
second.  Theological anthropology is the means by which an ontological link can be 
established between the historically constituted diverse self-understandings and 
theological anthropology which culminates in Jesus Christ. These two trajectories 
provide the philosophical-theological basis for appreciating the universal significance of 
Jesus Christ for contextual theologies and inculturation.  It is in this particular respect 
where Karl Rahner’s anthropology converges insightfully with that of John Duns Scotus. 
The following paragraphs introduce the main substance of Karl Rahner’s argument and 
other Catholic theologians whose anthropological thought rhyme with his.320  
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  Rahner premised his anthropology on the basic theological assumption that 
cultural anthropologies and Christian theology are concerned about the same object: the 
human being.  But in order that this basic understanding or principle is not blurred in the 
myriad matrices of diverse and often conflicting anthropologies, Rahner specifies a 
working framework. He broadens the question regarding what it means to be a person by 
situating it in a general ontology as the starting point and working framework.  For 
Rahner, then, a meaningful search for a valid concept of a person must take into account 
the general but basic human quest for self-knowledge and ultimate realization.  The 
acceptance or rejection of God takes place in the experience of self-explanation and the 
quest for ultimate fulfillment.  It is, therefore, in the experience of these basic human 
needs that we can recognize a basic relationship between cultural anthropologies 
(philosophy) and Christian anthropology. At the same time, theological anthropology 
which Rahner propounds turns into a critique of traditional dogmatic theology.  For 
example, Karl Rahner and David Walsh recognize a basic flaw in Catholic dogmatic 
theology. 321 A succinct statement on the Thomistic anthropology, the focus of Karl 
Rahner and the context of Duns Scotus, is essential to the current theme.  That is, the 
preeminence which contemporary philosophers give to empirical reason, to a certain 
degree, originates from a basic loophole in the Thomistic theology of grace, says Walsh.  
St. Thomas Aquinas somewhat paved the way for the estrangement of reason from faith.  
In explicating the classical theology of grace, Aquinas worked within the parameters set 
by dogmatic theology of the time.322  To illuminate a conceptual distinction between 
nature and grace, Aquinas assigned “relative independence” to human reason.  Walsh is 
not suggesting that Aquinas had a conscious intention of denying the integral character of 
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the human intellect. Aquinas sought to establish a conceptual distinction between the 
human and the divine natures, especially with the purpose of heightening what is 
humanly possible.  Thus, Aquinas put a strong accent on the fact that a human being can 
arrive at valid truths through the innate functions of reason.  Such a synthesis led him to 
assert that grace builds on nature.323  The fundamental flaw in this, according to Walsh, 
“was the failure to ground this in the overall understanding that “nature only flourishes by 
means of grace and not by its own innate capacities.”324  In a nutshell, although the 
Thomistic conceptualizations allowed for a deep understanding and appreciation of the 
value of reason in philosophy and theology in Christendom, David Walsh maintains that 
Thomas’ anthropology contains the seminal distancing of reason from faith. The vigorous 
Protestant contributions to the same phenomenon are also discussed at length by Walsh. 
Even so, the previous section has already pointed out, albeit briefly, the basic reason the 
church could no longer rely solely on the scholastic method without fostering the current 
separation of reason from faith.  For, if reason, and reason alone, can define what it 
means “to be,” then the quest for comprehensive knowledge would be emptied of its 
primordial meaning. The Second Vatican Council, by its emphasis on faith and reason, 
says the same thing.  The same idea constitutes a central argument in Rahner’s 
anthropology, of which only certain aspects pertinent to this study are discussed below.  
The previous summary does not, of course, do justice to Walsh’s eloquent critique of 
Aquinas’ theology of grace. It, nonetheless, does point out the existence of a loophole in 
matters of basic theological principles. Rahner’s particular focus brings out the 
philosophical and theological substance of the stated principle.325 As a corrective, Rahner 
maintains that contemporary Christian theology can no longer thrive on the previous 
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methodological model, because it does not pay attention to the internal structural 
(ontological) bond between philosophy and theology.  Yet, this is necessary in order to 
recognize that philosophy and theology are both concerned about the same subject: the 
human being’s existence and ultimate end. As such; philosophy and theology comprise 
two sides of the same subject matter: the relationship of a human being to God.  This is 
the same as the relation of a “being” to the “being of beings.”  Structurally, philosophy 
and theology share internal metaphysical unity.326  Seen this way, it is understandable, 
from Rahner’s point of view, that the recognition of the universal value of the Judeo-
Christian revelation depends on the explicit account of the ontological bond between 
philosophy per se and theology. Only then can Christianity sustain its evangelical claim 
of embodying a total vision of humanity and its abiding historical relevance.   
Hence for Rahner, Thomas Aquinas did not provide an “analysis of the human 
person as a being who can listen to a revelation of God….”327  Without this possibility, 
there is no way of knowing how and why Jesus Christ is the epitome of the human 
journey which includes cultural projects. The same possibility holds true in any attempt 
to perceive a basic relationship between cultural anthropologies and Christian 
anthropology.  Hence for purposes specific to this paper, the reality of a person as “a 
being who can listen to the revelation of God” is crucial in coming to grips with the 
fundamental relationship between faith and reason and its importance for theology.  It is 
with the primary objective of clarifying this important idea that Rahner integrates his 
anthropology with the Thomistic metaphysics.  He makes explicit the point at which 
philosophical anthropology opens into theology. The subsequent sections strives to 
assemble important dimensions of Rahner’s argument, namely, that human beings 
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regardless of whether or not they are Christians have a natural inclination to listen to 
God’s revelation.328  The same Rahnerian structure of analysis also clarifies the 
ontological necessity for self-transcendence and Christology as the basic springboard for 
ultimate transcendence.  He relies here on specific concepts in philosophical 
anthropology some of which were developed in the Catholic tradition before him.  He 
presents them from a theological anthropological standpoint peculiar to him. 
The Substance of Karl Rahner’s Anthropology in a Nutshell  
 
 Rahner explicates Christology as the essence of theological anthropology and the 
fulfillment of the primordial quest for a complete self-understanding. This is to say, 
Christology is the basis and condition for the ultimate realization of what it means to be a 
person.  The first half of the following section discusses how Karl Rahner explains this 
important point and its importance for theological methodology.  First and foremost, he 
points out a legitimate “distance” between concrete self-understanding (accidental self-
hood), and the meaning of a human being per se (ultimate self-hood).329  He devotes a lot 
of space to the nature of human knowledge as the basis for understanding the accidental 
self-hood, the constitutive substantial content for explaining the ultimate self-hoods, and 
the legitimate distance between what is actually known and objective knowledge.  In 
sum, there is a difference between objective knowledge concerning what it means to be a 
person per se and knowledge as possessed by the subject.  In light of this chapter’s 
objective, this last point is critical for coming to a deeper understanding of the 
problematic of a general human tendency toward absolute and definitive self-explanation.  
Against this background, it becomes possible to perceive how the aforementioned 
tendency hampers the development of true personhood and the realization of the 
 211
missionary objective of the Christian faith. In line with the current perspective, Rahner 
does not stop merely at clarifying the legitimate distance between “actual” and ultimate 
self-understanding.  He also makes it clear that the natural quest for knowledge and self-
explanation constitutes a principle by which we can meaningfully relate diverse historical 
self-explanations to Christology.  But this is only realized after we have understood that 
Christology is the essence of theological anthropology.  So to enable us to achieve this 
goal, Rahner must deal with what he perceives as loopholes in dogmatic theology, 
particularly the relationship between philosophy and theology. Suffice it to say, most of 
the issues that Rahner treats exceed the present scope.  Nonetheless, he makes medieval 
thought the context of his analysis.  He takes what is positive and enduring in Thomistic 
anthropology and theology of grace, as well as the medieval formal structure of 
theologizing.   
A line from Stephen J. Duffy on the related subject captures the stated dimension 
of the medieval form of theologizing. Duffy says, “[T]he medievals concerned 
themselves with finding a theoretic that could deal with all questions systematically.”330 
And one of the major questions that concerned Aquinas is the “medieval distinction 
between the natural and the supernatural.” This task required that theologians be clear 
about a methodology that would distinguish between “the horizon of a naturally known 
philosophy and that of a supernaturally known theology.”331  Rahner more or less follows 
the same procedure to establish the quest for self-understanding as the formal content of 
philosophy and theology.  In an interesting and insightful turn, Rahner shows that the 
very quest for self-knowledge holds the key for understanding the essential relationship 
between the “natural” and the “supernatural” spheres of existence; between philosophical 
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anthropology and Christology.  We shall outline briefly the substantial content of 
Rahner’s second line of thought before highlighting relevant aspects of his work on the 
relation of philosophy to theology. 
Catholic dogmatic theology had on the whole explicated the meaning of the 
human being in light of the fundamental significance of the Jesus event.  Yet according to 
Karl Rahner, theology tended to create an unnecessary disunity in its accounts of the 
human being and the meaning of the Christ.  Such a state of affairs, according to Rahner, 
is a result of the theocentric approach with which dogmatic theology has continued to 
pursue the subject of revelation in the past.  A human being seems to be just one among 
many other subjects that concern theology.332  This is not so for Karl Rahner. Although, 
“God is...the formal object of revelation theology,” the latter is equally about the human 
being.  “As soon as Man is understood as the being that is absolutely in respect to God, 
‘anthropocentricity’ and ‘theocentricity’ in theology are not opposites, but strictly one 
and the same thing, seen from two sides.” 333  He  goes on to argue that, “The question of 
man and its answering may not be regarded…as an area of study separate from other 
theological areas as to its scope and subject matter, but as the whole of dogmatic theology 
itself.”334  In succinct terms, Rahner is saying that Christ as the Second Person of the 
Trinity comes as a real human being who exists in dialogue with human beings in their 
historical diversity.  Christ comes to bring something new; a newness that not only has to 
be recognized on the basis of historical experience, but also as a newness that has to be 
claimed and incorporated into the existing self-understandings, because Jesus points 
beyond accidental self-hoods toward the fullness of self-knowledge in the eschatological 
future.  Important then for Rahner is that the incarnation, a central and dynamic reality at 
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the heart of Christian faith, constitutes the most important organizing principle.  Because 
Rahner also understands its philosophical implications, he is able to integrate ideas basic 
to philosophical anthropology as seen in this statement:   
 …Anthropological focus in theology is not opposed to or in competition 
with a Christological focus…anthropology and Christology mutually 
determine each other within Christian dogmatics, if they are both 
correctly understood.  Christian anthropology is only able to fulfill its 
whole purpose if it understands man as the potentia oboedientialis for the 
Hypostatic Union.335 
 
So the remaining part of Rahner’s theology presented here clarifies the fundamental 
relationship between (philosophical) anthropology and Christian anthropology, which is 
ultimately Christology.   
The very fact that the infinite mystery of the Trinity could be expressed in the 
concrete experience of God-Becoming-Man, then, the meaning of a person and the ways 
in which one comes to the knowledge of self and the existential realities also have to be 
explained from a transcendental perspective.  Transcendence in itself suggests the 
existence of an objective order that impresses itself upon an understanding of the human 
being and his or her innate ability to know any reality.  Thus, it is on the basis of this idea 
of coming from above that Rahner rightly perceives theological anthropology as 
transcendental anthropology and presents the same from a transcendental standpoint.  It is 
also at this point that Christology is properly understood as theological anthropology.  
The thought-forms proper to the metaphysics of “being” are the vehicles by which 
Rahner articulates the relationship between anthropology and Christology.  The 
subsequent subsections now endeavor to expand on the main subject of Rahner’s 
theological vision outlined here. The immediate section treats the nature of the essential 
distance between concrete self-understanding and a person per se. 
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The Unity of Knowledge and Being as the Ground of Human Thought Process 
Gerald A. McCool’s editorial note to Karl Rahner’s work cited in this study 
captures well the basic working principle underlying the latter’s theological 
anthropological schema. McCool says, “theological anthropology enables the Christian to 
understand and correlate the Christian mysteries in a way which relates them to the 
fundamental a priori structures of his own experience.”336  In Rahner’s own words:  
[T]he idea of God-man needs proof of a transcendental orientation in 
man’s being and history under grace. A purely a posteriori Christology, 
unable to integrate Christology correctly into an evolutionary total view 
of the world, would not find it easy to dismiss the suspicion of 
propounding mythology.337 
 
Rahner maintains that knowledge about self does not originate ad extra. The quest for 
knowledge stems from the basic human constitution known as human nature.338  It is the 
basic structure of existence which provides humankind with the structures of meaning by 
which to understand the self in relation to the environment.  That is to say human nature 
in its totality is ordered to the transcendent. Therefore, the basic set up, a transcendental 
orientation which Rahner speaks about contains the seminal seed for understanding how 
philosophical anthropology relates to Christian anthropology. This in turn allows for an 
understanding of the teleological character of the human quest for knowledge in general.  
Such knowledge accrues from experience at two levels: the transcendent and the 
historical levels. Also to ensure that the reflection on the basic human quest for 
knowledge does not lose sight of the fact that the historical quest springs from the 
transcendent point, Rahner situates anthropological reflection in the wider framework of 
a general ontology.  That is to say, Rahner posits the metaphysics of “being” as the 
ground for comprehending the universal quest for knowledge about what it means to be a 
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person.339  It will become clear that theological and philosophical considerations about 
“being” as it relates to the “Being of beings” is a necessary corrective to a historical 
tendency toward definitive self-explanation.   
Rahner contends that the “the nature of being is to know and to be known in 
original unity.”340  Although persons are not born [with] any actual knowledge about self,   
the basic natural inclination is toward complete understanding of any reality (cf. GS, no. 
12).  And all these take place in the historical process as the proper and formal context for 
the emergence of the basic quest to know.341 The next and immediate goal here is to point 
out the hierarchical manner in which knowledge emerges.   
The natural desire to know is neither arbitrary nor disorderly. Man never stops, in 
his thought or in his activity, at this or that reality taken in isolation. He wants to 
know what reality is in its unity within which he gets to know whatever he knows.  
He inquires about the ultimate foundations, about the one ground of all reality.  
Insofar as he knows every reality as being, he inquires about the being of 
beings.342 
 
The intertwining of the natural inclination to know with the need for differentiating the 
different levels of meaning and how these relate to each other can be explained with 
reference to an example from Africa cited earlier on.   
 Chapter II cited Placide Tempels’ philosophical propositions to colonial 
governments in Africa.  He maintained that every culture has its “foundation for logical 
and universal systems of human behaviour.” And that a political move to transform the 
pre-colonial African societies would have first required identifying a “logical system of 
thought” so as to render the universal behavior in the African societies intelligible.  After 
all, human behavior reflects personal and collective self-understanding as much at it 
affects the development of social systems. Tempels derived this basic insight from 
understanding the innate human concern about the basic question of “being.”  In other 
 216
words, without a primordial quest for comprehensive knowledge, African ancestors 
would have been incapable of organizing their experiences and accompanying thoughts 
into some coherent structures of meanings known as cultural values. Tempels thus 
concurs with Rahner: any “system of thought” is explainable from the standpoint of being 
as its metaphysical basis. When African traditional ontologies are, for instance, 
interpreted in light of “being” the ancestor, tribe, clan, family emerge as hierarchical 
logical systems of thought.  Together they comprise different dimensions of the African 
view of being.  They constitute the ontological ground on which the adherents to the 
traditional religions base their ongoing perceptions of ultimate realities.  For an African, 
then, “to be” is to exist in relationship with the founding ancestor, within a specific 
concrete setting of a tribe, clan, and family, all bonded by biological ties. Any thing 
outside that unified (whole) ontology is basically a non-being. Thus, we can further grasp 
the reason African people, in their ethnic diversity; find it extremely difficult to perceive 
a basic connection between diverse historical experiences of what it means to be a person 
or a community.  Experiences outside specific logical systems of thought are potentially 
inimical to one’s own.  In sum, each traditional African institution, as cited, constitutes a 
basic transcendent pole in African anthropologies because each reveals a specific 
dimension of the total self-understandings within a “particular” tribe.  
The African experience summarized above is significant in the understanding of 
Rahner’s ontology for a specific reason. It exemplifies his argument that individuals and 
collectivities are constantly involved in the practice of metaphysics; and more so, with 
respect to a cultural tendency toward definitive self-understanding.  In his own words: 
 Every time man makes of some reality his be-all and his end-all, he makes 
of it the center of that which is around him and of all that he is.  All the rest 
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is but a means for or an expression of this unique reality.  This is the way in 
which he says what he means and wishes to mean by being.  He is 
practicing metaphysics. Therefore we must practice metaphysics since we 
are always practicing it.  We must ask the question: what is the being of 
being.343  
 
Thus far, we can see why Rahner speaks about metaphysics in the general terms of the 
universal historical experiences. The natural or basic structure of human thought process 
is the same.  The thought forms may differ according to the way in which societies (and 
individuals) formulate and develop ideas, especially ultimate causes and ends.  Seen this 
way, the term philosophical anthropology appropriately describes a total cultural view of 
“a person” within a specific human grouping.  For beneath the veneer of cultural beliefs 
and customs, there is a recognizable metaphysical base.  This recognition is evidently 
purposeful in Rahner’s concept of theological anthropology as the theological method 
proper for theology as a sacred discipline. The basic quest for knowledge constitutes a 
primary working principle by which he relates the universal experience of knowledge to 
the Christian revelation, particularly Christology as the ultimate expression of Biblical 
anthropology.   
Since metaphysics seeks to explain ultimate causes by means of natural reason, a 
central subject in metaphysics is the nature of human knowledge.   And philosophy 
approaches this question very specifically by examining the nature of a human person 
with regard to the First Cause; or precisely the relation of “being” to the “being of 
beings.”  So Rahner takes up this structure of thought to argue that the basic question 
about “being” neither stops at particular experiences, nor is it fully realized in them.  A 
contrary position would imply that as finite beings, we can know the fullness of being at 
any one point.  Because complete knowledge is untenable, especially by sole human 
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efforts, Rahner invites us to discern the First Cause and Ends that philosophy discusses in 
terms of being vis-à-vis the being of being.  This step is extremely important.  We 
recognize in it the way in which Rahner builds toward an understanding that metaphysics 
is not an end in itself. It leads into theology for the following basic Christian reason. 
Human beings originate from God in whose image they are made. Although they possess 
a basic natural inclination to know, the processes of human knowledge are rooted in God, 
who as the Omniscient is the end of human knowledge.  In this way, it becomes clear that 
philosophical anthropology (in the Greek sense) is a bridge to Christian anthropology.  
For only then can we grasp that natural anthropology is the starting point from which 
persons and groups proceed toward an ever deeper understanding and experience of who 
they are as finite but spiritual beings.344 For the sake of more clarity, there is need to 
pursue further Rahner’s point on the relationship between philosophical metaphysics and 
theological anthropology.  
A human being, according to Rahner, is naturally inclined to know completely the 
reality of his or her own being.  But because this inclination exists both as an actuality 
and a possibility that always transcends the knower, self-knowledge is always 
“provisional.” 345 Hence, to identify provisional knowledge about being with its fullness 
is tantamount to short-circuiting the very (infinite) possibilities that lie within the range 
of knowledge.  To know is an actuality and a dynamic orientation to the fullness of 
knowledge about being as the point of self-disclosure.346  And so Rahner contends that 
“being is more than knowledge, it is life and action, decision and execution; but it is all 
this…insofar as they are not the fullness.  They radiate the reality of a particular being 
but differ conceptually from being itself.”347  He goes on to describe being in these terms.  
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“[B]eing is a self presence, an original unity of being and knowledge.”348  We can thus 
understand the reason Rahner puts emphasis on knowledge as luminosity, self-presence. 
Knowledge co-exists with “being” as the primordial structure of human existence.  Being 
cannot be subsumed into concrete knowledge, for there is always more self.  Yet, the 
natural inclination to know reality in its completeness implies the possibility of such 
knowledge.  That possibility lies with Jesus of Nazareth as we shall see shortly.  Rahner 
follows this idea to its logical end by inquiring into the nature of a being that can possess 
knowledge in its original unity.  And as he does so, we soon realize that there has never 
been such a person among humankind except Jesus of Nazareth! 
We shall first take note, in passing, that Rahner does not dwell on the historical 
concern about the human quest for an ideal human figure or cultural representatives of 
what it means to be human.  But such figures are implied in his ontology.  These would 
include socially revered figures like African ancestors, Buddha in the Buddhist tradition, 
and so on.  Hence, even though Rahner simply refers to it in the passing, the point is 
made. All societies make explicit references to an ideal figure that represents or 
epitomizes the collective yearning for the fullness of knowledge and life. This does not 
require much discussion given the copious examples of such figures in human societies 
world-wide.  Religious founders are typical examples of men and women who in some 
way embody the highest ideals toward which respective societies aspire.  Discernible, 
therefore, in the societal quest is a legitimate human quest for ideal figures.  But there is a 
problem with this historical quest, legitimate as it may be.  Rahner treats this problem at 
some length. The general human quest for complete knowledge has always tended to 
envision such ideal cultural figures with the beginning and end of all there is about 
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knowledge, personal and collective identities.  Rahner rightly recognizes that absolute 
idealization of ideal cultural representatives is an obstacle in the path of ongoing 
understanding of self.   He responds to this at some length.  Having given reasons as to 
why self-knowledge (being) is always provisional, he focuses on whether there is a being 
that embodies full knowledge about its own being in its primordial unity.  Rahner 
provides the answer himself:  “Only the pure act of being is the absolute identity of being 
and knowing; in the pure act of being, in the absolute being, there remain no more 
questions to be asked.”349  In other words, to establish the existence of such an individual 
requires that we know the basic distinction between “being” associated with individual 
categories and “the being of beings’’ as the ground of all beings (or all existence).  If 
“being,” in the singular, is associated with an entity then the ground of being is 
identifiable with the Absolute mystery known as God.350  In sum, only in reference to 
God can we speak about the fullness of being and knowledge, whether in action or in 
actual existence at any one time.  It stands to reason, then, that the internal structure of 
human life and existence manifests a dynamic orientation to something “ever-more than 
there is” now.  In sum, this is the metaphysical framework for positing God as the ground 
of being and the goal of human striving expressed concretely in the quest for self-
understanding.  However, for Rahner this assertion is not without some difficulty.   
To posit God as the ground of being and the end of human striving and at the 
same time underscore the limitations on the ability to know completely poses a 
philosophical dilemma. But this is exactly the dilemma Rahner strives to overcome by 
relating absolute finitude to the primordial structure of human knowledge.  This further 
clarifies his compelling argument that anthropology ought to open to Christology as the 
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full expression of the human quest for the fullness of being in its primordial unity. As the 
basic theological-anthropological statement, Rahner’s methodological schema is 
grounded in an understanding that the natural propensity to know the complete truth of 
one’s being is a formal structure of human nature, but which structure is limited by the 
factor of absolute finitude.  Now, the tendency in Africa and all cultures is to identify 
completely with the originating societal founders and their cultural projects sever the 
natural inclination to see beyond the historically crafted self-understanding. Such 
tendencies, as we saw in Chapter I and II constitute an obstacle for inculturation, which 
in its essence and end calls for ongoing openness toward ever fuller knowledge about self 
and the reality around us.  In view of developing further this important understanding, the 
following subtopic introduces the factor of “finitude.” This factor is at once a means of 
critiquing the tendency toward definitive self-understanding and a principle of cultural-
anthropological analysis in contextual theologies.  
Human Finitude in the Scheme of Knowledge 
The relation of absolute finitude to the essential character of human knowledge 
has also to be explained with reference to “being” in relation to the “being of Beings.”  
Rahner remains within the domain of established metaphysics-a branch of Christian 
philosophy which studies the nature of being with the purpose of explaining the nature 
and operations of beings.  Hence, by situating the primordial structure of human 
knowledge in the philosophy of being, Rahner seeks to show the natural laws or 
fundamental principles governing the human capacity for knowledge.  All human 
knowledge, as we have seen, takes its character from the nature of human being in 
relation to God. This general principle allows for the specification of the origin and end 
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of the human inclination to know self in fullness. It follows that human knowledge takes 
its character from the nature of a person as a finite being.  Finitude, therefore, implies 
dependence on the “Being of being” and on the absolute openness to the latter as the 
source and end of knowledge.  The following paragraph takes a cue from the previous 
statements and integrates with Rahner’s main insights so as to relate faith and reason 
(discussed earlier) to the reality of finitude.351  
The “open-ended character” of human knowledge is a “condition” for the full 
emergence of self-hood and ultimate fulfillment.  But the combination of “open-
endedness” and “finitude,” though necessary, means that the general human quest for 
knowledge does not yield uniform results.  Whenever human beings are confronted with 
limitations proper to human reason, finitude can be experienced as an obstacle or a 
catalyst for self-transcendence.  In the latter instance, finitude facilitates recognition of 
one’s limits and initiates the quest into the nature of human dependence. This can lead to 
faith in a higher being for some people, while others can view it negatively. Note that 
faith always co-exists with reason.  But the need for faith is more felt with the recognition 
of finitude.  It is in this light that dependence on the Absolute Mystery can be recognized 
more easily.  Hence, dependence on the Absolute Mystery can only emerge from having 
recognized the limited character of the knowledge already acquired.  If, on the contrary, 
acquired knowledge is identifiable with absolute fullness, then human finitude can 
become an obstacle in the path toward complete knowledge and self-transcendence.  
Instead of finitude propelling persons toward the yet-unknown, but knowable reality, 
persons can more easily take refuge in the ideals crafted by society, regardless of their 
moral validity. The reverse is equally unhelpful since it involves an odd fascination with 
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the open-ended nature of knowledge without concern for its teleological character. In this 
case, knowledge takes on a utilitarian meaning. This author agrees totally with Rahner 
schematic argument. A valid view of human knowledge must incorporate a proper sense 
of finitude, at the same time steering clear from crippling skepticism and defensiveness 
which undermine confidence in the human capacity for attaining valid knowledge. Yet a 
question must still be asked, if knowledge takes its character from the nature of being, 
how does this principle apply to God? 
  First, God as the origin and end of human striving implies that only in God there 
is unity of knowledge and being, as Rahner explains. This as the true nature of God, then, 
points to the true nature of a human being.  Human nature is created and as such, persons 
are primordially ordered to arrive at valid knowledge by participating in being as a 
primordial condition of existence. This is a statement of primary principle with profound 
implications for human existence, Christian theology and mission.  As a spirit, a human 
being is “absolute openness” to the mystery of his or her own being.352  And for this same 
reason, knowledge of self is never identical with concrete self-consciousness or 
understanding, however, sublime this may appear to be.  “True knowledge is a 
participation in being.”353 Second, absolute human finitude is indicative of a basic human 
need for divine help to foster authentic participation in being.  Human finitude is in this 
way a propellant toward self-transcendence proper to the spiritual nature of a human 
being.  But Rahner also brings the factor of finitude to bear on concrete experience as a 
means of working toward an understanding of Christology as the fullness of 
anthropology.  
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 That is, the possibility for complete self-knowledge accompanied by absolute 
finitude introduces a basic question as to whether or not there exists a human being who 
is the perfect embodiment of being. The unity of being and knowledge in its primordial 
state can be recognized in such a being.  Such a possibility among us is eliminated by the 
factor of finitude, because the latter rules out the possibility of arriving at the complete 
truths about one’s own being by one’s own effort.  At the same time, absolute openness 
to the infinite mystery holds the assurance of attaining such knowledge. Having said that, 
does finitude not pose a dilemma instead of resolving the question of whether or not a 
human being can arrive at complete knowledge about self?  Since Rahner knows this 
consideration is critical to the meaning of Christology as theological anthropology, he has 
to pursue another question regarding the total structure of human existence, imago Dei. 
This is the basis and condition for understanding the Christian meaning of human nature. 
In this lies the answer to all considerations pending clarification, especially the relation of 
anthropology to Christology.  It is at this point that the following attempt to relate 
Rahner’s work to an important tradition before him emerges.  That tradition spells out the 
theology of imago Dei in the manner that enables contextual theology to recognize how 
the basic working principle outlined above feature in inculturation and contextualization 
of Christian faith.  
    SECTION IV  
KARL RAHNER THROUGH JOHN DUNS SCOTUS’ ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
HORIZON 
 
A Human Being as Imago Dei 
 
  The following excerpts from the Medieval Christian anthropological thought offer 
important insights on the relationship between philosophy and theology discussed above. 
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The relation as discussed is incomplete without reference to the imago Dei anthropology 
in the biblical faith. Karl Rahner puts emphasis on the transcendent anthropology which 
consists in understanding imago Dei as it relates to God and to human beings. 
Accordingly, the Judeo-Christian faith tradition concerns itself with the essential subject 
matter of philosophy, namely; the relationship of “being” to the “Being of beings.”  At 
the same time, the Judeo-Christian tradition approaches this subject with thought forms 
proper to biblical faith as a whole. Needless to say, every thought form carries meaning 
that is specific to the central subject and objective in view. In the present case, Gaudium 
et Spes no. 12 testifies to imago Dei as the proper framework for explaining the 
teleological nature of “being” in relation to the “Being of beings.” This is because 
creation theology points to imago Dei as the ultimate horizon from which to account for 
being vis-à-vis the “Being of beings.”  This understanding has always been an important 
element of philosophical and theological thought in the Catholic tradition in its various 
strands. Rahner’s theological anthropology does not, therefore, spring in a vacuum.  It 
has visible roots in the pre-Vatican II Catholic theological tradition as indicated by his 
concern about the Thomistic anthropology.  Most of Rahner’s seminal insights are closer 
to the Augustinian theological anthropology as developed by the Medieval Franciscans. 
Of particular significance is the tradition that begins with St. Bonaventure and later 
developed by John Duns Scotus.  It is not possible to tell from the corpus of Rahner’s 
writings cited here whether or not he read Scotus’ work.  Yet the similarities in their 
thought forms are evidently unmistakable.  The following paragraphs strives to highlight 
key insights of Scotus’ anthropology in light of the present objective.  Scotus represents 
important developments in the medieval thought on the “meaning of a human being” in 
 226
relation to the incarnation.  Scotus’ insights, therefore, offer a relevant background for 
grasping Rahner’s argument that a human being is naturally constituted to listen to God’s 
revelation.  The following discussion casts Rahner’s argument that anthropology ought to 
open to Christology in the Franciscan anthropology represented here by Duns Scotus and 
others.   
 Mary Beth Ingham, CSJ, has done extensive and insightful study of John Duns 
Scotus’ theological tradition.  In one of her writings cited in this paper, Ingham presents 
Scotus’ moral vision, pointing out its relevancy for the contemporary world. The evident 
focus of her work is the Enlightenment’s attempt to create a moral vision for the world. 
In her estimation, which this author also agrees with, Scotus’ central theme that the 
meaning of a human being as the basis of morality is a needed response to the 
Enlightenment’s anthropological agenda.  However, this chapter only makes use of 
Scotus’ ideas relevant to the theological anthropological perspective on the transcendent 
dimension of the human reality.  According to Ingham, Scotus’ tradition is 
understandably “a moral vision of the whole which underpins his optimism about human 
nature and moral living.”354  His vision emerges through “rethinking the relationship 
between philosophy and theology, in light of a deeper understanding of Aristotle, as well 
as a concern to safeguard the key elements of Christian revelation….”355  Reiteratively, 
the previous excerpts from Rahner echo the same theological-methodological trajectory.  
In this way, the Judeo-Christian vision of humanity forms the core content and method of 
Scotus’ project, and renders key philosophical concepts understandable without 
immediate reference to the philosophical technicalities proper to Aristotelian philosophy.   
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 Scotus presents a dynamic view of a person situated in the total context of 
creation theology. The present moment and the eschatological horizon constitute two 
poles in his understanding of the Christian view of a human being.  This implies that a 
person in the Judeo-Christian world view is unexplainable outside the historical and the 
ultimate poles of existence. Scotus is obviously opposed to abstractionist approaches that 
rely on mere concepts without reference to a common ontology. Thus, Scotus’ concern 
for the concrete and the transcendent poles is reflected, as we shall see, in the medieval 
basic understanding that human life is truly a journey toward the future with God.  
Historical existence is the context and starting point for the journey.  Seen this way, the 
human being constitutes a statement of principle, as well as points to a method to be 
followed in theological and moral concerns.  Therefore for Scotus, “to speak of things 
human is to enter the domain of the divine.”356  Scotus is not in any way inventing a new 
organizing principle for theology.  The Judeo-Christian tradition understands a person in 
relationship to God.357  His personal merit consists in the emphasis he puts on the value 
of a human person for theology and faith, and his advance on the traditional 
understanding of imago Dei. The concept of human life as a journey finds full expression 
in the imago Dei anthropology.  From this vantage point, Scotus anthropology becomes 
relevant to:  
a) the teleological character of knowledge as propounded by Karl Rahner; 
 b) a universal human ontology as the basis for understanding how the Jesus event relates 
to persons and their lives in general; 
 c) the essential relation of philosophy to Christology. 
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 There are two major strands in the traditional Catholic understanding of Imago Dei: the 
Eastern and the Western tradition.  According to Ingham, Scotus leans more toward the 
Eastern tradition while blending in important developments from the Western tradition, 
especially the Augustinian tradition. However, Scotus follows in the footsteps of St. 
Bonaventure who is insightfully innovative in developing the Augustinian tradition in 
light of the Franciscan tradition.   
 In a nutshell, the Eastern tradition “identifies the human being as image of God 
(imago Dei) on the journey toward more complete resemblance to God.”358  This basic 
understanding clearly offered Augustine the spiritual framework in which he also 
explained the human reality.  For Augustine, then, “Transformation into [God’s likeness] 
constitutes the goal of all human living.”359 This is an extremely seminal idea put forward 
by St. Augustine.  At the same time, a particular concept of transformation colors 
Augustine’s interpretation of imago Dei to a greater extent.  For instance, keeping in 
mind that imago Dei is an ontological reality; Augustine tried to accommodate the reality 
of original sin, basing himself on the Genesis account, as indicated by the following 
statement: “The image of God within each person becomes the resemblance of God we 
are made to be. This resemblance is lost through original sin, but can be regained through 
baptism and the life of grace.”360  Notably, both statements contain valid substantive 
content as well as some basic flaws.  One has to take a step back and ask whether it is 
imago Dei (as a potentiality) that is lost, or is it the imago Dei as resemblance that is lost 
due to original sin? The key idea consists in Augustine having closely associated image 
with resemblance.361 To grasp the subtlety of this matter it is important that we 
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understand the way in which Augustinian envisions what the image consists in vis-a-vis 
“transformation into God’d likeness.”   
Augustine identifies the God’s image in us as the highest dimension of our soul: 
the mind (mens intellectus) which is the ‘interior and intelligible eye’…the mind 
with its faculties and activities is the image of the entire Trinity.  The process of 
conversion takes place within a precise relationship to the second person of the 
Trinity as Word (verbum), by which the mind is joined to the source of being 
(principium) and the source of goodness (Spiritus).362 
 
Once again one need to inquire whether identifying the image of God in us with the mind 
does justice to the meaning of a person as an embodied spirit. No doubt, the mind is 
essential in the total scheme of human transformation as a journey toward resemblance.  
Hence, knowing self and reality around us as God knows is essential to the journey 
toward resemblance with God’s image in us.  However, the Franciscans are justified in 
questioning a view that identifies transformation too closely with the mind, since this is 
tantamount to equating knowledge with goodness.363 Plenty of knowledge is not the same 
as goodness or human resemblance to God.364 
 Therefore for the Franciscans, in order for transformation into resemblance to be 
truly authentic, it would require love.  That is not to suggest that Augustine’s 
anthropology is devoid of a sense of love.  Such consideration is implicit in Augustine 
having related the mind to the Word, the Second Person of the Trinity.  Knowledge of the 
Word ought to lead to love. Nonetheless, methodological assumptions or principles 
generally determine the outcome of the subject content. By putting emphasis on the mind 
as the locus for interpreting imago Dei steers the concept of transformation to an 
epistemological horizon where human reason becomes the epicenter of the human 
journey.  Where does this leave faith as a human reality integral to rationality and love? 
We know from experience that people who apparently know a whole lot about God or 
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any reality for that matter are not necessarily the most loving people.  It is thus fitting that 
the Franciscans of the 12th and 13th centuries sought to unite knowledge and love in such 
a way that we can grasp the mutuality of the “cognitive” and the “affective” in imago 
Dei.365  By doing so, they help us to recognize the ontological difference between us and 
God in whose image we are made. 
Imago Dei as a Unity of Knowledge and Love 
In continuity with St. Augustine, the Franciscan tradition related the intellect with 
the soul, at the same time incorporating the affective domain for a holistic understanding 
of the human being as imago Dei.  It follows that, “while the cognitive domain gives rise 
to the image, it is the activity of loving which demonstrates resemblance.”366 Note in 
passing that this philosophical perspective sets the pace toward understanding Jesus 
Christ as the “being” in whom the knowledge of God and love are truly united. Ingham 
explains that “Franciscan writers emphasized the superiority of loving over knowing, 
since it is by the act of love that we most resemble God’s gracious activity, knowing 
provides the image, loving transforms us into image of God.”367  “St. Bonaventure would 
later advance this vision based on the “formula” propounded by John of Rochelle, a 
Franciscan philosopher.” “Image is to nature, resemblance to grace.”368  Notice that the 
last statement by St. Bonaventure ought to be seen as a working principle by which 
Franciscan philosophers sought to rearticulate the relation of nature to grace.369  
Bonaventure explains imago Dei as it relates to human nature in terms of “innate gifts.”370 
The view seems to have laid the foundation for the important development seen in 
Scotus’ and Rahner’s anthropological thought. That is, there is a sense in which we 
cannot separate nature and grace.  By the fact that human nature can function the way it 
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does is in itself grace. At the same time, human nature is limited and as such, stands in 
need of elevating grace. Thus Bonaventure “identified image with the natural capacity for 
knowledge of God” as Augustine had done.  But the basic difference for Bonaventure is 
to have identified resemblance with the indwelling of God which does not solely depend 
on the natural function of the mind. It requires a specific understanding and expression of 
love, continually supported by God’s grace.  There is then a theological nuance 
Bonaventure introduces: the movement (transformation) from nature to transformation is 
not a natural given.  It requires a dynamic action of grace in the workings of nature and a 
conscious relationship with God based on explicit revelation as Scotus and Rahner 
emphasize. Seen this way, the image of God in us is at once a reality and a potentiality. It 
emerges through transformation; i.e., a dynamic movement from “image” into 
resemblance.  In the latter respect, God’s grace is ordered to loving as an act and a state 
of being.  Knowledge leads to love, which love transforms us into likeness to God in 
whom the cognitive and the affective domains are also united.   
In spite of a subtle loophole in the Augustinian tradition, it offered the leverage on 
which the Franciscans developed their own understanding of Imago Dei.  Ingham sums 
up the overall pivotal point in the Augustinian tradition.  “Augustine offers a systematic 
presentation of what it means to be a human being both as a metaphysical reality (the way 
we are) and a dynamic spirituality which points beyond itself toward life with God (what 
we are meant to be).”371  This basic understanding furnishes John Duns Scotus with 
conceptual tools for reflecting on the meaning of a human person.  “Imago Dei is [an 
important motif] in Scotus’ thought as he weaves together key elements from medieval 
philosophy and Christian thought.”372  Let it be clear at this point that Rahner’s 
 232
philosophical ontology as previously outlined is reflected in Scotus’ theological 
anthropology. The following sections throw more light on this point. But before that, it 
ought to be noted that the above and the subsequent themes clear a lot of dark shadows 
currently hovering on contextual theologies.  Contextual theologians who are bent on 
absolutizing their cultural religious heritages are simply saying their cultures have it all.  
But as we continue to explore the theme of humanity’s basic openness and inclination to 
the transcendent, absolutization of culture is a serious obstacle to Christian faith in its 
very essence and goal. 
 A Human Being viewed in the Light of the Divine Image  
 Scotus’ anthropology emerges in the context of his discussions on moral life.  In 
continuity with his predecessors, Scotus believes that human life is truly a moral journey 
that involves transformation into the image of God.  At the same time, he advances 
further the tradition before him. For him, there are important elements that must be 
considered in trying to draw a legitimate distinction between a human being and God. 
These include the limitations accruing from the reciprocal action of the cognitive and the 
affective domains.373  Hence, and in contrast with Augustine, the cognitive and the 
affective comprise the context for understanding human finitude as it relates to the image 
of God that we are.  In the case of the divine image, cognition and affectivity do not 
constitute finitude for reason that shall be made clear. The same elements provide the 
basis on which Scotus re-interprets the meaning of sin and of the incarnation. We shall 
begin with Scotus’ understanding of imago Dei and move toward the place of finitude in 
the scheme of human existence.  
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  Augustine attributed the primary cause of sin to original sin. Scotus does not 
dismiss the theological value of original sin. He, however, brings insight into the internal 
structure of imago Dei beyond previous comprehension.  The following paragraphs pay 
attention to the intimate relationship Scotus puts between human finitude and sin, and 
how these affect the natural ability to know ourselves completely. For Scotus, according 
to Ingham,  
[T]he image of God within the human soul is not naturally knowable, due to the 
limitations of human cognition.  We can…know our source is God and still not 
understand the exact relationship that exists between creator and image.374  This 
relationship is unknowable because, in order to understand any relationship, we 
must understand both terms.  In the case of our nature as image of God, we fail to 
grasp God’s nature as infinite being, and therefore are unable to conceive of 
ourselves ‘for the absolute things that we are.’  We know something about who 
we are, but we cannot fathom on our own what God is really like….It is not that 
we cannot know ourselves, rather we cannot grasp the relationship we have to 
God in the absence of some revelation such as the account of creation in 
Genesis.375 
 
So, the two terms in relationship are a “human being” and a “divine being” known as 
“God.”  Using the language of “paternity and generation,” Augustine defined personhood 
in the Trinity in relational terms.  But for Scotus, individuality and communality are 
essential to an understanding of God’s image in us.  According to Ingham, Scotus leans 
toward the Eastern tradition to bring into sharp focus a basic relationship between 
“person” and “being,” as previously discussed.  Scotus introduces his position with a 
clarification paraphrased by Ingham.  
[T]he essence of God involves an incommunicable dimension proper to each 
Person and a communal dimension which can only be described within a 
relationship.  The dimension is incommunicable because it lies beyond language. 
It is expressed through language but is not itself reducible to the terms which are 
used to describe it. Scotus calls this the logical suppositum (term) which is 
necessary prior to any discussion of relationship.376   
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Thus and in contrast with Augustine, “Each person in the Trinity is a person in the 
absolute sense (per modus essendi) and not relative to others (per relationes).”377  Note 
that assigning absolute property to divine personhood is not a negation of the relational 
language of paternity and generation.  Absolute personhood and communion can both 
describe the essential nature of God. Ingham clarifies this point well.  
Personality is a result of relationship. I am who I am by virtue of my relationship 
to others throughout my life.  But description of my personality does not exhaust 
the mystery of my personhood throughout. The deeper mystery of each individual 
is the ineffable, and only finds expression in relation.378   
  
At any rate, what Ingham is saying is exactly what Karl Rahner’s and Duns Scotus’ 
anthropology is saying. The emphasis on individuality rightly underscores the uniqueness 
of each person in the Trinity, but which uniqueness is not self-containment. Rather, it has 
to be manifested in relationship. 379 That is not to say Scotus’ position is free from 
possible misinterpretation.  If, for instance, each divine person is an absolute being, in 
whose image human beings are made, can we still speak of imago Dei in the singular?  
The answer is yes.  
 Scotus understands that the “personal and communal dimensions” give rise to 
“the dynamic essence which is the fruit of this communion.”380  This has implications for 
how we understand the image of God as the essence of human nature (GS, no. 14). As 
human beings, therefore, we embody the two properties in the Trinity: the personal and 
the dynamic essence or relational property.  The personal speaks to our individuality, 
which for the most part, is not fully accessible to rational knowledge outside revelation, 
as discussed before. But it unfolds through mutual relationships.  So having grounded 
essential nature in the divine image, Scotus now explains the difference between the 
divine image and a human person as the image of God.  On the whole, his understanding 
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of divine personhood in the Trinity reaches its height in his discussion of divine freedom 
and will, a subject treated briefly in the next subsection.   
‘Being’ as the Order of Existence for Human and Divine Persons in Relationship 
A general ontology is very basic to Scotus’ anthropology as indicated by Ingham. 
She says the philosophy of being is very central to Scotus’ moral vision.  He presents it 
from the perspective of the biblical theology of creation. This is an extremely important 
development because it shows, without any doubt, that the Judeo-Christian world view is 
at once a theology and a philosophy.  Scotus situates the meaning of person, human and 
divine, in this general context so as to interpret cognition and affectivity as they relate to 
both parties. Once this basic understanding is laid out he also reinterprets the meaning of 
divine and human freedom, sin, and the purpose of the incarnation.  
 Scotus understood that “being” is not imposed on us from outside. Rather it 
permeates the entire spheres of existence, natural and divine.  And for the same reason, a 
philosophy of being expresses the fundamental relationship between creatures and God 
and relationships among created beings.  Precisely, “[a]s First Principle, God does not 
exist outside the order of being nor outside of relationship with humanity”381  Hence, 
“Being” is that which “can be predicated of everything, including God.”382  It is an 
“essential order” or the “order of essences.”  He describes “The essential order [as] a 
great sweep of being, a unified whole of reality which includes God” (cf. GS, no. 10). 383  
For instance, although God as the “First Cause” is prior to all other beings…God is 
not…beyond the realm of being [to the extent that we can leave] being to encounter God: 
we encounter God in being, in beings, in one another.”384  He makes reference to a 
notable passage in the Old Testament to make his case, namely; “the divine act of self-
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revelation to Moses as ‘I am who I am’…provides the rational basis for a demonstration 
of God’s existence precisely because God has chosen being as an appropriate description 
of his essence as it can be known by the human intellect.”385  In brief, “being” comprises 
the “order of essences” which expresses the ontological relatedness among different 
beings:  God, human beings, and lesser creatures.386 Overall, the biblical view of being 
comprises an ontological framework by which to account for creation as it relates to the 
Incarnation.  Accordingly, the “essential order means that creation is not only related to 
God, but that God is related to creation.”387  But “[t]he relatedness of the essential order 
does not mean God is equal to creation.”388  Thus Scotus recognizes different levels of 
mutuality stemming from inequality among different beings in the order of creation.  
According to Ingham, Scotus draws attention to mutuality as the principle by which he 
explains relationship among divine persons.  It suffices to note that in contrast to the 
relational terminologies of Augustine, mutuality marked by individuality and liberality 
are essential characteristics of divine personhoods. The factor of individuality serves a 
distinctive function not only to underscore difference among the divine persons; it also 
provides the basis for comprehending individuality among human beings. This includes 
the limitations proper to human cognition and affectivity. This points to the importance 
nature of the divine freedom in understanding the natural capacity and limitation of 
human cognition. Freedom bears directly on the natural quest for knowledge.  
Divine Liberality in light of Imago Dei 
According to Ingham, Scotus’ postulations on the absolute character of divine 
persons were censored on the grounds that they contradicted the theology of the Trinity 
propounded by St. Augustine.  This is no surprise given a static view of revelation that 
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marked a greater part of the Catholic theological tradition before the Second Vatican 
Council.  For present purposes, Scotus’ line of argument is valid.  Augustine, like Scotus, 
stressed the importance of divine communion in the effort to understand the divine 
persons.  Yet as Scotus maintains, in order for any person to be free, one must make 
legitimate claim to basic freedom as a condition for any authentic relationship.  That 
claim, by nature, presupposes distinctive individuality of persons in relationship.  At the 
same time, Scotus like Augustine understands that it is only in a free and loving 
relationship where individuality finds true expression. For instance, I am related to my 
parents through paternity.  But it is neither paternity nor filial relationship that endows 
me with basic freedom and a sense of being an individual person, distinct from my 
parents. I am free because I am basically constituted a free person at the time of creation. 
In other words, my basic freedom and individuality are patterned on the divine freedom 
and individuality; keeping in mind that only God knows my individuality in its fullness. 
At the same time, basic freedom by itself does not make me a loving person. Loving 
evolves in two dimensional relationships: vertical and horizontal. It is in these respects 
that we recognize that individuality is essential to a Trinitarian theology that speaks to the 
human being as a free and rational being.  
Scotus was convinced that “the freedom that exists among the divine communion 
is the basis for comprehending how God relates to creation.”389  Ingham explains that the 
reality of divine freedom provides Scotus with the rationale for asserting the possibility 
of a moral order. Quote: “The present order is good, not of itself, but because God has 
chosen to create it out of divine freedom and love, freely willed.”  For Scotus, this basic 
understanding is in itself a valid principle in theology, i.e., “the possibility of free choice 
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in the will, the contingency of creation and the value of theology as a scientific 
discipline.”390 A strong sense of mutuality emerges from a discussion of relationship 
among persons or between God and human persons.  This mutuality is stronger because it 
is based upon the free choice to enter into relationship, to create relationship or to 
establish order and ultimately communion.  Communion appears in an exemplary manner 
in the Trinity, a union among persons which Scotus calls both necessary and free.391  He 
also stresses that “a relationship of communion characterizes divine life and surpasses 
whatever distinction among divine persons in a way that the human mind might 
conceive.”392  All these have implications for imago Dei anthropology.  If divine image 
exemplifies who we are, a Christian view of a human being has to take into consideration 
the dialectical tension between individuality and communion. This tension is explainable 
in terms of freedom and free will. In this regard, Scotus draws attention to the nature and 
operation of the divine will.   
Scotus follows the logic of the Efficient Cause as the metaphysical basis for the 
operation of all primary principles. “The divine act of creative freedom functions as 
exemplar for the perfection of rational loving.  God’s choice to create this world was a 
free choice, not necessitated by any force other than the divine itself. This world is not 
necessary, nor is it impossible that there might be other worlds”393  So Scotus reasons that 
in order to bring about a free created order, God as the First Cause must move freely.  It 
therefore stands to reason that because creation is a result of God’s free will, such a 
movement on the part of God is “an act of will” that is also “free.”  Anything otherwise 
would not yield self-determination as the internal law in the order of being that includes 
God.  For instance, “Human action would particularly be the result of determinism” since 
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“we would have no power” for self-movement.394  In the same way, Scotus understands 
that divine freedom by itself does not exhaust the character of the divine will.  Mention 
was made regarding the Franciscan’s intent to advance the Augustinian insights on imago 
Dei by uniting knowledge and love. It is in the context of freedom and free will that the 
practical and theological implications of the Franciscan’s vision become evident.  
God is love and always acts in accordance with love as God’s consummate quality or 
nature.395 According to Ingham, Scotus expresses this reality by “uniting” divine willing 
and divine rationality and the perfection which this implies: justice and liberality.396 In 
other words, divine will and freedom are well balanced; there is no disharmony in God’s 
exercise of freedom and in the execution of the free will.  This in principle means that 
human nature, made in the image of God, has been grounded in individuality as an 
essential characteristic of divine persons who exist in relationship of freedom. It is thus 
valid for Scotus to assert divine liberality as a decisive factor in understanding a human 
person. A brief outline of Scotus’ understanding of the nature and operation of the human 
will can clarify imago Dei as it pertains to the meaning of a human being. 
Ingham points out that medieval thinkers put emphasis on God as the basis for 
understanding the nature of the human will.  Scotus’ reflection incorporates important 
elements in the same tradition. Yet in contrast to medieval thinkers who perceived the 
“free will [as] distinct from reason,” Scotus unites the two.  That is, reason is contained 
within the will as in the divine will.  He wants to show that the will contains the 
mechanism for internal “self-control.”397 The will “is able to control itself, it retains the 
power to refrain from an action, to re-direct, to influence and to execute the deliberative 
process at any time.”398  Hence, we can speak of the human will being rational, because it 
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has the capacity to choose what is good as the order of human nature.  Ingham observes 
that in this Scotus aligns himself “with medieval thinkers [who] defined rational freedom 
in light of the will’s capacity for reasoning and choosing” what is good. Like in the 
divine will, “[The human] will has the capacity for self-movement.”  It “is the 
autonomous cause of the free act.”399 Ingham is striving to show that Scotus makes a 
nuanced distinction between free will and basic freedom as seen in this paraphrase.  
Freedom relates to the end (as necessary) and free will is directed toward a 
contingent means to that end.  In other words, the notion of freedom deals more 
with the goal of human fulfillment while free will has to do with concrete acts of 
choice over which I have some control. When I make a choice, I exercise free 
will not freedom.400  
 
Freedom is that power ordered to what is good and is revelatory of that which a person 
desires most at any one point.  Scotus develops this aspect following St. Anselm’s401 
work on the affections of the will. That is, basic "human freedom" and "free will" are 
very important in the development of moral life consonant with the Judeo-Christian 
vision of a person as imago Dei. The will as the instrument that actualizes basic freedom 
contains two basic inclinations known as affections of the will.402  These realities are 
experienced in the basic inclination to self-promotion (affection for possession) and to 
justice (affection for the other). Together, these affections constitute the will as a rational 
faculty.403  The affection for justice focuses on others rather than self.  It is described as 
the “liberty innate to the will,” since it involves the internal self-control revealed by 
reflection upon internal experience.” 404  Ingham further explains that our choices are torn 
between self-preservation and justice.  “The object of the will is the good…” Hence 
affections of the will underscore “the nature of the good objects and how they ought to be 
loved.” In sum: 
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 Some objects have value as a means to other, better ends. These objects are 
useful goods…money and food would be such goods.  Their value belongs to 
their use, not to their intrinsic value…Goods of use can be lost without affecting 
the value of dignity of the one who possesses them….There exists other objects 
which possess a type of absolute goodness or intrinsic dignity.  These are 
called…honest goods worthy of love not because of any use we make of them, 
but because of their internal value. These absolute goods ought to be loved in and 
for themselves, never to be loved or possessed to further egoistic motives. Scotus 
identifies God as the primary candidate for this type of good and draws forth 
moral norms from the primary commandment to love God above all things and 
for God alone.405 
 
 These affections say something about the extent to which a person chooses the highest 
good, which in essence is a self-constituting action.  That is to say, “the two affections 
deal with the development of character insofar as they relate to self-centeredness or 
other-centered concerns.”406   For example, concern for personal safety and preservation 
is a good thing and a natural obligation but can turn evil; if self-preservation is the most 
decisive principle of one’s life; one becomes very egocentric. Obviously, such a moral 
stance cuts off the need to enter into dialogue with the Absolute Mystery. The basic 
human inclination turns to a different object other than God.  In summary, basic freedom 
and free will are essential to understanding how absolute finitude affects the natural 
human capacity (imago Dei) for God. This is also Scotus’ point of departure from 
traditional emphasis on original sin.  Augustine goes as far as suggesting that the image 
of God in us has been affected by original sin, as we pointed out before. In interpreting 
the two affections, St. Anselm followed St. Augustine more closely. According to 
Ingham,  
Scotus departs from Anselm to affirm that the tendency toward loving justly 
(affection justitiae) was neither lost, nor damaged by original sin.  The state of 
Adam and Eve was not supernatural, but rather preternatural somehow beyond 
our present condition but not on par with God or the Angels (her emphasis). 
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While it stands to reason that human nature has “capacity for goodness,” the same nature 
is also constituted in such a way that we often “[fail] to accomplish the good we 
intend.”407  This understanding has to be balanced by another: human relationship with 
God is free; it can be accepted or rejected.  Scotus asserts rightly that the natural human 
inclination toward the ultimate horizon (God) as the point of human fulfillment is 
contingent on the freedom of the will to accept or to reject the transformative grace.  The 
fact that we are made in the image of God does not in any way imply the absence of sin.  
As Scotus understands the realities of free will and freedom automatically impose the 
possibility of sin. At the same time, imago Dei as “natural capacity” for an-ever fuller 
human being implies that grace also takes on a dynamic meaning. It is not something 
superimposed on human nature, or something that we can do without. Grace is divine life 
ordered to increasing the natural capacity (imago Dei) for becoming more and fully 
human.  The entire conversation with Scotus transforms the meaning of redemption in the 
overall all scheme of creation and purpose of the incarnation. 
Scotus is obviously consistent in his argument that imago Dei cannot be known 
naturally. “Because the human mind is limited and can only grasp being as being, divine 
self-revelation is necessary for any qualitative knowledge about God and as a point of 
departure for any theological science.”408  “Divine assistance is available to make up 
what is lacking in human effort.  But divine assistance does not replace the freedom of 
the will to choose in accordance with what one considers of utmost importance. All these 
have implication for the concept of imago Dei as a journey of transformation into 
resemblance to God and for the relation of philosophy to theology, and anthropology to 
Christology. It is under this theme that all aspects that go into a holistic understanding of 
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a human being unite.  Only in Jesus, the human being per excellence, do the realities of 
faith and reason, love, freedom, free will and finitude find harmonious expression.  The 
attainment of self-knowledge is limited by divine order as well as the limitations proper 
to human nature.  Humanity can choose or reject God in the very act of choosing freely. 
These and other details that follow are critical to understanding the seriousness of the 
issues raised in Chapters I and II.  That is to say, there is more to a human being or 
religion than biological descent and cultural achievements. Contextual theology cannot 
be grounded in ambiguous cultural concepts of a human being without jeopardizing the 
salvation of people and the mission of the church.  
CONCLUSION: THE PURPOSE OF THE INCARNATION 
The foregoing discussion is basic to the understanding of the symmetrical 
relationship Rahner puts between anthropology and Christology and the incarnation as 
the essence of Christology. His entire theology, like that of Duns Scotus, presupposes 
understanding human nature as essentially imago Dei. The unique contribution of Rahner 
is to have transformed key elements of the tradition before him into transcendental 
anthropology which is essentially Christology. Rahner has, by the same act, transformed 
theological methodology.  The reality of humanity’s basic inclination to the transcendent 
does raise a basic question regarding the purpose of Christ in the total scheme of human 
existence. If all are ordered to the transcendent, then, why does humanity need Christ?  
Why can’t everyone just follow their basic inclinations expressed in the cultural projects 
as inculturation theologians insist?  It was to answer this question that the previous 
themes were selected to provide a philosophical-theological background to the meaning 
of Christ for the entire human race.  Precisely speaking, therefore, a reflection on human 
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nature is incomplete without the concept of sin and redemption which must have imago 
Dei as the ultimate reference point.  On this subject John Duns Scotus, Karl Rahner, 
Conciliar and some post Conciliar official teaching propounds exactly the same ideas 
only that each uses a different language with a different emphasis.409  We shall note, for 
present purposes, that the theme of redemption is crucial to an understanding of the 
purpose of the incarnation with specific reference to sin, human finitude, and the human 
quest for ultimate knowledge and fulfillment. There are various strands in the Catholic 
theology of redemption.  The following highlights summarize the expressed concerns of 
this chapter in the light of St. Anselm’s seminal ideas which dominated Catholic theology 
before the Second Vatican Council. 
A theology of the incarnation that is consistent with biblical faith, according to 
Scotus, does not to begin by inquiring into “whether or not the Word would have become 
incarnate [had] Adam not sinned.”  Rather, we should start by inquiring what the original 
intent of God was relative to the Incarnation….”410  As Scotus understands it; if the first 
perspective constitutes the starting point for soteriological reflection, the meaning of 
incarnation is more likely than not to embrace St. Anselm’s view.  That is, sin becomes 
the primary causal factor or motivation for Jesus’ coming on the ground that “reparation 
for so heinous a sin could only be made by a person who was both human and divine.”411 
Scotus does not dispute the theological validity of the previous idea in itself. He is, 
however, against making the same idea the basis for the incarnation. When examined 
against the theology of imago Dei above, we more easily agree with Scotus. St. Anselm’s 
soteriological schema does not take into account the nature of divine freedom and free 
will as internal principles permeating all creation.  Human beings, like other created 
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entities, are free beings.  Human freedom, however, involves the choice for self-
determination; i.e., the choice to follow the path to ultimate fulfillment ordained by the 
Creator or the choice to a contrary path.  The possibility of sin originates with the innate 
capacity for “self-movement” in the will.  The freedom of the will to choose what is good 
involves the possibility to choose sin.  Therefore, every human act embodies a decision to 
be what one wants to be, here and now, and in the future.  If, on the one hand, personal 
choices conform to God’s design (imago Dei) for us, then, those choices facilitate the 
process of transformation. The choice to be or not to be participants in God’s designs for 
humanity is ours to make.  Should our choices run contrary to God’s design, we are by 
the same virtue undermining the possibility of becoming the persons we are meant to be. 
We shall also note that Jesus’ mission does not change the nature of the basic relationship 
between God and the human being previously described. Rather he affirms that condition 
of existence at the same time brings to fulfillment God’s original plan of redemption. 
Hence for Scotus, “the summit of creation is the communion of all persons with 
one another and with God.”412  Based on this reality as God’s original intention for us, 
Scotus’ argument is in order:  
the predestination of anyone to the glory is prior by nature to the prevision of the 
sin or damnation of anyone…God intended first glory as ultimate and final end, 
and the Incarnation as leading to that end…The Incarnation represents not merely 
divine response to human need for salvation, but rather God’s intention from all 
eternity to raise human nature to the highest point of glory by uniting with the 
divine. This intention was freely chosen by God, and never necessitated by any 
human choice.413  
 
 In this way, Scotus situates the scheme of redemption or grace within the wider scheme 
of God’s original plan of creation. He does so, however, without eliminating the reality of 
original sin. Made in the image of God, who relates to creation in freedom, the freedom 
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of the will defines the character of human response or cooperation with God’s plan of 
salvation. We can see evidence of this in biblical faith.  The history of salvation from 
creation to the New Testament moves forward and realizes itself by the dynamic of free 
choice.  Jesus’ public life accentuates the reality of free choice in the self-understanding 
and in view of personal and collective destiny.  We can thus grasp the  
Christological and soteriological basis for Scotus’ assertion that, “Christ is that very 
person in whom the human and the divine achieve mutuality.”414  To be human, 
therefore, is to exist in relationship with God and with one another.  “The Trinity is a 
communion of persons exemplifying the goal of human activity.  Union with another or 
out of love is the key to human fulfillment, because this union is generative and life 
giving. In its fullness, the human experience of relationship and mutuality images divine 
life.”415  And for Scotus nothing images divine mutuality and human-divine relationship 
so perfectly as the Incarnation of Christ. With this background understanding, the 
following reference to Karl Rahner and John Duns Scotus bring this chapter to a 
conclusion.  
 Christian anthropology as outlined above represents an important development in 
the traditional Catholic understanding of the Judeo-Christian view of the human being.  
The new developments pinpoint basic structures of meaning by which dogmatic theology 
can give a holistic view of the human being.  That merit withstanding, there is yet another 
development that brings the same tradition to another level of understanding for 
contemporary theology.  For, it is one thing to grasp imago Dei as an ontological account 
of a human being.  It is yet another to realize that a transcendental anthropology holds the 
key to a more versatile theological methodology in accordance with Revelation in Christ.  
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This is the contribution that Rahner and Duns Scotus bring to the Catholic theological 
tradition, a contribution that is very meaningful to mission theologies.  In a special way, 
Rahner makes a synthesis of the previous developments in theological anthropology with 
Christology and by the same virtue, makes explicit the universal significance of Christ for 
the human race.  Since it is not the intention of this author to present an expose of 
Rahner’s work, which at most, would be a replication of available sources, the next 
immediate purpose is to draw some working principles to meet the general objective of 
this study. Toward that specific objective this now study turns to Chapter IV.  
 
CHAPTER IV: THE WAY FORWARD 
 
Given the current theological landscape of African Theology, the first Chapter 
had to raise a perennial question in the Catholic Theological Tradition.416 What is the 
foundation of a Christian theology?  For there can be no doubt that, if the Church’s 
mission in Africa proceeds by the organizing principle(s) of the African traditional world 
views, then the African ecclesia can end up with a Church structure which is properly 
rooted in the native cultures, but without being truly Christian in its internal structures of 
faith, practice, and ultimate redemption. It is, therefore, in view of forestalling the 
possibility for such ecclesial anomaly that this study puts the primary focus on the need 
to attain general clarity in understanding of what it means to be a local church and to 
guide its mission of evangelization in Africa.  To that end, the purpose of this chapter is 
primarily integrative.  It seeks, on the basis of the previous chapters, to formulate 
working principles (and guidelines) for the church’s evangelizing mission in Africa.417 
The principles in view are in the form of specific substantive contents ordered to the 
specific human and cultural anomalies in the collective African existence. The rationale 
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behind the current formulations is the expressed need in the teaching of the Second 
Vatican Council to incorporate human experience (culture) in theological reflection. This 
task requires that all the various levels of theology uphold fundamental principles in 
Catholic theology. The general objective of formulating general principles is, therefore, 
premised on the previously expressed anthropological assumption, namely, that the 
church’s evangelizing mission always encounters human cultures that have emerged as a 
result of humanity’s capacity for reflection and synthesis of their historical experiences.  
Hence, the principles as proposed do not replace the official Church teaching. Rather, 
they make Church teaching more intelligible and adaptable to the African local church. 
With specific reference to the African situation, Christology occupies a central place in 
the theological reflection tailored to inculturation. That is to say, since theology is the 
language with which the Catholic Church speaks to the world, then Christology is the 
foundation of the entire speech and life of the church. It, therefore, follows that for the 
Catholic Church to speak with a language proper to its nature, it must also know the 
anthropological language of the diverse ethnic groups that make up the Christian 
population of the African Catholic local Churches.  This means that the church must 
attend to the basic structures of meaning with which native people express who they are 
in relation to the world around them.  So, while the translation of the Gospel into native 
languages is essential to the mission of the church, such a task is only one step among 
more important ones. In short, it is on account of this basic understanding that this study 
proposes a way out of a theological impasse generated by the general contextual 
theological aversion to the biblical tradition and to the Church’s Western Christian 
heritage. 
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The apologetic position taken by African theology on the subject of Christology 
renders contextualization and inculturation in Africa null and void. The theological 
claims, presented in Chapter I, regarding the theological integrity of the traditional 
African religious heritage (in the singular) do not hold.  Moreover, this study did not find 
any moral principles in the African religious heritages that could universalize the diverse 
cultural world views on the African Continent without sparking off all kinds of moral and 
human conflicts.  Obviously, although the general principles and practical considerations 
proposed in this chapter are not exhaustive, they offer only one step out of the current 
cultural and theological impasses.  In their theological substance, the principles point to 
an existential approach to contextual theologies and inculturation in Africa.  Such 
theologies would have the purpose of bringing a Christian philosophy of a person (i.e. 
human nature) in dialogue with African anthropologies. In other words, redefining the 
philosophy of human nature is a necessary condition for a more humane cultural 
civilization in Africa.  An existential approach means that African anthropologies are not 
to be presented in the abstract.  The concrete African persons and their ways of viewing 
the realities that confront their common existence constitute the immediate point of 
concern. The real African peoples in their diversity are the living testimony of the true 
value of ancestral traditions. Peoples’ ongoing cultural attitudes, choices, actions and 
behaviors are in-roads toward a true understanding of the theological and spiritual 
viability of the traditional African religions.  Consequently, the church in its mission 
presents Africa with a fundamental choice between biological ancestors and Christ. It is 
also a choice that establishes the way forward for those who profess faith in Jesus of 
Nazareth.  In sum, the principles and guidelines as proposed are concise summaries that 
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accompany the interpretation and application of Christology.  They underscore the basic 
direction of local theologies by ensuring that the Church’s mission is properly attuned to 
the basic human418 needs of the Africa people in their cultural diversity.  In sum, while 
“general principles” point to the basic direction to be taken, practical guidelines are 
summaries which unearth the underlying assumptions in Christian faith and cultural 
world views.  Seen as a whole, the principles and guidelines as proposed are mutually 
interdependent as Christian doctrine and its application. 
A Statement on Christology as a Principle 
A basic principle by nature presupposes a certain substantive content.  For this 
same reason, this study perceives three specific Christological considerations as 
necessary in the attainment of general theological clarity required in the task of 
inculturation. These considerations consist of:  what or who is at the center of Christian 
theology and the evangelizing mission of the Church.  Second, contextual theologies need 
to consider how the Gospel relates to diverse cultures.  Finally, what is the organizing 
principle(s) in the task of relating Christianity to any particular culture?  It is the 
understanding of this author that these three questions have Christology as their basis and 
subject matter.  It follows that each question calls for a specific task in mission and 
theology as a whole. Clearly, then, the principal statement that Catholic theology and 
mission are grounded in Christology is one that requires a nuanced interpretation and 
methodological procedures.  
Basing ourselves on Chapter III, Christology is the most basic interpretive 
framework for contextualization and inculturation.419  Christology as the primary 
principle simply means that contextual theologies have to recognize the Christian view of 
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a human being as the organizing principle within a faith-culture setting.  It is only then 
that the same theology can discover the fundamental relationship between Christianity 
and culture and the relationship between multiple contextual theologies in the one 
Catholic theological enterprise.  This structural set up shifts theological premises from a 
Pan-African political agenda to the Vatican Council II anthropological-Christological 
schema. This arrangement also reinstates a human being as one who freely looks to Jesus 
Christ as the fullness of what it means to be a person.  In the same vein, the principle 
relativizes Western Christian experience with regard to the Scriptural tradition ad the 
tradition of the Church in the quest to safeguard the true substance of the Judeo-Christian 
vision of humanity.  This anthropological-Christological schema is vital for drawing a 
necessary distinction between the Western cultural experience(s)-past and present-and the 
biblical tradition itself.  In view of the substance covered in Chapters I-III, the present 
arrangement implies that Christian anthropology is necessary for bringing out the 
essential relationship between Christianity and the Western cultural experience(s) as well 
as the limitations of the latter.  In other words, contextual theological reflection is not 
self-referent; it must appeal to the transcendent horizon which Christology provides. 
 The second principle is derived from the anthropological-Christological schema. 
It consists in striving to understand such a schema in terms of faith and culture.  The 
purpose is to allow for differentiations to emerge with regard to the cultural and the 
theological anthropological structures of meaning (GS, no. 57).  That is, Christology has 
to be perceived through the lenses of a theological anthropological view of a human 
being for the reasons already discussed but only reiterated here.  A general ontology is 
necessary for clarifying the basic commonalities in the diverse self-understandings and in 
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the building of conceptual and moral bridges so that African peoples, in their ethnic 
diversity, can recognize their ultimate origin and identity.  It is toward the realization of 
this noble goal that the following sections present practical considerations as the starting 
points for contextual theological reflections. The following presentation also presupposes 
substantive knowledge of (Chapters 1-3) the theological links between the different 
structures of meaning subsumed under the term principles and practical guidelines. In 
other words, there is little, if any, introductions accompanying subsequent formulations. 
Whether or not each heading and subheading represents a principle or working guideline 
can be established from the respective substantive contents. 
 
SECTION I  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF IMAGO DEI FOR METHOD IN MISSION THEOLOGY 
 Imago Dei is the cutting edge in the missionary attempt to relate peoples and their 
cultures to the Christian world view. Imago Dei is therefore a central working principle in 
contextualization and inculturation. The methodological technicalities involved require 
that we understand the relationship between philosophical anthropology and Christian 
anthropology. This is the starting point toward recognizing the relationship between 
Christian faith and cultural philosophies and the primacy of the former over the latter. To 
that end, we need to apply Karl Rahner’s and John Duns Scotus’ ideas because of their 
consistency with the Second Vatican Council teaching.  
When Rahner asserts “a genuine anthropology must open into Christology,” he is 
making a statement of principle for contemporary Catholic theological methodology.  Its 
substance consists in understanding the relationship of philosophy to theology as one that 
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centers on the meaning of a human being’s natural capacity to come to the knowledge of 
self and of reality.  Like his prominent predecessor, Duns Scotus, Rahner draws attention 
to a general ontology as a domain common to philosophy and theology and the basis for 
comprehending the link between the two.  So to speak of the natural bond between 
philosophy and theology is to indicate that both disciplines present a “scientific”420 
account of a human being.  But, lest we settle for their formal similarity or structural 
similarity at the expense of their teleological value, Rahner subordinates philosophy to 
theology and by the same virtue philosophical anthropology to Christology so as to reveal 
humanity’s need for Jesus of Nazareth. We are, henceforth, impelled to consider more 
carefully the philosophical and the theological contents in light of their ultimate origins, 
subject matter, purpose, and ends.  This manner of proceeding translates into a 
“transcendental method” for reasons which Rahner and Duns Scotus provide: matters 
discussed in Chapter III.  This chapter provides a summary outline of how Rahner 
presents Christology as the essence of philosophical anthropology.  
A transcendental anthropology or Christology seeks to account for a human being 
based on his or her concrete experiences, but explained from the standpoint of the Judeo-
Christian revelation.  The heart of the aforementioned revelation consists in the statement 
that a human being is made in the image of God and Jesus Christ is its definitive 
expression.  It cannot, therefore, be emphasized enough that “person and human nature” 
are central to the Christology of the incarnation421 and consequently to the mission 
theology of inculturation.  In a forceful way that speaks to historical self-explanations, 
Scotus asserts that “The possibility of relationship depends upon the existence of persons 
who are capable of being related.  No relationship can exist where there are not two terms 
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which are joined together.”422 This is in reference to an ontological relationship such as 
that existing between a human being and the Trinity. 423  That is, since human nature is 
patterned on the divine image, God must be recognized as the source and end of life. 
Rahner is emphatic in showing that Jesus exemplifies this reality fully. That Jesus 
expresses fully the human and the divine realities points back to imago Dei. 424 The 
following Rahnerian underlying premises are very important if contextual theologians are 
to appreciate the basic need for cultural world views to open into Christology.   
In accordance with the imago Dei anthropology, Rahner reaffirms the medieval 
view of transformation as the essence of the human journey. But he filters the same 
understanding through the Johannine transcendental Christology of the incarnation. The 
Eternal Word became Man in Jesus (Jn.1.1-14).  By so doing, Rahner accentuates Jesus’ 
life as the explicit revelation and the definitive expression of human life.  By implication, 
a concrete human being is always in need of becoming more human:425 “…since [an 
ordinary person] is not the fullness which can repose contentedly in itself, he is found by 
the infinite and so becomes what he is: one who never succeeds in encompassing himself 
because the finite can only be surpassed by moving out into the unfathomable fullness of 
God.”426 For Rahner, therefore, the mode of becoming human is epitomized in the 
incarnation. Rahner is not pointing to something outside of Christian human experience. 
Had Jesus, for instance, died as a baby at the hands of Herod’s assassins, Christianity 
would never have been. The physical birth had to lead to an adult human being; 
otherwise, no one would have known the kind of person Jesus is.  All in all, the condition 
of “becoming human” finds full expression in Rahner’s emphasis on “surrendering,” 
passion, and death as its culmination.427  The resurrection testifies to the fact of Jesus 
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having accomplished the task of becoming fully human.  These four elements of Jesus’ 
life are basic to comprehending the primacy of a transcendental approach to theology 
over Christologies from below.  The logic is already set by Scotus: the divine is the 
proper horizon from which to understand the human reality. The resurrection expresses 
imago Dei at its best. For this very reason, the human being as God’s image is not a 
finished reality. It is a possibility or potentiality-always pointing to the goal.428 It is 
against this background that Rahner’s transcendental anthropology can be understood as 
a theological method.  
In an introduction to this particular aspect in Rahner’s thought, Gerald McCool 
gives a succinct definition of transcendental anthropology. He says, “Transcendental 
anthropology is not only a method.  It is the method of theology as well.”429  Precisely, it 
is at the level of anthropology as a method that a legitimate transition from anthropology 
(in general) to Christology can be recognized. The transition, however, requires that one 
understands the primordial structure of knowledge as consisting in relation of “being” to 
the “Being of beings.”  In sum, the primordial structure of knowledge constitutes a 
metaphysical principle by which to recognize the basic relationship between the human 
being and God.  The same principle is also necessary for reorienting the tendency in 
cultural anthropologies to focus on the human being in a way that undermines the basic 
orientation to the infinite mystery of God and of each person.430 However, the fact that a 
human being is naturally inclined to a transcendent end is not in itself a guarantee of self-
actualization consistent with human nature as imago Dei.  So Rahner rightly cites finitude 
as a philosophical and theological principle by which a line can be drawn between the 
basic human inclination expressed historically by ordinary human beings and Jesus of 
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Nazareth. He says, “The philosophical question as to a particular object is necessarily the 
question as to the knowing subject, because a priori the subject must carry with it the 
limits of the possibility of that knowledge.”431 Thus radical human finitude is an integral 
element to an understanding of Christology as transcendental anthropology, as well as the 
inherent limitation of cultural anthropologies.  For Rahner, therefore, it is not enough to 
recognize that philosophy is concerned about the transcendental character of a person, 
given its focus on the subject of human knowledge. Theology is also concerned about the 
same subject, but in ultimate terms.432  Rahner is obviously striving to eliminate the 
subtle danger of collapsing theology into philosophy or equating them on account of 
having the same internal structure.  So he accentuates the essential subject matter for 
theology in these terms.  “It is only a theological question as long as it sees the individual 
object with its origin in and orientation towards God…God is not one object among 
others in the realm of man’s posteriori knowledge but the fundamental ground and the 
absolute future of all reality.”433  So the purpose of imago Dei, among other things, is to 
show that “the transcendental structures of the object are already determined.”434  Even 
though beings embody a natural impulse toward complete self-knowledge, they are not 
creators of that impulse.  Rather, the impulse originates from a higher source but is 
discovered in the encounter with the world. The world is the context of self-discovery but 
not the ultimate horizon or source of their functioning power. As a corrective to a human 
tendency to self-preoccupation, theological anthropological methodology sharpens the 
nature of a human being as an embodied spirit.  
In conclusion, Rahner concurs with medieval anthropological thought when he 
contends that a genuine anthropology can only emerge in the context of biblical 
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Revelation regarding the meaning of a person.  Jesus Christ is the fulfillment, the anchor 
for, and the mirror of the primordial self-understanding that the Book of Genesis 
proclaims.  Thornhill applying Rahner’s ideas expresses the same idea well. “The Christ 
even at once canonizes anthropocentrism and subordinates it to theocentrism: the 
intelligibility and values of human existence are safeguarded by their subordination to the 
divine reality, through Christ.”435  “Revealed theology has human spirit’s transcendental 
and limitless horizon as its inner motive and as the precondition of its existence.”436   
This is Thornhill’s way of saying philosophical and theological knowledge are all 
concerned about the same subject content; i.e., the actual existence and the end of human 
life. In Rahner’s own words: “As soon as man is understood as the being who is 
absolutely transcendent in respect of God, ‘anthropocentricity’ and ‘theocentricity’ are 
not opposites but strictly one and the same thing, seen from two sides.”437 These 
statements are not only directed at obliterating a dichotomy between philosophy and 
theology.  They also point out the basic human inclination to the infinite mystery as the 
key to grasping the common bond between philosophy and theology  as well as their 
legitimate differences. 
THE NEED FOR A SOTERIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE IN THE 
APPLICATION OF CHRISTOLOGY 
 
The present consideration requires that we recognize the interrelationship between 
Christological foundations as a basic principle in relation to its actual application. For, it 
is essential that belief in the Christian mystery, Jesus Christ, is translated into pastoral 
action. That is to say, Christology is a doctrine about the person of Jesus Christ, 
expressed by his entire life.  It therefore follows that Christology is a doctrine that forever 
presupposes concrete application, because the total meaning it embodies must become 
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incarnate in people’s lives.  Because the incarnation presupposes the reality of actual 
saving grace, there is need for accurate knowledge regarding the person of Christ and the 
consequent assimilation of that knowledge.  Contemporary Catholic thought is very 
consistent, creative, and nuanced in this regard as evident in all Conciliar and Post 
Conciliar documents and writings.  For instance, the church’s teaching on theological 
foundations for mission generally consists in stipulating general principles and 
guidelines. There is, however, a shift in the Catholic theological method.  In pre-Vatican 
Council II thought, for instance, it was taken for granted that non-Western local churches 
would benefit from the Christian faith by reflecting on and applying Christology on the 
basis of general doctrinal principles and guidelines.  This way of applying Christology 
did not affect peoples’ lives meaningfully. The dominant trend was an increasing but 
notional understanding of Jesus Christ and all that he stands for.  This would change with 
the theological momentum toward contextualization informed by Vatican Council II 
theology of the Church’s “mission in the world.”438  Now Christology has to be 
interpreted and applied while taking into account the native mindsets and actual needs of 
the respective local churches.  This in no way means that contextualization transforms the 
practice of theology.  Contrary to that assumption, Christology is a normative principle in 
the task of Christianity entering into dialogue with native cultures.  It is on this account 
that interpretation must precede the actual application of doctrinal principles.  But even at 
the stage of application, it is equally important to draw up general principles suited to the 
perceived needs of the church, whether local or universal. Such general principles are 
spelt out well in the many Conciliar and Post Conciliar documents. 
 259
The primacy of Christology, therefore, means that theological reflection has to 
take seriously the subjects of the purification and the ultimate redemption of culture.  In 
other words, soteriology is significant in the interpretation and application of theological 
foundations.  As the core of Christology, it constitutes the end to which contextualization 
and inculturation are ordered.  The practical considerations as proposed, therefore, have 
to be seen as hermeneutic tools of social analysis, pinpointing the path by which African 
ontologies could open to the Christian world view.  The next consideration expands on 
soteriology a basic principle in the Catholic missionary methodology. 
The Notion of a World View is Essential to the Contextualization Process 
 
 The Judeo-Christian view encounters people who already have their own world 
views in place. That is to say, they have a moral horizon that provides them with the 
basic structures of meaning they hold as valid. By those values, people define who they 
are and how they ought to structure their existence.  So when the biblical view enters a 
social milieu, it offers new elements as well as the ultimate horizon of meaning, but not 
without some familiarity with which a culture can identify.439 A question which must be 
addressed, however, is whether traditional African cultures are always morally pre-
disposed to embrace the horizon of meaning Christianity offers to Africa. Contrary to the 
fact, the predominant voice in African theology suggests that this is indeed the case. 
Technically, the dominant African theological voice ignores the complexities underlying 
the meeting of Christianity with African local cultures. For many, if not most African 
Christians, Christianity is embraced alongside a strong attachment to the ancestral 
philosophies and values. It is, therefore, not surprising that the majority of African 
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theologians also opt for ancestrology rather than Christology as the valid foundation of 
the church’s mission and theology.  
For present purposes, the basic presumption that the ancestor Christology would 
lead to the same end as Christology proper is utterly false.  Basing ourselves on the 
substance of Chapters II & III, there are four major and related considerations that must 
inform the selection and application of theological foundations for contextual theology. 
The first consists in the discernment of the basic needs of the local cultures. The second 
consists in a proper grasp of the ultimate purpose of Christianity in general. Third, those 
concerned must have a good grasp of the organizing principles in Christian faith and in 
the native cultures concerned. The last consideration constitutes an organizing principle 
to facilitate Christian-cultural encounter.  Otherwise, if the world view and the purpose of 
Christianity are presumed to be of the same substantial content as those of the native 
cultural religions, then, a theological posture such as that expressed by African theology 
is bound to emerge. The ancestor as the organizing principle of the native cultures is 
easily transposed into Christian theology.  Consequently, biological ancestry replaces 
Jesus Christ on the presumption that the two frames of reference have the same 
substance, purpose and goal.  It is in view of countering this simplification that Chapters 
II and III focused on the critical analysis of the African traditional cultures and the 
transcendent value of a human being, respectively. It is also in view of facilitating 
effective dialogue between Christianity and native cultures that the thesis of this study 
aims at generating principles for truly inculturated theologies in Africa.  But in doing so, 
the task has been to meet the challenges presented by both African theology and 
traditional anthropologies, namely, the intent to center all reflection on the African 
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cultural experiences around the ancestral world view.  For reasons given in Chapter III, 
the following considerations seek to ground anthropological consideration in the meaning 
of Jesus Christ.  In this way the true meaning and value of ancestors would emerge.  
Translating “Person” and “Jesus” into a Soteriological Working Principle 
 
The subject of theological foundations for mission theology ought to be at the 
center of the church’s mission in Africa.440  At the core of this subject also lie basic 
soteriological questions: what is the nature of Christian salvation, who is being saved and 
who does the saving?  These are basic and interrelated questions often presented 
separately for technical purposes. Nonetheless, it is in light of these questions that the 
meaning of “Jesus” and of a “person” emerges as a soteriological principle. The 
theological basis for the last statement of principle is already provided in Chapter III with 
respect to Christology as the essence of theological anthropology.  For our present 
purposes, the true meanings of mission and theology have to be ultimately understood in 
light of soteriology. The purpose of this arrangement ought to be obvious at this point.  
The Church’s mission is basically ordered to engaging “persons” in dialogue with Christ 
with salvation as the goal of dialogue.  It is from this experience that Africa can truly 
recognize the need for dialogue among its own myriad traditions and with the 
(traditional) Western social system. What is crucial is that the principles governing the 
stated dialogue have to be very clear. To this end Chapter III specifically pointed out that 
philosophical anthropology is a path to Christology as its end.  This is because 
philosophical anthropology expresses historically constituted anthropologies.  
Christology as theological anthropology offers the philosophical and theological horizon 
for transcending the historical self-explanations.  In brief, the need to relate the concept 
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of person to Jesus Christ is an urgent task for the church in Africa.  For there are not only 
multiple concepts of what it means to be a human being, but traditional anthropologies 
are also set in a finite horizon, the natural sphere of concrete existence.  To say, therefore, 
that the concept of the church’s mission and theology ought to revolve around a 
soteriology as a “principle” is to point to the Christian view of the human being per se as 
the most important factor for resolving basic obstacles in inculturation.  The above 
statements imply that there is an essential relationship between a concept of a human 
being and theological foundations. 
The human being as a theological principle culminating in the person of Jesus 
Christ allows theological reflection to be more practical yet focused on important matters 
amidst a multitude of cultural ideas and concerns.  An immediate and practical example 
is how to lead an African person to the transcendental meaning of a human being.  For 
reasons already provided, a “person” as a basic theological principle is the means by 
which ATR can enter into dialogue with the Judeo-Christian world views and the 
Western social system.  It is for this same basic reason that Chapter III narrowed the 
scope of theological discernment to the meaning of a human being.  In this way a general 
human ontology becomes necessary for spelling out the basic commonalities in the 
diverse self-understandings and in the building of conceptual bridges so that African 
peoples in their ethnic diversity can recognize their common but authentic identity and 
destiny with the rest of the world.  Such advancement in knowledge is not only 
necessitated by anthropological poverty in the traditional African thought; it is also called 
for by a globalizing world which stands in critical need of moral imperatives to define the 
collective direction of human history.  A right direction is not possible if something other 
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than the true meaning and value of a human being becomes the organizing principle of a 
common history. Also for reasons already given in Chapter III, the Jesus event emerges 
as the explicit answer to the common quest for the ultimate view of the human being.  By 
implication the question regarding the meaning of Jesus Christ for Africa is, therefore, 
the most important theological question facing the local Church in Africa. It signals the 
fundamental need to come to grips with the traditional experiences and how these relate 
to changed conditions, local and global.  The question cannot, however, be answered 
through the means envisioned by the ancestral theological thought. 
In conclusion, the meaning of Jesus Christ for the Catholic theology and its 
mission is very basic and, as such, a valid answer must get to its core by inquiring into 
the nature of the Person at the center of the Christian mystery of salvation.  At one level, 
this study affirms the centrality of Jesus Christ; at another level, its structural 
methodology draws attention to soteriology as an integral aspect of theological 
foundations without which theological reflection can become an abstract and meaningless 
enterprise. In other words, Christology and soteriology have to be seen as one and the 
same reality. The soteriological trajectory here not only draws attention to Jesus Christ as 
a foundational principle but also to his redemptive role. Both are essential to the structure 
of theological foundations. For while the nature of Christian theology allows the use of 
“cultural structures of meaning,” the Christian world view does not validate culture for its 
own sake (Chapter II).  It therefore follows that a Catholic theological methodology that 
is consistent with Vatican Council II thought must subordinate culture anthropologies to 
Christology for reasons laid out in this study.  Otherwise, indiscriminate use of cultural 
ideas may “ultimately” hinder the intended goal of the Church’s mission. As a means of 
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safeguarding the evangelical integrity, this chapter presents the basic principles alongside 
some guidelines.  Both terms generally have to do with the “internal alignment” of 
contextual theologies within the overall structure of Catholic theological thought, past, 
present, and future. The following major sections are a moderate illustration of the 
aforementioned technicalities. The following major section is, however, different in its 
substance and presentation in order to provide an important background to Section III-VI 
 
SECTION II 
THE NEED FOR A BASIC SHIFT IN AFRICAN CONTEXTUAL 
THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
With reference to the concerns raised in Chapter I, there is not only inadequate 
use of scripture in many African contextual theologies, there is also a general lack of  
awareness of the fundamental conflict between internal controls in African theology and 
the nature and purpose of Christian mission. Therefore, as a corrective, the present 
considerations strive to show that the Christian principles governing (inculturation) 
evangelization can become pastorally effective only when preceded by a clear 
understanding of the conceptual and methodological obstacles in African theology.  The 
obstacles broadly include, but not limited to, the structural set up of African theology, its 
soteriological assumptions and goals. To this end, the following paragraphs explain the 
aforementioned obstacles in terms of “internal controls.”  These are controlling factors 
governing the substance and basic direction of African theology.  For this same reason, 
“internal controls” stand in competition with the general principles in Catholic 
theological methodology as a whole.  
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The Need to Dismantle Internal Controls in African Theology 
The task of reaffirming the centrality of Christology must start from a clear grasp 
of the methodological structure in African theological thought.  Methods in contextual 
theology tend to focus on a narrowly defined historical approach as discussed in Chapter 
I.  The narrowness consists in viewing history in the literal sense.  History is defined 
exclusively in terms of the African religious and social political context.  That this form 
of historical analysis is foreign to Catholic theology and to the nature of the Church is a 
matter treated in Chapter V.  Thus, current mention of a historical approach is limited to 
the nature and practical consequences for the church’s mission in Africa.   
 Precisely, the first structural control consists in a global theology known as 
African theology.  This is the global working framework for a contextual theology. The 
second consists in the goals pursued by African theology, namely: liberation, 
empowerment, unification, and restoration of African culture (in the singular).  Together 
these make up the substantive content and theological rationales for the Church’s 
evangelizing mission. The same components imbue a “global theology” with a unified 
agenda realized through a historical method.  A unified agenda draws together the many 
voices and concerns in African theology with a single purpose: to liberate, empower, 
unify, and restore Africa to its ancestral roots. The essence of these statements is clearly 
indicated by Emmanuel Martey when he says the “Second General Assembly of the 
Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians” reaffirmed what has become an 
official statement of the criterion for articulating the African reality and for formulating a 
method by which African theology can address the issue of domination.   
Africans emphasized history as the first methodological approach to African 
contextual analysis and to African theological interpretation. ‘For the Africans 
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there is no liberation without their historical presence, since they have been 
expelled from the field of history by their oppressors.  Liberation, if true, must be 
historical liberation; if not there is no liberation.’441     
 
Clearly, Africa’s history of suffering is the justification for pursuing the ideals of 
liberation, empowerment, unification, and restoration of African culture.  These define, 
shape, and determine how Christology is interpreted and applied.442  For our purposes, 
the combination of these factors reinforces the prevailing perception of: 
 (a) the concept of “culture” and of the soteriological significance of African Traditional 
Religions; 
 (b) the concept of African context; 
 (c) the method to be used therein; 
 (d) the meaning and the scope of a local theology;  
 (e) the problems and the needs of African people and,  
(f) the use of scripture and tradition.   
These six factors give a definite form to the character of African theology. That said, it is 
important that we understand the extent to which the African theological concept of 
liberation is in harmony with the Christian view of liberation and inculturation.  
 Internal controls in African theology are, in summary, more concerned with 
restoring the Continent to the grandeur of the more ancient ancestral cultures than with 
allowing Christian liberation to transform Africa.  At the utmost, a pure historical 
approach has led to a basic shift from Christology to the ancestor as the unifying 
principle for a Christian Catholic theology.  But as Chapter I indicated, the combination 
of the specified brand of a historical approach with a global African theology ignores the 
actual contexts of the people and their real needs.  African theology, like traditional 
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African cultures, is basically orientated to the past rather than the future.  So in its basic 
substance and direction, the current historical approach puts a wedge between liberation 
and inculturation.  Internal controls dictate how the Christian mission ought to proceed by 
setting a limit of what Christianity can or cannot do in the African context.  But since it is 
only proper that the Christian mission proceeds by its own internal dynamism, bridging 
the chasm between liberation and inculturation is integral to the proposed guidelines. The 
next remaining guidelines of the present section are proposed to meet this expressed 
need, namely; to reaffirm the essential relationship between liberation and 
inculturation.443 Here too, Martey’s views illustrate well the main objective pursued here. 
The Need to Bridge the Chasm between Liberation and Inculturation in African 
Theology Requires a Non-Ecumenical Approach to Catholic Contextual Theology 
 
From a biblical standpoint, inculturation is basically liberation. For this same 
reason, African liberation ought to draw its substantive content and pastoral significance 
from Christology rather than the political events that have marked Africa’s history.  Only 
when it is perceived and applied as such can Africa’s liberation take on true and 
permanent significance. It is thus in light of the stated focus that the existing chasm 
between liberation and inculturation can be bridged. The intent to bridge the existing 
chasm requires a clear grasp of the African theological view of liberation in relationship 
to inculturation. This will in turn cast further light on the basic character and function of 
internal controls in African theology.   
African theology maintains that the Continent’s “present condition has come 
about as a result of five centuries of [its] history that has been largely caused by contact 
with Western capitalist imperialism.”444  But while Martey upholds this common belief, 
he also recognizes a dichotomy in the way African theology presents inculturation and 
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liberation.  He illustrates his view point with a critique of Black South Africa and Sub-
Saharan approaches to liberation and inculturation, respectively. The concern he raises in 
this regard is legitimate.  According to Martey, Black South African theology places 
emphasis on political liberation while Sub-Saharan Africa is mainly concerned with 
inculturation.  He further observes that South African theology excludes cultural 
considerations just as Sub-Saharan Africa generally ignores socio-economic and political 
liberation.  Regardless of the fact that Martey views inculturation and liberation as 
separate realities, the following observation he makes stands to reason, some basic flaws 
notwithstanding.  Martey insists that in articulating the African reality one should get 
beyond the narrow confines of political liberation to  
the totality of African existence -politics, economics, religion, language, 
culture,445 ethnicity, music, art, sexuality, and changes brought about by modern 
science and technology that have had impact on African people.  These are not 
separate parts of the whole existence, but rather, are intersecting dimensions of 
the African experience and African cultures.446 
 
However, other than a historical approach, Martey does not suggest a new methodology 
by which the elements he proposes would be systematically tied together.  As in other 
instances, the previous points are simply stated as a matter of fact. Although this brief 
analysis does not do justice to Martey’s overall insights, the concerns he raise are 
legitimate in themselves. 447  But does Martey get beyond the blind spots which pose 
great obstacles in the path of theological discernment?448 To give a concise answer to this 
question, we have to understand his view on the relationship between liberation and 
inculturation.  A dichotomy which Martey points out is fundamentally accurate. His 
Christological underpinnings are, however, inadequate and misleading. For instance, his 
critique of Black South African preoccupation with political liberation without regard for 
 269
culture as a whole is justified.  But his critique of Sub-Saharan preoccupation with 
inculturation without liberation is accurate insofar as inculturation is seen as a means for 
a wholesale endorsement of African cultures.  Apart from that, Martey misunderstands 
the fact that liberation is the substance of inculturation and the latter is essentially 
Christology.   
Take, for instance, Martey’s own view that liberation and inculturation are two 
dimensions in the overall task of liberating Africa.  For him, they constitute two 
Christologies as in his sub-topic indicates: “Christologies of Inculturation and 
Liberation.”449  Referring to the importance of Scripture and tradition for African 
theology, he goes on to state clearly that, “no single theology, certainly not the 
inculturationist or the liberationist…can present us complete theological knowledge in 
Africa.”450  This is obviously a dichotomous view, which ultimately undermines his 
legitimate intent to link inculturation to liberation. Martey’s interpretation demonstrates a 
basic lack of understanding that liberation is the core substance of inculturation. At the 
same time, it is in this kind of misinterpretation that we ought to appreciate the extent to 
which the ecumenical factor can be a disservice to inculturation.  
The re-evangelization of Africa needs a concerted collaboration among different 
Christian denominations.  To that end, African theology has, since its inception, been an 
ecumenical project. However, this has to go on without leveling the substantive and 
methodological technicalities in Catholic theology and mission.  So, let it be outright 
clear that the issue raised here is not about whether or not ecumenical collaboration is 
important to a contextual theology.  Rather, the point is that a contextual theology in 
Africa that is a product of ecumenical efforts at the very initial stage is too premature and 
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ill-conceived.  Emmanuel Martey, like many of African theologians, hails from a 
Presbyterian Protestant background and like Protestant African theologians, speaks for 
inculturation.451  It ought to be recalled that the theology of inculturation was crafted in 
the context of the Catholic Church’s self-understanding (ecclesiology).  Needless to say, 
the Catholic self-understanding as a Church has direct bearing on Catholic theology and 
methodology.  Hence, an ecumenical approach to theology, from the very start, ignores 
the realities of diverse ecclesiologies which in effect propose a different perspective on 
the method in theology, mission and in the confession of the one Christian faith, to say 
the least. To mention but one example, non-African Catholic theologians maintain a 
disregard for a unified theological view and the role of the Magisterium in the structure 
of Catholic theological thought.  This position requires no further argument to recognize 
that a local theology which is a product of an ecumenical project at this point in time, not 
only poses a problem to the emergence of a genuine Catholic contextual theology; it also 
ignores that diverse ecclesiological perspectives by nature resist the full and integral 
application of the Vatican Council II teaching in its complexity. As a result, African 
theology operates by either compromising or conforming to predetermined philosophical-
political ideals which are blended with Christological and ancestrological assumptions.  
The whole wealth of the Second Vatican Council teachings that would add clarity to 
many vexed issues in contemporary African history are, as a result, not effectively 
applied. 452  The following paragraphs further illustrate the misunderstanding of the 
essential relationship between inculturation and liberation. 
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A Précis of Iniobong Udoidem’s Interpretation of John Paul II’s Teaching on 
Inculturation 
 
The ongoing failure to comprehend inculturation as liberation stems from defining 
inculturation as incarnation, and in doing so, the latter is explained solely in reference to 
the mere taking on of flesh by the Word of God.  In addition, the incarnation is perceived 
as an event that happened simultaneously in all cultures.453 This erroneous view is 
literally translated into a method of inculturation which consists in finding similarities 
between the African and the Judeo-Christian religious external expressions.  Martey’s 
own position illustrates the previous point.  Explaining the shift in pastoral theology from 
“adaptation” to incarnation, Martey has this to say. The “‘theology of incarnation’…was 
open to the aspiration of African people.  Incarnation was preferable because it involved 
“immersing Christianity in African culture [so that] just as Jesus became man, so must 
Christ become African.”454  But as the next principle illustrates, the notion of Christ 
becoming African is completely different from that expressed in Catholic theology of 
mission.  John Paul II’s teachings cited below is a fitting example.   
The Second Vatican Council teaching on the significance of God’s general self-
communication prior to the Jesus event was generally received with theological optimism 
by Catholics and others. The teaching stirred a new theological consciousness in African 
Catholicism in particular.  African theologians have since sought to make explicit and 
applicable the Conciliar teaching. Be as that may, inculturation became merely the means 
for resolving the longstanding problem for African theology: Western cultural hegemony.  
Similarly, inculturation is continually seen as a tool for remedying the harm done by 
colonialism. It provides ancestral theologians with the needed leverage to validate their 
argument concerning God’s presence and activity in African traditions prior to Christian 
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mission in Africa. Accordingly, the incarnation of Christ is increasingly viewed as an 
affirmation of all that God had already begun prior to the historical incarnation. Thus 
African theology often appeals to the idea of cultural preparedness to argue for the 
comparative significance of the ATR to Revelation in Israel.  Indigenous cultures have 
been equally prepared to receive the Gospel of Christ and consequently to shape their 
independent destinies, the argument goes.  It is important to note that the previous 
perspective places all cultures on an equal footing with the Revelation in Israel. God’s 
universal self-communication is a reality ante-dating the New Testament event.  
Consequently, they say the African Traditional Religions ought to be seen as a 
preparation for the New Testament just as in the case of the Old Testament.  This 
dominant view must be noted for what it seeks to achieve. That is, only by re-rooting 
itself in the ancestral cultural heritages can Black Africa rediscover its “humanity” and 
function in accordance with its own cultural and religious inclinations.  However, 
questions must be raised as to the extent of the stated preparation and whether general 
revelation is synonymous with explicit Revelation in the Judeo-Christian tradition.  The 
following précis of Iniobong Udoidem’s interpretation of John Paul II’s teaching on the 
essential relationship between incarnation and inculturation offers insight into the 
absence of true Christian liberation in African theology.  
In his address to the University Community in Portugal, John Paul II said: 
It is through the providence of God that the divine message is made 
incarnate and is communicated through the culture of each people.  It is 
forever true that the path of culture is the path of man, and it is on this 
path that man encounters the one who embodies the values of all cultures 
and fully reveals the man of each culture to himself.  The Gospel of 
Christ, the incarnate word finds its home along the path of culture and 
from this path it continues to offer its message of salvation and eternal 
life455 (my emphasis).    
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Here John Paul clearly acknowledges the essential value of culture in the total scheme of 
human existence.  But this he does without subordinating a human being to culture. Very 
remarkable is the strong emphasis on culture, not as an end in itself, but as a “path” 
through which humanity encounters God in Christ.  Iniobong puts the same statements 
into the perspective of his reflection and makes notable deductions.  He begins by 
situating inculturation in its proper theological and historical context in these words: 
“Inculturation is the new concept of Evangelization which takes into consideration the 
whole of salvation history, beginning from creation to the present day evangelization 
mission.  The whole concept is rooted in the missiological character of God’s salvific 
activity.”456  This particular perception is the main thrust of his argument. His 
interpretation of the essential relationship between inculturation and the incarnation of 
the Word is also made against the same backdrop.  He says, “The notion of incarnation as 
inculturation is that there is no one culture which is the embodiment of the message of 
Christ. Rather, all cultures were and are affected simultaneously by the incarnation event 
and thus all cultures are immanently transformed.457   To spell out its methodological 
implications for mission, Iniobong makes the following conclusion. “This implies a 
seeing of the incarnation event as having affected all cultures, thus, making the function 
of the evangelizer, a matter of going about identifying and proclaiming Christ who is 
already present in a given culture.”458  Obviously, this is a fundamentally flawed 
perception of John Paul II’s teaching on inculturation.  
Iniobong does not simply misinterpret the core of John Paul II’s teaching. His 
position also begs a lot of questions regarding the essential relationship between 
Christianity and culture.  According to Iniobong, the saving manifestation of Jesus Christ 
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in the world is something that happened apart from Jesus’ Person, his public preaching 
within a specific cultural context, his passion, death and resurrection, with the necessary 
free cooperation of the believer; to say nothing about the Church’s evangelizing mission.  
Moreover, “grace” is a static reality rather than something that is at once concrete and 
dynamic, signaling a unique invitation to enter into an ever-deepening and enlightening 
communion with God and with one another. The consequence of Iniobong’s view can 
only breed a moral stance that curtails the recognition of God’s freedom to be God, 
insisting as he does on indiscriminate conservation of traditional values and customs. In 
brief, it is for reasons such as these that the future of contextual theology in Africa must 
proceed from a clear understanding of the true Christological character of inculturation. 
John Paul II’s teaching offers an immediate point of reference. 
A Christocentric Method is the Way Forward: John Paul II on Inculturation in 
Africa  
 
The Pope’s teachings, which Iniobong also cites, are consistent with the teaching 
of the Second Vatican Council on the theology of mission. Accordingly, transformation, 
collective and individual, is the mode and goal of inculturation.  John Paul does not 
envision transformation in abstract terms. Rather, he grounds it in the meaning of a 
human being in light of which the true value of African cultures can be established and 
safeguarded. This in turn means that “cultural transformation” takes place via the human 
moral agent.  For John Paul, then, a human being is fundamental to a comprehensive 
understanding of the ways in which the incarnation relates to God’s general self-
communication outside the Judeo-Christian faith.  John Paul makes this clear as he strives 
to expound the relationship between incarnation and inculturation.  Discernible in his 
teaching is the necessity for mutual interchange between theological reflection and 
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methodology, or the concurrence of “technical” and “expository” procedures. Such a 
procedure, if well carried out, can facilitate a deeper understanding of culture in a way 
that inspires the need for transformation toward a Christian world view. We shall 
comment in passing on the stated technical trajectory.  
Convinced that theological and educational technicalities must go into any 
inculturation processes, John Paul II points out the following:  
You are aware that inculturation commits the Church to a path that is 
difficult but necessary.  Pastors, theologians and specialists in the human 
sciences must also collaborate closely, so that this vital process may 
come about in a way that benefits both the evangelized and the 
evangelizers, in order to avoid undue haste that would end in syncretism 
or secular reduction of the proclamation of the Gospel.459  
 
It ought to be noted that nothing in these two citations suggests that inculturation consists 
in a matter of identifying Christ who is already present in native cultures as Iniobong 
claims.  On the contrary, the Pope recommends a perspectival study so as to reinforce 
clarity and commitment to a well integrated study of culture.  By implications, the 
theological elucidations that ensue depend then on the proper alignment of the various 
perspectives and the constant incorporation of new findings so that different but often 
subtle structures of meaning in any one culture can be brought to light.  Needless to 
emphasize, the success of such alignment depends on the coherent understanding of the 
fundamental Christian principles involved.  This requires no further argument in this 
chapter, given the substance covered in the previous chapters.  It suffices to say, Vatican 
Council II documents and post-Conciliar teachings reaffirm the primacy of Jesus Christ 
in all aspects of the Christian faith expressed through the Church’s life. Important to note 
is the creative tensions between Christ and the concrete human being, a topic treated in 
Chapter III. These are two facets in the comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
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between Christianity and culture, inculturation and liberation.  Such a relationship can 
hardly be termed Christian, if it does not elicit a measure of the need for transformation, 
be it individual or collective.   
In brief, the Christocentric view of transformation in the contemporary church’s 
teaching can be grasped from recognizing that a human being exists in an ontological 
relationship to Jesus Christ.  Christianity does not, therefore, present Christ as a past 
reality or an “optional factor” that can be dismissed by those who confess salvation 
through him. There can be no doubt that John Paul II was aware of this basic 
contradiction in the African theological thought.  Hence, his obvious concerns for 
theological technicalities should not overshadow the Christocentric character of his 
message.  For, it is from that standpoint that we can really comprehend the ways in which 
the incarnation of Christ relates to God’s general self-communication. For instance, in 
one of his several addresses to the Church in Africa, John Paul II made an unequivocal 
affirmation of the purpose of the Gospel mission in relation to traditional African 
cultures. 
Inculturation, which you rightly promote, will truly be a reflection of 
the incarnation of the Word, when a culture, transformed and 
regenerated by the gospel, brings forth from its own living tradition 
original expressions of Christian life….there is no question of 
adulterating the Word of God or emptying the cross of its power 
(1Cor.1:17) but rather of bringing Christ to the very center of African 
life and lifting up African life to Christ.  Thus not only is Christianity 
relevant to Africa, but Christ in the members of his body is himself 
African460 (emphases mine).   
 
Yet when Iniobong interprets the same statements he lays emphasis, not on the history of 
salvation and the Judaic tradition as the context of the incarnation, but on God’s general 
self-communication which he makes the interpretive framework for everything. In the 
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end, God’s general self-revelation in cultures becomes the reference point for the 
incarnation and the redemption by Christ.  It becomes possible to understand why 
Iniobong’s interpretation implies that the Jesus event adds nothing new to what has been 
revealed in cultures.  All in all, the incarnation is then seen as a tool for validating the 
theological integrity and autonomy of local theologies.  This is neither the position of 
John Paul II nor of Second Vatican Council theology of mission.  On the contrary, the 
Pope puts strong emphasis on the person of Christ as the primary “principle” in the 
“transformation” and “regeneration” of African cultures. 
  Based, therefore, on John Paul’s interpretation, the conclusion must be, Christ 
“can” become African, not by virtue of being cloaked in the traditional cultural forms, 
even when the latter are diamentrically opposed to what Christ stands for.  Rather, Christ 
can become African only when people are freely willing to be transformed into his 
likeness.  This likeness is not one of external forms but of substance: a communion with 
God through the Spirit of Jesus (Lk 4:14-30; Jn. 14).  The reality of this communion too 
has to be manifest in tangible attitudes, actions, and relationships.  The transformation the 
Pope points to demands, therefore, a courageous and honest look into the diverse African 
cultures with a view of uprooting values and attitudes that are not in tune with the biblical 
view of human nature and existence.  Indeed, cultures do not transform themselves; only 
human beings can bring about transformation.  Seen this way, liberation and inculturation 
are not simply “two dimensions” of Christology as Martey and others may want us to 
perceive.  Inculturation is always about liberation. So unless contextual theologies 
express clearly the essential relationship between them beyond the current positions, the 
existing dichotomy will continue to cloud theological debates and missionary work.  
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SECTION III 
 
A Religious Memory as the distinguishing Mark between the African Religions and 
the Judeo-Christian Faith Tradition  
  
An obvious characteristic of African Traditional Religions is a felt need to 
remember and pass on shared and lived memories from the past. In reality, this is a 
universal human need, without which human traditions and values die away.  Therefore, 
seen in itself, the two dimensional act of remembering and passing on is integral to 
human life and existence.  However, Chapter III raised a concern indispensable to the 
human need to remember and pass on shared and lived experiences.  Does a felt need to 
remember and pass on lived memories preclude an ongoing openness to the mystery of 
self in relation to God?  Many contextual theologies and African Christians in general 
have a tendency to posit a basic commonality between African religions and biblical 
revelation.  Such assertions do not hold for reasons given in the previous chapters. In 
view of discerning that which is theologically valid and that which is not from a Christian 
point of view, the current sections propose the basic freedom to choose one’s destiny and 
a religious memory as interrelated principles for contextualizing biblical revelation in the 
diverse African context. The two principles are especially significant for bringing out the 
fundamental differences between ATRs and biblical revelation. 
 Memory is an important element of human nature. It is like the air we need in 
order to breathe and live. Human life disintegrates without integral memory. But what is 
memory? Memory is a generic term describing two dimensional and interdependent 
functions of the intellect.  The first function, which can be called instrumental memory, 
accompanies everyday action and decision making that goes on at every minute of one’s 
life.  It is functional because through it, the intellect is engaged in and at the ongoing 
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service of every human decision and action. Because of the spontaneous character of the 
instrumental memory, we are hardly conscious that we are exercising it until we forget 
something. Obviously, religion needs this kind of memory. But, as an organized system 
of values and beliefs, religion moves its adherents to exercise memory at a much deeper 
level of the intellect. This level consists in the second function of the intellect described 
below.   
The second function consists in the intellect making a selective and ongoing 
synthesis of the past experiences. This then is a function of the rational intellect or 
rational memory. That is to say, memory is an integral function of the intellect, because 
the human intellect has the natural ability to “recall or re-member” events in the past and 
organize them according to recognized hierarchies of values. Value per se is by nature 
moral and religious at the same time, because it speaks to the core of a person as a 
transcendent “being.” Since every action is at once moral and religious, every human 
being can be considered to exist as a basically religious person, even outside a religious 
creed.  Furthermore, because value is tied in with the basic freedom to choose, 
recognized hierarchies of values are crucial to whether or not persons will fully embrace 
the ongoing journey of transformation and self-transcendence. Hence, in order to function 
as an authentic human being, one needs to develop in body and in spirit. This basic need 
is served by the rational intellect finding fresh meaning in what one remembers. That is 
to say, the instrumental memory and the rational memory ought to establish meaningful 
connections in what one remembers and passes on. It is in this process that certain 
meanings and values are dropped in favor of others. This is not to imply that every new 
meaning and value is always good.  In fact, it is due to the possibility of bad choices that 
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all religions present what they consider to be their highest hierarchy of values. The latter 
comprise the means by which religious adherents realize themselves and their collective 
destinies.  In short, the two functions of the intellect described above are collectively 
termed here as religious memory.  The following paragraphs offer only a brief summary, 
highlighting the importance of the religious memory in understanding a basic difference 
between the Judeo-Christian tradition and the African Traditional Religions (ATRs).  A 
detailed account of memory as a creative dynamic discernible in all religious traditions is 
not possible within the present scope. It suffices to mention that the universality of a 
religious memory in all religious experiences does not presuppose uniformity in religious 
experience, usage and substantive content.  The implied difference is the primary reason 
for employing a concept of religious memory to bring out the fundamental differences 
between the biblical faith and the African Traditional Religions. 
This author currently identifies two major ways in which a religious memory is 
used in religion.  The first consists in a distorted use of the instrumental memory. In this 
instance, persons religious adherents choose not to live by a recognized value system. 
Rather, prevailing circumstances and needs determine the value and nature of decisions 
to be made. This is a depraved form of memory because it does not take the past and the 
authentic future into the present life considerations.  Obviously, this kind of religious 
memory is alien to African Traditional Religions and to biblical faith.  
A true religious memory is consistent with the two functions of the human 
intellect as described above.  However, active memory (instrumental memory) has to be 
accompanied with some form of synthesis, which by nature presupposes the need to pass 
on values from past experiences. There is, however, a basic difference in the way ATRs 
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and biblical faith utilize a religious memory.  In biblical faith, religious memory is a self-
transcending dynamic imbuing its adherents with “a living faith creed” which ensures 
that the biblical tradition does not ossify.  In this way, the biblical tradition is able to 
adapt and meet new historical challenges, while simultaneously opening its adherents to 
ever-new horizons of meaning.  This goes on without the tradition changing its core-
substance and basic direction toward the infinite mystery of God.  In brief, the Judeo-
Christian religious tradition is as self-sustaining as it is self-validating. It is always within 
the reach of a practicing Jew or Christian to recognize that the God of Abraham is 
unequivocally present, in command, and involved in the sphere of human existence. So 
when a faithful Jew or Christian remembers, he or she does so with an understanding that 
he or she exists in a living relationship of mutuality with God.  Such a believer does not 
emerge unchanged from the experience of remembering the past and handing it on to 
future generations.  Rather, one believes that he or she has been “touched” by God and 
therefore stands in need of a continuous transformation by the same God.  Hence, this 
kind of faith is not ethereal; it is concrete in the sense that the believers feel moved by 
grace to change his or her limited value system on the basis of ongoing encounter with 
God.  The past experiences, good or bad, become the basis and motive for future 
encounters with the living God.  It is in this intertwining of memory and increased moral 
sensitivity that biblical revelation is depicted as a journey of faith and reason from 
creation to resurrection. The major but interim events are but necessary steps for future 
developments. Each phase contains the seed for a developed understanding of the 
personal mystery in relationship to God. Hence, just as memory is pivotal in the 
maturation of a person, so it is in the development of the religious truths within a 
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tradition. Also, in order to sustain a basic human openness as a condition for 
transformation as the end of human life, one has to exercise a religious memory.  
Religious memory according to biblical revelation is, therefore, a point at which 
God called Israel from Egypt and recreated their past in light of their present situation of 
slavery. God refocused Israel on the future horizon: the Promised Land.461 In the event of 
a crisis; i.e., when the changes in Israel’s “present memory” deviated from the pattern of 
God’s self-revelation, the past became the guarantee of the future, while the latter became 
a motive for further creativity.462 The dialectical tension between the past, present, and 
future was always a necessary decisive moment from which the Judaic tradition 
developed from a crude perception463 of the deity to a sublime understanding and 
experience of God reflected in the Hebrew prophets and culminating in the Jesus event. 
In sum, a religious memory is comparable to a needle and thread with which Israel 
weaved together their religious experience into a unique mosaic. With a back and forward 
loop, Judaism and New Testament writers did what political empires of their time could 
not do. In the words of my New Testament Professor, Fr. Sean Kealy, C. S. Sp., “Israel 
experienced everything but forgot nothing.”464 They did not conceal their failures in order 
to find fulfillment in their transitory achievements.  Instead, everything had meaning, 
because everything belongs to one religious memory that has its origin in God’s self-
revelation. But, how does the Judaic religious memory differ from that evidenced in the 
ATRs? 
The texts used in Chapter I clearly indicate that the act of remembering the past is 
integral to Black African religious consciousness in general.465 A religious memory finds 
elaborate expression in the traditional ritual celebrations. While a few aspects of the 
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Judeo-Christian faith are similar in form and substance to those found in ATRs, there are 
basic technical and substantive discrepancies in the latter traditions. To date, the act of 
remembering in the ATRs involves recycling the values systems designed from the 
remote past.  This kind of remembering transforms the intellect to see the past as a 
“paradise to be recaptured” and relived at all costs.  Change in “form and substance” is 
seen as a detriment to a religious memory. This kind of resistance carries with it very 
basic problems. Authentic religious memory acts as a catalyst for the development of 
faith. It impels the believer toward the transcendent.  Therefore, a religious memory that 
basically consists in a mere passing on of values from the past impels persons toward 
self-preservation and pre-occupation, at the same time stifling the natural impetus toward 
the infinite mystery and self-transcendence. Consequently, the possibility for ongoing 
encounter with the living God is equally hampered.  A defensive moral stance is the lot of 
religious traditions bent on the scrupulous preservation of their traditions. The respective 
adherents are less willing to reinterpret their originating religious experiences in the light 
of the present in order to guarantee further development in the understanding of God’s 
nature, presence, and activities in their midst and in the world. Under such circumstances, 
there emerges a possibility of worshipping a past religious event in itself, rather than 
God.   
In conclusion, the need for contextual theologians to understand the relationship 
between native traditions and the Judeo-Christian tradition is valid. However, such an 
effort is not simply a matter of linking the two traditions according to their formal 
expressions, a move that ignores what is really at work in historical revelation.  
Moreover, such hermeneutics ignore that the inner character of biblical faith is a journey 
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of ongoing development in understanding God’s self-revelation and that memory as 
authentic creativity can only be maintained by putting God first and self second. Without 
ontological ordering of a religious memory, religion and culture can degenerate into a 
dehumanized self-preservation. This in turn triggers off a dynamic of self-depreciation.  
The Problematic of Structuring Basic Human Freedom in African Traditional 
Cultures  
 
When native religious structures of meaning ossify, basic freedom becomes the 
possession of cultures rather than of individual persons.  In order for the group to ensure 
that their religious memory is passed on from generation to generation, individual 
liberties are curtailed to a greater extent. This phenomenon is evident in African cultures 
and religions. Basic freedom is limited in the sense that individuals are free to live and 
order their lives in the way they want, provided their freedom to choose who they want to 
be remains within the norms of the tribal mores.466 To put it slightly different, when a 
person is subordinated to culture, such one exists in a state of uncompromising obedience 
to the cultural world view. That this is a serious obstacle to Christian faith and practice 
and to the building of harmonious African nation-states is the primary objective of the 
current and the subsequent sections.   
 It must be emphasized that the choice for or against God is always contained in 
the freedom to choose.  Basic freedom constitutes one of the primaries principle by which 
we can establish whether or not a particular anthropology is oriented toward the 
transcendent or otherwise. In the freedom to choose lies the possibility for the survival or 
demise of African cultures. The way contextual theologies examine how basic freedom is 
socially structured not only helps the local church to comprehend the basic orientation of 
African cultures and religions; it is also indicative of the extent to which contemporary 
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African Christians are disposed toward Christianity in its radicalness. T. M. McFadden’s 
position lends itself well to the present consideration. “Man is a being of finite resources 
oriented to the infinite.”467 He elaborates on the substance of that orientation in these 
compelling terms: 
 Man is radically free to respond to or reject God.  The unique 
supernatural existential order wherein God draws all men to himself 
does not forestall the sin of unbelief or the acceptance of this divine 
self communication as totally gratuitous. Only insofar as man’s free 
response to God’s word is recognized as self-realization can this 
response be fully human.468  
 
Implied here is the view that culture is an essential yet unfinished reality which always 
stands in need of redemption.  The incompleteness of culture always implies the 
incompleteness of the cultural subjects.  Here too McFadden offers a point for 
development and transition into Rahner’s Christology via theological anthropology. 
“Within the theological enterprise, anthropology would be a study of human beings 
insofar as they are related to God.”469  Christian anthropology does not simply assume 
that the incarnation event is already immanent in all cultures.  Rather, it “seeks to explain 
man in the light of revelation, particularly the Christ event.  It asks how man relates to 
God’s world and hence inquires into his understanding of the world and himself.470  
Christian anthropology then turns human finitude into a necessary good, not a curse.  For 
the  
Absolute is perceived as the metaphysical ground of man’s limitless receptivity 
toward being itself…The acknowledgement of this tension [between person and 
God] and its implication for man as both limited and transcendent is the 
foundation for the open-ended anthropology without which religion and 
revelation become totally extrinsic to the human spirit.  The fulfillment of this 
tendency becomes explicit for the Christian in the mystery of the Incarnate Word, 
the ultimate union of God and man who is the paradigm for all humankind.  
Christology becomes, therefore, the culmination of theological anthropology.471  
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Thus the corollary which is a corrective of a depreciating focus on self can be put into 
proper perspective through cultures entering into dialogue with Christianity.  
SECTION IV 
PRINCIPLES AS TOOLS FOR MEDIATING CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE WITH 
TRADITIONAL CULTURES 
 
In the previous sections, we pointed out the tendency to separate theology of 
liberation from transformation, in theory and in method.  It goes without saying that the 
objective of liberation, which only has Western domination or African political leaders as 
its raison d'être, falls far short of the Catholic teaching on inculturation. Contextual 
theology has to strive to establish a measure of proportionality between the past, present, 
and the future history of the Continent.  Even then, the “present African history” 
comprises the vantage point for evaluating the significance of the past and for setting the 
direction of the Continent through the contextualization process.   In this same regard, an 
honest articulation of the African reality is a necessary critical step. It is, therefore, 
because of the need to move contextual theologies toward the Christological horizon that 
working principles are necessary for emptying a monolithic theology of its “rigid poles” 
or internal controls.  This must be if Christology is to serve its real purpose in the 
church’s mission and theology.  Part of the church’s mission is to gather into one all that 
is morally valid in every culture and to universalize it, thus transforming it into the 
patrimony of all humanity even beyond Africa. The act of gathering is a necessary step 
for recovering the sense of a “common reason” as the energy driving forward a common 
human history.472  The question, however, is: can a common reason evolve and thrive in 
the context of multiple philosophies of human nature?473   
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Human Ontology as a Working Framework in the African Encounter with 
Christianity and Western Culture  
 
The preceding analyses set the stage for recognizing a general human ontology as 
the working framework for Christian-cultural and inter-cultural dialogues. With reference 
to Chapters II and III, the last statement simply means that Christianity offers a 
philosophical framework in which persons situated in diverse cultural settings can 
recognize their common ontological identity. Without the aforementioned framework, it 
is very difficult to appreciate the rationale for positing a human being as the foundation 
of Catholic theology and mission. Therefore, as a working principle, human ontology is 
the backdrop against which individual cultural anthropologies are evaluated.  For 
instance, the African traditions, the Western social system, and Christianity, are all 
framed within a specific world view.  Each has a unique set of underlying principles.  
Also because world views embody organizing principles that govern collective existence 
within a respective social setting, social or religious world views are critical to any form 
of dialogue. It is on account of these concrete realities that a human being constitutes a an 
essential working principle in contextual theologies and inculturation. Further 
explanation is necessary to clarify the way in which the terminology of “principle” is 
used in the present regard.   
A “principle” is generally defined in two general but related ways.  In one 
instance, it refers to an underlying law or assumption required in a system of thought.  
For example, the moral value of a human being is the most basic principle governing the 
Western social system. In another instance, a principle is also defined as the primary 
source of a specific reality. This implies that a human being is the ethical standard of 
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decision-making and morality. When the two levels of meaning are viewed as a whole, a 
human being constitutes a primary principle because it offers a way of working out social 
and individual existence within and outside the boundaries of a particular world view.  
Therefore, the proposal to situate contextual theology in a general human ontology sets 
the task of dialogue at a different level.  Precisely, human dignity, rather than culture, 
constitutes a criterion by which the church in Africa can determine what to take and what 
not to take from Western culture. This basically implies distinguishing that which is 
morally good from that which is not. This is a general criterion and consists in whether 
established values promote or undermine human dignity.  This is only a first step in the 
long process of discernment.   
One other principal factor in human ontology is the role of Christianity in the 
African-Western cultural dialogue.  Important elements of the Judeo-Christian view of 
human nature and a person are deeply ingrained in the Western social philosophy.474 At 
the same time, Western culture is not the full embodiment of the Judeo-Christian view of 
humanity and all that it stands for.  The Word of God, Jesus of Nazareth, made forever 
visible in the New Testament, is the full embodiment of human nature in its 
transcendence and in its corporeal diversity.  In light of this, the African stance toward 
the Western religious heritage and culture has to be two-pronged.  On the one hand, 
Western culture stands, not as the fullness, but nonetheless, a concrete demonstration of 
the inherent potential of the Judeo- Christian vision of humanity.   On the other hand, 
Western culture, like all societies, also stands in need of redemption.  In sum, African-
Western cultural dialogue calls for a critical selection of values and cultural goods from 
the Western culture.  At the same time, limitations inherent in culture call for the 
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recognition of Christian anthropology (Christology) as the ultimate point of reference in 
inter-cultural dialogue. Christianity not only acts as a corrective of deviant developments 
in both cultures, but it also offers the moral impetus to delve into the mystery of Jesus 
Christ, incarnate and risen.  This is necessary to prevent the dialogue from crystallizing 
into mere abstractions or violent engagement.  All in all, inculturation puts Christianity in 
dialogue with culture.  At the same time, inculturation is also a means toward recognizing 
the transcendence of Christianity over and above any culture.  The present procedure also 
shifts the focus on cultural and religious hegemony to another level.  Unless we recognize 
these nuances in this study as a whole, the temptation of identifying Christianity with any 
one culture will continue to dog contextual theologies. No Western government today can 
impose its culture on Africa without the consent and choice of African governments and 
peoples. As a matter of fact, the ordinary African person is more eager and quicker to 
imitate the Western life styles than any African government would have them do. This 
goes without an equal attempt to evaluate what is being assimilated from the West. 
In his recent book entitled, Jesus of Nazareth, Benedict XVI was cited by 
Pittsburgh Catholic weekly report to have expressed concern about the nature of Western 
involvement in Africa: “Foreign aid to Third World Countries, for example, has imposed 
a materialistic technical solution on populations, ignoring their religious beliefs….Africa 
in particular has been ‘robbed and looted’…and like a man on the roadside in Christ’s 
parable, is in need of a good Samaritan.” The Pope went on to indicate the primary cause 
of all the aforementioned evils. “Instead of giving these populations God…”we have 
brought them the cynicism of a world without God, in which the only things that count 
are power and profit.”475 This is an extremely important observation which bears on the 
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proposed structure of dialogue.  Since the Christian vision of humanity is the moral 
foundation of the Western social system, there is no way African nations can succeed in 
inculcating the moral values of the Western social philosophy without reference to 
Christianity as its ultimate frame of reference.  Precisely, this means that the Western 
involvement in Africa must not be accompanied by a rigid separation of Christian faith 
and reason from parliamentary actions. To do otherwise is to cut the tree at its roots. 
Africa will end up in the same scenario that David Walsh speaks about with regard to 
nations that have acquired the rational tools of Western civilization without its Christian 
frame of reference.476  An immediate example is China, which is going through rapid 
technological advancement but while remaining insensitive to human rights.477  Even 
when nations like China speak about human rights, they do so with a different 
understanding of human nature than the one integral to Christianity. The conclusion 
Walsh makes in this regard is not only timely, but it is also of extreme significance.  By 
abandoning a Christian consciousness, the West automatically loses the very tools it has 
for advancing the true value of political freedom and liberty through dialogue. It is for 
reasons such as these that the African governments and local churches must strive to 
comprehend the moral frame of reference in the Western social system without which 
ecclesial and political life in African states builds on a flimsy foundation.  Only then can 
Christianity accomplish something meaningful and long lasting in Africa which is 
situated irreversibly in the Western social system. A critical view of Western cultural 
influence must be accompanied by similar regard for traditional social philosophies. 
Chapters II to III already treated the fundamental limitations in ancestral world views.  
The latter comprise an important horizon in any attempt to understand the implications of 
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a historical method in African theological thought. The next set of practical 
considerations seeks to clarify, although without being exhaustive, the proposal made in 
this study that contextual theology be “critical of traditional social philosophies.”  
The Need to Recognize the Power of Ethnocentrism to Empty Biblical Faith of Its 
Soteriological Substance  
 
Keeping in focus the previous statements on the significance of “a world view” 
vis-à-vis a person in the structure of dialogue, the present concern treats the implications 
of ancestral foundations as a theological method.  When ancestry as the organizing 
principle, with all its basic assumptions about person and human nature are transposed 
into Christianity, the end theological content is bound to be very different. In short, the 
traditional African anthropologies are not compatible with the Christian vision of 
humanity.  As a result, consanguineous socio-ethical standards and human behaviors are 
in diametric conflict with the Christian moral horizon. It ought to be understood that this 
is not a naïve disregard of the wealth of values in the African traditional cultures. Yet, the 
existence of positive values is not a license to make an uncritical application of the 
formative principles of African cultures in the making of contextual theologies. While 
such a move purports to safeguard cultural integrity, it does in fact ignore basic moral 
assumptions underlying the consanguineous world view.  An ethnocentric moral stance 
impedes the Judeo-Christian saving dynamism to re-orient the African world views 
toward the universal (Jn 17: 20-21).  The internal constitution of traditional African 
ontology (ancestrology) does not foster total commitment and fidelity to the Christian 
truths. People confess faith in Jesus Christ but naturally fall back on their cultural values 
in the decision making process.  Given this ethical scenario, a primary factor in 
contextual theological discernment is the reality of the universal human nature as a 
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common good, over and above ethnic and biological particularities.  Christians are not 
bonded to Christ by ties of biological descent.  On the contrary, the true bond is an 
ontological one because every human being is created in the image of God.  From this 
vantage point, what hinders or promotes the common good in African society becomes 
obvious.   
There is yet another level of concern in contextualizing biblical faith.  The need to 
place the factor of the essential human nature at the center of theological reflection does 
not preclude the reality of diverse historical expressions.  Rather, the reality of essential 
human nature safeguards diverse historical expressions from collapsing into multiple 
human natures which then gives birth to a negative principle of social fragmentation and 
alienation of all forms. A critical discernment procedure ought to lead to the 
understanding that a general human ontology provides the basis for grasping the 
fundamental connectedness among all peoples.  But the moment one proceeds from a 
finite reality such as biological ancestry, one ends up with the basic temptation that 
continues to mark historical human existence: that of perceiving the human reality in 
exclusively temporal terms.  These limited propositions are then transposed into the 
practice of theology and given absolute and autonomous theological expressions.  
Autonomous theologies tend to identify Catholicism with the local theologies and end up 
rejecting the theological patrimony of the Church, either on the basis of multiple 
conceptions of human nature or on the account of hegemonic realities. These trends of 
thought serve to alienate rather than achieve theological unity. An instance of this is the 
theological mindset that sees no need for exchange of ideas between different cultural 
blocks.478  For example, the terminologies of race, ethnicity, tribe, and clan, are concepts 
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which historical humanity uses to project collective self-understanding within a particular 
experience and history of a group. The terms, however, share a common denominator.  
For, in spite of the many sublime values with which cultures are suffused, societies have, 
more often than not, resorted to the aforementioned finite horizons to delimit the ultimate 
view of a human being. The result is human and social alienations such as those that 
plague the African Continent.  So, placing a human being at the center of Christian-
guided dialogue is an invitation to break through the historical sphere as the decisive 
anthropological horizon.  Jesus’ life in its totality offers Africa a compelling testimony to 
the infinite horizon, which alone can be seen as the valid and ultimate point of reference 
in the historical quest for self-understanding and existence.  
In conclusion, Christianity offers all cultures the opportunity to break through 
those social structures of meaning that foster fundamental human and cultural alienations. 
Dianne Bergant accurately describes racism as the “preference of one representation of a 
human being to another.”479  The same is true for tribalism.  Physical differences ought to 
be seen as representation of form, not of substance.  Contrary arguments would have to 
account for how all peoples in their historical diversity can be considered true human 
beings made in the one image of God, yet at the same time, possessing different basic 
human natures.  If that is the case, then, different human groupings have reason to wait 
for the respective “Incarnations of the Word” in conformity with their true human 
natures.  This is an obviously ridiculous argument at most.  Chapter III highlighted the 
meaning of Christ for the universal humanity and so need not be repeated here.  For this 
same reason, the following practical considerations simply make explicit some of the key 
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themes that ought to shape African dialogue with Christianity and Western religious and 
social heritages.       
The Dynamics of Contemporary Social Change Comprise the Immediate Context 
for Theological Reflection.  
 
 In order for inculturation to be truly liberating, there has to be a direct link 
between basic needs of contemporary Africa and the perceived means for meeting those 
needs.  The fact of social change requires that the local church situate theological 
reflection in the context of contemporary social change in African societies. Inculturation 
demands assiduous study of tribal mindsets that make up the local churches.  Equally 
important is the need to admit the obvious that Africa is no longer governed by 
autonomous tribal socio-political systems. The presence of Christianity and the Western 
social system not only exert real influence on the entire continent, but they also offer the 
religious and the philosophical horizons for a constructive evaluation of Africa’s history, 
past and present.  But since African theology generally views the aforementioned 
presence in terms of religious and cultural hegemony, the following sub-principle points 
to the need to look at the signs of the time. These can lend insight into the question of 
whether or not Christianity and the Western social system ought to be perceived in the 
terms envisioned by African theology.  
The Concrete African Persons Constitute the Signs of the Time and the Starting 
Points for Theological Reflection  
 
 African peoples who have embraced the Christian faith do so because they 
recognize it as a distinctive creed from their own religious traditions. It is also important 
to acknowledge that almost the entire continent, regardless of religious creed, recognizes 
and aspires to the social benefits accrued from the Western social system. This is evident 
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in the whole-hearted commitment to literacy as a condition for the improvement of 
material and living conditions. Given the present historical realities, a valid response to 
the presence of Christianity and Western social systems requires that Africa “opens its 
traditional consciousness” to a transcendent anthropological horizon to promote an ethos 
of solidarity among diverse ethnic groups comprising the present day African nations.  
Otherwise, Africa cannot sustain the aspiration for a life rooted in Christian faith and 
Western social philosophy on the terms dictated by the ancestral visions of humanity.  
Those visions, as Chapters II & III strived to illustrate, are basically opposed to a 
common vision of humanity.  Needless to say, Africa still prefers fragmented existence 
stemming from a consanguineous social philosophy in a totally changed socio-political 
setting.  It is with this mindset that African theology, consciously or not, tends toward 
unconditional preservation of the ancestral world views.  The following practical 
consideration develops the current consideration by offering a corrective to the existing 
theological and pastoral anomaly. It does so by drawing attention to the dynamic of self-
contradiction in the ancestral theological perspective. 
The Need to Recognize a Fundamental Contradiction between the Basic Aspirations 
of Contemporary African Nation-States and the Tenacious Hold onto Tribal 
Ontologies 
 
 The fact that contemporary Africa continues to aspire to Christian faith and to 
social systems rooted in Western social philosophy needs no further argument here. But 
while this goes on, contextual theologies see little, if any, need to unearth the theological 
and evangelical significance of human aspirations characteristic of contemporary Africa.  
New choices and experiences among Africans signify providential moments inviting 
Africa to reexamine the strength and limitations of its traditional ethos.  Present day 
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African nation-states cannot adopt the Western social system without a commitment to 
embrace the moral/organizing principles on which the system is based.  In brief, the 
proposal that Africa learns from the Western cultural experience does not consist in 
turning African nations into copy-cats. Rather, the proposal consists in understanding and 
implementing the underlying moral principles that govern the social system in which 
African tribes are now situated.  At the same time, modern Western culture in itself 
cannot provide Africa with a comprehensive understanding of the full substance of moral 
values that underpin its social systems.  It is here that an authentic and lively dialogue 
with Christianity is a necessary condition for coming to grips with the church’s mission 
in Africa. Such dialogue automatically takes into account the negative changes in the 
Western societies: changes that would have an adverse impact on peoples and their 
societies. The reverse yields contrary results. When learning from another culture 
consists in surface imitation of external structural forms, a cultural crisis such as the one 
pervading Africa today becomes the norm rather than the exception.  A question can still 
be raised at this point regarding the right to fashion one’s own identity.  Is the call to step 
out of traditional cultural consciousness not identical to losing one’s identity? The 
following paragraphs present a major principle, which in essence is a summary of key 
ideas from the previous chapter. The purpose is to underscore the importance of identity 
in African traditional social consciousness in a way that facilitates the process of opening 
African Christians to Christian faith in its radicalness.  
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SECTION V  
 
CONCERNS WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE REQUIRES 
REDEFINING THE AFRICAN PROBLEM 
 
The current principle shifts the focus of reflection from Western cultural 
hegemony to the fundamental subject of human nature.  The issue which is going to 
determine the future of Africa hinges on the need to redefine the philosophy of nature in 
the traditional but diverse African views of a person.  The present consideration does not 
repeat the subject matter of Chapters I-III.  Rather, the selected principles and working 
guidelines attempt to clarify what is involved in an anthropological dialogue in a 
diversely constituted cultural context.  In general terms, the present focus calls for a basic 
shift from “cultural hegemony” as the basic problem and in light of which liberation is 
perceived, to a philosophy of human nature as the most fundamental problem confronting 
Africa.  Such an approach does not disregard the reality of hegemonic forces.  Rather, it 
helps us to understand hegemonic forces as symptoms of cultural malaise rather than the 
primary cause of the present cultural crisis. 
The Need to Clarify a Basic Question: In What Does Identity Consist? 
Basing ourselves on Chapter III, the quest for identity is a universal experience.  
Yet, it is not enough to search for identity or to be conscious of its concrete significance. 
Underlying any notion of identity is the deeper question concerning what it means to be a 
person.  This in itself presupposes a philosophy of human nature.  The three elements; 
i.e., a person, identity, and human nature are, therefore, decisive with regard to whether 
or not: (a) the African local Church truly seeks to “embrace and sustain” the Christian 
faith; (b) whether the Continent will be able to muster a level of development that can 
withstand the whirlwinds of social change being ushered in by globalization.   
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A big concern in African theology has to do with the denigrating attitude of 
colonizers toward African peoples and cultures.  By questioning whether or not the 
African cultural world views constitute cultural systems, the colonizers were, in essence, 
questioning whether or not Black Africans were human beings. That inquiry has a strong 
emotive quality as seen from the repugnance reflected in the reactionary approach to 
contextual theologies.  But while self-defense or the defense of one’s culture is a moral 
duty, the current principle draws attention to two major limitations of a reactionary 
method presented in Chapter I.  First, when reaction becomes the theological rationale for 
the church’s mission and theology, the tasks of contextualization and inculturation are 
henceforth turned into the means for self-defense rather than the basis for Christian 
liberation. Second, there is a need to question the philosophical-theological justification 
with respect to a direct correspondence which African tribal views set between collective 
and personal identities. The following analysis situates the aforementioned concerns in 
the context of historical experience.  
Identity generally denotes a set of (essential) characteristics by which an entity 
can be recognized in comparison with another within the same category of beings.  The 
notion of identity carries the connotations of uniqueness. We are presently concerned 
with two general levels of identity: personal and collective identities both of which are 
experienced historically as discussed in Chapter III. The historical and the relational 
character of human life impart a sense of belonging to the experience of a specific group.  
The sense of belonging develops from a shared or communal experience and by virtue of 
adhering to a common ethos.  In short, communality imparts a sense of sameness or a 
sense of being alike.  Hence, interrelated hierarchies of meanings (italicized above) come 
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to the fore in the attempt to understand the intertwining of personal and collective 
identities in the historical experience.  More precisely, history, relationality, 
communality, sense of belonging, and sameness are essential characteristics of a 
collective identity. These also suggest that collective identities are not established 
theoretically; i.e., independent of a person’s historical existence.  Otherwise, it would not 
be possible to understand the reason a person’s sense of identity is also linked to a 
particular group.  Yet all in all, this is not to say that a collective identity is the basic 
constitution of personal identities.  
Every person belongs to a community by virtue of which they can be recognized 
as unique persons. The question for African theology and Black Africa in general is 
whether collective identity can be equated with personal identity and what it means to be 
a person.  For reasons provided in Chapters II and III, a host of intractable problems in 
contemporary Africa are rooted in an undifferentiated sense of identity. The transcendent 
aspects of identity are compactly intertwined with the collective identities.  It is from 
recognizing this anthropological anomaly that an argument is rightly made here that the 
success of Christianity and the attainment of sustainable development in Africa greatly 
depend on accurate understanding and an honest attempt to examine the problem of 
identity, to say nothing of its moral ramifications today.480  And as indicated in Chapters 
II-III, the meaning of identity cannot be tackled apart from the traditional African sense 
of being.  
The Need to Understand the Traditional African View of “Being” 
 In the realm of ontology, “being” is the metaphysical basis for understanding all 
reality-historical and transcendental.  It is, therefore, the appropriate philosophical 
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context in which to account for the historical sense of identity as it relates to a person as a 
transcendental principle. “To be” a person in traditional African anthropologies is to be in 
close bonds of relationship with one’s immediate family, clan, and tribal community. 
This is a widely shared experience and, therefore, not limited to Africa.  There is a unique 
historical development in the case of tribal ontologies. For want of communal identities, 
tribal ancestors sought to “legitimize” splintered tribal communities by providing 
alternative sources of ultimate origin. They set ancestry as the ultimate point of reference. 
Tribal ancestors consequently re-interpreted the ultimate origin and destiny of their 
respective tribes.  But by doing so, the founding ancestors confined the meaning of a 
person vis-à-vis identity in a self-realizing horizon: biological descent.  Henceforth, 
“community or communality” originates with biological ancestors. The transcendence of 
communality is emptied in a historical community.  It does not, therefore, require great 
imagination to realize that self-understanding, personal and collective, is channeled 
through consanguineous social and moral horizons. A tribe in its diverse expressions of 
family units and clans epitomizes and recapitulates the ancestor as the origin and ideal of 
human nature and personhood.  Out of this ontological structure derives a 
“communitarian” view of a person, with a consanguineous slant as the norm.  In a similar 
fashion, individual destinies are closely tied up with the tribal communities. It ought to be 
clear at this point that the African concept of identity takes on a sense of physical 
resemblance or “sameness” or “generic” meaning as an essential characteristic of human 
nature and identity.  All in all, the historical horizon imparts a differently nuanced 
“communitarian view of a person.” That is to say, the traditional African communitarian 
philosophy is not synonymous with the biblical view of community, which is ultimately 
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Trinitarian and transcendent and therefore, inclusive.  It is thus safe to conclude that 
culture is the core of personal and collective identities in traditional Africa.  This explains 
the reason a Black African hardly recognizes the humanity of others outside one’s own 
tribe! These are serious anthropological anomalies that must be recognized to pave the 
way for the seeding of the Christian Gospel. 
 Because the concept of “being” is fashioned from an historical-existential 
horizon rather than a transcendent pole, the conceptual distinction between an identity 
and a person per se is blurred.  Having collapsed the meaning of a person into a historical 
sphere of existence, certain reversals in the basic structure of being became inevitable.  
For instance, the transcendent horizon imposes itself as the necessary point at which 
human beings come to recognize “universality” as an indispensable structure of meaning 
in human existence.  Without a good sense of the universal, the meaning of person, 
community, history, and culture lose the transcendent meaning proper to each.  Similarly, 
although human nature is oriented toward communality within the context of historical 
existence, human beings do not originate the meaning of history, community, 
relationship, identity and so on. The human task is to discover and represent collective 
experiences while maintaining a basic openness to the future with its promise for unity 
through historical convergences.  A contrary view leads to definitive self-explanations 
that consist in the “reversal” of a basic human orientation to the transcendent horizon and 
as a necessary point of reference in the effort to realize ultimate personal identity.  A 
basic cultural orientation toward definitive self-explanation can only perpetuate itself by 
means of self-preservation.  There can be no doubt that this is the basic direction of 
traditional African ontologies. Difficult as this problem may appear to be, authentic 
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liberation of Africa is contingent on redefining traditional African philosophy of human 
nature.  Everything else flows from this main issue. In line with the present theme, the 
following principle illustrates two principal aspects in the Christian view of human nature 
and how a poorly structured sense of identity impacts the day-to-day operations of faith 
and reason.  
The Need to Recognize the Importance of Faith and Reason in the Development of 
Persons and Culture 
 
Chapter III drew general attention to the configuration of “faith and culture” in 
contemporary Catholic theological methodology. It was further pointed out that this 
methodological structure allows Christianity to enter into dialogue with “native reason.”  
The notion of native reason as used in this paper is not intended to validate the colonial 
myth that each “race” has a different structure of intellect. Such propositions can only 
derive from a terrible lack of understanding of the potential influence of historical 
realities on the exercise of reason.  The colonial assumption simply flies in the face of 
John Duns Scotus’ and Karl Rahner’s theological anthropology. Both theologians offer 
philosophical and moral grounds on which to speak about diverse expressions of reason 
without creating hierarchies in the basic human nature. Even when culture imposes its 
conditioning and colonizing influences, individual persons within the same culture 
maintain a good measure of self-determination. Very often, many can transcend native 
cultural trappings to a greater degree.  The many revolutionaries in the past histories of 
human cultures were people groomed by their respective cultures. They, however, 
managed to rise above their cultures and to found a different moral horizon toward which 
they steered their collective social history. The Old Testament prophets are typical 
examples of what it means to live in a culture and yet be ahead of it.  
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A notion of native reason is thus used here to bring out important and observable 
characteristics of historical human existence.  Although human nature is the same, native 
cultures do exert influence on the evolution of human reason.  Culture can either foster 
the natural impetus of reason toward the transcendent or it can impose conditions that re-
orient rationality in the opposite direction.  In the latter instance, persons become focused 
on finite realities as the most important sources of knowledge.  Where this kind of 
rational impetus is recognized, it is necessary to pay attention to the cultural world view 
because it plays a central role in shaping patterns of thought.  Also because each culture 
offers an ultimate moral frame of reference, persons tend to work out their existence 
within set or acceptable limits.  By doing so, individuals actualize and reinforce the basic 
direction of their native philosophies, whether good or bad. It is in this light that the 
power of African ontologies on the development of the human intellect can be 
understood. In other words, a notion of native reason is essential to understanding the 
reason why the mechanisms of self-preservation are deeply ingrained in tribal societies, 
although with varying degrees of intensity. Importantly, the mechanism of self-
preservation poses serious obstacles to evangelization and to social political 
development. Since personal and collective identities (tribe, clan, and nuclear family) are 
intertwined, then, the wellbeing of one’s community is deemed indispensable to the 
survival of the individual.  
In brief, traditional African societies, like all cultures, have values and customs by 
which individual and collective wellbeing is guaranteed, now and in the future.  But in a 
special way, African ontologies propound uncompromising loyalty to “set traditions” of 
the tribes. These are important for individual and communal identities.  As a result, free 
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thought and personal creativity are permissible provided these do not compromise or 
undermine the established traditional moral order.  Given this arrangement, an individual 
grows up with the mind focused on how to adapt his or her rational attitude to set 
philosophical and moral horizons rather than on creating something entirely new, or even 
radically improving on what already exists.  These observations need not be stretched to 
appreciate the negative consequences of superimposing unwholesome structures of 
meaning on individual and collective perceptions. With time, persons become 
accustomed to being content with taking responsibility for and passing on what they have 
acquired from their forbearers. In other words, persons become the very embodiment of 
their cultures to the extent of being totally blind to its unwholesome values.  In the event 
of encountering a new reality such as Christian faith, the need to preserve a common 
identity can motivate cultural partners in dialogue to seek indiscriminate legitimization of 
cultural values by means of false religious reinterpretation.481  It is much easier to empty 
“newness” into the “old” than the reverse, a posture Jesus found impracticable and 
reminded his followers that new wine cannot be poured into old skin wines. The latter 
might not have the capacity to contain the newness with its promise of surprise and 
absolute surrender.  At this point, it is important to consider another dimension of the 
present theme, namely; how structured rationality impacts the development of innate 
spiritual capacities. These broadly include the capacity to reason, to love, hope, believe, 
trust, and engage in positive imagination. The following statements follow the 
explanations provided in Chapter III regarding the basic human inclination toward the 
transcendent and fulfillment in God as the highest point of any belief. 
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Faith is generally associated with a set of beliefs found in a specific religious 
creed. Faith in this case is a personal assent to a distinctive religious creed. This 
understanding withstanding, faith can also be explained from the perspective of natural 
law. That is to say, faith is synonymous with belief in the ordinary sense of the word.  For 
this same reason, faith and belief are interchangeable: only the context determines the 
nuanced differences.  Hence, faith as currently perceived is experienced as a natural 
principle of life before it is directed toward a specific religious creed.  One may say that 
“belief” forms a necessary background for the experience of faith as an assent to specific 
religious beliefs.  Hence as indicated in Chapter III, human nature is constituted in such a 
way that a normal person has a natural ability to make decisions based on reason. In 
reality, to believe, hope, trust, imagine, and love give expression to the natural capacities 
for reasoning and believing in something.  In fact, faith without reason turns religion into 
a fantasy as a bed rock for all forms of violence. A normal development of a person is 
contingent upon proper integration of the natural capacity to reason and to believe.  All 
religions draw upon these innate spiritual resources and the sustenance of any faith creed 
depends on the same.  The following paragraphs seek to show the negative impact of 
culture on the development of the natural capacity to believe and to reason. It is the 
understanding of this author that the greatest hindrance to technological development in 
Africa, for instance, has less to do with a natural lack of intelligence than with the 
ongoing choice to exist within a finite horizon, informed by fixed value systems passed 
on from the distant past.  It is much easier to believe and exist by the traditional world 
views because they provide certain knowledge from collective experiences.  However, 
the present emphasis is on the fact that the personal capacity for making the most of the 
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natural capacities for believing and reasoning can be weakened or become dysfunctional.  
Confining innate functions of the soul within a finite ontological horizon can have a 
damaging impact on the development of faith and reason as the following explanations 
strive to show.  
Outside the sphere of any religious creed, a person must love or be drawn to 
something, let us say a project as an object of one’s love. One must somehow believe in 
the validity of whatever decisions are reached, either individually or collectively.  One 
must also trust and hope that the project will be realized. And in all these experiences, 
faith and reason are at work because they are natural preconditions for embarking on and 
completing any project. Because decisions have a futuristic impetus, the natural 
experiences of belief, trust, love, and hope are necessary for perseverance and 
transcendence at whatever level of existence this may be.  So what is likely to happen 
when faith without reason is based on unchangeable value systems as their driving 
motive? This is an extremely important point because it helps us to comprehend the 
potential influence of society on the development of the human spiritual capacities.  
Culture or religion can either elevate faith and reason by ordering them to their natural 
end, or deform some, if not all, depending on the basic moral assumptions involved in a 
particular religion.  
All human beings need faith to act, but especially to step out of oneself into the 
unknown. Where the natural impulse to believe is impaired, fear (even moral 
recklessness) becomes the norm thus making it difficult to follow the positive leads of 
reason.  One is only able to perform acts about which one is certain of the outcome. In the 
case of Africa, the choice to confine the intellect within the historical sphere of existence 
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continues to play a big role in the intellection processes. Under finite existential 
conditions, reason is conditioned to conform to tribal mores.  While a certain mindset 
becomes habitual, common sense and instinctive response replace the need to ask new 
questions and follow them through.  One tends to avoids difficult or novel decisions by 
“playing it safe.” After all, contrary choices might not only incur punishment; they might 
cause ostracizing by the group and eventual loss of identity.  But while all this goes on, it 
ought to be remembered that nature cannot be cheated.  What is not properly claimed or 
developed can either come back with vengeance or it can find an outlet in deviant 
expressions. One such example, which has direct relevance to this chapter, is the practice 
of superstition. The following paragraphs seek to show that the prevalence of superstition 
is a means of coping with a dysfunctional intellect. We shall only cite briefly the nature 
and expression of superstition among its victims.  
As the Catholic hierarchy gathered at the Vatican to await the solemn interment of 
John Paul II, Raymond Arroyo and Richard John Neuhaus interviewed the now retired 
Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala of the Kampala Archdiocese, Uganda. On the statement 
regarding Africa as the new cradle of Christianity, Cardinal Wamala responded in his 
characteristic manner.  He acknowledged the growing number of African Christians, at 
the same time underscoring the fact that increase in numbers is not yet matched with 
growth in mature faith. For the most part, faith is still superficial and he cited parts of 
West Africa where voodoo remains very attractive. On the whole, many people are 
Christians during day time and sorcerers and witches at night, although this reality is 
present in different degrees among the different tribes. Cardinal Wamala’s cautioning 
remarks were recently echoed at Koenigstein, Germany, by Bishop Peter Marzinkowski 
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of Alindao, Central African Republic.  The Bishop was “speaking with the group from a 
charitable organization known as “Aid to the Church in Need.” The Bishop notes 
poignantly that “many of the people [in Africa] have no natural explanation for death, 
sickness, or natural disasters.  The people always look for a scapegoat who must, in their 
view, have caused the misfortune through witchcraft….”482  Given the prevalent religious 
climate, there can be no doubt that African Christianity stands in great need of continued 
evangelization.  
Pope Benedict XVI, in his address to the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, at the conclusion of their 2006 ad limina visit gives concise 
guidelines on what needs to be done. He told the Bishops, 
You have highlighted the need to work for a profound evangelization of the 
faithful. The living and vibrant ecclesiastical communities in all your dioceses 
well reflect this 'hands-on' evangelization which makes the faithful ever more 
mature in their faith, in a spirit of evangelical fraternity that brings them to reflect 
together on the various aspects of ecclesiastical life.483 
 
The relation of this statement to the problem of superstition is not immediately clear. The 
expressed relation is evident in the Pope’s concern about the underlying “fear” which 
breeds “rancor” in African society.  The Pope’s concern echoes those of John Paul II 
about Ecclesia in Africa. For present purposes, the following sections seek to show, in a 
limited way, the direct outcome of superstition.  
The Need to Distinguish Valid Cultural and Religious Expressions from 
Superstitions in African Traditional Heritages 
 
Not every African person is superstitious even among tribes where this 
phenomenon is the hallmark of collective existence as in the case of voodoo practitioners. 
Put simply, superstition is not the norm of African traditional societies, although it 
features in certain tribes more prominently than in others.  Generally speaking, however, 
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even the least superstitious persons can harbor a measure of superstitious traits due to the 
general lack of a holistic philosophy of human nature.  Those who wallow in superstition 
do so simply because they do not know any better.  Others are cunning enough to make a 
living out of it. The effects of superstition are undeniably damaging with respect to the 
development of faith and reason. The negative effects of superstition are so many and as 
such, they cannot be covered in a study of this scope. What is important is that 
superstition must be recognized for what it is: a deep-seated anthropological malaise, 
because it directs the capacity to reason and to believe towards falsehood. In the end, a 
person’s intellect becomes so impaired that one can hardly recognize and abide by valid 
moral (or rational) truths.  It is from recognizing this malady that it can be possible to 
understand the extreme importance of developing a new anthropology with a focus on a 
transcendental anthropology (imago Dei). Understanding the root and nature of 
superstition is the key to drawing up effective pastoral strategies that can help individuals 
transcend their personal fears and insecurities that undermine their journeys toward 
authentic personhood. 
Early Christian missionaries in Africa did not know how to distinguish between 
valid cultural-religious expressions in their numerous forms from real superstition. To the 
early missionaries, everything African was superstition.  For present purposes, 
superstition cannot be truly grasped outside the framework of “faith and reason.” In the 
past as in the present, there were men and women in African societies endowed with the 
medicinal (herbal) healing. There were authentic and well reputed psychics and herbal 
medicine healers. There was nothing phony about these healers and, as such, their 
practices lie outside the category of superstition: those who deliberately camouflage as 
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authentic healers.  For while authentic healers construct and sustain life, the superstitious 
persons undermine its very essence.   
There are many levels of superstition.  In the following paragraphs the 
phenomenon of superstition is presented in two general categories; i.e., low level and 
high level superstition. The magicians, diviners, witch doctors, and those who put their 
wholehearted trust in what superstition can offer are true examples of high level 
superstition. They believe that success in life comes from some esoteric power that can 
be controlled and manipulated to one’s advantage.  There are also people whose basic life 
direction is not driven by superstition but, nonetheless, harbor elements of it. This last 
group often becomes victim of highly superstitious persons who exploit their fears and 
insecurities.  Low level superstition can be easily reversed as compared to their 
counterparts.  Low level superstition could be the result of external influences rather than 
the consequence of a dysfunctional intellect that eventually turns self-indulgent.   In the 
latter instance, a person is obsessed with the object of desire to the point of subduing 
reason.  For instance, a superstitious person sees a neighbor with a new car, and without 
contemplating what might have gone into its procurement, he or she not only begins to 
envy the neighbor, he or she also makes it a point to obtain one. If one does not go to 
sorcerers to seek the means of getting into quick fortune, one will resort to other equally 
devious means. The obsession to be like another person -without an attempt to consider 
that everything lies within the individual’s capacity, God’s plans, hard work, and often a 
favorable environment- opens the door to superstition and often pushes persons to the 
edge of foolhardiness.  People go to sorcerers hoping to get some supernatural powers by 
which others can be destroyed. This mindset is obviously inimical to personal and 
 311
collective development, to say nothing about the harm it does to the capacity to reason 
and believe.  In sum, diviners and witchdoctors are highly superstitious individuals who 
exert strong influence on those who are vulnerable. They often draw the undivided trust 
and commitment of the less superstitious.  
As previously noted, the primary cause of superstition is the absence of a sound 
philosophy of nature. Such knowledge or awareness would enable individuals and 
communities to understand the true meaning of experiences such as death,484 sickness, 
natural disasters, prosperity, and many more.  Confronted with the reality of not being 
able to change their situations, frustrations set in often leading to destructive envy and 
jealousy. In this state of mind, destroying those more successful becomes more believable 
than improving on one’s condition through emulating the other. “If I cannot get what you 
have, then you are better off dead so that there is no one around to remind me of my own 
limitations.”  Rather than commit oneself to hard work and creativity through active love, 
trust and hope in one’s own ability, the need for immediate gains becomes the order of 
the day. Under these circumstances, success consists in the desire to excel by not sharing 
knowledge.  This is a more aggressive expression of perverted reason. When intellectual 
perversion combines with the absence of real faith in God, persons are consumed by 
jealousy, which for the most part gains control of the person.  
The more serious effects of superstition were hidden in traditional societies for 
obvious reasons. In the past societies encouraged sharing life and good neighborliness. 
Moreover, life was less sophisticated owing to the little diversity in the means of 
livelihood. But with the onset of Western education with its inner impetus toward a 
measure of material independence, the effects of the suppressed intellection are easily 
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exposed in the forms discussed in Chapter II & III. Thus, it is in view of transforming this 
intellectual climate that a valid account of superstition has to take into consideration the 
fact of self-determination as treated in Chapter III.  This must be, because superstition is 
indicative of the ways in which two major principles of the intellect can be redirected 
toward the opposite direction.  Perversion of the intellect manifests itself in two different 
ways.  In one instance, the intellect can develop a false sense of confidence in the human 
capacity for attaining complete truths about reality. This is partly expressed in the endless 
spinning of ideologies that appear reasonable yet point to contrary moral paths of life and 
existence. This is the most subtle and elusive form of superstition but very damaging, 
nonetheless.  The sorcerers, diviners and magicians comprise this group.  
In brief, superstition is indicative of a regressive condition and, therefore, should 
not be limited to a belief in something other than God.  As rational capacities become 
increasingly dominated by a predominant orientation to the past or present only as the 
true reference points, a false thought pattern of trust, of belief, hope and love emerges to 
compensate for free thought that is always open to the future.  For the extremely 
superstitious persons, the mind creates an imaginary485 divine space or horizon as an 
independent reference point.  Persons “reformulate” questions about “being” around the 
self, or around natural objects like trees, animals, etc. These are then associated with 
divinity or transcendent realities.  And all the while, persons concerned truly believe in 
the validity of these experiences.  We shall take note of the effects of such a stance in the 
daily expression of one’s life.  
A highly superstitious individual does not only subject his or her self and all 
reality to an imaginary philosophical horizon, he or she also draws from such a horizon 
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new meaning by which he or she redefines the self. Self-redefinition means that such a 
one begins to define self apart from the tribal identity; the persona or self-image society 
has carved for one. One becomes a new person, a recognizable authority such as diviners. 
He or she begins to speak on the basis of new experiences that do not square with human 
reality but, nonetheless, sets him or her apart from the rest of the tribe. This new mode of 
existence is social alienation and spiritual alienation for the obvious reason that 
superstition makes claims on moral truth based on falsehood.  For example, a woman 
faced with infertility can be advised to poison a specific individual. Very often the target 
is someone vulnerable, wealthy or with great potential for abundant life. Now, any 
rational being can see that destroying human life is not a cure for anything.   
In sum, highly superstitious individuals existed and continue to exist in African 
societies.  They make up the majority of caricatured diviners, healers, sorcerers, 
magicians, visionaries and even the common masses.486 They exude a magical aura.  
Against the background of undifferentiated philosophy of nature, we can grasp the 
reasons persons with a low level superstition easily succumb to diviners and the like in 
times of need.  Immersed in poverty and other challenges, and possessing little 
knowledge of the eternal laws that govern nature, people easily become victims of the 
ingenious ones who exploit the situation to their advantage.  The highly superstitious 
individuals offer the prospect of magical solutions out of an experienced dilemma. But 
the more one makes falsehood the means and end of one’s life, the more one’s ability for 
independent thought and genuine reflection is impaired. Under such imaginary spheres of 
existence, the natural orientation of the intellect to valid knowledge or “truth” is hence 
subverted.  Based on the above analysis, one has to inquire whether superstitious minds 
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can really attain to genuine creativity as the lot of human nature. Does creativity not turn 
into a negative human drive?   Faith as a principle which reinforces and supplements 
rational capacity is replaced by fear. The result is a general lack of confidence in one’s 
innate capacity. This in turn undermines the natural ability to trust and hope in what one 
loves and believes in, and to imagine in order to create something new. The falsification 
of natural impulses makes people easily succumb to all forms of skepticism and violence. 
Persons become paralyzed by the fear to embrace the unknown. Christian faith can hardly 
mature in situations of fear.  Ultimately, superstition is a deadly form of egotism which 
chokes the human potential. 
It goes without saying that the subject of faith and reason is central in the effort to 
unravel the not-so-obvious realities underlying the material and the spiritual aspirations 
of African nations today. It is not enough to recognize the primary role of ancestry in any 
understanding of African ontologies.  All effort must be accompanied by a courageous 
commitment to grow in the understanding of the way in which the natural ability to 
reason, to believe, to trust, and to love is conditioned by consanguineous ontologies. 
Confining individuals within the natural or historical sphere gradually renders them 
incapable of entering fully into the Judeo-Christian world view whose purpose is to lead 
all persons toward their true identities and ultimate fulfillment. Christianity is capable of 
elevating the natural capacities for rational thought and reflection; for sound belief, trust, 
and love. A pastoral theology that ignores the reality of a superstitious mindset in today’s 
world is bound to fail miserably. With the preceding reflection on major obstacles to the 
proper development of faith and reason, this chapter arrives at the concluding section of 
this chapter. 
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SECTION VI 
CONCLUSION    
Lasting development, the rule of law, and peace in Africa are untenable without a 
general human ontology.  For that matter, contextual theology can no longer define a 
person in exclusively experiential terms of African communitarianism without regard to 
the ontological basis of a person vis-a-vis community.  The concept of community, be it 
nuclear or extended, is an ontological reality and therefore transcends experiential 
categories. Historical community, like a human being, is always a concrete and a not-yet 
finished reality. Human beings always aspire to a perfect community. Such a yearning 
must be in order not to turn temporary structural means into the ultimate ends.  At the 
same time and relevant to Africa, a communitarian view of a person does not override 
individuality, nor does the latter exist independently of the former. That a person is at 
once communitarian and a distinctive entity stems from the transcendent character of 
human nature as imago Dei.  Hence, contextualization ought to proceed with a clear and 
firm purpose of bringing individuality in dialectical relationship with communality. Once 
again a dialectical tension ensures that experience does not become the measure of 
anything validly human. To that end, tribes provide indispensable contexts for theological 
reflection tailored to inculturation 
The Tribe as an immediate Social Context for Theological Reflections 
Theological reflections on tribal cultures ought to be carried out in relation to the 
meaning of African Nation States today.  The reason is obvious: tribal mindsets ought to 
be properly aligned with the national interests that concern all. This must be so because 
the true end of contextualization is not a local theology for its own sake but a means 
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toward the transformation of peoples and their cultures with a view of cultivating a 
common social consciousness. Also, given the complex matrices of tribal philosophies 
and the values they propound, the first phase of Africa’s transformation ought to consist 
in enabling tribal communities to gain a deeper understanding of the implications of their 
total world views. It is only then that persons can come to grips with who they are in 
relation to other ethnic groups within and without Africa.  Obviously, it is for teleological 
reasons that theological reflection has to have the Judeo-Christian vision of humanity as 
the ultimate point of reference. It is also the criterion for establishing what is genuinely 
good in the diverse African cultures.  
Christian dialogue with individual tribes is a critical condition for inter-ethnic 
dialogue487 and peaceful co-existence among people from diverse cultural backgrounds.  
There can be no authentic contextual theology without dialogue with one’s own culture, 
and with all the cultures that any Christian encounters. Dialogue is not about making 
people feel good about themselves or their cultures, even as cultural affirmation is 
essential to the task. Rather, the purpose of dialogue or inculturation is to come to a 
deeper understanding of one’s own reality through truthful speech and receptive listening.  
Dialogue, therefore, commands an honest intent and the will to recognize all that is 
enduringly good and supportive of the true nature of the human spirit. What is good may 
be temporal or otherwise, provided all are ordered to the ongoing enrichment of human 
life.  In brief, the key factor in contextualization and inculturation is the need to formulate 
reasonable and effective pastoral strategies to help people relate their experiences/world 
view to Christianity and ultimately to the person of Jesus Christ.  Tribal cultures are, 
therefore indispensable loci in the development of a universal contextual theology suited 
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to the local Church in Africa. They must therefore the primary locus for social analysis 
and theological reflection. The following final consideration sums up the essence of the 
last statement.  
African Theology or Theologies?  Contextualization and inculturation as a Dynamic 
Interchange 
 
There is no doubt that the African local church needs a contextual theology of a 
global nature.  Basing ourselves on the content of this study as a whole, an African 
theology, in the singular, can hardly be termed Christian as long as there exists the 
cultural dynamic of turning one’s back to the future by focusing on past and localized 
experiences.  This dynamic has the power of suffocating philosophical inquiry488 and 
forestalling transformation at all levels. Hence, contextualization must be seen as the 
means toward a deeper appreciation and recovery of the person’s natural capacity for an 
on-going philosophical inquiry. This is the true spring board for human creativity and 
holistic development, personal and collective. This particular outlook gives form and 
direction to an African Christian theology. It means that the terminologies of African 
theology and theologies are both appropriate forms of envisioning the nature, content, and 
direction of contextual theological reflection in Africa.  Precisely, the need for intense 
and critical-ongoing reflection on the individual tribal world views is the basis for 
African theologies. These are important in the long term goal of formulating a more 
universal African theology.  That is, tribal contextual theologies are the constitutive basis 
for the development of an African theology.  The latter will be a product of integrating 
positive findings from the multitudes of African tribal cultures. In sum, the concept of 
African theology implies that a universal local theology befitting individual local 
churches in Africa is a consequence of gradual but sustained commitment to a critical 
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examination of tribal world views. African theology is, in other words, a point of 
integration -the outcome of localized theologies. Similarly, contextualization is a 
precondition for inculturation just as the latter would constantly open new horizons of 
meaning for re-examining the previous findings in the theological reflection processes. 
All in all, contextualization and inculturation comprise a dynamic interchange which 
must be sustained to guarantee a local theology the substance it needs to face new or 
emerging situations without ossifying.489  The interchange is a needed process for 
recovering a religious memory that forever seeks to unite the past, present, and future.  In 
that case, inculturation is neither a one-time event, nor is it simply a task that only 
involves translating the Christian message in the linguistic and customary expressions of 
native cultures as is frequently construed.  It is in essence an ongoing philosophical 
inquiry which forever acts as bridge between emergent but potentially alienating 
historical conditions. Seen this way, contextualization and inculturation are processes of 
incarnating the Spirit of the Gospel so that the Risen Christ can become the life force in 
the lives of African peoples.  In this way, persons can encounter Jesus in each other and 
in the social structures that mediate communal lives. Hence, in the early stages, 
inculturation acts as a bridge by connecting diverse tribal experiences in the lived hope of 
coming to a point when people can recognize and embrace a common ontology as the 
ground of true identity, individual and collective.   
A local theology is, however, at the service of the church from which it emerges 
to speak to the surrounding culture(s) and to which it returns to be rejuvenated or 
invigorated.  For this same reason, a local theology ought to embody a method that 
reflects an “image of the local Church” and which it seeks to actualize or make a reality 
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through inculturation.  In view of ecclesiological concerns, there are two important 
questions that must be answered.  First, what is the image of a local church which is 
appropriate to the present African situation in its cultural diversity vis-à-vis the Christian 
mission? This study proposes that the imagery of a gatherer is a fitting image of the 
Catholic Church of Africa. The image of gathering in turn raises a second question 
regarding the model of inculturation suitable to the African cultural situation. Since 
inculturation takes its character from the nature of the Church, the principles and 
guidelines related to the task of gathering are set in the framework of what it means to be 
a Catholic Church. These are interrelated concerns that must be treated together. This is 
the task of the final chapter which is at once a continuation of the present chapter and a 
conclusion to this study as a whole.  
 
CHAPTER V: THE CHURCH AS A GATHERING COMMUNITY 
INTRODUCTION: The Concept of “Church” in the Mission of a Local Church and 
in the Making of a local Theology 
 
The immediate goal of the previous chapters has been twofold: to present the 
African reality from the standpoint of the contemporary global situation and by so doing, 
to establish a  realistic philosophical framework in which to discuss issues that affect 
contextualization of the Christian message and inculturation. This is also the perspective 
from which to assess the real problems in Africa that the local Church aught to be looking 
at.  For almost six decades, African theology has expressed concern about Western 
domination in Africa.  But the same theology has generally tended to respond to the 
aforementioned problem in ways that instead embolden it.  Convinced of the 
soteriological integrity of African Traditional Religions, African theology generally tends 
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toward theological and ecclesial autonomy.  There is no doubt that such an approach to 
inculturation undercuts Gospel Mission. The search for autonomy is by nature a negation 
of Christian-cultural dialogue at all levels of the church’s life and of human life.490  The 
end result is a theological stance that is harmful to the Christian mission in the African 
Continent as a whole. It is, therefore, no small issue that the conclusion of this study 
should draw attention to the essential relationship of the local churches to the Universal 
Catholic Communion.  Only then can the efforts aimed at contextual theology come to a 
deeper and comprehensive understanding of the direction to be taken, now and in the 
future. There are basic reasons for this recommendation. 
 The basic tendency toward autonomy reinforces the domination of Africa by any 
emerging power player in the world.  For instance, European domination in Africa is 
significantly giving way to China and India as emerging global powers in social 
economic matters.  But while European domination was largely mitigated by Christian 
missionary activities, and from which Africa has benefited greatly, the growing influence 
of India and China is not likely to have the same outcome.  India and China mainly see 
Africa as the source of raw material and a market base for manufactured goods.  It is not 
far-fetched, then, to maintain that the reluctance to embrace self-scrutiny makes Africa 
forever vulnerable to random changes and influences from outside.  Over-reliance on 
external means of survival is indicative of a deeply seated cultural malaise.  Perennial 
political and economic underdevelopment subjects Africa to the whirlwind of un-ending 
social changes and the poverty this brings.  When socio-economic and political 
circumstances change in the West, for instance, Africa is simultaneously affected.  For 
this and many reasons presented in the previous chapters, the logical conclusion must be 
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that the existing developments in Africa are very superficial.  They do not emerge from 
the native potential latent in the diverse peoples of Africa or from genuine understanding 
of the Western social system which Africa has embraced.  Yet, it is only by tapping into 
one’s human potential that there can emerge an expedient culture capable of withstanding 
every wind of social change.  
The meeting points between the general reluctance to critique the traditional 
African world views, on one hand, and external domination on the other, is where this 
study has situated and discussed the causes of the existing cultural crisis in Africa.  The 
conclusion was reached that the limitations in the diverse African cultures forever serve 
as inroads for any kind of domination from within and from without.  Toward deepening 
this awareness, Chapter II not only pointed to the need to examine cultural hegemony 
from the standpoint of changed conditions in Africa and in the world as a whole, it also 
underscored the need to examine native anthropologies. These are the two angles from 
which one can properly comprehend the how and the why of the new forms of domination 
in Africa, past and present. Given these realities, this author felt justified in taking a 
different position from African theology.  Finally, the substance of Chapter III 
specifically forms the basis for understanding the organic relationship of the local to the 
universal Catholic Church.491  Precisely, the same (Christological) theological 
anthropological assumptions presented in Chapter III apply to the task of understanding 
the relationship of the local to the universal Church.  The present chapter has a more 
moderate purpose, namely; to offer a statement on the image or the self-understanding 
best suited to the local Catholic Church of Africa and its mission therein.  
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SECTION I 
 
 THE PRIMACY OF ECCLESIAL COMMUNION 
 
Pope Paul VI’s encyclical, Evangelii Nuntiandi, clearly indicates the pontiff’s 
deep concern regarding the theological tendencies that undermine the integrity of the 
Gospel and of the Universal Catholic Communion.492 The tendencies are characteristic of 
those that were discussed in Chapter I.  The Pope says, “If any individual Church, of its 
own volition cuts itself off from the Universal Church, it breaks its connection with 
God’s plan and its ecclesial status is impoverished.”493  Such conditions need not be a 
result of deliberate and conscious severance from the Universal Ecclesial Communion. 
Organic communion can be broken by the distortion of revealed truths or theological 
models rooted in something other than Christology. The result is the eventual loss of the 
“core theological and soteriological substance”, be it in theory or practice.494  
   The disregard for ontology at any one level of theological reflection can easily 
lead to either arbitrary or a fundamentalist biblical hermeneutic.495 Christian-cultural 
dialogue can disintegrate into some kind of ideology that passes for a contextual theology 
at the service of inculturation.  It is, therefore, important to realize that formulating a 
valid local ecclesiology is integral to contextualization and inculturation. Contextual 
theologians must examine, reflect on, and utilize cultural factors in a manner that allows 
particular churches to be truly local without losing the universality characteristic of a 
Catholic Church. This kind of theological orientation will not fail to recognize certain 
basic but general cultural elements which Christianity encounters in every social milieu. 
Since these were discussed in Chapter III, the remaining part of this conclusion will 
simply summarize what is meant here by an image of the church and some key 
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considerations that go into an understanding of a local church in Catholic theological 
thought. 
Towards a Living Communion of the local with the Universal Church 
 
Christological concerns in the local mission of the church and in the making of 
theology are incomplete without considering the image of the Church which is consonant 
with the biblical world view. There are two reasons behind the last statement: one 
Christological and the other arises from the “nature of culture.” The first reason centers 
on the fact that because all Catholic theology is grounded in Christology, the making of a 
local theology, the mission of a local church and the self-understanding (ecclesiology) of 
a local church form an inseparable triad. Inseparability implies that the concept of church 
always underlies and, therefore, accompanies any form of contextualization and 
missionary activities.  The second reason concerning the “nature of culture” takes us back 
to the reflections presented in the previous Chapters. African cultures, like all cultures, 
embody certain fundamental flaws.  Of particular concern to this study is the basic 
cultural orientation toward social fragmentation and political autonomy.  Hence, should 
the basic foundations of African tribal cultures be transposed into ecclesiology, the 
Catholic Church in Africa would imbibe the same dynamics of fragmentation and 
autonomy among the many ecclesial communities (dioceses) that make up the one local 
Catholic Church of Africa.496  It is toward staving off fragmentation in the self-
understanding of the African local church that a working image or model of the Church 
becomes truly imperative.  
Therefore, contextual methodology must put the Catholic Church’s self-
understanding at the forefront of theological reflection and inculturation. The Catholic 
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theological tradition contains many images or models grounded in Scripture, all of which 
speak to the totality of the church’s self-understanding and how it ought to exist among 
different cultures through the passing ages. The models include, but not limited to; the 
Church as a mystery, a sacrament of salvation, the body of Christ, and so on.  These and 
all other traditional images particularly indicate the relationship between the church’s self 
understanding (its nature) and its mission in the world.  It is thus safe to conclude that 
contextual theologians can use one or more of these images to articulate the experience of 
being a particular local Church, or it may come up with a suitable image for the same 
purpose.497  Either way, the choice of any model ought to accomplish two things: it must 
speak to, as well as express pastoral realities in the local church without detracting from 
the Universal Catholic Communion.  There are, of course, many realities; however, one 
that remains normative is the relationship of a particular local church to the universal 
Catholic Church.  This understanding has practical implications. 
Given the argument in this study that particular churches are mostly marked by 
cultural self-understandings as discussed in Chapter III, the following conclusion has to 
be drawn. All local churches exist in the state of “being truly Catholic” and “becoming 
fully Catholic” both in faith and in practice.  The degree of authentic catholicity depends 
on the extent to which the Spirit of Christ is incarnate in the faith and life of the believing 
community. The scope of cultural diversity in the Church is extensive and complex. We 
saw in Chapter II, for instance, that the situation of cultural diversity in Africa is 
expressive of exclusion rather than inclusion. Chapter III sought to provide some insights 
toward resolving this dynamic of exclusion.  By showing the essential relationship 
between philosophical anthropologies and theological anthropology, this study affirms 
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the foundational significance of Jesus Christ for Catholic theology and mission among 
diverse cultural contexts -local and global.  It also became clear in the same Chapter that 
the subject of Christological foundations is ultimately bound up with the redeeming and 
the unifying role of Jesus Christ for the entire human race. This, in many ways, 
underscores the point made earlier that particular churches, of which Africa is part, are in 
the state of “becoming” fully Catholic. Such a state does not make any particular local 
Church any less Catholic than another.  It simply means that catholicity is both a reality 
and a dynamic state of “becoming” with a basic orientation to the future with God. But 
because local churches are concrete realities, the condition of “becoming” imposes 
responsibility upon all particular local Catholic Churches not to succumb to false 
contentment.  Rather, they must always be disposed to seek continuous transformation as 
the essence of Gospel Mission.  In this way, the Catholic Church can truly become and 
reflect its essential nature as a Universal Communion in the diversity of expressions.  On 
the contrary, when a local church exists only in name, when the self-understanding of a 
local church is not properly attuned to the basic orientation of Catholic theology and 
mission, the evangelical effectiveness of the universal church is weakened. The quality 
and extent of communion with the universal church are also weakened.  In a nutshell, 
finding an appropriate working model for a local church is an extremely important 
practical consideration for a contextual theology at the service of inculturation.  At the 
same time, in order that such a model is not selected in isolation from existential realities, 
both in the church and the world, the following subsection incorporates certain key 
realities already pointed out in the previous chapters.  
 
 326
Why a Working Image or Model of the Church? 
An effective model ought to add clarity to pastoral discernment in view of 
contextualization and inculturation. Although this is a statement of principle, the primary 
aim is not to provide a detailed account of how any pastoral scheme should evolve. 
Rather, the purpose is to point out practical considerations that go into the selection of a 
working model for a particular local church.  Since Chapters I-III more or less treated 
specific practical concerns in the African ecclesial milieu, the present objective is more 
general. That is, an image of the Church that can speak effectively and comprehensively 
to the African local church must take into account the continent’s dire need to foster 
mutual dialogue at many levels of existence.  For, if the purpose of the church’s universal 
mission is to bring all people into a living communion that extends to the future with 
God, then, fostering co-existence among cultures in which the local church is situated is 
essential to contextual theology and inculturation.    
As presented in Chapter III, co-existence within the church and among diverse 
cultures is not possible without a transcendent anthropological horizon. This horizon is 
necessary for “[finding] a new orientation for the church, the world, and mankind,” wrote 
Pope Benedict XVI, by then, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger.498   The theological, 
missiological, and ecclesiological basis for the church is also clearly expressed by Pope 
Benedict XVI in his intent to lay the foundation for a fundamental theology.  Writing 
about the “formal principles of Catholicism,” the Pope puts primacy on “Scripture and 
tradition.”499 At the same time, he points to “anthropology” as the legitimate foundation 
of the concept of tradition.”500  The following citation concisely spells out the extreme 
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significance of relating well the human and the ecclesiological elements in theological 
reflection.  He says: 
For a long time now, we have no longer been able to 
distinguish…between those problems that pertain to the Church and those 
that pertain to mankind.  Although there are, of course, questions that are 
specifically Christian and specifically ecclesial, they must, nevertheless, 
always be seen in the human perspective.  Should the Church ignore this 
fact, she would fail to recognize the central principle on which she is 
founded, by which she is ordered to universality, that is, to the service of 
man, of the humanity of man.501 
 
Note that Pope Benedict XVI points out that the universal mission of the Church is not 
compact and abstract such that it is concerned about people in a general and ambiguous 
way. The Church is at the service “of the humanity of man.” In other words, the Church’s 
universal mission is directed to the different levels of a person’s being and existence-
historical and transcendent.502 This involves the corporeal, the moral, and the spiritual 
aspects of any person.  
It follows that the self-understanding of the African local Church ought to derive 
from a theological anthropological vision of which some basic aspects were articulated in 
III.  The vision calls African Catholicism to exist in dialogue with everything good and 
human--everything truly life-giving.  In sum, the current position demands critical 
evaluation of what is foreign but good, from that which is not.  In this case, dialogue 
presupposes that the primary intent of theology is to discover the universal truths, even in 
those realities that appear opposed to one another.  This kind of dialogue is ultimately a 
dynamic process of making sense of the historical experiences of humanity and seeking 
to reconcile them according to the universal (transcendent anthropological) “principles.” 
One can hardly envision a common vision of humanity that is not rooted in a general 
ontology.  Only in the latter context can dialogue be rightly perceived as a necessary 
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means for fostering a better quality of moral and spiritual life and for creating justice, a 
condition of co-existence among all peoples. In light of this analysis, a fitting model of 
the local church should be able to speak to the human as well as the material aspects of 
the local and the global histories of humankind.  It is another way of saying that an 
ecclesial model ought to lead a particular church out of preoccupation with itself.  A 
working church model accomplishes this by providing a formal structure of meaning that 
sets a local church toward genuine and fuller communion with the Universal Catholic 
Church and otherwise. The very notion of a Universal Catholic Church presupposes a 
certain understanding of history. It is an understanding which must impact the self-
understanding of a local church in relationship to the Universal Communion.  It should be 
noted, in passing, that an authentic ecclesial model helps to connect particular human 
histories with the universal human history in a way that helps people to relate their faith 
experience and aspirations with the rest of the Catholic Church.  For the same reason, 
contextual theology, inculturation and the self-understanding of a local church must 
thrive on the concept of history which is in tune with Gospel mission. This is a very rich 
topic and has been treated by many prominent theologians and others.503  Consequently, 
the following section in no way explores in depth important dimensions that go into a 
valid concept of history or its hermeneutical implications for a Christian theology.  The 
goal is more limited to pointing out the place of history in the making of contextual 
theology and in the task of inculturation. 
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SECTION II  
 
THE CONCEPT OF HISTORY AND ITS PLACE IN THE MAKING OF A 
CONTEXTUAL THEOLOGY  
 
Thus, a certain concept of history is necessary for a legitimate and fruitful 
application of theological foundations in the making of a contextual theology and in the 
task of inculturation.  But since the notion history in the church is experienced and 
conceived at two levels, the particular and the universal, which of these constitutes the 
interpretive framework for theological reflection?  With respect to contextual theology, 
does a concept of history derive from a general ontology504 or ethnological experience?   
We shall begin by observing that just as a particular self-understanding influences 
the development of native anthropologies, the same holds true in the experience and 
conception of history among native cultures. That is, because the notion of history is 
immediately identified with the collective tribal experiences, for instance, these 
experiences are likely to affect the ways in which a local church conceives its relationship 
with the universal church.  This experience as it relates to African theology was discussed 
at length in Chapters I and III and, therefore, need not be repeated here.  It thus suffices 
to point out here the essential relationship of the particular and universal history in the 
making of a local theology, especially the self-understanding of a local church.   
On one hand, if race, tribe, or ethnicity is made the ultimate frame of reference for 
a human ontology, then, it equally follows that the concept of history is more likely than 
not to be subsumed into the finite horizon of particular experiences of history.505 
Similarly, it becomes difficult to even contemplate that certain valid human values or 
structures of meaning transcend particular historical experiences.506 Instead, transcendent 
meanings not only take on the limitations of particular experiences, they are also viewed 
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in ultimate terms by the group concerned.  On the other hand, to post ontology as the 
basis for understanding history implies that the universal rather than particular cultural 
experiences provide the context for theological reflection at the local and the universal 
levels of church life.  This is also the pathway to which biblical faith points by means of 
theological anthropological method.  
Rather than indulge in mere abstract ontological discussions, the Judeo-Christian 
world view situates ontology and anthropology in the concrete context of human origin 
and existence (Gen.1).  Because this context comprises of a common origin, a common 
human nature, a common human history, and a common destiny, it is rightly termed 
salvation history.  The latter is, therefore, the basis for positing a universal concept of 
history for theological reflection and for inculturation.  Precisely, the experience of what 
it means to be human is always impacted by the above (italicized) structures of meaning.  
And although the same structures translate into the specificity of racial and ethnic 
identities, the latter do not constitute the ultimate frame of reference for a truly 
theological concept of history.507  For, if ontological discussions are limited to race and 
ethnicity, one has to inquire as to whether the concept of history the latter engenders is 
also not limited to particular experiences.  Whether or not discussions on human ontology 
can be open-ended depends on the response to the last inquiry.  In brief, Catholic 
theology of mission can be freed from a dehumanized particularity by situating 
theological reflection in the context of a general ontology or salvation history. This 
ecclesiological and missionary trajectory is evident in the Second Vatican II documents. 
Thus, situating theological reflections in the context of salvation history allows the 
church to speak in terms of the human race in general. The church is also able to appeal 
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to the universal structures of meanings and frameworks within its own world view, so as 
to speak to the whole humanity without reducing human nature to the historically limited 
realm of experience, i.e., race or ethnic origin. This is one of the biggest temptations 
among contextual theologians in general. For each of these factors (humanity, history, 
and destiny) contain a deeper meaning that points beyond itself. So how do we arrive at 
these conclusions?  
To underscore the importance of ontological referents in the perception of history, 
this chapter has to reiterate what was stated in Chapter IV on the subject of inter-racial 
and inter-ethnic dialogue. 508  It was emphasized that the historical experiences of culture 
impact diverse self-understanding and eventual perception of what it means to be human.  
It is here where ontological consideration necessarily ought to lead any local church 
outside the bounds of particular history. Once the human being takes center stage, 
everything else becomes relative, including collective tribal histories. It is also in light of 
historical transcendence that any fruitful dialogue between Africa and the West can 
ensue, for instance.  The conclusion, then, must be that even though valid truths about 
human existence acquire an aura of particularity, truths are realities that bind and 
transcend historical particularities.  It is here that we ought to discern in Christian 
scriptures or the tradition of the church imperative structures of meaning with which to 
explicate a concept of history that transcends racial and ethnic histories.  Without rooting 
a concept of history in a transcendent ontology (salvation history), contextual theology 
can be easily mired in the cloud of endless confusion.  
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History as Salvation History is the Proper Context for Theology and Mission 
 
Formally conceived, epistemology (metaphysics) lies within the speculative ambit 
of reason.  But because theology seeks to account for the definitive origin and end of 
created reality, theology is the end to which epistemology tends.  For this same reason, 
epistemology is not simply a theoretical speculation without specific purpose and focus, 
but a study concerned with meaning and, therefore, real issues affecting real people.  
Thus any body of human knowledge has impact on people’s lives, for better or for worse.  
It is not enough, then, to have good epistemological assumptions or theories concerning 
reality. Knowledge is valid when it is able to say something meaningful to the human 
condition within the context of the universal history.  The following statements are a 
summary of the sphere of knowledge in which history has to be defined.  Considerations 
regarding the meaning of history are as vital as any of the basic concerns in Catholic 
theology. There are theological and practical reasons which intertwine here as we attempt 
to provide a concise explanation of salvation history.   
Contextual theologies are constantly involved in the task of articulating the 
“traditional”509 experiences of peoples who are always marked by particular histories.  It 
goes without saying that the church’s mission transverses particular histories.  For this 
same reason, a local church ought to work with a concept of history that affirms 
particular histories at the same time opening them to an understanding of human history 
as salvation history. Such a task does not simply consist in a linear movement of the mind 
from a particular to a religious understanding of history.  Rather, interpretation of 
particular histories ought to be explained in the context of biblical revelation.  History has 
to be viewed as salvation history. This historical consciousness is evident in the Second 
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Vatican Council teaching on the development of culture.  In seeking to expound Catholic 
theology of mission, Vatican II linked closely the meaning of “person,” “history,” and 
“salvation” in ways that enable us to be critical about non-biblical assumptions about the 
same.  In the theology of Lumen Gentium, no.13, for instance, the essential mission of the 
Catholic Church is to unite all people into one human family.  “…though there are many 
nations there is but one People of God, which takes its citizens from every race, making 
them citizens of a kingdom which is of a heavenly rather than an earthly nature.” The 
same paragraph also notes that “the Church or People of God in establishing that 
kingdom takes nothing away from the temporal welfare of any people.”  In other words, 
organic communion within the church does not detract from the human responsibility for 
self-direction and self-determination. However, because the church is concerned with 
ultimate realities, represented in the evangelical teaching and liturgical life, the same 
paragraphs also underscore the fact that maintaining organic unity among “particular 
churches” is impossible without central leadership in the church.510 In light of the 
immediate objective, all these pronouncements in Lumen Gentium, must have salvation 
history as their interpretive context. 
   Salvation history is the interpretive context for presenting a notion of history that 
speaks meaningfully to all diverse cultural civilizations.  It also forms the background for 
conciliar theology as a whole.  It is thus impossible for the Judeo-Christian tradition to 
speak concretely about the meaning of a “person” without reference to the idea of Imago-
Dei.  Nor can we comprehend the true meaning and nature of the church’s abiding 
mission to the nations without a clear theology of Imago-Dei.  Created by God, human 
beings share one common history and destiny. It is thus right to conclude that an 
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appropriate sense of historical unity is essential for the peaceful flow of global human 
history.  Hence, by teaching that human salvation is worked out within earthly realities, 
the Second Vatican Council linked the human being, culture, and history.  The stated link 
is not simply essential to a healthy evolution of global history: the church’s mission can 
hardly progress without it.511  Pope Paul VI put it clearly, “[t]he kingdom which the 
Gospel proclaims is lived by men who are profoundly linked to culture, and the building 
up of the kingdom cannot avoid borrowing the elements of human…cultures.”512  In 
fulfilling its missions, the church borrows concepts and tangible cultural expressions 
from cultures to proclaim the Gospel message.  Basic language patterns are indispensable 
vehicles for preserving and for the coherent transmission of a Christian world view. 
Chapter II barely treated the pros and cons of a globalized history.  But in light of Pope 
Paul VI’s teaching and of the present concern, globalization confounds the already 
limited concept of history vis-à-vis salvation history, as much as it endangers the 
church’s mission. Felix Wilfred lends insight into how this is enacted. 
He says, 
Implicit in the philosophy and practice of globalization is the assumption that it is 
a movement towards unity of the whole human family.  It claims to represent the 
infallible future historical trajectory of humankind, its ultimate unity and 
universality.  Even more, with the supposed triumph of capitalism, the drive force 
behind globalization, ‘The end of History and the Last Man’ are being 
proclaimed. But we know that there is a deep contradiction between such claims 
and the actuality.  The greatest harm globalization does is to delude us with the 
make believe pseudo-unity and universality of humankind. 513 
 
Needless to say, globalization is being accompanied with the emptying of language 
patterns of their original coherent meaning.  The result is the eventual collapse of basic 
moral content and a systematic riding of linguistic traditional patterns of meanings that 
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were once the vehicle for transmitting the Gospel truth.  Christianity’s power and genius 
to impart coherence to the flow and direction of human history is thereby rendered 
difficult. These are partly the reasons why historical unity ought to comprise an essential 
aspect of contextual theology and inculturation because a concept of history has a place 
in the making of human civilization.  Above all, it is a necessary step toward an 
appreciation that all peoples share a common origin, history and destiny. In sum, it is 
with this background understanding that the following model of the Church is proposed 
for the African reality. This being the case, this model speaks to the expressed realities 
within a local church and beyond. 
SECTION III 
 
THE CHURCH AS A GATHERING COMMUNITY 
The concept of the Catholic Church as a gathering community has deep biblical 
premises. The aim of this section is not to discuss the church’s theological underpinnings. 
In fact, Lumen Gentium, no. 13 lays down the biblical assumptions behind the image of 
the church as a gathering community.  It thus suffices to say that this image speaks well 
to biblical faith as the most viable solution to a Continent whose people are divided on 
account of diverse genetic formulae and historical traditions.  The image, as proposed, 
does not replace those that the Catholic Church has put forward to denote its self-
understanding in the course of history. A close look at each of those images, however, 
shows that each of them is contained within the aspect of gathering.  For example, the 
Church as body of Christ or a mystery expresses the same doctrinal realities found in 
Lumen Gentium, no. 13 and elsewhere.  It has to be presumed, on this basis, that each 
traditional image expresses different dimensions of the church’s missionary activity of 
gathering peoples and creation into one.514 One way the Church does this is through the 
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Eucharistic with its specific genetic formula, i.e., the one Jesus inherited from the Jewish 
People and turned it into a spiritual food and bonding principle for the ‘People of God.’ 
Therefore, since Christian faith and life presupposes the involvement of God in the 
world, the image of gathering particularly lends itself well to God’s active presence, 
especially as experienced through the life of the church (Jn. 17: 21).    
We have also seen, particularly in Chapter II, that African communal 
configurations are more basically oriented toward fragmentation and alienation than 
toward unity in diversity.  It is precisely due to this basic obstacle to integration at the 
different levels of existence that we can appreciate the proposal that the local church in 
Africa is less suited to a self-understanding that takes after consanguineous structures of 
meaning such as a clan.  This is not to suggest that the Judeo-Christian world view is 
opposed to the value of natural descent.  Consanguinity is not an absolute biblical moral 
imperative such that it can constitute an absolute basis of social order and working 
concept of history. The moral value of consanguinity is dependent on the other 
hierarchies of meaning in the overall Christian world view. That the fragmentary nature 
of the African tribal worldviews stand in need of basic rehabilitation requires no further 
persuasive argument.  The Catholic Church is capable of bringing Africa to authentic 
unity without doing damage to the good values which are inherent in diverse tribal 
cultures. But change cannot be realized without explicit willingness and determination on 
the part of Africa to re-orient the cultural direction of the Continent.  Only a contextual 
theology that has the transformation of people and their culture as its subject matter and 
object stands the chance of playing a valid role in the church’s missionary task of 
gathering the goods of humanity and their diverse histories into a single history.  Having 
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said that, however, a question ought to be raised at this point: does the mere fact of 
having a model such as the one proposed here have any impact on the pastoral realities of 
fashioning a local theology or inculturation?   
The response to the question has to go back to Chapters III and IV.  A brief 
explanation is needed as to how the model of the Church as gathering community 
translates into appropriate theological methodology.  A model is the tool with which the 
church reflects and implements its pastoral findings. It is also the tool with which all 
things are gathered into one.  The model, then, as proposed, is the most effective way by 
which to describe the essential relationship between different local missions in the One 
Catholic Church.  In the case of Africa, the image facilitates an understanding of how the 
African local Church is theologically and pastorally linked to the Universal Ecclesial 
Communion.  Such understanding is not an end in itself.  The notion of gathering ought 
to lead to a theological methodology capable of giving full and valid expression to the 
nature of the Church, its theology, and mission.  Chapter III enunciated such a 
methodology in terms of theological anthropology or transcendent anthropology.  That is, 
by putting “a human being” at the center of a theological methodology, Chapter III 
“pointed toward” the moral criterion and basic principle by which the church gathers 
everything into one.  On the basis of this fundamental principle, ecclesial models must be 
reflected in theological methodologies for a local theology and for inculturation.  This 
structural arrangement in methodology guarantees the integrity of the church’s nature and 
mission in human history. Otherwise, the lack of harmony between contextual theology, 
inculturation, and the self-understanding of the local church spells conflict in the basic 
direction of the church’s mission.  That the stated conflict constitutes the main problem in 
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African theology was a matter discussed at length in the previous Chapters.  The 
following summaries only briefly clarify what it means to say an ecclesiological model 
ought to say something about theological methodologies. But this means that we have to 
establish a link between the present concerns with the theme of Christological 
foundations. 
Ecclesiological Implications for a Theological Model  
 
The notions of “gathering” and of “history” ought to be linked to that of 
theological foundations to appreciate the necessity to uphold ecclesial integrity in the 
tasks of contextualization and inculturation.  As pointed out in the previous chapters, 
theological foundations set the basic direction of theology at all levels of church life and 
structures.  It is on the same account that this study sustains the argument that ancestral 
foundations or models impede the possibility of opening up native cultures to the 
unifying function and saving power of the Gospel. It is, therefore, urgent that the Catholic 
church of Africa be clear about the fundamental distinction between Christology and 
ancestrology. The distinction is necessary in order not to collapse the saving mission of 
Jesus Christ, of salvation history into cultural enterprises or agenda.  Such an instance 
would imply that the mission of the Catholic Church is to merge with existing cultures 
according to their philosophical modes of operation.  Under such ecclesial conditions, 
theological methodology would merely consist in a synthesis such as the one proposed by 
Benezet Bujo and others, in Chapter I.  But that the synthesis he proposes leads to a 
complete theological and ecclesial autonomy was also treated in the previous chapters.  
Thus, the following summary of Avery Dulles’ insights casts light on the subject of a 
theological model most suited to the self-understanding of the Catholic Church in the 
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world today.  His basic concerns lend themselves well to the image of the church as a 
gathering community and the need to link this with a theological methodology. We shall 
begin with a passing review of the main theme in Chapter I. 
The Basic Problem with Benezet Bujo’s Synthesis Model 
Avery Dulles has mainly delved into specific challenges which inculturation 
poses to catholicity; i.e., the nature of the Church, mission, and theology.515 His particular 
work cited here clarifies the inseparable relationship between ecclesiology, mission, and 
local theologies.  Dulles rightly maintains that in order for the aforementioned elements 
to hold together in a fruitful way, the choice of a theological model matters.  He 
exemplifies his position by discussing, at some length, three main models often used by 
inculturationists. They include an autonomist, a synthesis, and a transformationist model 
of inculturation.  Dulles underscores a transformation model as the one which is 
consistent with the Second Vatican Council theology of the church and its mission in the 
world today. But before recommending a transformation model, he first brings out the 
limitations inherent in the theological models often used by contextual theologians. The 
following concluding statements more or less follow Dulles’ pattern of thought to show 
that a synthesis proposed by Benezet Bujo is, in essence, an autonomist model.  The 
Christological reasons are already provided in the previous chapters and in the preceding 
sections of this chapter.   
Dulles’ overall thought is that, although inculturation is at the service of particular 
local churches, the latter are not meant to exist in opposition to universality as the norm 
and basic direction of catholicity.  Therefore, and as a corrective, he draws attention to 
the essential relationship between the ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council and 
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inculturation.  Accordingly, the nature and objective of Vatican Council II ecclesiology is 
bound up with inculturation.  Inculturationists have, however, not yet been able to relate 
the two in the spirit of Vatican Council II theology of the Church and its mission in the 
world.  This theology tends toward the transformation of peoples and their cultures.  
Dulles ascribes the above-mentioned theological impasse to certain brands of 
transcendental theologies, of which he cites Bernard Lonergan, whose philosophical and 
theological position in this regard has given a particularly autonomist slant to 
inculturationists.516    
Lonergan, according to Dulles, “rejects, a normative view of culture, [because] he 
identifies it as classicist view [in favor of an empirical concept of culture].”517  By 
implication, Lonergan rejects a general (ontological) concept of culture as a basis for 
understanding diverse cultures.  In sum, if Lonergan’s overall position is followed to its 
logical end, it negates the intent by the Vatican Council II to arrive at a normative view of 
culture, as a necessary step in the self-understanding of the Catholic Church today.518  For 
by imparting equal importance to every cultural tradition, Lonergan is obviously working 
outside a common ontology as the absolute philosophical basis for comprehending 
humanity and its cultural experiences.519 Lonergan consequently envisioned the future of 
dialogue as being grounded in the universal experience of “divine love…which is “not 
dependent on the prior preaching of the gospel.”520  Divine love is accessible to all, the 
argument goes.  Contextual theologians often use this frame of reference to attribute 
relative evangelical significance to the Gospel.  Hindu theologians have, according to 
Dulles, taken Lonergan’s position to raise the argument that, “Jesus is not the only one, 
albeit the most important, of many epiphanies of Christ.”521  Consequently, the traditions 
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of native peoples are seen, “at least in an analogous way, as an Old Testament, pointing 
to Christ as much as the Hebrew Bible did for the early Christians.”522  Indigenous 
peoples need not convert to Christianity, because it “has assumed Western cultural 
norms.”523 All cultures come closer to God through their own religions.  In brief, given 
the basic theological assumptions from which a synthesis and an autonomist models 
proceed, Dulles is right in raising the following questions.  “[U]nder what conditions can 
the church appropriate a particular human culture without impairing its fidelity to Christ 
and the gospel?”524  Since this particular question has been the particular focus of the 
previous chapters, the following citations from Dulles only serve the purpose of 
underscoring the ongoing but wide spread significance of Catholic theology and mission.  
This author is in complete agreement with Avery Dulles in arguing that 
Lonergan’s transcendental theology is being used to justify cultural and theological 
relativism.525 Notably, while inculturationists are right in perceiving that faith, love, 
reason and justice are transcendent principles and, as such, essential to the transformative 
character of Christianity, Dulles is more theologically and methodologically accurate in 
pointing out the following. “The source and center [of Christianity] is not some abstract 
metaphysical principle or virtue but a concrete universal, Jesus of Nazareth.  Christianity, 
as a historical religion, cannot escape from what has been called the scandal of 
particularity.”526 So what does Dulles propose as a corrective to the current 
misapplication of the Second Vatican Council theology of the church and its mission?  
The following paragraphs outline some key aspects of Dulles’ main arguments which tie 
in with the main position of this study.  
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 Dulles’ argument is thoroughly compelling. The Catholic Church has a purpose, 
which must correspond with its self-understanding and manner of being in the world. 
Rooted in the Judeo-Christian worldview as a dynamic movement toward the unity of all 
peoples, the post Vatican II Catholicism is an “emerging World Church.”527  Its nature 
and missionary character basically tend to unity in faith and diversity in cultural 
expressions. Given this missionary landscape, Dulles rightly examines how “multiple 
inculturations in the face of divergent models of inculturation…can benefit the universal 
Church.”528  The right response lies in aligning native anthropologies with Christology.  
Thus Dulles is accurate in pointing out that “there are qualitative differences among 
cultures.”529 In light of the church’s mission, the conclusion has to be made that 
Christology and transcendent anthropology is the most fundamental principle by which 
Catholic theology can “[discriminate] among cultures in light of their harmony or lack of 
harmony with the divinely established order.”530  Chapter III strived to clarify important 
aspects of this critical point.  It suffices to say with Dulles that, although Christianity has 
an essential relationship to all culture, it cannot be equated with the latter. In all these, 
Dulles is trying to show the limitations of models of inculturation that sees no difference 
between Jesus Christ and the rest of humanity.  The Church would end up being no 
different from any secular society.  
 An autonomist model does not lead to a transformation as the essence and goal of 
the Christian mission. Instead, it creates deep alienation among local churches and 
diverse cultures.531  It asserts and widens differences instead of establishing a common 
framework in which historically crafted differences can be resolved.  The model also 
closes up avenues for dialogue, positive criticism, and mutual enrichment.  It views 
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Christianity as a mere stimulant for indigenous religious impulses.532 Dulles is thus right 
in concluding that an autonomist model leads to the “[loss] of the church’s capacity to 
bring Jews and gentiles into a single people.”533  The question is how this “loss” is 
expressed by a synthesis model.  
 A synthesis model, according to Dulles, “holds that Christianity must embody 
itself in appropriate cultural forms.”534 There is nothing immediately wrong with this 
position, granted that the official Catholic Church teaching holds this to be the case.  
However, general statements of this kind not only ought to be weighed against an 
anthropological model, but also that the latter must accommodate a valid concept of 
church and of history.  Hence, because a synthesis model is premised on the basic 
assumption that, “Culture is regarded as good in its own order and as perfective of the 
human,”535 it undercuts the very essence of catholicity.  The uniquely Christian meanings 
and symbols become bound up with specific cultures.  A synthesis identifies the actual 
dynamic of human transformation with culture, as in the case of ancestrology-based 
synthesis.  Seen this way, the only viable strategy on the part of inculturation is to 
conserve most, if not, all things deemed valuable by particular cultures.536  It follows that 
cultures are to “[provide] Christianity with a suitable base for the Gospel.”537 The 
possibility of any culture being transformed by Christianity does not, therefore, arise.  
After all cultures already embody the essence of the Christian transformative dynamism 
and, as such, are oriented toward the same end.  It is on these accounts that Dulles rightly 
refutes an autonomist and a synthesis model. In their place he reasserts a transformation 
model as the one intended and, therefore, in character with the Second Vatican Council 
theology of the Church and mission. Let it be clear that the theoretical basis for 
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inculturation as transformation, which Dulles points to, is already established in Chapter 
III. It is, nonetheless, important that we mention his argument because it opens up 
practical dimensions which are important to the task of inculturation.  
 Transformation, according to Dulles, has to be understood in terms of reciprocity.  
The latter term has to be grasped against the background of theological anthropological 
discussions provided in Chapter III.  In light of that, Dulles clearly makes practical 
observations which enable us to see that reciprocity holds particularity and Universal 
Ecclesial Communion in a right balance. First and foremost, he strongly and clearly 
argues that, “When the Bible, dogmas, sacraments and ecclesial structures are branded as 
culture bound, the sources of continuity and communion in the universal church are 
weakened.”538 As a corrective to autonomous tendencies, transformation as reciprocity 
means that a local theology has the moral obligation to “[discriminate] among cultures in 
light of their harmony or lack of harmony with the divinely established order.”539 This 
has to be because Christianity offers criteria by which we can recognize that “there is 
qualitative difference among cultures.”540  It is then that we can validly speak of mutual 
enrichment among cultures, and between the latter and Christianity.   
In sum, Catholic contextual theologies have the obligation to link Christology, 
ecclesiology, and native anthropologies in a meaningful way.  A pure synthesis is in 
conflict with transformation as the missionary character of the Gospel and, therefore, of 
the church’s mission in the world.  Dulles does not see conflict simply as departing from 
the Gospel or missionary imperatives of Vatican II theology. Rather, the models in 
question reflect a distorted perception of the historical revelation for the meaning of the 
church and its universal mission situated in human history.  The proponents of 
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unwholesome models, according to Dulles, “lack a clear understanding of where the 
transformative power of Christianity comes from.” With that, we come to the final 
conclusion of this study. 
V. THE CONCLUSION 
 The changes ushered into Africa through Western missionary and political 
influence require a critical appraisal of the many existing cultural traditions in the entire 
history of Africa. This task demands free and decisive action on the part of the Catholic 
Church of Africa.  Either African Catholicism spearheads the process of human and 
cultural transformation to which the Continent is being invited by Divine Providence or 
abandon this in favor of the ethnocentric worldviews.  On the contrary, that latter choice 
works against the new modes of aspirations and behavior and the emerging patterns of 
social life in Africa. However, the new modes of behavior are evolving alongside an 
unfaltering will to stay rooted in the ancestral philosophical mold.  But can ecclesia in 
Africa continue to thrive on the simple assumption that it is possible to embrace the new 
changes and at the same time maintain traditional anthropologies and ontologies intact?  
The cultural and human crises already unfolding in Africa are bound to shatter the 
previously held beliefs with a certain ferocity.  The socio-economic and political 
dynamics in the world have changed to the point where Africa is confronted with two 
clear choices: to embrace radical transformation in the traditional philosophies and 
become a viable partner in the emerging historical processes, or to cling uncritically to all 
traditional values and consequently condemn the helpless masses to a condition of 
despair.  Ironically, the synthesis and the autonomist models favored by ancestral 
theologians do just that!  But ought things to remain that way?  There is a way out of the 
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current situation and it is offered by the Second Vatican Council teaching on the mission 
of the church in the modern world. 
Hence, if African theologians truly seek to make Christianity relevant to Africa, 
the methods of proceeding must relate church teaching to the concrete historical realities 
therein.  The preference for the pre-colonial social context only helps to distance the tasks 
of theological reflections and inculturation from the church’s mission in general. It is not 
only the African social setting that has changed over the years; people’s aspirations and 
needs are changing daily in favor of external values. These new situations are largely a 
result of Western missionary and cultural influences.  It is not farfetched, then, to 
conclude that the peoples of Africa, in their diversity, recognize the new conditions and 
aspirations as a welcome change.  Today, Black Africa show signs of wanting to know 
and live by the Christian Gospel.  They also see the need for socioeconomic and political 
changes and the benefits directly associated with them. These and many other changes 
should be helping the African local church to recognize the potential as well as the 
limitations of the tribal world views. But in doing so, theological reflection cannot 
proceed blindly, remaining content in theological abstractions.  It is here where this study 
can particularly offer some, albeit, limited insight into what needs to be done, especially 
what to make of the rich theological heritage of the Second Vatican Council and many 
sound theological writings in Catholic theology.  
 
                                                 
END NOTES 
 
1 It is very important that we understand from the outset the basic distinction between the following 
phraseologies, because contextual theologies tend to use them synonymously. From a human and a 
Christian theological standpoint, there is a philosophical distinction between “valid cultural experience” 
and “valid cultural values.”  Valid cultural experiences denote the inherent ability in every human being to 
create culture. It affirms the universality of a common human nature.  Valid cultural values, on the other 
hand, have to do with the transcendent truths contained in a culture and are at the service of people.  Both 
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economic self-interest.  But its not all negative – as the global economic giant bulges, opportunities also 
arise for Africa. China’s increased presence in Africa is part of a wider effort to ‘create a paradigm of 
globalisation that favours China’ [1]. In the past China’s African presence benefited from a shared history 
as an  object of European imperialism and its ideological commitment to anti-imperialism and national 
liberation. China’s declared principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal 
affairs appealed not only as a contrast with the suspect motives of former colonial powers, but for less 
elevated reasons to rulers threatened with internal dissent. But more recently China’s policy has shifted 
from Cold War ideology to a more classical pursuit of economic self-interest in the form of access to raw 
materials, markets and spheres of influence through investment, trade and military assistance - to the point 
where China can be suspected of pursuing the goals of any classical imperialist.” This article accessed at 
Pambazuka news, through editor@pambazuka.org. 
  
478 In reference to Chapter I, Section IV on “A Legend of the Reactionary Approach to Contextual 
Theology.” 
 
479 The statement was made by Dianne Bergant, a renowned biblical scholar at a seminar organized by the 
Franciscan Sisters of Peace, which I attended in July, 2007.  
 
480 With traditional cultural symbols in stiff competition with their Western cultural counter parts, many 
Africans experience a crisis of identity.  The individuals find themselves pulled between the symbols of 
modern Western forms of identity and the tribal ones. The degree and intensity of this crisis differs from 
tribe to tribe, depending on the extent to which ethnocentrism nurtured egoism.  While in the past some 
tribes aimed at taming egoistic life-styles, others appear to have encouraged the building of self-esteem 
through relentless competition that forever seeks self-esteem in the accumulation of material goods, and by 
the latter becoming the measure of personal worth.  In a situation of poverty, a relentless search for identity 
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is visible in many forms, the most obvious being invasive behavior and a reckless pursuit of monetary gains 
within and without one’s country. These are growing realities and cannot be simply ignored for the sake of 
preserving obsolete traditions. 
 
481 Perhaps no African Christian theologian exemplifies this inclination better than Benezet Bujo.  Review 
Chapter I: The Hermeneutic for Translating the Gospel into Cultural Categories 
 
482 Church in Central Africa @Zenit.org (Koenigstein, Germany: September 25, 2007), 1.  
 
483 Benedict XVI, “Prophetic Signs of a Humanity Freed from Rancor and Fear” (Vatican City, January 27, 
2006), 1. 
 
484 One of the greatest merits of African cultures is the spirituality of mourning the dead and dealing with 
suffering.  It is probable that if Africa adopts contemporary Western attitude to suffering, it would be a 
worse disaster than what is going on in other sectors of life. This is one those many important aspects of 
life that the contemporary West needs to learn from Africa. A strong aversion to any form of suffering 
breeds the inability to face the reality of death.  Psychotic illnesses that can emerge from this condition are 
innumerable. 
 
485 It ought to be clear that a person who is transformed by a superstitious world view does not necessarily 
think that his experience is the sheer outcome of delusional thought. This kind of person is also different 
from one who consciously adopts superstitious practices for material gains so that people can come to him 
or her to seek for advice. This second group simply exploits the masses. 
 
486 It is important to Catholic faith in Africa that any claims about the existence of traditional healers 
outside medicinal healers have to be examined in the light of an authentic Catholic theology of grace. 
Naturally, the theology of grace lies in the wider context of the Redemption in Christ. 
 
487 While respective tribal members are crucial to the process of theological discernment, especially in the 
interpretation of concepts and specific customs, non-tribal remembers are equally important. Because tribal 
cultures forever exist by asserting their superiority, the likelihood of reflecting on the impact of tribal 
attitudes and actions on others is alien to Africa. It is therefore the non-tribal members who must, with 
charity, bring their observations to a dialogue forum. In other words, inter-cultural dialogue is extremely 
important for pinpointing the cultural blind spots, however uncomfortable this may be. Besides, it is 
through inter-ethnic dialogue that tribes can recognize the need for mutual exchange of ideas. This is 
extremely important, since it is taken for granted that ancestry guaranteed homogeneous development of 
moral values. The opposite seems to be the case. Tribal cultures developed moral values in varying degrees. 
In some in instances, if not many, it is possible to find that certain tribes are totally lacking in certain moral 
values than others.   
 
488 For details on the importance of philosophical inquiry refer to John Paul II’s Encyclical, Fides et Ratio. 
 
489 This is well addressed by John Paul II, Catechesi Tradendae (16 October, 1979),  no. 17. His entire 
encyclical, Fides et Ratio also deals with the need for continued progress in self-understanding. It 
presupposes that such cannot be without a felt need for constant revision of cultural beliefs and values. 
 
490 Refer to Chapters I-III on this topic. 
 
491  See Avery Dulles, S. J., The Reshaping of Catholicism: Current Challenges in the Theology of the 
Church (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988), 37. 
 
492 There is an interesting “Essay” written by Avery Dulles, S.J., which “Addresses the Question of 
Universal and Particular Churches.”  Its main topic reads as: Cardinal Dulles Weighs in on Ratzinger-
Kasper Debate. http://Zenit.org/English.  Dulles’ aligns his position with that of Pope Benedict XVI, then, 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, who rightly maintained that the universal Church ontologically precedes 
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particular Churches. The profundity of Pope Benedict XVI’s theological vision is well articulated in the 
context of ecumenical dialogue.  An important theme that is crucial to an authentic Christian theology 
pervades most, if not all, of Pope Benedict XVI’s theological works. He believes, and rightly so, that the 
foundational significance of scripture for theology does not exempt from ontological discussions.  By 
implication, ontology underlies every biblical assumption.  An instance of this is reflected under the title: 
“Exchange of Letters between Metropolitan Damaskinos and Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger,” p. 217-241.  See 
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion, Henry Tailor, trans. 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002).    
 
493 Pope Paul VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi (Evngelization in the Modern World) in Vatican Council II: More 
post Conciliar Documents, Vol. 2, Austin Flannery, O.P, ed. Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1996) no. 
62. 
 
494 Review Chapter III, on the relationship between Christology and theological anthropology.  This 
contains basic underlying systems of closely interconnected meanings that form the foundations for 
bringing the gospel message into a cultural milieu. They offer the standard by which the local Church can 
reformulate its self-understanding beyond the traditional heritages. 
 
495  See Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental 
Theology, Sister Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D., trans. (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1987).   
 
496 On the role of the Pope see, for instance, Cardinal Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: The Church 
as Communion.  The Catholic Church contains a political element ordered to centering different ecclesial 
communities around the See of Peter. This political aspect of the Church is dynamic in the sense that it is 
expressible in the many local churches that “make up” the one local Church.  The notion of “make up” 
must be read with an understanding found in Benedict XVI’s work cited above.  In this work he makes a 
sound argument that the Catholic Church is not a product of particular communions-did not come about as 
a result of the amalgamation of many Churches.  For the Pope, universality and communion are rooted in 
specific metaphysical assumptions.  Obviously, the Pope’s position is very different from the one expressed 
by the German Lutheran theologian, Jurgen Moltmann. He says, “The “Church” with its structures, 
organizations, and powers exists exclusively for the sake of the congregation.  There is in the “Church” 
nothing higher than the congregation. All ministries of the “Church” are related to the congregation and are 
put to the test by the mature congregation. From its side, the congregation is mature to the degree that it no 
longer experiences itself as being taken care of ecclesiastically and tended to by ordained officials but 
rather becomes the independent, responsible subjects of its own history with God. Only then can Christian 
freedom be experienced in the congregation….See the back cover of his book: The Open Church: 
Invitation to a Messianic Life-style Church (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978). 
 
497 It ought to be clear that whether or not one or more of the traditional images of the church is consciously 
selected for the use of a local theology, all comprise an intrinsic component of any Catholic ecclesiology.   
 
498  See Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental 
Theology, 85. 
 
499 Ibid. 
 
500 Ibid. 
 
501 Ibid., 85-6. 
 
502 The Pope gives a profound discussion of these aspects in the same work, under the subtopic, “Tradition 
and Humanity,” 86-94. 
 
503 To cite but two more examples, see Pope Benedict XVI as Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in 
St. Bonaventure, Zachary Hayes O.F.M., trans. (Chicago, Illinois: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971).  
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Although many of the major points the Pope talks about in this book are well defined in the Principles of 
Catholic Theology cited above, the former is very important in understanding the development of the 
Pope’s ideas of the importance of history. One could rightly term Benedict XVI’s treatment of history as a 
systematic theology and philosophy of history.  Another important writer is a German historian and 
philosopher, Eric Voegelin, Israel and Revelation: An Interdisciplinary Debate and Anthology, William M. 
Thompson and David L. Morse, eds. (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2000).  This is 
also an outstanding piece of work on the role of “Revelation in Israel” in the understanding and emergence 
of contemporary human history.  These and many other authentic thinkers are essential for a notion of 
history which must accompany contemporary Catholic theological thought.  But the Pope’s treatises of 
history are particularly critical in discerning the specific principles for the development of a fundamental 
Catholic theology.   
 
504 Because Biblical revelation springs from God as the source of all being, it must follow that that there 
can be no concept of history without reference to a general ontology.  Contemporary Catholic systematic 
theology cannot avoid the subject of history without doing itself a disservice.  Pope Benedict provides a 
very insightful discussion on the extreme significance of history in the understanding of tradition. Taking 
Scripture and tradition as theological principles for Catholic theology, he develops this extremely important 
subject in direct relations to the meaning of history for a Catholic theology. See also the work of a 
Protestant theologian, Wolfhart Pannenberg. Basic Questions in Theology: Collected Essays, vol. I, George 
H. Kehm, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970). Wolfhart also presents a compelling view of history that 
resonates with the current concerns of the present study.  
 
505 This assumption does not disregard the fact that revelation in Israel also falls under “particular 
experience.”  However, the difference between revelation in Israel and general revelation in cultures lies in 
a correct understanding of salvation history in relationship to Jesus Christ. This is the basis for pursuing a 
specific understanding of history when it comes to a Christian theology that is Catholic.  See Joseph 
Cardinal Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 85ff.   
 
506 An immediate example has to do with an attitude common in the contextual theological circles.  It 
claims that if one does not have immediate knowledge of a particular culture, such a one cannot understand 
a contextual theology that arises from that culture, let alone comment on the contents of that theology.  
There is an alternative view. If a contextual theology is grounded in the one Christian message of salvation, 
then it is also possible that those who believe in that message can comprehend contextual theologies 
developed in other cultural contexts other than one’s own.  
 
507 For example, although the ethnic, racial identity and history of Israel is essential to the understanding of 
salvation history, it is not that which gives substance to meaning of history as salvation history. Rather, 
biblical Israel understood that it is God’s initiative to reveal Himself to Israel that gives substance to history 
as salvation history and to Israel’s racial history. In this way, Israel experience of history is normative for 
human history. 
 
508 I borrow this phraseology from Mary Beth Ingham, CSJ, on John Duns Scotus cited in the subsequent 
chapters where its meaning is already clarified. Otherwise see The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and 
Moral Living According to John Duns Scotus (Quincy, Illinois: The Franciscan Press, 1996). 
 
509 I use the term tradition in the sense that Pope Benedict XVI used in his work already cited above, i.e., 
Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology. Refer to this book for an in 
depth reading of this terminology as it relates to the mission of the Church. What Pope Benedict says here 
can easily be translated into specific principles for fashioning a local theology. 
 
510 Marianne Lorraine Trouve, FSP, ed.,The Sixteen Documents of Vatican II (Boston: Pauline Books and 
Media, 1999). 
 
 378
                                                                                                                                                 
511 The notion of history is changing in a world that is becoming increasingly globalized.  Chapter II, 
Section II indicated that globalization is imparting new meaning to the understanding of history and 
consequently to the way in which societies structure different forms of existence and international 
relationships.  The phenomenon presents itself as a new interpretive framework for a concept of human 
history.  Although there are many areas still to be explored beyond what this study has accomplished, it 
suffices to recognize one serious obstacle to contextualization and inculturation (i.e., what it means to be a 
local Catholic Church). The notion of history informed by globalizing phenomena contains many forces 
with great potential to impede the ability of any local church to gather all things into one.  The potential 
obstacles do not detract from the concept of any church as a gathering community. 
 
512 Pope Paul VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi,  n. 20. 
 
513 Concilium: Globalization and Its Victims, Jon Sobrino and Felix Wilfred, eds. (London: SCM Press, 
2001), 35.  The author concurs with Etienne Perrot, who also gives an accurate appraisal of the changes 
being ushered in by globalization.  He largely maintains that “economic development will no longer be 
under the control of nation-states.  The availability and flow of goods from industrialized nations lead to 
the disregard of less versatile good in recipient countries.  The most visible effects of the social disorder 
produced by economic globalization are the growth of economic insecurity and the precarious nature of 
employment, both of which are linked to the instability of the markets.  All this is bound up with a disparity 
in revenues.  These phenomena are the consequence of the selectivity of the markets and lead to a decline 
of the economic value of unskilled labour and an increase in the value of skilled labour. The corollary is a 
displacement of economic power.” Etienne Perrot, “The General Dimension of Globalization and Its 
Critics: The Ambiguities of Globalization” in Concilium: Globalization and Its Victims,18.  All in all, the 
available means of producing and disseminating goods in the globalizing context take priority over basic 
human values.  This is a point at which one ought to locate the nature of the unholy marriage between 
contemporary social theory and globalization.  They both embody and enforce the “economic principle” as 
the most fundamental drive behind “development.”  They put in force the internal mechanisms that have 
the power of leveling the cultural landscapes of global nations. They simultaneously cultivate and inculcate 
a narrow view of the concept of development.  What matters most in contemporary social theory and in the 
globalization drive is the economic aspect of human life and the most efficient means of realizing it.   
 
514 Let it also be clear that the process of gathering is not limited to people, but to everything humanly 
good, within and outside African cultures.  One such important item in modern African history is the 
Western social system.  The Christological interpretive framework for “gathering” that which is of ultimate 
value in the Western social system is already provided in Chapter III & IV.  
 
515 In this particular aspect of Dulles’ discussions, he is applying a “typology”, which H. Richard Niebuhr 
put forward for working through the challenges posed to Catholicity by inculturation.  The typology is 
presented in form of four models, of which I have omitted a “confrontation model,” because as Dulles 
mentioned, it has not found valid use in Catholic theology.  See Avery Dulles, S. J., The Reshaping of 
Catholicism: Current Challenges in the Theology of the Church, 38.  
 
516 Although Dulles cites specific examples from Ecclesia in Asia, the content of discussion is applicable to 
all cultural regions in which the Church finds itself.  It is with this understanding that these concluding 
summaries ought to be read.   
 
517Ibid., 42.  
 
518 This statement ought to be read in light of the material covered in Chapters II & III.   
 
519 Avery Dulles, S. J. The Reshaping of Catholicism: Current Challenges in the Theology of the Church, 
42. 
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520 Ibid. Note that Bernard Lonergan’s assumption is that, since divine love is open to all, it is experienced 
with the same quality, degree and intensity.  Needless to say, Lonergan’s position ignores the fact that 
personal disposition to the divine and social circumstances have a direct bearing on the experience of 
divine love, for better or for worse.   
 
521 Ibid., 43. 
 
522 Ibid.  
 
523 Ibid. 
 
524Ibid., 37.  
 
525 Ibid., 42-43. 
 
526Ibid., 43. 
 
527 Ibid.  
 
528 Ibid, 42. 
 
529 Ibid., 44. 
530 Ibid.  
 
531 Ibid., 43. 
 
532 Ibid., 44. 
 
533 Ibid., 45. 
 
534 Ibid., 39-40. 
 
535 Ibid., 38. 
 
536 These statements should, in no way, be interpreted as a negation of a synthesis model.  The latter has its 
place in the Christian cultural encounter as indicated in certain documents from official teaching.  John 
Paul II is cited by Avery Dulles to have made the following official statement regarding the value of a 
synthesis model for the Christian mission.  Quote: “The synthesis between faith and culture is not only a 
demand of culture but also of faith…A faith that does not become culture is a faith not fully received, not 
entirely pondered, not faithfully lived.” Ibid., 40.  Understood this way, a synthesis, properly conceived, 
enables Christian faith to become “a way of life” for any cultural group. In other words, a valid synthesis 
should be ordered to making biblical faith become a culture of any people. 
 
537 Ibid. 
 
538 Ibid., 43. 
 
539 Ibid., 44.  
 
540 Ibid. 
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